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The purpose of this thesis is to examine the extent to which China has stabilized its 
communist regime and defended or pursued its crucial nationalist interests while 
maintaining a relatively peaceful environment in East Asia. This research question is 
relatively new and important because many analysts assumed that only through 
changing these two identities, can China achieve its peace rise.  
 
By innovatively combining Social Identity Theory’s (SIT) recategorization strategy 
and its emphasis on the actor’s rational choice, and using the Chinese Communist 
Party’s (CCP) United Front Strategy as an example of SIT, this thesis deduces 
principles of what I call as China’s strategic management of identities and interests. 
By doing so, this thesis also makes several theoretical contributions to the literature. 
First, this combination is a new approach to analyze the puzzle that contrary to some 
pessimistic classical, neo-classical and offensive realists’ expectation, China has not 
faced a hard-balancing coalition in East Asia although it is consolidating communist 
regime and sovereignty claims. Second, this thesis also makes contribution SIT’s 
application in international relations (IR) because IR scholars using SIT often 
underplay the theory’s emphasis on the actor’s rational choice and did not use 
recategorization to examine how Sino-US competition can be ameliorated.  
 
This thesis argues that by forming shared identities/interests with relevant actors and 
downplaying conflicting ones, China has to a certain degree maintained a relatively 
benign environment without seriously destabilizing its communist regime and 
damaging crucial nationalist interests. However, this strategy also has limitations. 
First, the shared identities/interests approach often fails because CCP is unwilling to 
loosening political control or concede important nationalist interests. Second, China’s 
strategy of pursing crucial interests in a restrained way to downplay conflicting identity 
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Chapter 1 Introduction. 
 
In the past decades, China has developed rapidly and impressively, transforming 
itself from a poor and backward country to the world’s second-largest economy. It 
has also managed to quickly develop its military. While successive Chinese leaders 
are at pains to reassure the rest of the world that China’s rise will be peaceful and 
beneficial to all (Jiang, 1999, cited in China News, 1999; Hu, 2007, cited in China 
Daily, 2007; CCTV News, 2018), many scholars and elites outside China are 
concerned about frictions that stem from China’s rise (Roy, 2013, pp.2-3; Holslag, 
2015, p.16; Campbell and Ratner, 2018, p.61).  
 
Among their concerns are two focal points bound by China’s communist and 
nationalist identities, which have drawn a lot of scholarly attention, including by many 
realists who use them as important variables to explain or predict China’s actions 
(Roy, 2013, p.14; Holslag, 2015). The first point is the friction between the rising 
communist China and the US-championed liberal internationalism. This includes 
irreconcilable values between democratic and non-democratic countries, democratic 
countries’ inherent mistrust towards non-democratic countries, and rising 
authoritarian China’s challenge to the liberal order (Friedberg, 2011; Boyle, 2016, 
p.37; Mounk and Foa, 2018, pp.30-31). Ideological frictions often heat up when liberal 
democratic countries criticize China for illiberal behaviors but China views the 
criticism as unfair treatments. For instance, in 2019, the then US Secretary of State 
Mike Pompeo claimed that China was “in a league of its own when it comes to human 
rights violation”, a remark China perceived as being full of “ideological prejudice” 
(Martina and Blanchard, 2019). Moreover, many analysts and politicians in the US 
view ideological competition between communist China and liberal democracy as 
zero-sum (Weiss, 2019, p.92; Swanson, 2019). Meanwhile, the Chinese Communist 
Party [CCP] suspects that liberal democratic countries, especially the US, are aiming 




in Hong Kong (HK) against the law allowing extradition to mainland China as popular 
opposition but as a plot by the US to destabilize the mainland’s central authority 
(Reuters, 2019).  
 
The Second focal point is that China’s nationalist identity is the “potent driver” for its 
increasingly hardline regional policies (Ratner, 2013, Zhao, 2013, p.545, Schweller, 
2018, p.35), which raise geopolitical tension in East Asia. These muscular policies 
include China’s irredentist actions of consolidating its sovereign claim over perceived 
lost territories in the region, such as land features in the South China Sea [SCS] 
(Buszynski, 2012, p.140, Amer, 2014, p.17, Ba and Kuik, 2018, p.346). Also, China’s 
strategic expansion in East Asia, which aims to break the perceived US-led island 
chain encirclement on China’s rise, causes frictions and intensifies Sino-US strategic 
competition in the region. Some scholars and elites outside China criticized these 
actions for the destabilization in the region (Lee, 2014, Lim et al, 2017, p.189).  
 
China’s communist and nationalist identities seem to conflict with its peaceful rise 
rhetoric because they are major sources of ideological and East Asian geopolitical 
frictions. Indeed, many scholars and politicians argue or indicate that as long as the 
two identities remain, China’s rise will not be peaceful (Friedberg, 2011; Campbell 
and Ratner, 2018, p.61; Pence, 2018). The thesis wishes to square the circle by 
raising the question: Can China rise peacefully in East Asia without substantially 




This question is under-developed in the existing literature, which has assumed that 
China’s communist and nationalist identities are irreconcilable with its peaceful rise. 
For many optimists, China can realize a peaceful rise by transforming its identities or 
conforming to the norms of the existing orders. Earlier works by optimists often 




identities and related illiberal or threatening behaviors can be transformed into 
socially acceptable ones in the international community (Johnston, 2008; Qin and 
Wei, 2008; Campbell and Ratner, 2018, p.61). This optimistic belief is one of the 
major reasons that have underpinned the US and East Asian countries’ decades-
long China engagement policy (Border, 1997; Pence, 2018). Through engagement, 
the US wishes that China could become more politically democratic and open (The 
Economist, 2018) and many East Asian countries hope China could transform its 
coercive actions into cooperative behaviors (Acharya, 2005, p.133; Ba and Kuik, 
2018, p.241). Other optimists has tried to prove that China is more of a status quo 
power, norm taker, or responsible stakeholder than a revisionist power (Johnston, 
2003; Chin and Thakur 2010; Etzioni, 2011, p.549). By proving that China is a status 
quo power, the belief that the country can be socialized is strengthened.  
 
However, the arguments of optimists are flawed because it has been proven that the 
two identities can hardly be transformed. China’s regime has remained authoritarian 
despite the US’ engagement. Moreover, although China has actively participated in 
regional institutions led by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN], the 
country has never given up on nationalist goals, which many East Asian states view 
as threatening. To name a few, in 1985, China has set up a naval strategy of near 
sea defense to increase its naval presence and deterrent capability in the first island 
chain (Liu, 2004, p.437). It has since incrementally developed its military power 
according to the strategy. Since China first declared it would become a maritime great 
power in 2012, it has substantially strengthened its navy, which has begun to patrol 
in the second island chain (Yang and Yang, 2019). Thus, scholars who view China 
as a status quo power often underestimate the country’s assertiveness in the past, 
which Johnston (2013, p.7) convincingly demonstrated in his seminal work.  
 
In recent years, many optimists have become frustrated, as China’s two identities 
remain unchanged amid the continuous rise of its power. For instance, Campbell and 




sense of its ability to determine China’s course” because China has neither become 
democratic, nor refrained from pursuing strategic goals in the region. Likewise, John 
Pomfret (2018) argued that “engagement with China is failing”. Moreover, in 2018, 
then US Vice-President, Mike Pence (2018) strongly criticized an illiberal and 
aggressive China that violates US-upheld liberal norms and challenges US strategic 
interests despite US engagement.  
 
Moreover, it seems that pessimists have dominated the once-heated debate over 
whether China is a status quo or revisionist power in recent years. They mainly view 
China as a revisionist power that challenges the interests of many regional countries 
and US domination in East Asia (Goldstein, 2007, p.640; Christensen, 2015, p.2). An 
increasing number of analysts has viewed China’s military actions in East Asia as 
threatening, assertive, and anti-status quo (Swaine, 2010, p.1; Friedberg, 2018; Roy, 
2019, p.52). Many analysts or western politicians also view the US and China as 
strategic competitors (Allison, 2017, p. xvii; Zhou, 2019, p.2).  
 
The frustration of optimists and domination of pessimists make this thesis question 
new and increasingly important. As noted earlier, many optimists have countered the 
arguments made by pessimists. They assumed that China’s communist and 
nationalist identities and related illiberal or threatening actions can be changed 
through an engagement policy (Johnston, 2008; Campbell and Ratner, 2018, p.61), 
or that China is more of a status quo power than revisionist power (Johnston, 2003; 
Etzioni, 2011, p549). However, even in their open letter calling for continuing 
engagement with China, many scholars do not believe that changing the two 
identities is possible in the near future (Fravel et al, 2019). They propose engagement 
for constraining China’s revisionist actions, not for changing China’s identities (Fravel 
et al, 2019). As a result, the argument that China can be changed or is a status quo 
power does not fully support optimism in China’s peaceful rise and counter the 
pessimists’ argument that China is a revisionist power in East Asia. Thus, the next 




China rise by preserving its communist identity and pursuing nationalist interests 
while maintaining peace in the East Asia?  
 
This thesis focuses on East Asia, which is the hard case of China’s peaceful rise as 
many scholars argue that the great power competition between the US and China 
will most likely occur in this region (Friedberg, 2011; Christensen, 2015, p.2). 
Moreover, Because the US is the leading power in East Asia and promotes liberal 
values, China’s rise in East Asia does not free itself from the pressure of political 
liberalization.  
 
Currently, in English language literature, there is a growing number of publications 
discussing the US standpoint and talking about how to secure the hegemon’s 
interests in the US-China competition (Allison, 2017, p.221-231, Friedberg, 2018, 
p.39-51, Leung and Depp, 2019, Erickson, 2019). However, Publications that are 
based on China’s standpoint and that examine how illiberal and nationalist China 
copes with the challenges of the hegemon are still lacking.  
 
This main thesis question also remains underexplored in Chinese literature. Some 
Chinese scholars noted that the emergence of China-US strategic competition, but 
they not analyze how the former copes with the latter. Wang and Hu (2019) argued 
that China and the US will probably become “long-term strategic rivals”, but they did 
not mention how China will handle the rivalry. Likewise, Yang (2020, p.34) argues 
that the Sino-US competition will intensify if the US seriously violates China’s core 
interests, such as Taiwan. Thus, Yang (2020, p.34) believes that the next critical 
issue Chinese scholars must analyze is China’s strategy to cope with the competition.  
 
Other Chinese scholars noted the ways in which China could handle the competition. 
Liu (2011) argues that China needs to provide regional countries with security 
protection to win their support. However, many of them seek the US’s security 




in East Asian context because China cannot provide the security protection that some 
regional states may use to balance against China. Moreover, others have provided 
more general suggestions. Sun (2018, pp.36-38) argues that to assuage strategic 
pressure from the US, China should prevent formation of a rivalry bloc, deepen 
cooperation with strategic partners and prevent ASEAN from choosing a side. While 
somewhat similar to some of the arguments made in this thesis, Sun (2018) did not 
discuss his suggestions in details. Gao (2018, p.25) generally argues that China 
should face up to Sino-US competition and focus on increasing influence in East Asia.  
 
 
Contribution to the literature 
 
As noted, this thesis question can China peacefully rise in East Asia without changing 
the two identities? is a relatively new and important in the current context of 
international relations (IR). Moreover, China’s standpoint on the matter is 
underexplored in Western and Chinese literature. This thesis, thus, fills this gap by 
making initial progress in this regard. Besides this contribution, it makes several 




As will be demonstrated by Chapter 2, regarding China’s rise in the region, many 
optimistic defensive realists, liberal institutionalists, and constructivists 
underestimate the importance of nationalist and communist identities to China and 
their influence on the country’s goals and actions. Thus, defensive realist Glaser 
(2015) argued that mainland China only focuses on its control over Taiwan. However, 
China has gradually expanded its military presence in the East China sea (ECS) and 
SCS mainly due to Chinese nationalist’s goal of deterring possible foreign 
intervention coming from the sea (Liu, 2004). Liberal institutionalist Ikenberry (2008, 




countries’ pressure and have to accept liberal norms. However, CCP has fortified its 
control over other systems and society of China, especially since the Chinese 
President Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, demonstrating CCP’s unwillingness to 
soften political control. Constructivists’ socialization argument also did not consider 
the significant psychological costs that the socializee will suffer in the socialization 
process (Johnston, 2008). Some pessimistic offensive, classical or neo-classical 
realists argue that China’s communist identity and nationalist actions in the region 
will lead to a hard-balancing coalition against China, thereby increasing the possibility 
of conflicts between China and established powers (Goldstein, 2007, p.641). Hard-
balancing means a strategy among “states engaging in intense rivalry” and that states 
confronts opponents by engaging in arms race, forming formal military alliance (Paul, 
2019, p.22, Han and Paul, 2020, p.3) and giving up any attempt to construct 
partnerships or shared interests with the opponents (Kuik, 2013, p.5). However, 
contrary to their expectation, thus far, China does not face a hard-balancing coalition 
while consolidating its communist identity and nationalist claims. Because neither of 
these aspects of the existing literature is satisfactory, a new approach to 
understanding China’s relationship with the region and the US is necessary.  
 
This thesis argues that the social identity theory (SIT) opens up the possibility of 
tackling the puzzle that China’s communist identity and nationalist actions do not 
necessarily lead to a hard balancing coalition against China. Specifically, the thesis 
uses SIT’s recategorization strategy and its emphasis on the actor’s rational choice 
to tackle this puzzle. The recategorization strategy refers to attempts that increase 
“the number of categories which simultaneously define a target…to reduce ingroup-
outgroup differentiation” (Prati, et al, 2021, p. 50). One of recategorization strategies 
is the construction of the cross-cutting identities/interests of actors. That is, while an 
actor has identities/interests that conflict with others on some dimensions, it also 
shares identities/ interests with others on other dimensions (Hogg, 2016, p.8). For 
instance, China and Vietnam share economic interests and communist identity while 




strategy postulates that shared identity/interests offset distrusts and negative effects 
derived from competing ones. SIT’s emphasis on the rational choice of the actor tells 
us that although China cannot abandon its communist and nationalist identities due 
to their importance on China’s self-image, it can manage consequences caused by 
actions derived from these identities. For instance, China could pursue crucial 
nationalist interests in a restrained manner to avoid overt escalation. Also, an actor 
can rationally pursue interests defined by the identities, such as adjusting 
recategorization strategies (Saguy, et al, 2008, p.433). Thus, in terms of the 
principles, a relatively peaceful environment may be maintained if China could form 
and increase the salience of shared identities and interests, as well as pursue or 
defend interests derived from identities that conflict with those of others in a 
restrained manner.  
 
Salience here means “the identity that came into play in a specific situation” (Pondent, 
2017). Forming or increasing the salience of shared identities and interests means 
making other countries prioritize the shared identities and interests over conflicting 
ones when managing relationships with China. Also, in this thesis, making the 
conflicting identities or interests less salient to others means controlling the identities 
related actions to prevent other countries from prioritizing the conflicting 
identities/interests over the shared ones. Also, this thesis uses phrases, such as 
downplaying conflicting identities, interests, frictions, or competition, similar to 
making the identities less salient to others.  
 
Moreover, it is worth noting that forming shared identities in SIT is somewhat different 
from the constructivists’ concept collective identity. The threshold of forming a shared 
identity in SIT is much lower than that for constructing constructivists’ collective 
identity. According to some constructivists, forming a collective identity is hard 
because “interdependence”, “common fate”, and “homogeneity” are only variables 
that can lead to formation of collective identity (Adler and Barnett, 1998, p.50-51; 




shared dominant beliefs, values, and expectation about the future (Alder and Barnett, 
1998, p.54). In contrast, in SIT, a sense of ingroup/shared identity can be formed by 
just randomly assigning people into two distinctive groups, which is named as “the 
minimal group paradigm” (Hogg and Abrams, 1988, p. 48; Brown, 2000, p.36). 
Common fate, interdependence or shared interests enhance ingroup cohesion 
(Brown, 2000, pp.36-37).  
 
By applying SIT’s recategorization and emphasis on the actor’s rational choice to 
China’s relationship with other actors, this thesis also contributes to the application 
of SIT in IR. The current dominant SIT framework in IR established by Larson (2015) 
focuses on social mobility (abandoning the disadvantageous or lower status social 
identity to get socially approved ones), social creativity (changing the negative traits 
into positive ones, or finding another dimension/group for comparison), and social 
competition (reversing the current status relationship) (Tajfel and Turner, 2001, p103; 
Larson, 2015). However, SIT, as it is currently used in IR, falsely regards ‘social 
creativity as a viable strategy to avoid competition between China and the US (Gries, 
2005, Larson, 2015). As Chapter 4 demonstrates, there are limits to the applicability 
of the “social creativity” strategy. I argue that combining SIT’s emphasis on the actor’s 
rational choice with recategorization strategy, which is currently underused in IR, 
provides crucial insight for analyzing how a communist and nationalistic China can 
possibly prevent a US-led hard-balancing coalition in a competition scenario. 
Moreover, SIT has not been used to analyze the regional flashpoints, which I do in 
the latter part of the thesis. 
 
Also, the current dominant SIT framework ignores or downplays the importance of 
the actor’s rational choice even if the social psychology’s version of SIT puts equal 
emphasis on the actor’s rational choice as its identity (Gries, 2005; Larson, 2015). 
Unlike the scholars that separate SIT from the rationalism (Gries, 2005; Lee, 2016), 
this thesis argues that SIT is an eclectic approach that combines some principles of 




“with fixed preferences and identities, who rationally adjust their beliefs and strategies 
in response to the information they receive and the strategies pursued by other actors” 
(Kydd, 2008, p. 438). Constructivists view that identities are socially constructed, 
differentiate the self and the other, and define interests and preference (Hopf, 1998, 
p.175. p.182). Some IR scholars suggest that as analytical approaches, rationalism 
and constructivism can be complementary rather than competitive in answering 
research questions (Fearon and Wendt, 2002; Hurd, 2008, p.311-2). Hurd (2008, 
p.312) proposes the “division of labors” between rationalism and constructivism. That 
is, “constructivism is suited to answering questions about how actors acquire their 
interests and identities and rationalism specializes in explaining the pursuit of 
interests by already constituted actors” (Hurd, 2008, p.312). This division of labors is 
reflected in SIT, which postulates that actor defines interests and acts according to 
the social identities (Brewer, 2011, p.125) but could rationally pursue the interests by 
managing the consequences of actions derived from identities that conflict with 
others (Van Zomeren, et, al, 2012, p188) 
 
Another contribution to the literature is that the thesis regards CCP’s united front 
strategy (UFS) as an example that SIT highlights. The current dominant application 
of UFS treats the strategy as a revolutionary one, reflecting irreconcilable competition 
between authoritarian and democratic states (Brady, 2017). However, in this thesis, 
UFS is a practice of SIT that aims to manage the competition and cultivate shared 
identities and interests that enable trust and compromise between conflicting parties. 
Moreover, many Chinese scholars use traditional Chinese thoughts as frameworks 
to prove that China’s peaceful rise is possible (Qin, 2014; Yan, 2016). However, UFS, 
which plays a significant role in CCP’s history, has not previously been used to 
analyze China’s peaceful rise in East Asia. This thesis fills the gap in this regard.  
 
Another originality of this thesis is the application of CCP’s UFS during the Anti-
Japanese War as an analytical framework to examine CCP/ People’s Republic of 




the US observation team went to Yan’an, CCP’s capital at the time, up to the present. 
The thesis views CCP’s relationship with Kuo Min Tang’s [KMT] dominant Chiang 
Kai-shek faction and warlords during China’s Anti-Japanese War (1931-1945) as a 
comparable case with PRC’s relationship with the US and East Asian countries. The 
first similarity between CCP-KMT’s Chiang and PRC-US relationships is their 
conflicting identities. Like the US and PRC, KMT and CCP viewed each other as 
ideological and strategic competitors. Second, the relationships between the US and 
regional countries are similar to those between Chiang faction and warlords. The 
Chiang faction was the ruling party of China, but it was far away from CCP, which 
was surrounded by warlords. Thus, the effectiveness of Chiang’s constraints on CCP 
would diminish if warlords halfheartedly supported Chiang’s policy. Likewise, while 
the US is the leading power of East Asia, it is far away from the region. Thus, support 
from regional countries is important if the US is to have a check on China’s rise. Third, 
CCP defined two stages in terms of power distribution between the lower status CCP 
and the higher status Chiang faction, which is suitable for analyzing the Sino-US 
relations. During the defensive period, the lower status group (e.g. CCP/PRC) is 
weak while the higher status group (e.g. Chiang faction/US) surpasses it on all 
dimensions. During the stalemate period, while the lower status group’s power grows, 
it does not surpass that of the higher status group but threatens the latter the leading 
status. During the Anti-Japanese War, CCP implemented the UFS to preserve its 
communist identity and pursue strategic goals while preventing Chiang’s formation 
of an anti-CCP coalition. It attempted to maintain a relatively peaceful surrounding 
environment between itself and the KMT during the two stages of the Anti-Japanese 
War period. How the CCP implemented the UFS in this way can help explain the 
PRC’s foreign policy concerning the US and regional countries.  
 
A point that the thesis details in Chapter 3, but is also worth noting here, is that the 
CCP made a distinction between domestic and international UFS. Domestic UFS has 




example of SIT, thus the strategy’s revolutionary aspect is beyond the scope of the 
discussion. 
 
Empirical Contribution.  
 
First, this thesis makes an empirical contribution to the literature concerning China’s 
assertiveness. Many analysts argued that regarding regional disputes, China has 
been increasingly assertive in consolidating its sovereignty claims (Hoang, 2016, 
p.188; Do, 2018, pp.213-214). Other scholars argue that China has been restrained 
when consolidating sovereignty (Wu and You, 2019, p.54; Zhang, 2019, p,119) 
 
The findings of the thesis demonstrate the partial validity of scholars’ argument about 
China’s restraints in consolidating sovereignty claims. First, compared to the most 
assertive options that China had before taking actions, China did always show 
restraints. Second, in many cases, such as Chinese Coastguards’ regulating of 
foreign fishermen in disputed waters, China’s actions are of similar strength with or 
even less assertive than other states’ actions. However, in some cases, such as its 
de facto control over the Scarborough Shoal, China is more assertive than other 
states. Third, China’s restraints may not always avoid overt escalation of the incident. 
China’s actions may not be able to compensate for other states’ perceived significant 
loss of sovereignty interests, as demonstrated by the case study on the Philippines’ 
loss of Scarborough shoal in the SCS Chapter. Moreover, while China shows 
restraints, incrementally increasing the intensity of its actions may heighten regional 
tension, which this thesis demonstrates through its case study on Taiwan. 
 
Second, the existing literature is mainly concerned with the implication of China’s rise 
on the China-US relationship and international order or China’s relationship with 
specific regional states (Boon and Ardy, 2017, p. 117; Smith, 2021, p.57). However, 
there is a dearth of a more holistic analysis of the general pattern of China’s 




SIT categorizes actors into a limited number of groups to simplify and order the social 
world (Larson, 2015, p. 326). The shared identities and interests between China and 
the regional states accentuate the similarities between them. Analyzing China’s 
attempts to create or increase the salience of shared interests and identities with 
regional states can contribute to a more holistic analysis of the general pattern of the 




To answer the research question of whether China can rise peacefully in East Asia 
without changing communist and nationalist identities, this thesis divides the question 
into two in terms of a Sino-centric view. First, how does China preserve its communist 
identity under the pressures of political liberalization and ideological competition from 
the US? Second, how does China pursue its nationalist goals and preserve a 
relatively peaceful environment in East Asia? 
 
Peace in the thesis first means that a new cold war or world war between the US and 
China will not occur. Second, it means relative peace, which means that tension in 
varying degrees exists in the region but a generally peaceful environment has been 
maintained. Relative peace is consistent with the reality of East Asia because even 
without China, regional tensions or frictions often occur. This is evidenced by Japan 
and South Korea’s spat over historical issues in 2018 (Denyer, 2019), and the 
collision between the Indonesian warship and Vietnamese coast guard vessel in SCS 
in 2019 (Anya and Septiari, 2019). In a relatively peaceful environment, China’s 
nationalist moves can to some degree be accommodated as long as frictions caused 
by such moves are not detrimental to China’s relationship with regional countries.   
 
The main arguments are as follows: First, competition between China and the US (or 
many regional countries) in several dimensions is inevitable. As CCP is unwilling to 




liberalization. Because of its nationalist identity, China is a revisionist power in the 
East Asian geostrategic context because it is determined to reverse its perceived 
disadvantages regarding territorial disputes and the US-led island chains. China’s 
effort to defend sovereignty claims will also cause frictions with other claimant states. 
Moreover, as China’s hard power is rising, China will threaten the US’ leadership in 
the region. 
 
Second, however, while the competition is inevitable, SIT’s recategorization strategy 
and emphasis on an actor’s rational choice open up the possibility that China can 
strike a balance between its goals of stabilizing the communist regime or pursuing 
nationalist interests and maintaining a relatively peaceful environment by strategically 
managing identities and interests. This means that, based on perceived security of 
its communist and nationalist identities, China may maintain a relatively peaceful 
regional environment by forming or increasing the salience of its shared identities or 
interests with other countries and making the communist and nationalist identities 
and related interests less salient to others.  
 
Third, CCP has used this strategic management strategy for decades. To a certain 
degree, this strategy has contributed to China’s attainment of the three goals 
simultaneously because currently CCP has stabilized its control over the Chinese 
nation and secured or even advanced important nationalist interests. Meanwhile, 
China has maintained a relatively benign regional environment because it has not 
faced a regional hard-balancing coalition. China’s territorial disputes with regional 
countries, such as the SCS and Diaoyu island disputes, often aroused frictions but 
they were kept under control in many cases.  
 
Fourth, however, this strategy has limitations. Because China always seeks shared 
identities/interests when it views communist identity and important nationalist 
interests as secure, the shared identity/interests strategy may fail. This is because 




nationalist interests, such as its emphasis on PRC’s sovereignty over Taiwan, in 
exchange for forming the shared identity/interests.  
 
Also, although China always demonstrates restraints when pursuing or defending 
important nationalist interests when compared with its most assertive options, it has 
not always been less assertive than other regional countries. Also, China’s restraint 
may not help the country achieve its goal of keeping frictions under control. China’s 
restraints may not be able to compensate for other regional states’ perceived damage 
to their interests. Moreover, despite its restraints, China may incrementally increase 




This thesis utilizes documentary research and case studies as the research methods.  
 
Documentary research is “the analysis of documents that contain information about 
the phenomenon we wish to study” (Bailey, 1994, cited in Mogalakwe, 2009, p. 44). 
This thesis wishes to study how China’s strategic management of identities/interests 
could help it attain the three goals simultaneously. This includes how China defines 
its identities and interests, interprets events and other countries’ strategies, seeks 
shared identities/interests, and acts to strike a balance between conflicting interests. 
The thesis also needs to assess how other states or organizations respond to China’s 
actions. Since many documents are available in the public domain, documentary 
research is an efficient method because a large quantity of data can be collected to 
meet the needs of this thesis (Bowen, 2009, p. 31).  
 
Moreover, the thesis draws on many primary documents, including official and semi-
official Chinese and English language documents, elites’ writing and speeches, and 
news coverages from countries and organizations. These primary documents are 




interpretation of events. When they are unavailable, the thesis refers to secondary 
resources that could have a certain degree of credibility, as they have been widely 
cited in scholars’ works. For instance, when analyzing the CCP’s strategic 
management during Mao’s time (1944–1976), many official documents were not easy 
to obtain. Thus, the thesis selected works from Gong Li, Yang Kuisong, and Tao 
Wenzhao, which are often cited by scholars who analyzed CCP history.  
 
The common criticism of documentary research is the bias of both authors and 
researchers when selecting data and interpreting events due to social context and 
identity (Ahmed, 2010, p. 9). To mitigate the problem of bias and obtain a more 
balanced view, this thesis chooses sources from other countries that describe or 
interpret the same event when possible. Also, the thesis will also provide counter-
evidence or interpretation from international and regional academic works. For 
instance, when using Chinese sources stating how the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 
is equal to all to support its argument that China seeks a shared pluralist identity with 
regional countries, the thesis provides a counter-argument that China wishes to 
dominate other countries through the BRI. Moreover, the thesis will engage academic 
debates to remain critical. For instance, it critically assesses the evidence of the 
debate over whether or not the BRI is China’s dominant plan.  
 
This thesis also uses case studies, which provide in-depth analyses of an issue. The 
thesis studies how China seeks to form shared interests and identities with regional 
countries through the BRI. Moreover, it examines the SCS dispute and the Taiwan 
issue. Both of the cases are flashpoints in East Asia and hard cases for China’s rise 
because regarding the two issues, China and relevant parties’ conflicting identities 
and interests are salient, causing frictions to easily arise. This thesis aims to test the 
extent to which China’s strategic management of identities and interests could help 
it simultaneously preserve a relatively peaceful environment and attain important 





Outline of the chapters.  
 
The rest of the thesis is divided into five parts. 
 
Part 1, which includes Chapters 2 and 3, presents the analytical framework.  
 
Chapter 2 discusses the theoretical framework on which the thesis is built. The first 
part is a literature review of theories used by scholars to analyze China’s rise. This 
review aims to show the reasons why this thesis chose SIT as its theoretical 
framework. First, regarding China’s rise in the region, the review discovers that some 
optimistic defensive realists, liberal institutionalists, and constructivists 
underestimate the important influence of China’s communist and nationalist identities 
on the country’s definition of interests and actions. Also, contrary to some pessimistic 
offensive or neo-classical realists’ expectation, China’s rise does not necessarily lead 
to a hard-balancing coalition of established powers. Neither of these two aspects in 
the existing literature is satisfactory; thus, a new approach to understanding China’s 
relationship with the region and the US is necessary. The second part offers a brief 
introduction of SIT and presents the reasons why it could address the flaws in the 
existing literature. The third part is a critical review of the literature that used SIT to 
analyze China’s relationship with other actors. This part aims to show the originality 
of the theoretical framework of the thesis. The main point is that the current dominant 
SIT framework in IR works, despite criticism that it is somewhat dissimilar to social 
psychology’s version of SIT. However, SIT, as it is currently used in IR, falsely 
regards social creativity as a viable strategy for preventing competition between 
China and the US. As I demonstrate, there are limits to the applicability of social 
creativity strategies. Yet, there is potential in another concept derived from SIT, which 
has been underused in IR, and that is what is being used as the recategorization 
strategy. I argue that this can be used to analyze how a communist and nationalistic 
China avoids the formation of a hard-balancing coalition in a competition scenario. In 




been used to analyze the flashpoints in the region, which I do in the latter part of the 
thesis. The fourth part of this chapter is about how SIT will be applied to the thesis to 
analyze how China can thwart a hard-balancing coalition, and maintain a relatively 
peaceful environment without abandoning its nationalist and communist identities 
and related crucial interests.  
 
Chapter 3 focuses on the UFS. The first part shows originality because the use of 
UFS in this thesis is different from the dominant view of UFS. Specifically, unlike the 
dominant view of UFS that reflects competitive interests between China and liberal 
states, the thesis regards UFS as a practice of SIT, a theory that aims to find 
remedies for the competing parties. Also, this thesis focuses on China’s relationship 
with East Asian states. Unlike the dominant view that focuses on China’s relationship 
with sub-national actors, this thesis focuses on the inter-state relationship and cross-
cutting identities/interests of the states. The thesis does look at the relationship 
between Beijing and KMT/ Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in Taiwan. However, 
the focus is on their cross-cutting identities or interests. Moreover, unlike the 
dominant view that regards UFS as a revolutionary strategy, this thesis highlights the 
distinction between revolutionary domestic and unrevolutionary international UFS. 
Also, as an example of SIT, a theory that aims to ameliorate intergroup conflicts, this 
thesis does not discuss the revolutionary aspect of UFS. Finally, this thesis will not 
engage in the never-ending debate over whether China’s UFS is genuine or 
propaganda. The second part is CCP’s UFS in the anti-Japanese war period. This 
part looks at how CCP’s UFS could be an example of SIT and applied to China’s 
relationships with other countries/organizations. In the anti-Japanese war, the CCP 
adjusted its UFS according to changes in power distribution between itself and the 
KMT’s Chiang faction. It strived to form and maintain shared identities/interests with 
Chiang during the defensive period when its power was much weaker than Chiang’s 
on all dimensions. However, during the stalemate period, Chiang, who feared losing 
dominant status in China, began to prioritize conflicting identities and contained the 




and sought shared identities/interests with warlords, while downplaying conflicting 
interests to prevent the formation of an anti-CCP coalition. This thesis applies these 
CCP strategies to the context of China’s rise in the region. 
 
Part 2 is comprised of Chapter 4, which analyzes China’s nationalist and communist 
identities, and the reasons that the competition between China and the US/ regional 
countries on some dimensions is inevitable. Unlike IR scholars using SIT that view 
social creativity as the viable means for China to achieve a peaceful rise, the chapter 
argues that because the two identities are important parts of China’s self-
identification, it can hardly abandon (social mobility) or neglect them through 
changing other dimensions for comparison (social creativity). After proving that social 
mobility and creativity are not viable methods, the thesis analyzes the reasons that 
China will meet the three conditions that cause social competition (unstable power 
relationship, dissatisfaction to the current status quo, and a cognitive alternative). 
Thus, China is determined to reverse the perceived disadvantageous position 
regarding territorial disputes and the East Asian geostrategic environment. It will also 
promote pluralism in the face of pressure from the US-led liberal internationalism. As 
important parts of China’s self-identification, the two identities play a critical role in 
the country’s definition of great power. From China’s perspective, it cannot declare 
the completion of national rejuvenation without achieving important nationalist goals, 
such as recovering Taiwan. This definition of great power has made competition 
between China and some regional countries or the US on territorial disputes and 
geopolitical environment inevitable. Also, China will work hard to preserve its 
communist identity since it wishes to rise as a “socialist great power” (Xi, 2019).  
 
After arguing the inevitability of the competition between China and the US/regional 
countries on geostrategic and ideological dimensions, Parts 3 and 4 draw on the 
CCP’s UFS with the KMT’s Chiang and warlords during the Anti-Japanese War. This 




the actor’s rational choice to examine the interaction of the CCP, and later the PRC 
(beginning 1949), with the US or regional countries from 1944 to date. 
 
Specifically, these parts analyze the extent to which the CCP, and later the PRC, 
could possibly maintain its communist identity and pursue or defend crucial 
nationalist interests without confronting a US-led hard-balancing coalition in East 
Asia by strategically managing identities and interests. In other words, I analyze to 
what extent the CCP, and later the PRC, could achieve the three goals by seeking 
shared identities or interests while downplaying conflicting ones.  
.  
By examining China’s structural position in terms of a united front (UF) framework, 
the thesis divided the time periods from 1944 to date based on two criteria. The first 
is whether or not China had successfully formed shared identities or interests with 
others, and the second is the power distribution between China and the US. This is 
because successfully forming shared identities or interests is the start of a united 
front, while power distribution between the two sides set boundaries between the 
defensive and stalemate periods. Thus, the thesis views the CCP’s, and later the 
PRC’s, foreign policies during Mao’s time (1944–1976) as an attempt to use the 
strategic management of identities and interests to unblock the US-led military and 
economic blockade without compromising core nationalist interests, such as the 
Taiwan issue, and destabilizing the CCP’s absolute control over China. In this thesis, 
the period from 1978 to 2009 is referred to as the defensive period, when China’s 
power lagged far behind that of the US.  
 
In this thesis, the year 2009 is referred to as the start of the stalemate period because 
it was then that China and the US became aware of the changing distribution of power 
between them and gradually adjusted policies. In the same year, then US Defense 
Secretary Robert Gates (2009, p. 33) suggested that, while US power remains to 
have a greater advantage over China’s, the country should adjust its defense policy 




US from supporting allies in the Asia-Pacific region. This remark was the prelude for 
the substantive policy adjustments of the US that aimed to maintain the country’s 
leading position in the region. One example of a policy adjustment is the formal 
announcement of the rebalancing policy of the US towards Asia in 2011 (Carter, 2016, 
p. 68). In 2009, the CCP Central Committee (CCPCC) issued a political document 
entitled, “Decision of Improving and Consolidating Party Building Under the New 
Situation” (CCPCC, 2009). The CCP perceived that China is at a “new historical 
starting point” because its power and status have increased substantially, but 
industrialized countries still possess advantages over it (CCPCC, 2009). In this new 
situation, Chinese elites believed that China’s rising power will inevitably threaten 
established powers that will resist China’s rise (Han, 2014). Because the US could 
not easily constrain China, and China could not get rid of these constraints easily, a 
stalemate has been formed since 2009.  
 
Moreover, according to the CCP’s UFS during the Anti-Japanese War, the CCP’s 
main target for seeking shared identities/interests changed prior to the defensive 
period and in the stalemate period. Before the defensive period, the CCP regarded 
the dominant Chiang faction as the main target for the successful formation of the 
shared identity/interests, with Chiang being the key to breaking the KMT’s 
encirclement. In the stalemate period, the CCP’s main target changed from Chiang 
to warlords because the former attached less importance to the anti-Japanese 
alliance. This thesis also applies the change in the main targets to the CCP’s strategic 
management of identities and interests during Mao’s time and in the stalemate period. 
The CCP’s main target for constructing shared identities/interests was the US during 
Mao’s time, and it was the regional countries during the stalemate period. During the 
defensive period, the CCP strived to seek shared interests/identities with both the US 
and regional countries. 
 
The change in the target does not mean that China will no longer seek shared 




came about because their shared interests, such as environmental protection, are 
unlikely to be important enough to reduce the salience of the strategic competition 
between China and the US. 
 
Part 3 includes Chapter 5, which discusses the CCP’s, and later the PRC’s, historical 
application of its strategic management of identities or interests during Mao’s time 
(1944–1976), and Chapter 6, which I refer to as the defensive period (1978–2009). 
Both chapters demonstrate the viability and limitations of China’s strategic 
management in breaking or preventing the formation of CCP/China perceived US-
led hard-balancing coalition respectively without substantially changing CCP/China’s 
communist and nationalist identities. First, in Chapter 5, the shared identity/interests 
approach did break the US-led military and economic blockade on China even if 
China did not change its political system and concede important nationalist interests, 
such as disobeying treaties signed between the US and the Chiang government, 
during the last few years of Mao’s chairmanship (1972–1976). Second, the strategic 
partnership reduced the salience of China’s communist identity and made the US 
compromise on conflicting interests related to China’s nationalist identity, such as 
Taiwan’s status. Third, the CCP intentionally downplayed its communist identity by 
proposing ideological armistice and its nationalist identity by conceding less 
important interests relating to the Taiwan at that time, such as its de facto 
independence. 
 
However, this strategy had limitations. First, the CCP was unwilling to concede when 
it perceived the communist regime and crucial nationalist interests, such as 
preventing Taiwan’s independence, as insecure; thus, the shared identity/interests 
approach may fail. For instance, CCP’s unwillingness to loosen its control over CCP 
regime or later the whole China led to the CCP’s failure to form an anti-Japanese 
alliance with the US in 1944 and receive US recognition in 1949. Second, the shared 
identities/interests may not be important enough to ameliorate frictions deriving from 




easing the tension in the Taiwan Strait in 1955 to pave way for establishing Sino–US 
diplomatic relationship.  
 
Chapter 6 argues that the strategic management of identities and interests to a 
certain degree succeeded in achieving the three goals during the defensive period. 
China and the US had an amicable relationship from 1979 to 1989 and from 2002 to 
2008 due to the salience of a shared strategic partnership and anti-terrorist colleague 
respectively. Also, shared economic interests helped China gain the most favored 
nation status from the US since 1994. The shared strategic partnership and anti-
terrorist colleague identity also helped reduce the salience of China’s communist 
identity. Moreover, by discontinuing support for communist movement in regional 
countries, keeping a low-profile policy, and behaving as a status quo power, China 
attempted to downplay communist and nationalist identities to alleviate regional 
countries’ fear and ideological competition. Further, CCP maintained authoritarian 
control over the nation. Frictions occurred when China consolidated and defended 
important nationalist interests but China attempted to use controlled military actions 
and diplomatic means to avoid unduly escalation. In some cases, such as the 1988 
seizure of land features in the Spratly Islands and 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, 
China succeeded.  
 
However, in others, China’s restraints in using offensive means failed to prevent the 
escalation of frictions, as demonstrated by ASEAN’s strong criticism after China’s 
seizure of Mischief Reef in 1995. Moreover, because the CCP will not concede its 
authoritarian control over the Chinese nation, the ideological frictions had been 
salient until China constructed another shared identity/interest to which the US 
attached importance. For instance, ideological frictions between China and the US 
were salient after the end of a strategic partnership in 1991. China’s effort to construct 





Part 4 is about the extent to which China could preserve its communist identity and 
pursue important nationalist goals, while thwarting a hard-balancing coalition in East 
Asia to preserve a relatively peaceful environment in the stalemate period (Chapters 
7-9).  
 
Specifically, chapter 7 is about how CCP stabilized its control over Chinese nation 
while avoiding an anti-communist coalition in East Asia in the stalemate period. 
Chapters 8 to 9 analyze how China sought shared identity and interests with regional 
countries while pursuing or defending nationalist interests in a restrained way to 
prevent a formation of a regional hard-balancing coalition against China.  
 
Chapter 8 argues that, based on an already close economic partnership, China is 
increasing salience of economic interests and constructing shared pluralist identity 
through BRI despite conflicting interests between China and regional states. The 
shared economic interest or pluralist identity could cancel out negative effects of the 
conflicting interests and thus could possibly preventing regional countries from joining 
a hard-balancing coalition.  
 
Chapter 9 looks at how China pursued nationalist interests with restraint. China has 
made a lot of effort to seek shared interests and identities with regional countries to 
preserve the peaceful environment. However, if uncontrolled, its nationalist actions 
will probably make regional countries prioritize conflicting identities and interests over 
shared ones and join a rivalry bloc to constrain China. To systematically analyze 
China’s restraint in pursuing offensive actions, this chapter provides three criteria. 
First, China’s actual actions are compared with those that it could have taken before 
the incident. Second, China’s actual actions are compared with the similar actions of 
regional states. Third, the chapter classifies the responses of regional countries into 
five categories to analyze the effectiveness of China’s strategy and whether its 
restraints could prevent the breakdown of its relationship with regional countries. The 




sovereignty rights, such as protests (Chubb, 2021, p. 88). The second is the 
demonstrative response, which means regional states’ actions that demonstrate their 
claimed sovereignty without directly confronting China physically (Chubb, 2021, p. 
89). The third is low intensity confrontation, wherein regional states use limited means 
to directly confront China, but cautiously avoid overt escalation while preparing for 
de-escalation. The fourth is medium intensity confrontation, wherein regional states 
use stronger means than the low intensity confrontation to directly confront China, 
but also cautiously avoid overt-escalation while preparing for de-escalation. The fifth 
is high intensity confrontation, wherein regional states use forceful means to confront 
China with little to no consideration for de-escalation. If regional states choose high 
intensity confrontation, China and its relationships will break down.  
 
This chapter argues that regarding its gray zone operations, such as patrolling the 
first island chain and Chinese Coast Guards’ actions towards fishing and oil 
exploration, China demonstrates restraints when its actions are compared with its 
most assertive options. Also, in these cases, China’s actions are generally of similar 
strength or even less assertive than other regional states’ similar actions. In general, 
regional states’ responses to China’s actions range from a declarative response to a 
medium intensity response. Thus, China’s strategy of pursuing or defending 
nationalist interests with restraint does mitigate threatening potential of its nationalist 
actions. The one exception is the Scarborough Shoal incident of 2012, which will be 
discussed in Chapter 10. Moreover, China’s upper limits of not occupying other 
claimants occupied land features further reduce threatening potential of its gray zone 
actions. Finally, China’s response to Japan’s nationalization of disputed Diaoyu 
islands simultaneously kept frictions under control and consolidated China’s claims 
over the islands  
 
Part 5 is the case studies, including chapters 10 and 11. Chapter 10 is the SCS 
disputes. It specifically analyzes to what extent China could find a balance between 




breakdown of its relationship with regional countries through a strategic management 
of interests. Chapter 10 presents the case study of the SCS dispute. Similarly, in 
Chapter 10, China’s restraints in pursuing or defending its nationalist interests is 
examined by comparing its actual actions and available options before the incidents, 
its actual actions and those of other regional states, and the five categories of 
response. This chapter looks at the two cases that have a profound impact on China’s 
sovereignty claims and its relationships with regional countries or the ASEAN: the 
2012 Scarborough Shoal incident, and the international arbitral tribunal concerning 
disputes between China and the Philippines from 2013 to 2016. This chapter argues 
that while China’s strategic management of interests was effective in striking the 
balance, it also had its limitations. First, China’s shared interests in the de-escalation 
with the Philippines did manage the tension in the SCS in the first phase (April 11–
14) and the first half of the third phase of the Scarborough Shoal incident of 2012. 
The shared interests in de-escalation between China and ASEAN also managed the 
tensions aroused by the arbitral tribunal from 2013 to 2016. China’s 
acknowledgement of ASEAN’s shared interests in managing the disputes helped the 
former alleviate pressure from the latter. Second, China’s strategy of defending 
interests in a restrained manner maintained the space for reconciliation. However, 
China’s unwillingness to concede to the Philippines’ demand for international 
arbitration in the Scarborough Shoal incident led to its failure to construct shared 
interests in de-escalating tension from April to May. Moreover, although China did 
not occupy the shoal to show restraint, its restraint could not make up for the 
Philippines’ loss, which directly led to the breakdown of the relationship between the 
two countries from July 2012 to 2016. 
 
Chapter 11 presents the case study of the Taiwan issue. This Chapter investigates 
how mainland China strikes a balance between achieving its nationalist will of reunion 
with Taiwan and the One China principle and preserving a relatively stable 
environment for development by strategically managing identities and interests. The 




KMT through the 1992 consensus from 2008 to 2016 to preserve a stable cross-strait 
environment for accumulating power. Meanwhile, the mainland made its nationalist 
identity less salient to the Taiwanese by tolerating the KMT’s interpretation of one 
China as the Republic of China (ROC) and giving the KMT space to participate in 
international organizations. By doing so, the mainland preserved the core interests 
of the One China principle and bought time to accumulate power from 2008 to 2016. 
However, because it was reluctant to recognize the ROC’s sovereignty status, the 
KMT was stigmatized as a traitor of the ROC and was unable to start political talks 
with Beijing, thereby making non-coercive unification impossible. Due to this 
reluctance, Beijing’s effort to seek a shared one China identity with the DPP failed. 
Thus, it increasingly relied on conducting military actions in a restrained way to 
address the DPP’s disobedience to the one China principle and maintain a relatively 
stable Taiwan Strait. Although Beijing demonstrated restraint, the cross-strait tension 
was escalating, especially in 2020. The shrinking of shared interests between the 
mainland and the US also led to the latter being less tolerant of Beijing’s interpretation 
of one China that stresses PRC’s sovereignty over Taiwan. This resulted in Beijing’s 
more escalatory military actions in 2020. Thus, Beijing’s strategic management of 
identities/interests with the KMT, DPP, and the US failed to a large degree. As a 
result, it is increasingly difficult for Beijing to strike a balance between maintaining a 
relatively peaceful Taiwan Strait and pursuing or defending its crucial interests in 
Taiwan, such as the one China principle. In other words, the heightened tension or 
even conflict over the Taiwan Strait is likely to happen. 
 
Before concluding the outline of the chapters, it is worth noting that the thesis uses 
communist identity and communist regime interchangeably because according to 
CCP, the essence of China’s communist identity is the “CCP’s leadership” (Xi, 2020). 
That is, CCP views its political domination in China as the core interests related to 
China’s communist identity, Moreover, this thesis generally refers to China as the 
PRC. However, because it uses Chinese history to explain the PRC’s nationalist 




4. Additionally, the distinction between PRC and ROC in Chapter 11 is important for 





















Part 2, Analytical Framework  
Chapter 2: Social Identity Theory 
 
This chapter focuses on the main theoretical framework the thesis is built on. The 
first part of the chapter is a literature review of theoretical frameworks used by 
scholars to analyze China’s rise. This review aims to show the reasons the thesis 
chooses SIT as the theoretical framework. First, regarding China’s rise in the region, 
the literature review shows that some optimistic defensive realists, liberal 
institutionalists, and constructivists underestimate the important influence of China’s 
communist and nationalist identities on its definition of interests and actions. Also, 
contrary to some pessimistic offensive, classical and neo-classical realists’ 
expectation, China’s rise does not necessarily lead to a hard-balancing coalition of 
established powers. Neither of these two aspects of the existing literature is 
satisfactory, and thus, we need a new approach to understand China’s relationship 
with the region and the US. The second part offers a brief introduction of SIT and 
presents the reasons it could address the flaws in the existing literature. The third 
part is a critical review of the literature that uses SIT to analyze China’s relationship 
with other actors. This part aims to show the originality of the thesis’ theoretical 
framework. The main point is that the current dominant SIT framework in IR works 
despite criticism that it is somewhat dissimilar to social psychology’s version of SIT. 
However, SIT, as it is currently used in IR, falsely regards “social creativity” as a 
viable strategy to avoid competition between China and the US. As I demonstrate, 
there are limits to the applicability of “social creativity” strategies. Yet there is promise 
in another concept derived from SIT, which has been underused in IR and that is 
what is used as “recategorization strategy.” I argue that this can be used to analyze 
how a communist and nationalistic China prevents the formation of a hard-balancing 
coalition in a competition scenario. In addition, this is an original application of SIT in 




which I do in the later part of the thesis. The fourth part of this chapter is about how 
SIT will be applied to the thesis to analyze how China maintains a relatively peaceful 
environment without abandoning its nationalist and communist identities and related 
crucial interests.  
 
Theoretical debate regarding China’s rise  
 
To begin, most realists are pessimists when viewing the debate concerning China’s 
peaceful rise. Some classical and neo-classical realists who stress the influence of a 
state’s attributes on its behaviors argue that China’s nationalist and communist 
identities cause clashes of interests between China and the US and make the former 
a dissatisfied power to the US-led order (Friedberg, 2011; Kirshner, 2012, pp. 57-58; 
Allison, 2017). Even some structural realists who regard states as unitary actors note 
the two identities cause China’s revisionist ambition and Sino–US competition 
(Tunsjø, 2018, p. 3; Holslag, 2015, p. 4). Pessimistic realists further argue that, as 
the power distribution between the two countries is changing, a hubristic and 
revisionist China will challenge the US-led order to seek or maximize security (Waltz, 
2000, pp. 36-37; Mearshimer, 2010, 2014), pursue status, or shape the international 
environment (Shambaugh, 2013; Kirshner, 2017, p. 60). To pessimistic realists, 
China’s rise will not be peaceful because of the growing likelihood of conflict between 
the rising revisionist China and the US-led status quo power coalition (Goldstein, 
2007; Mearshimer, 2014). Goldstein (2007, p. 641) argued that the power transition 
theory expects “a growing probability of conflicts between a more demanding China 
and those, most importantly… the US, who will resist changes Beijing demands.” 
Likewise, Friedberg (2011) stated that the “resulting clash of interests” between the 
rising power and established powers “has seldom been solved peacefully.”   
 
Some optimistic realists and scholars of other theoretical perspectives counter the 
arguments of pessimist realists and view peace as something that can be maintained. 




the conflicts of interests, including the Taiwan issue, disputes in the SCS and East 
China Sea (ECS), and the US military presence in East Asia. He (Glaser, 2015) 
assumes that China is generally a security seeker. Thus, it is safe for the US to 
abandon its commitment to Taiwan to obtain China’s concession on its sovereignty 
and maritime claims in the SCS and ECS and acknowledgement of US presence in 
the region (Glaser, 2015). Liberal institutionalists argue that while China is somewhat 
dissatisfied with the US-led order, it is a rational actor and, thus, will choose 
integration, which is essential in its pursuit of power (Goldstein, 2007, p. 651). For 
instance, Ikenberry (2008, 2014) argued that the liberal order provides China with 
abundant interests and advantages, such as “club benefits” and rules of equal access, 
and is hard to overturn. Constructivists look at whether China can be socialized into 
the liberal order (Johnston, 2008). They also analyze how narratives, such as a rule-
based order, have strengthened the “master narrative” that China is a revisionist 
power and will “crowd out” opposing narratives (Breuer and Johnston, 2019, p. 447). 
 
However, many optimistic arguments are flawed for underestimating the significant 
influence of communist and nationalist identities on China’s goals and actions. For 
instance, Glaser (2015, p. 79) assumes that China is generally a security seeker 
because of the limited revisionist goal that only focused on recovering Taiwan. 
However, while Chinese officials have reiterated that China will not seek hegemony, 
they believed that its security is guaranteed by gaining a certain degree of control 
over the sea lanes of communication within the first island chain. This view is a 
product of the nationalist experience that China was invaded by imperial powers 
coming from the sea in the past (Liu, 2004, p. 438). This security goal may probably 
make Glaser view China as a “greedy state” because it shows that the country aims 
at “expanding its control and influence beyond Taiwan” (Glaser, 2015, p. 79). If China 
is viewed as a greedy state, Glaser would recommend a containment or balancing 





Also, while China is satisfied with some norms or areas of liberal international order 
as Ikenberry (2008, 2014) argued, such as free trade, it is dissatisfied with others, 
such as liberal values like democracy and human rights. According to Ikenberry (2014, 
p. 8), China’s dissatisfaction can be suppressed, and it will have to accept liberal 
norms due to the enormous pressure of liberal democratic countries and other rising 
and satisfied powers. However, it values its communist identity more than is implied 
by Ikenberry. If Chinese leaders feel the communist regime is threatened, they will 
not follow the liberal norms of human and civil rights and liberal democracy. For 
instance, despite decades-long Western criticism for suppressing human and civil 
rights, China built and has continued fortifying “a great firewall” to preserve the 
stability of the communist regime by preventing the perceived infiltration of Western 
ideas into Chinese society through the Internet since 2002.  
 
The argument that China can be socialized also underestimates the importance that 
it attaches to its nationalist and communist identities. As Epstein (2012, pp. 140-141) 
criticized, IR scholars generally view socialization as a unidirectional process that 
“infantilizes the socializee” and simply ignores the identities’ importance for the 
socializee, which leads to the resistance of the socializee and failure of socialization. 
In the case of China, it is not uncommon that Chinese leaders emphasize the 
importance of the two identities by stating that China will not give up its nationalist 
goals and change the one-party dominated political system. It is also not uncommon 
that the leaders criticize Western countries’ ideological bias and others’ violation of 
China’s sovereignty regarding disputed land features, which demonstrate their 
resistance to socialization. Rather than socializing into the US-led order in the 
process of reform and opening up, China is likely to remain an authoritarian state that 
achieves nationalist goals incrementally. Also, while arguing that the master narrative 
that China is a revisionist state is exaggerated (Breuer and Johnston, 2019, p. 445), 
Breuer and Johnston (2019, p. 445) noted that there are multiple orders; China is 




p. 446; Johnston, 2019, p. 12), such as “distributions of territory” (Johnston, 2019, p. 
30). This demonstrates that China’s revisionism exists to some degree.  
 
This chapter, thus, agrees with the pessimists that China’s nationalist and communist 
identities are major drivers of competition between itself and the US. Many pessimist 
realists expect that China’s rise will not be peaceful because revisionist China will 
conflict with a US-led coalition that aims to balance against or even contain its 
revisionist goals (Shambaugh, 2013; Mearshimer, 2014; Glaser, 2015, p. 83; 
Mandelbaum, 2019, pp. 126-127). However, in contrast to their expectation, China 
has managed to stabilize and even strengthened its communist regime, and steadily 
obtained its crucial nationalist goals. It currently has relatively benign relationships 
with its neighbors and has not faced a rivalry bloc in East Asia. Thus, the thesis views 
that China has maintained a relatively peaceful environment to a certain degree, 
while not sacrificing crucial interests that are defined by the two identities. This raises 
the central question in this thesis: How has this been done? 
 
Realists may view that this is because East Asian countries are using the strategy of 
“buck-passing” wherein they stay on the sidelines and let the US shoulder the main 
responsibility of balancing against China. Thus, realists may suggest that the US 
should become an offshore balancer and let the regional countries shoulder the main 
responsibility to contain China (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2016, p. 74). However, this 
argument is not consistent with the reality. The US has engaged with regional 
countries less when former President Trump came to power in 2016, even 
withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership in 2017, which aims to balance 
against China’s economic influence in the region. But as we have seen, East Asian 
states have not followed that lead and are not hard balancing China by forming a rival 
bloc.   
 
From the literature review, the chapter claims that the arguments of optimistic and 




nationalist and communist identities to China and their influence on China’s goals 
and actions. Thus, Glaser (2015) made a false argument that China only focuses on 
control over Taiwan. Ikenberry (2008, 2014) falsely argues that China will have to 
accept norms it dislikes. The socialization argument of constructivists also failed to 
account for the significant costs that the socializee will suffer in the socialization 
process. The pessimistic realists are also flawed because contrary to their 
expectation, the communist identity and nationalist claims in the region have not led 
to war or intense rivalry between China and the East Asian states. Neither of these 
two aspects of the existing literature are satisfactory, making a new approach to 
understand China’s relationship with the region and the US necessary.  
 
The next section proposes SIT as an approach that enables us to better understand 
how that relationship has evolved and how it may develop in the future. 
 
Social identity theory 
Social identity refers to “the individual’s knowledge that he belongs to certain social 
groups together with some emotional and value significance to him of the group 
membership” (Tajfel, 1972, cited in Turner, 1982, p. 18). SIT postulates that actors 
who strongly identify with social identity differentiate in and out groups and act (Hogg 
and Abrams, 1988, pp. 14-15) and define interests according to the identity (Brewer, 
2011, p. 125). Status here refers to a group’s relative position within the hierarchy in 
a social system. As status is an effective means to gain social prestige (Tajfel and 
Turner, 2001, p. 98; Fiske et al, 2016, p. 11), obtaining a higher group status can 
satisfy the members’ need for “positive self-esteem,” such as “feeling good about 
themselves” (Crisp and Turner, 2010, p. 220).  
 
One group’s status is obtained through “evaluative comparisons” between its 
attributes or achievements and those of other relevant outgroups on important 
dimensions (Hinkle and Brown, 1990, p. 84; Larson and Shevchenko, 2014, p. 37). 




positively, the higher the status and more favorable the image it can obtain for itself 
(Tajfel and Turner, 2001, p. 101; Hogg, 2016, p. 7). Unfavorable comparisons with 
the outgroup lead to the group’s low status and negative self-image (Tajfel and Turner, 
2001, p. 101; Hogg, 2016, p. 7). Further, the higher status group advocates that its 
significant attributes or values be supported across group, by establishing them as 
standards for social categorization and comparison (Deng, 2008, pp. 22-24). This 
leads to the delimitation of intergroup boundaries and the preservation of the higher 
status group’s positive self-image and the social stigma of lower status group 
members (Deng, 2008, pp. 22-24). Because the lower status group is often 
disadvantaged on the dimension that it compares unfavorably with the higher status 
group, the thesis regards that lower and higher status groups are interchangeable 
with disadvantaged and advantaged groups. 
 
Besides social comparison, SIT postulates that disadvantaged groups have three 
identity management strategies for getting rid of a negative self-image (Tajfel and 
Turner, 2001, pp. 103-104; Hogg, 2016, p. 7). They are social mobility, social 
creativity, and social competition. 
 
Social mobility refers to the status seeker’s attempt to acquire membership in the 
higher status group by abandoning negatively attributed identities or making 
achievements to improve unfavorable comparisons when intergroup boundaries are 
permeable (Brown, 2000, p. 326; Tajfel and Turner, 2001, p. 103; Wright et al, 2001, 
p. 224; Hogg, 2016, p. 7). Social creativity refers to the status seeker’s attempt to 
change the evaluation of its attributes from negative to positive, or find new 
dimensions that compare favorably with other groups and do not threaten the status 
or interests of the higher status outgroup (Tajfel and Turner, 2001, p. 103; Larson, 
2015, p. 327).  
 
Social competition refers to the status seeker’s attempt to change its unequal status 




valued by both sides (Hogg and Abrams, 1988, p. 58). It occurs when the status 
seeker views the current relationship as unfair and unstable and has a cognitive 
alternative to the current unequal relationship (Brown, 2000, pp. 329-330; Hogg, 
2016, p. 7). The cognitive alternative is defined as “an alternative social world-a 
sense of somewhere different that we want to go” and a plan “of how we might get 
there” (Reicher and Haslam, 2012, p. 55; Lye et al, 2017, p. 751). 
 
According to SIT, tension can be reduced through a recategorization strategy even if 
they are engaged in social competition (Hogg, 2016, p. 8). The recategorization 
strategy refers to attempts that increase “the number of categories which 
simultaneously define a target…to reduce ingroup-outgroup differentiation” (Prati, et 
al, 2021, p. 50). Recategorization includes creating an overarching identity inclusive 
of competing groups (Crisp and Turner, 2010, p. 228; Gaertner and Dovidio, 2012, p. 
33; Hogg, 2016, p. 8), a dual identity wherein the competing groups’ respective 
identities are preserved but an inclusive overarching identity is created and 
recognized (Krochik and Jost, 2011, pp. 159-160; Dovidio et al, 2016, p. 17), or cross-
cutting identities that the groups have distinct identities and “share identity on other 
dimensions” (Brewer, 2011, p. 137; Crisp and Hewstone, 2007, pp. 181-182; Hogg, 
2016, p. 8). The cross-cutting identity ameliorates conflict and contributes to peace 
because the effects of ingroup membership/shared identity on the other dimensions 
and outgroup membership/conflicting identities “cancel each other out” (Brown, 2000, 
p. 345). The thesis argues that by the same token, shared interests may have a 
similar cancel out influence on frictions deriving from conflicting interests. 
 
In SIT, identity plays an important role in the group’s choice of identity management 
strategy or the effects of the strategies. As many scholars (Tajfel, 1978, p. 54; Brewer, 
2011, p. 137; Krochik and Jost, 2011, pp. 159-160; Hogg, 2016, p. 8) have argued, 
all strategies but social competition are flawed if the groups strongly identify with their 
distinctive identities. The status seeker that pursues social mobility may find out that 




higher status group extremely difficult because it is unwilling or unable to abandon 
the identity (Tajfel, 1978, p. 64). Status seekers pursuing social creativity may learn 
that it cannot sidestep the negative effect of a stigmatized identity by comparing 
favorably on new dimensions. Likewise, the shared identity will not effectively 
ameliorate conflicts if the competing groups prioritize mutually exclusive identities 
rather than the shared identity (Brewer, 2011, p. 137; Hogg, 2016, p. 8). 
 
However, while acknowledging the importance of identities, SIT puts equal emphasis 
on the group’s rational choice and its legitimacy or identity in dealing with intergroup 
relationships. This means that although the groups strongly identify with and are 
unwilling to abandon the identities, they are rational actors that, to some degree, are 
able to rationally pursue identity-related interests and control preferences derived 
from the stigmatized or disadvantaged identities. For instance, lower status groups 
do not often fiercely react to perceived unfair treatment from higher status groups 
when they feel such move is infeasible and costly (Van Zomeren et al, 2012, p. 188; 
Saguy and Dovidio, 2013, p. 1032; Shi et al, 2015, p. 45). In addition, status seekers 
will not directly conflict with the higher status group even if social mobility fails (Hogg, 
2016, p.7). Instead, they will pursue social creativity to reduce the negative self-image 
derived from the identities, because reversing the current status relationship is costly 
(Hogg, 2016, p. 7).  
 
Moreover, the rational choice dominates the groups’ choice of identity 
recategorization strategies. For instance, to realize its material interests, the lower 
status group may prefer to form a dual identity than a superordinate one with the 
higher status group (Saguy et al, 2008, p. 433; Dovidio et al, 2016, p. 17). The 
superordinate identity part of the dual identity is inclusive to both lower and higher 
status groups; thus, the ingroup favoritism of higher status group members can 
extend to former lower status outgroup members (Dovidio et al, 2009, p. 9). This 




sensitive to issues of intergroup inequality, even though the former may value a 
distinctive group identity more than a superordinate one (Dovidio et al, 2009, p. 9). 
 
Rational choice also plays an important role in the higher status group’s interaction 
with the lower status group. The higher status group is not willing to concede material 
interests to the lower status group if it feels that its status is threatened by the latter 
(Saguy and Dovidio, 2013, p. 1031; Fiske et al, 2016, p. 46) on the dimensions that 
it values most. A study finds that the advantaged group shows more willingness to 
cooperate and share non-vital interests with the lower status group if the intergroup 
power relationship is insecure (Ng, 1982, p. 203). For instance, the lower status group 
has an external alternative to balance against the higher status group’s power (Ng, 
1982, p. 203). The higher status group may probably also feel constrained if the lower 
status group is more powerful on another important dimension. For instance, while 
China has hard power advantages over ASEAN, many Chinese scholars argue that 
it has been constrained by ASEAN’s agenda setting power (Zhang, 2016, p. 4; Zhao, 
2013, p. 86).  
 
To recap, SIT postulates that a group strives to maintain a positive self-image through 
favorable comparisons of traits and achievements with outgroups on important 
dimensions (Hinkle and Brown, 1990, p. 84; Larson and Shevchenko, 2014, p. 37). 
To preserve a positive self-image, the higher status group is able to define its values 
as standards for comparison (Deng, 2008, pp. 22-24). Thus, the lower status group’s 
identity is stigmatized if its values conflict with those of the higher status group (Deng, 
2008, pp. 22-24). To gain positive self-image, the lower status group that compares 
unfavorably with the higher status group on several dimensions will choose social 
mobility, social creativity, and social competition (Larson, 2015). All strategies but 
social competition are flawed if the lower status group strongly identifies with its 
disadvantaged identities. Moreover, SIT views the actor’s rational choice as being 
equally important as identity in explaining intergroup behaviors. Identity 




groups in a competition, such as cross-cutting identities (Hogg, 2016, p. 8). The 
shared identity/ingroup membership of a cross-cutting identity ameliorates intergroup 
conflict and contributes to peace (Hogg, 2016, p. 8) because the effects of an ingroup 
membership/shared identity on other dimensions and the outgroup 
membership/conflicting identities “cancel each other out” (Brown, 2000, p. 345). 
 
SIT provides crucial insights for us to address the gap in the current literature. As 
noted, optimistic scholars underestimate the importance of China’s nationalist and 
communist identities. They make a flawed argument that China is either exclusively 
focused on controlling Taiwan or will adapt to liberal norms due to pressure from 
liberal countries or after years of socialization into the liberal order. The flaws of the 
social mobility and social creativity strategies give us reasons why social competition 
between China and the US is inevitable. It is hard for China to abandon its two 
identities (social mobility) or sidestep its negative self-image caused by these 
identities (social creativity) because it strongly identifies with them (see forthcoming 
Chapter 4). 
 
Further, as noted, pessimistic realists are flawed because China has stabilized its 
communist identity and steadily pursued or defended crucial nationalist interests to 
date, but does not face a rivalry regional bloc to contain its rise. SIT’s recategorization 
strategy and emphasis on the actor’s rational choice can potentially help in 
addressing the gap in the literature. Specifically, it provides insight by explaining how 
war can be avoided in the context of clashing values and interests. The 
recategorization strategy suggests that shared identities/interests will offset distrusts 
and negative effects derived from competing identities, such as China and many 
regional states’ nationalist identities that view disputed territories as mutually 
exclusive. SIT’s emphasis on the actor’s rational choice tells us that China can control 
actions derived from the identities that conflict with those of others. For instance, it 
could pursue its crucial nationalist interests in a restrained manner to avoid overt 




forming an increasing salience of the shared identity or interests and downplaying 
actions derived from the identities conflicting with others, China could maintain a 
relatively peaceful environment without radically changing its political system or 
losing its crucial nationalist interests.  
  
Critical Review of application of SIT in IR and China’s rise 
 
SIT is useful in analyzing domestic politics, especially between minority and majority 
groups or higher and lower status social groups. However, while the thesis analyzes 
Chinese domestic politics, it will not examine this aspect by investigating intergroup 
conflicts within China. As a theory that mainly focuses on analyzing intergroup conflict 
and cooperation (Hogg, 2016, p. 7), SIT is also applicable in analyzing IR, because 
a state is a “group self” (Kohut, 1985, cited in Wendt, 1999, p. 225).  
 
In IR, because of many similarities between constructivism and SIT regarding identity, 
some constructivists have used SIT to analyze identity formation, that is, how in-
groups and outgroups are formed. For instance, Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston, and 
Mcdermott (2009), and Brady and Kaplan (2009) provided a measurement for identity 
analysis and borrowed concepts from SIT, such as social comparison and social 
categorization (Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston, and Mcdermott, 2009, pp. 24-25, Brady 
and Kaplan 2009, pp. 34-35). This approach was used by Acharya and Layug (2012, 
p. 6) in their analysis of ASEAN. Rumelili (2016, p. 24) views that SIT has a profound 
influence in IR literature, making contributions about how the self and the other have 
been formed.  
 
Further, many scholars use SIT to analyze inter-state relations, especially that 
between the rising dissatisfied power and dominant status quo power. This may be 
because SIT provides an applicable theoretical framework for the analysis. Through 
social categorization and comparison, it is clear which categories the two powers 




dominant higher status state enjoys positive self-image. For instance, Deng (2008, 
pp. 22-24) used social categorization and comparison to analyze the US‘s use of 
liberal value to set up intergroup boundaries between higher liberal and lower status 
illiberal states, and reasons that communist China has been negatively evaluated in 
the US-led liberal order. Also, SIT’s identity management strategies, social mobility, 
social creativity, and social competition, provide a useful framework for analyzing 
how conflicts between rising and established powers can be managed. This has been 
demonstrated in the works of many scholars (Gries, 2005; Larson and Shevchenko, 
2014; Wolf, 2014; Clunan, 2014; Evans, 2015; Larson, 2015; Lee, 2016). Among 
these works, the theoretical framework of Larson and Shevchenko (2014) that 
adjusts SIT into IR has been widely used (Ward, 2015). The main principle of their 
framework is that the failure of rising powers to attain peaceful social mobility and 
creativity will increase the likelihood of social competition between rising and 
established powers.  
 
These scholars’ applications of SIT in IR are somewhat similar to its application in 
this thesis. The identities of states define interests and goals, the self and the other, 
and the understanding of the external environment (Abdelal, et al, 2009, pp. 24-25; 
Brady and Kaplan 2009, pp. 34-35). This tells us how China’s nationalist and 
communist identities define its goals and interests, as well as the self and the other. 
Social categorization and comparison give us reasons why China feels 
disadvantaged on ideological and geostrategic dimensions. Also, the thesis uses the 
main principle of Larson and Shevchenko (2014) to explain the reasons behind the 
inevitability of the competition between China and the established powers on some 
dimensions. 
 
However, Ward (2015, 2017, p. 827) argues that Larson and Shevchenko’s main 
principle, that the state’s failure of peaceful social mobility and social creativity will 
cause social competition, lacks a “firm foundation” when applied to IR. First, Ward 




between social competition and social mobility. Social competition is a collective 
response strategy where the status seeker aims to mobilize the whole disadvantaged 
group to raise status, while social mobility is an individual response strategy where 
the status seeker disidentifies with the disadvantaged group (e.g., a citizen in a poor 
country) and changes the disadvantaged identity (e.g., the citizen obtains the 
nationality of a developed country) (Hogg, 2016, pp7-8). Also, it is wrong to argue 
that the status seeker’s failure to pursue a peaceful social mobility strategy will result 
in conflictual social competition (Ward, 2015, p. 13, 2017, p. 830). Ward argues that 
in social psychology’s version of SIT, social mobility can be conflictual and social 
competition can be peaceful (Ward, 2017, p. 830). For instance, geopolitical 
competition is conflictual but can be regarded as a social mobility strategy if seizing 
a territory from another country is a requirement for the dominant group’s 
membership (Ward, 2017, p. 826). Ward (2017, p. 826) also claims that becoming 
more democratic is peaceful social competition if democratic values are status 
markers, because social competition aims at improving the status seekers’ ”position 
along consensually valued dimensions of comparison.”   
 
Contrary to Larson and Shevchenko’s (2014) view that the state will first choose 
social mobility and creativity before social competition, Barnhart (2016, p. 396) 
argues that the status seeker will prefer social competition over social mobility and 
social creativity. First, this is because “a single instance of disrespect” will make 
states choose competitive actions (Barnhart, 2016, p. 396). Second, social 
competition is less risky than social creativity because it relies upon an “established 
base of status” and the status seeker may fail to establish a new dimension to claim 
superiority (Barnhart, 2016, p. 396).  
 
This thesis holds a similar view with Larson and Shevchenko (2014) that the failure 
to attain peaceful social mobility and creativity will increase the likelihood that the 




and Barnhart (2016, p. 396) will also cast doubt on the validity of the theoretical 
framework of the thesis. Thus, this section critically examines their views in detail.  
 
Ward’s (2017) argument that social mobility is an individual response strategy and 
social competition is a collective response strategy in social psychology’s version of 
SIT is valid. However, like Larson and Shevchenko (2014) and many other scholars 
(Wolf, 2014; Barnhart, 2016, p. 396; Lee, 2016), this thesis argues that blurring the 
distinction makes SIT more applicable in IR. First, there is a different dynamic to 
individual and state behaviors. However, to the extent the state (or the individuals 
acting on its behalf and influencing its behavior) care about identity—and IR 
constructivism has proven that they do—then it seems appropriate to apply the 
concepts in IR. Moreover, treating the state as the social agent makes social mobility 
similar to the constructivists’ concept of socialization. This is because the state, rather 
than its citizens, needs to abandon its identity/social category (e.g., illiberal state) to 
obtain membership in the advantaged group (e.g., liberal states group) if it wishes to 
succeed in socialization or social mobility. As constructivists often use socialization 
to support China’s peaceful rise, the reasons that cause social mobility to fail help 
the thesis explain why the socialization argument is flawed. Further, if social 
competition is not a collective response strategy, it is more flexible when this concept 
is applied to the rising and established powers’ relationship. This is because the rising 
power does not need to always cooperate with other states that share the same 
disadvantaged identity to compete with the advantaged power or group in the flexible 
model.  
 
Ward’s (2017, p. 826) distinction between “conflicting social mobility” and “peaceful 
social competition” is flawed. In social psychology’s version of SIT, the distinction 
between social mobility and competition is based on changes in the advantaged 
group’s status. In this version, the advantaged group’s status will not lose if the status 
seeker pursues social mobility because the goal of the latter is to gain acceptance in 




abandons its illiberal state identity and becomes a liberal state, its status will rise in 
the US-led order because it meets the requirement of entering the dominant liberal 
states group. Accepting China into the group will not make liberal states lose their 
leading position because liberal ideology still dominates the order. However, social 
competition means changes in position between the lower and higher status groups 
(Tajfel and Turner, 2001, p. 104), that is, the lower status group becomes the higher 
status group after the successful social competition (Tajfel and Turner, 2001, p. 104). 
This means that illiberal states become a dominant group, while liberal states become 
a lower status group if China wins the ideological competition. Thus, Ward’s (2017, 
p. 826) view that the status seeker’s strategy for becoming more democratic is a 
peaceful social competition is wrong because democratic states will not lose their 
dominant position after the status seeker’s democratization.  
 
Moreover, the occupation of territory is not a social mobility strategy as Ward (2017, 
p. 826) suggested because one country’s occupation of a territory will make the other 
country lose its status or interests. For instance, in 1931, Japan’s occupation of the 
Chinese province Manchuria increased its status as an imperial power. However, it 
threatened the status of Britain, the once dominant colonial power that had “exercised 
an informal empire in China” (The Cabinet Papers, no date). Moreover, because 
social competition means reversing the status on important dimensions (Tajefel and 
Turner, 2001, p. 104) and ranges from “protests to revolution and war” (Hogg, 2016, 
p. 8), it will hardly be peaceful as Ward (2017, p.826) argued.  
 
Besides disagreeing with Ward’s (2017) views, this chapter counters Barnhart’s 
(2016, p. 396) claim that states will prefer social competition over social mobility 
because a single case of dissatisfaction will make the status seeker choose 
competitive strategies. In SIT, a dissatisfaction or feeling of unfairness towards the 
higher status group is not enough for the status seeker to pursue competitive strategy 
because the instability of hierarchy where the status seeker is capable to challenge 




(Brown, 2000, p. 330; Hogg, 2016, p.7). The second argument of Barnhart (2016, p. 
396) somewhat proves this point by indicating that due to the feeling of unfairness, 
the status seeker with the sufficient capability will choose social competition. Further, 
the thesis counters Barnhart’s (2016, p. 396) argument that social creativity is riskier 
than social competition. While the status seeker that pursues social creativity wishes 
to establish a new dimension for comparison, this dimension may not be valued by 
the higher status group (e.g., China’s leading position in table tennis matches). 
However, social competition would mean reversing the group’s disadvantaged status 
on salient dimensions valued by higher and lower status groups (Tajefel and Turner, 
2001, p. 104) (e.g., technological competition). Under such circumstance, wining 
social competition is riskier than achieving social creativity; thus, it is unlikely that a 
state will choose social competition before social mobility and social creativity. 
 
To recap, the criticisms of Ward (2017) and Barnhart (2016) will not prevent the thesis 
from using the principle that a failed peaceful social mobility and social creativity will 
make disadvantaged states choose social competition, which is also highlighted by 
the current dominant SIT framework (Larson, 2015), to address the optimistic 
scholars’ flaws. This is because treating the state as an agent makes the social 
mobility strategy similar to the socialization concept of constructivists. The causes of 
the failure of social mobility help the thesis explain the reasons why the socialization 
argument of optimistic constructivists is flawed. Also, Ward’s (2017, p. 286) 
distinction between conflictual social mobility and peaceful social competition ignores 
the change of status between the lower and higher status groups as an important 
criterion in the social psychological version of SIT. Additionally, Barnhart’s (2016) 
argument that a state will prefer social competition to social creativity conflicts with 
SIT’s emphasis on the actor’s rational choice because social competition is the 
costliest strategy. Thus, the principle of the current dominant SIT framework in IR, 
which indicates that a failed peaceful social mobility and creativity will make the state 




competition between China and established powers on some dimensions is likely to 
happen.  
 
When the current dominant IR SIT framework is used to analyze China’s rise, the 
academic works have four major weaknesses.  
 
First, scholars who use SIT to analyze China’s rise generally argue that Sino–US 
competition is avoidable. Most scholars argue that social mobility will not work 
because China strongly identifies with nationalist and communist identities and is 
unwilling to abandon them (Gries, 2005, p. 250; Larson and Shevchenoko, 2010; 
Larson, 2015; Lee, 2016). However, they view social creativity as a useful path that 
can allow China to raise its status and preserve its two identities without conflicting 
with the US (Gries, 2005; Larson and Shevchenoko, 2010; Larson, 2015, 2020; Lee, 
2016). However, China’s strong identification with its nationalist and communist 
identities, which makes social mobility infeasible in preventing Sino–US competition, 
has the same effects on social creativity. This is because the new dimension that the 
status seeker finds for favorable comparison cannot make up for its dissatisfaction 
derived from its disadvantaged identity, or the unfavorable comparison with the 
outgroup on dimensions it values most. For instance, Chinese nationalists care about 
national security and, consequently, military power. Therefore, China may feel 
disadvantaged because of unfavorable comparisons between its military power and 
that of other states, even if it compares favorably with them on other dimensions, 
such as economic growth.  
 
Second, scholars generally believe that the social competition between China and 
the US can be avoided through a successful social creativity strategy. Therefore, 
none of them have considered how China could preserve a peaceful environment 
and the crucial interests defined by its two identities without conflicting with the US in 
a competition scenario (Wolf, 2014; Gries, 2005; Larson, 2015; Lee, 2016). Thus, 




been mentioned in academic works that use SIT to analyze China’s rise. Among 
scholars that use SIT to analyze IR, three have mentioned the recategorization 
strategy. Mercer (1995, p. 250) mentioned that the European Union (EU) can 
ameliorate conflicts between France and Germany. However, Mercer (1995, p. 250) 
indicates that this superordinate identity will not change the self and other distinction 
because the EU also has the other, such as Japan. Ward (2015, p. 21) noted the 
recategorization strategy and used it to explain how the shared Anglo-Saxon identity 
fosters a relatively peaceful power transition from the UK to the US in the 20th century. 
However, his case study lacked depth (Ward, 2015, p. 29). Wendt (1999, p. 229) 
argued that collective identity is social identity. However, as noted in the introduction, 
the constructivists’ definition of collective identity formation is largely dissimilar to that 
of SIT. Thus, using the recategorization to analyze China’s relations with regional 
countries and the US can fill the gap in academic works that have used SIT to 
investigate China’s rise and IR. 
 
Third, the actor’s rational choice has been underplayed or ignored by scholars that 
use SIT to analyze China’s rise. Gries (2005) separated SIT from rationalism, arguing 
that “symbolic and rationalist approaches” are complementary in the analysis of 
China’s rise. Likewise, Lee (2016, p. 30) criticized IR realists and liberal 
institutionalists for focusing on a rationalist view to analyze China’s rise. Larson (2015, 
p. 348) seems to note that China is a rational actor, using one sentence to argue that 
China did not choose to compete for dominance in East Asia because such move will 
be balanced by regional powers and the US. Underplaying the rational choice of the 
actor in the framework is striking because, as noted in the preceding section, SIT 
regards the rational choice as being equally important as legitimacy or identity in 
dealing with intergroup relationships.  
 
Fourth, scholars using SIT to analyze China’s rise focus on the Sino–US power 




China’s actions in the SCS or Taiwan, although China specialists generally agree 
that the country’s actions in SCS and Taiwan are a hard case of its peaceful rise.  
The application of SIT in analyzing the research question 
 
Because the thesis views SIT theoretical framework of Larson (2015) as workable 
despite criticism, it will first use the framework to analyze important and valued 
dimensions for the social categorization and comparison between China and the US 
or regional countries. Social categorization and comparison define the disadvantaged 
ingroup and advantaged outgroup based on such dimensions (e.g., disadvantaged 
China and the advantaged US on ideological dimension). Intergroup relationships on 
these dimensions are competitive and mutually exclusive. In IR, states are rated 
according to valued and important dimensions, such as economic power, “coercive 
capability” (Larson, 2015, p. 327), and geopolitical position (Brzezinski, 1997/1998, 
p. 48). As the leading power in the international community, the US has set up liberal 
values as an important dimension of evaluation (Deng, 2008, p. 26; Khong, 2013, pp. 
1-2). In the context of East Asia, many countries value their claimed sovereignty over 
disputed territories. Thus, consolidating sovereign claim is an important dimension 
East Asian states compare because successful consolidation will enhance their 
positive self-image as defenders of sovereignty integrity. As will be discussed in 
Chapter 4, China’s nationalist and communist identities have led to its view that it is 
disadvantaged on the ideological, territorial disputes, and East Asian geostrategic 
dimensions.  
 
This thesis agrees with other scholars that use SIT that social mobility is ineffective 
for China to gain positive feeling on these dimensions because China is unwilling to 
abandon the two identities (Gries, 2005, Larson, 2015). However, it argues that social 
creativity strategy is also ineffective, which will be further detailed in Chapter 4. 
Therefore, competitions between China and regional countries or the US are 





By arguing that the competitions are inevitable, this thesis adds two elements to the 
current dominant SIT framework in IR. First, it analyzes how China could preserve its 
communist identity and advance crucial nationalist interests, while maintaining a 
relatively peaceful environment by thwarting a hard-balancing coalition through 
recategorization strategies. Also, unlike IR theorists who generally focus on collective 
identity formation (Wendt, 1999; Ward, 2015), this thesis is centered on China’s 
cross-cutting identities/interests with other actors, that is, while China has identities 
that conflict with other actors on some dimensions, it also shares identities and 
interests with others on other dimensions. For instance, while China and many 
regional countries’ nationalist identities and interests are mutually exclusive on 
dimensions of territorial disputes, they share pluralist identity and economic interests. 
These shared identities and interests can offset the negative effects of conflicting 
ones (Brewer, 2011, p. 138).  
 
Second, this thesis brings the actor’s rational choice back to SIT when applying it to 
IR. SIT postulates that the group, as a rational actor, is able to manage preferences 
derived from disadvantaged identities to some degree (Van Zomeren et al, 2012, p. 
188; Fiske et al, 2016, p. 46). Thus, while China’s conflicting identities or interests 
cause frictions between itself and other actors, it might be able to manage them to 
reduce others’ threat perception towards itself and prevent a complete breakdown of 
its relationship with others.  
 
Finally, rational choice in SIT, like the rational choice theory, means that a rational 
actor adjusts its policy to pursue interests in accordance with power comparison with 
others and their strategies (Kydd, 2008, p. 438). For instance, the higher status group 
shows more willingness to cooperate when the lower status group has external force 
to counter its advantageous power (Ng, 1982, p. 203). 
 
This thesis argues that combining the feature of a cross-cutting identity/interests in 




pave the theoretical foundation for China’s use of its strategic management of 
interests and identities to possibly prevent a hard-balancing coalition and maintain a 
relatively peaceful external environment. Because the shared identities/interests 
contribute to peace and conflicting identities/interests lead to frictions, China can form 
or increase the salience of shared identities/interests with other actors, while 
downplaying conflicting ones to thwart a hard-balancing coalition and preserve a 
relatively peaceful regional environment. This thesis also uses the combination of 
recategorization and rational choice to analyze how China adjusted its strategic 
management to achieve its goals in accordance with its power contribution to others 
and their response to it. 
 
When applied to IR, the emphasis of SIT on the actor’s rational choice is similar to 
the assumptions of realists because states will calculate power distributions with 
others and adjust their strategies accordingly. However, contrary to many realists’ 
assumption that China’s rising power will lead to formation of a hard-balancing 
coalition (Han and Paul, 2019, p. 4), SIT provides insights on how China’s strategic 




This chapter is about the main theoretical framework the thesis is built on. The first 
part of the chapter is a literature review of the theoretical frameworks used by 
scholars to analyze China’s rise. First, the review finds out that regarding China’s rise 
in the region, some optimistic defensive realists, liberal institutionalists, and 
constructivists underestimate the important influence of China’s communist and 
nationalist identities on China’s definition of interests and actions. Also, contrary to 
some pessimistic offensive, classical and neo-classical realists’ expectation, China’s 
rise does not necessarily lead to a hard-balancing coalition of established powers. 
Because the current theoretical frameworks used in the existing literature are not 




approach to understand China’s relationship with other regional countries and the US. 
The second part offers a brief introduction of SIT and presents reasons for SIT to 
address flaws of the existing literature. The third part is a critical review of literature 
that uses SIT to analyze China’s relationship with other actors. This section argues 
that the current dominant SIT framework in IR works despite the criticism that it is 
somewhat dissimilar to the social psychology’s SIT version. However, SIT, as it is 
currently used in IR, falsely regards “social creativity” as a viable strategy to avoid 
competition between China and the US. As I demonstrate, there are limits to the 
applicability of “social creativity” strategies. The recategorization strategy, which is 
an SIT concept on ameliorating competitions, has not been applied to analyze 
China’s rise. Also, the emphasis of SIT on an actor’s rational choice has been ignored 
when scholars use it to analyze China’s rise. I argue that combining the 
recategorization strategy with SIT’s emphasis on rational choice can be applied to 
analyze how a communist and nationalist China prevents the formation of a hard-
balancing coalition in a competition scenario. This thesis will also fill the gap of 
application of SIT in IR by using SIT framework to analyze the flash points in the 
region. The fourth part of this chapter discusses how SIT will be applied to the thesis 
to analyze how China maintains a relatively peaceful environment without 
abandoning its nationalist and communist identities and related crucial interests. By 
constructing or increasing the salience of its shared identities or interests with other 
relevant actors, while pursuing interests that conflict with others in a restrained 
manner, China could maintain a relatively peaceful environment without 











Chapter 3. United Front Strategy (UFS) 
SIT provides the general idea that China can pursue crucial nationalist interests, 
preserve its communist identity, and maintain a relatively peaceful regional 
environment by thwarting the formation of a hard-balancing coalition through a 
recategorization strategy and rational choice. China might be able to achieve the 
three tasks simultaneously by strategically managing identities and interests. First, it 
can seek shared identities and interests with other relevant actors that could cancel 
out the negative effects of competition derived from conflicting identities 
(recategorization strategy). Second, it can pursue interests related to conflicting 
identities with restraint to manage frictions (rational choice). China can also adjust its 
strategic management of identities and interests according to the others’ response 
and distribution of power among relevant actors (rational choice) to achieve the 
aforementioned tasks. However, when applied in the context of China’s rise, SIT is 
not specific about how China constructs its shared identities or interests and controls 
conflicting ones. It is also not specific about how China could adjust its strategic 
management of them.  
 
The UFS is an example of an SIT by providing concrete ways on how China can put 
SIT into practice. It provides a practical framework for how a rising but disadvantaged 
actor adjusts its strategic management of identities and interests in accordance with 
the changing power distribution with advantaged actors and the response of others. 
It is also specific about how China could pursue or preserve crucial interests that 
conflict with others’ interests while controlling its actions to maintain a relatively 
peaceful surrounding environment. Finally, it specifies how China could construct 
shared identities and interests with relevant actors.  
 
The novelty of this chapter is twofold. First, many Chinese scholars use traditional 
Chinese thought to explore how China can achieve a peaceful rise (Yan, 2014; Qin, 




(Slyke, 1970, p. 134; Armstrong, 1977, p. 1) has rarely been used to analyze China’s 
peaceful rise. Second, the use of the UFS in the thesis is different from the current 
dominant view of the strategy as one that is revolutionary, reflecting irreconcilable 
competition between authoritarian and democratic states. In this thesis, UFS is a 
practice of SIT that aims to manage the competition and cultivate shared identities 
and interests that enable trust and compromise between conflicting parties by 
cancelling out the negative effects of competition.  
 
The first part of the chapter explains how the UFS used in the thesis is different from 
the dominant view. In the second part, using the CCP’s UFS during the Anti-
Japanese War as an example, this chapter aims to show how SIT can be applied in 
the context of power transition. It also aims to deduce the specific principles of what 
I call as China’s strategic management of identities and interests that can help the 
country prevent the formation of a hard-balancing coalition, while pursuing crucial 
and conflicting interests.  
 
Difference between UFS used in this thesis and current dominant view of UFS 
  
The dominant view of UFS (Brady, 2017; Groot, 2017; Kynge et al, 2017; Dreyer, 
2018; Garnaut, 2018; Gill and Schreer, 2018; Bowe, 2018; Suzuki, 2019) claims that 
China is using UFS to quietly subvert the Western democratic society. Scholars argue 
that China’s united front activities often include its covert, and sometimes illegal, 
interactions with sub-national actors within the democratic countries, such as 
manipulating overseas Chinese communities, bribing the elites of political parties, 
and cultivating agents in democratic countries (Brady, 2017; Suzuki, 2019). From 
their perspective, united front work also includes China’s political propaganda and 
espionage activities (Brady, 2017, p. 3). Some scholars also look at China’s 
economic engagement with other countries (Brady, 2017; Gill and Schreer, 2018). 
According to them, these UFS activities are subversive because they undermine 




and challenge fundamental liberal norms, such as freedom of speech (Brady, 2017; 
Gill and Scheer, 2018; Garnaut, 2018). The scholars’ view of the UFS is similar to 
the concept of sharp power, which refers to China’s use of many similar subversive 
tactics to pursue its own political agenda at the expense of the crucial interests of 
democratic countries (The Economist, 2017; Suzuki, 2019).  
 
The first feature of the dominant view of the UFS implies that it is a revolutionary 
strategy that aims to defeat Western democracy. According to Brady (2017, pp. 2-3), 
this view is derived from the origin of the UFS as a Leninist strategy that seeks to 
exploit even the smallest frictions among enemies, form a temporary alliance with 
former enemies, and lead a revolutionary force to defeat capitalists (Armstrong, 1977, 
pp. 16-17).  
 
However, this interpretation of UFS overlooks the fact that CCP made a distinction 
between domestic and international UFS. During the Anti-Japanese War, the UFS 
was a revolutionary strategy used by CCP to struggle for power and control. However, 
CCP stated that it abandons the revolutionary objective in international UFS that is 
mainly about China’s relationship with other states (Mao, 1971, cited in Xiong, 2006, 
pp. 373-374). As Mao (1971, cited in Xiong, pp.373-374) stated, “the fundamental 
difference between domestic UFS and international UFS is [that]… CCP must obtain 
leadership in domestic UFS while regarding international UFS… there is no issue of 
leadership.” The leadership in domestic UFS means the CCP’s revolutionary goal 
aimed at making it the ruling party in China. Having stated that China should “never 
think about leading others [in international UFS]” (Mao, 1971, cited in Xiong, 2006, 
pp. 373-384), CCP conveys that its international UFS has no revolutionary goals of 
seeking hegemony, defeating rival ideology, and controlling others. However, it aims 
to maintain a benign relationship with other countries.  
 
Two historical pieces of evidence of China’s diplomacy may counter CCP’s statement 




First, from the late 1950s to 1970, China adopted a revolutionary UFS that attempted 
to help it achieve its revolutionary goals of defeating capitalism and exported 
revolutions to many Third World countries. This demonstrates the zero-sum 
ideological struggle between socialism and capitalism at the time. However, while 
this evidence did reflect China’s revolutionary strategy then, Chinese scholars have 
generally viewed the strategy as a betrayal of the principles of international UFS that 
aimed to construct a peaceful environment and promote coexistence among states. 
Yang Gongsu and Zhang Zhirong (2009, p. 189), a senior Chinese diplomat from 
1949 to 1983 and a professor of politics from Peking University, respectively, argued 
that the “international UFS that was established since the founding of New China and 
that has stressed peaceful co-existence” was distorted as a “surrender to imperialism, 
revisionism and reactionaries.” Likewise, Yang Kuisong (2010, p. 74), a professor of 
Peking University renowned for his research on CCP history, argued that, since 1958, 
the CCP’s denial of international UFS that had promoted a peaceful co-existence has 
seriously tarnished China’s national image and isolated it from the rest of the world. 
Similarly, Wei and Wei (2010, p. 132) argued that revolutionary diplomacy in the 
1960s was a failure because it threatened other countries and betrayed China’s 
peaceful diplomatic principle.  
 
Semi-official and official documents have also demonstrated that CCP recognized 
that revolutionary diplomacy was wrong. According to Wu Jianming (2009, p. 10), the 
top Chinese diplomat from 1959 to 2003, Zhou Enlai, then Premier and Foreign 
Minister of China, was angered by revolutionary diplomacy, stating, “I am not sure 
whether you guys [revolutionary diplomats] are revolutionists or not, you are happy 
because you damaged [China’s] relationship with other countries.” In 1968, Mao 
(1968, cited in Gong, 1998, p. 181) admitted that China’s revolutionary diplomacy 
failed because “we had been isolated…no one recognized us.” In 1979, the 
International Department of CCPCC issued an announcement that exonerated senior 
CCP official Wang Jiaxiang’s re-proposal of international UFS principles to CCPCC 




revolutionary, and ameliorate relationships with the Soviet Union and the US (Luo, 
2009). The announcement demonstrates that the CCP had indirectly admitted that 
revolutionary diplomacy in the 1960s was wrong and damaging. 
 
Some scholars may argue that even if CCP stated that revolutionary goal did not 
exist in the international UFS and has admitted that revolutionary diplomacy was 
wrong, the party could bring revolutionary element back to the UFS in the future. This 
thesis acknowledges that this uncertainty exists. However, in this thesis, UFS is 
viewed as a practice of SIT, a theory that aims to find the cause of and remedy for 
intergroup conflicts (Bar-Tal, 2011; Brewer, 2011). Thus, discussing the revolutionary 
goal of UFS is beyond the scope of the thesis. 
 
The second historical evidence is that China broke up its alliance with the former 
Soviet Union and formed a strategic partnership with the US to balance against the 
Soviets in 1972, thereby turning the former ally into a new enemy. Some scholars 
may argue that the change of policies was consistent with the view that UFS was a 
temporary tactic and the breakup was a proof of China’s competition for leadership 
and control over the socialist bloc with the Soviet Union. However, the argument’s 
reasoning is wrong. First, while the two countries did have a spat over the rightful 
path of the socialist movement from the late 1950s to 1960s, Chinese officials 
believed that the breakup was much less due to the competition than the Soviet 
Union’s paternalism, which seriously violated China’s sovereign independence (Wu, 
1999; Mao, 1971, cited in Xiong, 2006, p. 373; Deng, 1989, cited in Xu, 2014, p. 57). 
Second, as will be demonstrated in Chapter 5, China’s strategic partnership with the 
US in 1972 was in line with the thesis’s view of international UFS. This is because 
the partnership was less a temporary tactic to contain the Soviet Union as a new 
enemy, and more a long-term goal of breaking the US-led encirclement. The 
partnership was the key to China’s establishment of diplomatic relationships with 
most of the Western and East Asian allies of the US, and its creation of a relatively 





The second feature of the dominant view is that treating UFS as a revolutionary 
strategy (Brady, 2017) reflects the constant and irreconcilable competition between 
authoritarian and democratic states. Similarly, this thesis views the competition as 
irreconcilable; however, it treats UFS as an example of SIT. Through the lens of SIT, 
it demonstrates how the UFS may help China control competition and cultivate 
shared identities and interests that enable trust by cancelling out the negative effects 
of competition.  
 
Some scholars may disagree with the use of UFS in this thesis and point out the 
negative effect of shared identities/interests. First, they may argue that the shared 
identity/interests between China and other member states effectively cause disunity 
in a certain state group and prevent it from realizing its important values or interests 
(Gill and Schreer, 2018, p. 162). The frequently cited example supporting this 
argument is Greece’s opposition to the EU’s condemnation of China’s human rights 
records in 2017 because Greece needed China’s investment (Gill and Schreer, 2018, 
p. 162). To many scholars, another solid evidence of the argument is that China 
successfully prevented ASEAN from reaching consensus on the SCS policy by 
pressuring Cambodia to veto against Vietnam and the Philippines’ proposal of 
specifying disputed SCS areas in the 2012 ASEAN Foreign Minister meeting’s (AMM) 
joint communique (Murphy, 2017, p. 64; Gill and Schreer, 2018, p. 162).  
 
First, China ‘s influence on individual group member is not as strong as these 
scholars argued because the group itself had shared but contradictory interests 
regarding disputes. Cambodia’s case demonstrated this point. To be sure, at the 
meeting to draft the 2012 AMM communiqué, Cambodia’s stubborn rejection of 
Vietnam and the Philippines’ proposal did reflect China’s position regarding the 
disputes (Thayer, 2012). However, ASEAN members shared but contradictory 
interests regarding SCS disputes caused their disunity as well. As I demonstrated in 




interests in deescalating tension. However, these interests are contradictory because 
using ASEAN-led forums or strong wording in the forums’ statements may 
antagonize China and further escalate tension. At the meeting, Cambodia used 
ASEAN’s shared interest in de-escalating tensions, noting that the wording in the 
communiqué draft was so strong as to be unhelpful in realizing this interest (Thayer, 
2012). Some ASEAN states also mentioned this interest. Thailand highlighted the 
need to de-escalate tensions and preserve a benign relationship with China (Thayer, 
2012). Brunei, Laos, and Myanmar stressed the need to promote regional peace and 
engage with China (Thayer, 2012). Also, Malaysia and Indonesia proposed the less 
confrontational phrase ‘disputed area’, which Cambodia went on to endorse (Thayer, 
2012). This demonstrates a compromise on the part of a mild claimant like Malaysia. 
However, the Philippines and Vietnam rejected this proposal and used another 
ASEAN interest to support their argument. They insisted that ASEAN-led forums 
must stress the tension in the specific area (Thayer, 2012). Thus, examining the 
meeting in detail did not show that ASEAN was divided into two, with Cambodia 
representing China’s interests and the other ASEAN members wishing to address 
concerns by specifying the area of tension. In addition to the China factor, ASEAN’s 
disunity occurred because of its members’ insistence on realizing ASEAN’s 
contradictory interests. Hayton (2014) indicated that most ASEAN countries stressed 
the importance of ASEAN’s unity and that Cambodia’s rejection caused the disunity. 
However, ASEAN’s unity could also have been achieved if Vietnam and the 
Philippines had accepted the wording of ‘disputed area’ proposed by Malaysia and 
Indonesia and endorsed by Cambodia.  
 
Second, in some cases, it is the group members’ division over other crucial policies 
unrelated to China that leads to or strengthens shared identities or interests between 
China and some group members, rather than the other way around. Take Greece’s 
case for example. From 2009 to 2017, Greece’s sovereign debt crisis created a 
division over the austerity policy between wealthy creditors led by Germany and 




policies could ensure that Greece did not use a new loan to repay the old one 
(Amadeo, 2020). However, the policies made Greece feel as if it were being treated 
like “medieval leeches,” according to Costas Douzinas, Head of Greek Parliament’s 
Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee (Horowitz and Alderman, 2017). The 
perceived hostile attitude of many wealthy EU creditors and harsh measures imposed 
by them towards Greece were two of the main reasons that caused frictions within 
the EU. Feeling desperate, Greece then attached greater importance to Chinese 
investments and considered China a valued partner (Douzinas, 2017, cited in 
Horowitz and Alderman, 2017). Greece in turn voluntarily reciprocated China’s aid by 
supporting China’s position when disputes concerning the latter arose (Douzinas, 
2017, cited in Horowitz and Alderman, 2017). Therefore, it was not China that divided 
the EU, but it was the division of the EU that strengthened China’s partnership with 
Greece.  
 
Some scholars may also argue that economic interdependence, one form of shared 
interests between China and other countries, increases others’ dependence on China. 
This provides China with the leverage to pressure other countries to soften their 
position when disputes happen. This is evidenced by China’s ban on banana imports 
from the Philippines when the Scarborough Shoal incident escalated in 2012 (West, 
2012). China also implemented an economic sanction on Australia in 2020 when the 
latter called for an international independent investigation on the origin of the 
coronavirus (Dziedzic, 2020). Beijing believed that the demand was based on a 
presumption of guilt and was aimed at stigmatizing China (Xinhua Net, 2020). 
 
This thesis acknowledges that economic interdependence will increase other 
countries’ dependence on China and give it the leverage to put pressure on them. It 
also acknowledges that a state group’s degree of cohesion that is exclusive and 
competitive to China on some dimensions will be decreased by China’s shared 
identities and interests with its member states on other dimensions. As noted in the 




how China attempts to preserve a relatively peaceful environment by thwarting a US-
led hard balance coalition. 
 
However, unlike scholars who call for enhancing unity between the US and its allies 
to “comprehensively” balance against China (Gill and Schreer, 2018, p. 164), this 
thesis views the effects of shared identities/interests as largely positive. This is 
because despite the negativities of shared identities/interests, the world can be better 
off and more peaceful when most states cooperate with each other through them. 
With shared identities/interests, states cooperating with each other can ameliorate 
frictions derived from conflicting identities/interests, compared to those divided by 
two mutually exclusive rivalry blocs with clear-cut boundaries that can only trigger 
hatred and frictions. Some senior politicians in many countries have already opposed 
the formation of a rivalry bloc. For instance, in 2018, Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee 
Hsieh Loong showed his disapproval of such a formation (Wore, 2018). Likewise, in 
2020, Germany’s Foreign Minister Heiko Mass stated that the EU does not wish for 
the world to be split into “two spheres of influence” and that the organization would 
not benefit if the interests of China and the US become irreconcilable (DW News, 
2020).  
 
The third feature of the dominant view of the UFS focuses on China’s “corrosive” 
networking with subnational actors, especially influential foreigners and overseas 
Chinese in other countries (Brady, 2017; Suzuki, 2019). However, the focus of the 
thesis is on the inter-state relationship, because this thesis treats UFS as an example 
of SIT, a theory of intergroup relations (Hogg, 2016, p. 7). To be sure, the CCP could 
form a shared identity with political parties/groups within East Asian countries. 
However, it is hard for the thesis to analyze the relationships due to language barriers 
and the lack of public information regarding CCP’s relationship with sub-national 





The fourth feature of the dominant view of the UFS is that it treats the strategy as 
deceptive propaganda (Brady, 2017; Groot, 2018, cited in Kuo, 2018). However, this 
thesis will not engage in the unproductive and unending debate of identifying which 
of China’s action or discourse is propaganda. It will also not engage in the normative 
debate of whether labelling the works of China’s united front, which include almost 
all tracks of Chinese diplomacy (Brady, 2017; Suzuki, 2019), as deceptive 
propaganda or sharp power is derived from ideological bias (Shi, 2018), the fear of 
losing American supremacy (Sachs, 2020), or genuine worry about the demise of 
democratic ideology.  
 
 
UFS during the Anti-Japanese War (1935–1945) 
 
This section explores how the idea of SIT can be put into practice through CCP’s 
implementation of the UFS during the Anti-Japanese War, thereby deducing 
principles of China’s strategic management of identities and interests. The section 
first looks at how the disadvantaged CCP strategically managed its identities and 
interests to simultaneously preserve its communist identity, pursue strategic interests, 
and maintain a relatively benign surrounding environment by thwarting the Chiang-
led KMT coalition during the war period. First, I look at how the CCP adjusted its 
strategic management in accordance with the calculation of the changing distribution 
of power between the CCP and Chiang. Second, I examine how it sought shared 
identities/interests with Chiang and KMT warlords to thwart the latter’s encirclement 
and create a benign surrounding environment. Third, I investigate how CCP 
preserved its communist identity and pursued strategic interests while controlling 
ideological and strategic competition to avoid a breakdown of its relationship with 
other actors. 
  
This section will not analyze the CCP’s effort to defeat Japan during this period. 




common threat. Moreover, because thesis will not discuss the revolutionary aspect 
of domestic UFS, it focuses on the CCP’s effort to construct shared identities and 
interests with other counterparts while downplaying conflicting ones, rather than its 
preparation to defeat the KMT. Third, although the Soviet Union had a profound 
influence on the CCP’s united front with the KMT from 1935 to 1939, this section will 
instead analyze the CCP’s efforts to construct a united front with the KMT, to be more 
aligned with the focus of this thesis.  
 
To begin with, UFS is consistent with SIT, which views the intergroup relationship as 
essentially competitive; groups have “profound differences in ideology, value, and 
beliefs” (Hogg and Abrams, 1988, p. 15). During the Anti-Japanese War, the 
disadvantaged group, CCP, viewed the advantaged group, the KMT’s Chiang faction, 
as the ideological and strategic competitor. 
 
Mao (1938) compared China’s power with that of the Japanese army and concluded 
the two stages of relationship between CCP and the Japanese army according to the 
changing distribution of power and Japan’s possible response to the CCP’s 
development. In the first stage, referred to as strategic defensive period, the CCP 
compared unfavorably with Japan on every dimension (Mao, 1938). The second 
stage was a stalemate period caused by the change in power distribution between 
the CCP and Japan (Mao, 1938). During this period, the CCP’s power was growing 
but did not surpass Japan’s power. It reached a point that began to threaten Japan’s 
dominant status and vital interests (Mao, 1938). Due to its fear of further damaging 
interests and losing status, Japan began to constrain the CCP’s development (Mao, 
1938). Because the CCP had substantially increased its power, a declining Japan 
could not easily constrain the CCP. However, the CCP’s power still lagged behind 
Japan’s power. Thus, CCP could not get rid of Japan’s constraints. A stalemate 





Because the CCP compared unfavorably with Japan and KMT‘s Chiang faction on 
all dimensions at the start of the Anti-Japanese War, the two stages can also be 
applied to the CCP-Chiang strategic and ideological competition during this period.  
 
To begin, the CCP had been badly defeated by the KMT in 1935 (People’s Net, 2001) 
and lost nearly all its base areas. It just completed the long march aimed at escaping 
from the KMT’s military encirclement, and only had over 10,000 soldiers (Yang, 2010, 
p. 322). During this year, the CCP was nearing its demise, while the KMT was at the 
peak of its power. 
 
Under such circumstance, the CCP tried to form a shared anti-Japanese identity with 
the KMT to improve the CCP–KMT relationship while viewing the KMT as the 
ideological and strategic competitor. In August of 1935, the CCP first declared in its 
official newspaper that all Chinese parties must be aware that “while having 
disagreements, brothers should unite together to defend humiliation and intervention 
of the external enemy” (CCP, 1935). This discourse intentionally downplayed the 
ideological divide within China and stressed the CCP’s shared Chinese identity with 
the KMT. Moreover, despite insisting on simultaneously resisting the Japanese and 
the Chiang in the declaration and many other public statements, the CCP has 
gradually and subtly signaled its willingness to construct a shared anti-Japanese 
identity with the Chiang since 1935. For instance, Mao stated in January 1936 that 
“as long as Chiang was willing to fight against Japanese, CCP of course could 
cooperate with him hand in hand” (Mao, 1936, cited in Yang, 2010, p. 329). On 
December 12, 1936, KMT warlords Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng arrested their 
commander Chiang in Xi’an City for compelling him to change the anti-communist 
policy into a united resistance against the Japanese. While scholars hold divergent 
views over whether the CCP, Soviet Union, or Chiang’s patriotism played an 
important role in peacefully solving the Xi’an incident, they held the consensus that 
the incident marked the very beginning of the CCP–KMT anti-Japanese united front 




Yang, 2010, p. 336, Tsang, 2015). The CCP’s efforts to form the shared anti-
Japanese identity with the KMT was certainly derived from the urgency of resisting 
Japanese invasion. However, the CCP also wished to make time to reorganize from 
its near demise by using the shared identity to substantially offset the KMT’s view 
that the CCP was an ideological and strategic enemy. 
 
Scholars like Shen (1992, p. 158) and Garver (1988, p. 40) argued that the inclusion 
of Chiang in the united front was insincere because the CCP, especially the Mao-led 
faction, still aimed to overturn him from late 1935 to early 1937. However, some 
Chinese scholars argue that although the CCP resisted Chiang during this period, its 
focus was not to overturn him but to unite with him without conceding its bottom-line 
interests (Zhang, 1988, pp. 59-60; Yang, 1989, pp. 52-53). This is because the CCP 
wanted to compel Chiang to accept its absolute control over the red army in the anti-
Japanese united front (Zhang, 1988, pp. 59-60; Yang, 1989, pp. 52-53; Zhang, 2014, 
p. 32; Xu, 2016, p. 17). If the CCP were determined to be revolutionary, it would not 
have secretly negotiated a possible anti-Japanese united front with Chiang since the 
autumn of 1935 (Garver, 1991, p. 46; Yang, 2010, p. 329). 
 
In the same year, the CCP also abandoned its oversimplified perception that KMT 
warlords are homogenous anti-CCP group members led by Chiang (Mao, 1935). 
Instead, the CCP began to realize the warlords’ cross-cutting identities/interests with 
the CCP. While they were the CCP’s ideological and strategic competitors, the CCP 
could form shared identities/interests with them on other dimensions and seek their 
limited alignment (Mao, 1935, 1940b). To gain alignment, the CCP sought to provide 
interests and form a shared identity/ingroup membership by exhibiting shared values 
(Mao, 1940b). The effectiveness of these two means was proven during the Anti-
Japanese War. The belief that the CCP could obtain assistance from the Soviet Union 
and the shared anti-Japanese alliance identity were two major reasons that warlords, 
such as Zhang Xueliang, somewhat aligned with the CCP and disobeyed Chiang’s 




administration was the central government of China at that time, its control over 
warlords who were at the frontline of combating the CCP was loose. Thus, its 
containment on the CCP’s expansion would not achieve the ideal result if warlords 
halfheartedly obeyed its commands. The CCP was well aware that the warlords’ 
support was not staunch due to their conflicting interests and identities with the CCP. 
However, the CCP believed that, as long as it “continued to develop, was open to all 
and had methods to attract them, while some warlords may abandon CCP, others 
may cooperate with it” (Mao, 1935). 
 
To create a relatively peaceful environment with the KMT for development, seeking 
a shared identity with KMT leader Chiang was the key. This is because without 
Chiang’s acknowledgement of a shared identity/interests with the CCP, it would 
continue to be besieged by KMT warlords even if they halfheartedly obeyed Chiang’s 
demand. This has been demonstrated by the CCP’s situation in the spring of 1936. 
Although warlord Zhang Xueliang had formed an anti-Japanese alliance with the 
CCP and gave the latter breathing space, Chiang greatly compelled Zhang to 
exterminate the CCP (People’s Net-CCP News, 2014). Thus, though halfheartedly, 
Zhang could hardly disobey Chiang’s command (People’s net-CCP news, 2014) and 
was forced to combat against the CCP from September to early December 1936, 
which seriously threatened the CCP’s survival (Yang, 1995, p. 260, 2010, p. 336). 
However, after the Xi’an incident, the CCP was relieved from the KMT military’s 
encirclement to a certain degree due to Chiang’s recognition of shared anti-Japanese 
identity with the CCP. Just as Mao stated, the Xi’an incident “saved us from devil” 
(Mao, no date, cited in Yang, 1995, p. 428) 
 
Besides seeking shared identities with the KMT, the CCP downplayed conflicting 
identities and interests during the Anti-Japanese War. To gain Chiang’s 
acknowledgement of the shared anti-Japanese ally identity, the CCP made its 
communist and strategic competitor identities less salient to Chiang. As Skyle (1970, 




supported by actions, which often include “real concessions” on conflicting 
dimensions. This was evident in the CCP’s anti-Japanese UFS. First, instead of 
stressing ideological and class divide within China, the CCP has begun to emphasize 
the shared Chinese national identity and urgency of forming a shared anti-Japanese 
identity with the KMT in its official newspapers and slogans since 1935. Although it 
had mixed signals and discourse regarding its relationship with Chiang from 1935 to 
1936 (e.g., “anti-Chiang”, “force Chiang to resist the Japanese”), it officially 
abandoned the revolutionary policy and established its main policy of cooperating 
with Chiang to resist the Japanese in 1937 (Yang, 1989, p. 58; Zhang, 1988, p. 60). 
Second, the policy was supported by actions. For instance, in 1937, the CCP first 
publicly promised the KMT to give up its revolutionary policy of violently overturning 
the KMT-led central government (CCPCC, 1937, pp. 157-158). Second, it changed 
its regime name from the Chinese Soviet Republic into the Special Administration of 
the ROC, and was willing to obey the KMT central government’s commands (CCPCC, 
1937, pp. 157-158). Third, it recognized Chiang as the leader of the CCP’s army 
(Xinhua Net, 2012). These actions were the CCP’s big concession to Chiang on the 
ideological dimension because they minimized its revolutionary trait. Moreover, it 
almost met Chiang’s demands for merging the CCP and its army under his central 
government and the KMT’s central army respectively (KMT, 1937, pp. 433-436).  
 
However, for CCP, forming a shared identity and downplaying the conflicting identity 
by making concessions must be based on the preservation of its communist identity 
and important strategic interests. CCP was very cautious to preserve its regime’s 
existence and independence (Xinhua Net, 2012). For example, its reluctance to 
satisfy Chiang’s demands mentioned above was the reason that its negotiation with 
and Chiang on the united front from August 1935 to September 1936 failed (Garver, 
1988, p. 54). Even when CCP had to accept Chiang’s demands in 1937, its bottom-
line was to preserve its occupied areas and have absolute control over the red army 
(Sheng, 1992, p. 163; Yang, 2010, p. 329). Thus, to avoid assimilation of the red 




a new central military committee to strengthen its direct control over the army (Zhou, 
2015, p. 441). 
 
CCP’s efforts in forming a united front with the KMT was a strategy of upward mobility. 
From 1937 to 1940, the period that this thesis defined as the CCP’s strategic 
defensive period, the CCP’s power compared unfavorably with that of Chiang on all 
dimensions but the party strived to re-organize party institutions and develop after 
the establishment of the united front. First, CCP enlarged its base areas, set up a 
military region in these areas, and quickly and effectively expanded its army (Zhou, 
2015, p. 443). Second, CCP established a centralized system. Third, CCP developed 
its economy in its base areas (Yu, 2005, pp. 43-44). As a result of the successful 
completion of these policies, CCP’s power dramatically developed in this period. The 
party built a regime that had many base areas and had absolute control over a strong 
army. 
 
CCP’s development in the defensive period narrowed its power disparity with Chiang 
and threatened the Chiang faction’s status as the ruling party of China. Thus, from 
1939 to 1945, the Chiang faction shifted its policy from fighting with the Japanese to 
constraining CCP’s expansion and tightening its economic and military blockade on 
the CCP’s base areas (Garver, 1988, p. 239; Yang, 2010, p. 428). Conflicts between 
the KMT and CCP consequently increased (War Annals Office of Japanese Defence 
Ministry, 1982, p. 204). During this period, Chiang initiated the CCP-named “anti-
communist high tides” (Garver, 1988, p. 239) where it focused its economic, political, 
and military power on the containment of the CCP. This thesis characterizes this time 
as a stalemate period between the CCP and Chiang. Because the CCP’s power had 
dramatically increased in the defensive period, Chiang could not easily constrain the 
CCP. However, because the CCP’s power had not yet surpassed that of the Chiang 
faction, CCP could not get rid of Chiang’s constraints. Facing changes in power 
distribution and Chiang’s response to the CCP’s rise, the latter adjusted its strategic 





Perceiving that its communist identity was endangered by Chiang’s constraints, the 
CCP increasingly tightened its control over its regime to preserve its existence and 
stability. First, the CCP fortified its centralized leading system and established core 
leadership (Mao, 1943). “Party, regime and the army were under unified leaderships” 
(Mao, 1943). Second, the CCP unified elites and ordinary party members. In 1941, it 
began its rectification movement, which aimed at eliminating factional conflicts within 
the party through self- and peer criticism (Ju, 1996, p. 119; Shi, 2012, p. 17). The 
movement also prevented the party from decentralization, wherein many elites acted 
in terms of their own experiences or based on the Soviet Union’s demand, instead of 
that of the CCPCC (Shi, 2012, pp. 12-13). The central task of the movement was to 
band the party, especially the elites’ group, together under the guidance of Mao’s 
beliefs by unifying their ideas about the CCP’s goals and policy making. The central 
committee’s control over grassroots party organizations was also tightened through 
a “purifying party” movement that censored the loyalty of the members (Wang, 2000, 
p. 17). As a result of these measures, the CCP maximized the unity of the regime 
and ensured the stability and effectiveness of the centralized regime to balance 
against Chiang. 
 
During the stalemate period, the CCP rationally adjusted its strategy of seeking a 
shared identity and interests in accordance with others’ strategy regarding the CCP. 
During this period, CCP focused on maintaining a shared identity/interests with 
centrists while attempting to do the same with Chiang (Mao et al, 1940). The CCP 
may have perceived Chiang’s determination to prioritize conflictual identity and 
interests over shared ones, and contain the CCP through an economic and military 
blockade. Thus, it was much harder to seek a shared identity with Chiang than with 
centrists. For instance, while Chiang began to concentrate his forces to constrain the 
CCP in 1939, Mao (1939, p. 221) stated in his speech that “as long as Chiang was 
anti-Japanese, we should still insist on supporting Commander Chiang.” in 1938, 




1938). These advices included setting up a committee to coordinate and discuss 
military, party and political affairs between the two parties, and reaching substantive 
compromises to ameliorate military frictions (Law, 2011, p.38). This indicated that the 
CCP would continue seeking a shared anti-Japanese identity with Chiang as long as 
the latter recognized that the KMT and CCP had a common enemy. However, in the 
same year, Chiang (1939, cited in Zhou, 1939, pp. 192-193) told Zhou Enlai, “to me, 
[merging CCP into KMT] was a matter of life and death, if this goal couldn’t be 
achieved, I would not rest in peace when I died [and] winning anti-Japanese war was 
not meaningful.” This showed that he prioritized eliminating the CCP over sharing an 
anti-Japanese identity with them. In 1939, KMT commanded CCP to hand over its 
absolute control of the Eighth-Route Army and New Four Army to KMT central 
committee and to disband CCP regimes in Shanxi, Gansu, and Ningxia regions 
(Chen, 2001, p.338). Therefore, CCP could hardly maintain a shared identity with 
Chiang without giving up CCP regime. In contrast, CCP was optimistic regarding 
seeking a shared identity with warlords. For instance, in Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and 
Zhou Enlai’s telegram to other party members in 1940, they asked the members to 
“mobilize all resources” to win over “friend armies,” which was “very meaningful and 
possible” (Mao et al, 1940). 
 
As the centrists were surrounding the CCP, preserving a shared identity and interests 
with them could substantially reduce the effectiveness of Chiang’s blockade, thus 
helping the CCP maintain a relatively stable surrounding environment. For instance, 
in 1940, the CCP was militarily blockaded by Tang Enbo and Li Pingxian from the 
Chiang faction (Mao et al, 1940). However, it wished that its effort to win over the 
“sympathy” and “neutrality” of the centrist warlords accompanying Tang and Li would 
make the central army’s military blockade on them less effective and help them 
counter the “anti-communist movement” (Mao et al, 1940). According to the telegram, 
shared anti-Japanese identity was proved to be effective for CCP to win over centrist 
warlords and cancel out negative effects caused by warlords’ anti-CCP identity (Mao, 




constructing shared anti-Japanese identity with Li Mingyang and Li Changjiang, two 
local warlords in Subei district, prevented them from containing the Eighth-Route 
Army passing their garrison areas and thus caused Chiang’s subordinate Han 
Deqing’s failure to defeat CCP (Qin and Wu, 2007, Benton, 1999, p.523). These 
warlords’ halfhearted support for Chiang’s blockade indirectly but greatly reduced the 
pressure Chiang put on the CCP (Mao et al, 1940).  
 
Besides maintaining shared identities/interests with warlords on strategic dimensions 
that were sensitive to and valued by all relevant parties, the CCP intentionally 
conducted development in a restrained manner to avoid making strategic conflicts 
salient enough to completely break down its relationship with other parties. For 
instance, the expansion of the CCP’s base areas did not cover those occupied by 
warlords to show the CCP’s accommodation of their interests and prevent the 
breakup of the relationship (Wei, 2010, p. 11). Moreover, as long as critical strategic 
interests were secured, the CCP would concede less important strategic interests to 
show compromise and alleviate frictions (Mao, 1940a). For instance, through a 
telegram sent in 1940, Mao asked Peng Dehuai, then Deputy Commander of the 
CCP army, to stop expanding base areas in Northern China because “over-
expansion would make centrists view the CCP as over-offensive”, thereby making 
the CCP lose their “sympathy” (Mao, 1940a). Under the circumstance that the CCP’s 
crucial strategic interests were secured, such as its successful occupation of lanes 
or counties that were of strategic significance, Mao (1940a) asked Peng to concede 
less important strategic interests, such as the withdrawal of troops from lanes and 
counties occupied by the CCP, but were of less strategic importance. This move was 
intended to ameliorate the tense relationship with warlords. 
 
Finally, the CCP reacted when KMT warlords or Chiang’s actions evoked conflictual 
identities and triggered irritants with them, but they cautiously kept these incidents in 
check. While the CCP must react when an incident occurs, it also attempted to avoid 




defense” and “being restrained” in the CCP’s active defense principle (Mao, 1940b). 
When responding to incidents, the CCP would cautiously exclude counterattack 
strategies that were viewed as too offensive and consequently destructive to its 
relationships with Chiang or warlords. Reacting through non-military means was 
more preferred over military means because they are less destructive to CCP-
warlords/Chiang’s relationships (Mao, 1941b). For instance, the Chiang faction 
almost eliminated the CCP’s New Four Army in Wan’nan in January 1941 (Lv, 2011). 
The CCP was deeply angered about the Wan’nan incident but excluded military 
options to counter-attack Chiang because its power lagged behind his. Moreover, 
using force to take revenge could also lead to a “comprehensive breakup” between 
the CCP and Chiang (Mao, 1941a), which would be devastating for the former. 
Instead of reacting through military means, the CCP used political means, such as 
negotiation and protest, to react to Chiang’s elimination of the New Fourth Army 
(Zeng, 2014, p. 11) 
 
However, when the CCP’s critical strategic interests were involved in incidents such 
as KMT’s blockade of its expansion of base areas, it would use military means to 
secure its strategic interests (Mao, 1940a). However, military actions were conducted 
with restraint to avoid a complete breakdown of the relationship. Moreover, to prevent 
an escalation of the incident, the CCP expressed willingness to negotiate a peaceful 
solution with other relevant parties (Mao, 1940b). In addition, when they softened 
their attitude and actions, the CCP would de-escalate tension correspondingly (Mao, 
1940b). For instance, the warlord Yan Xishan occupied the Lvliang and Zhongtiao 
mountains in Shanxi Province in 1940 (Mao, 1940a), which threatened the CCP’s 
important strategic interests by blocking all the main communication lines between 
the CCP capital Yan’an and its base areas in Northern China (Yang, 2019, p. 89). 
Thus, Mao commanded Eight Route Army’s Deputy General Peng Dehuai to “at least 
restore a communication line and base area” (Mao, 1940a). Mao, however, also 
stressed that “upon the completion of the mission, CCP could stop and let Yan 




CCP and Yan and avoid completely destroying the relationship between the two (Mao, 
1940a). CCP sent delegations to Yan to express its willingness to peacefully solve 
the conflicts and restore the relationship with Yan (Mao, 1940a).  
 
As the thesis demonstrated above, the CCP chose non-military means to react to the 
Wan’nan incident in 1941 and military means to counter Yan’s occupation of Lvliang 
mountain in 1940, although both Yan and the Chiang faction were more powerful 
than the CCP at the time. This may be because Although the CCP suffered a huge 
loss due to Chiang faction’s elimination of the New Fourth Army in Wan’nan in 1941, 
its crucial strategic interests, such as base areas, remained secure, but Yan’s 
occupation of the mountain blocked all communication lines and seriously threatened 
the CCP’s crucial strategic interests. 
 
To sum up, this part of the thesis aims to use the CCP’s UFS during the Anti-
Japanese War to demonstrate how SIT can be applied in the context of power 
transition and deduce the principles of China’s strategic management of identities 
and interests.   
 
First, the disadvantaged actor, the CCP, manages identities and interests 
strategically in accordance with its power comparison with other relevant parties and 
their strategies concerning the CCP. For instance, because of the large power gap 
between the CCP and KMT during the Anti-Japanese War, the former sought a 
shared identity and shared interests with the latter to alleviate frictions and buy time 
for development. Before the defensive period between the CCP and KMT, the former 
mainly aimed to develop a shared identity or interests with the dominant Chiang 
faction. This is because only through Chiang’s acknowledgement of the shared 
identity/interests could the CCP break the Chiang-led economic and military blockade 
and preserve a relatively peaceful environment between the CCP and KMT. However, 
in the stalemate period, while attempting to preserve a shared identity and interests 




interests with KMT warlords. This was because Chiang was determined to contain 
the CCP’s rising power during this period, it is hard for CCP to maintain shared 
identity/interests with Chiang. Moreover, because the warlords were surrounding the 
CCP, preserving a shared identity and interests with them could substantially reduce 
the effectiveness of Chiang’s blockade and help the CCP maintain a relatively stable 
surrounding environment.  
 
Second, the CCP forms a benign relationship with other actors and preserves a 
relatively peaceful surrounding environment by seeking shared identities and 
interests and downplaying conflicting ones. For instance, it formed a shared anti-
Japanese ally identity with the Chiang faction during the anti-Japanese war.  
 
Moreover, the CCP makes the conflicting identity/interests less salient in six ways. 
First, forming a shared identity and interests with others will offset frictions derived 
from conflicting ones. Second, the CCP made concessions on less critical interests. 
For instance, the CCP recognized the ideological competitor Chiang as its 
commander to reduce salience of strategic and ideological competition between the 
two side. Third, the CCP pursued strategic interests in an incremental and restrained 
manner to avoid overt escalation and a complete breakdown of relationships between 
itself and others to preserve a relative peace. For instance, the CCP’s base areas 
during the Japanese War did not expand into areas occupied by warlords to prevent 
the CCP–warlords relationship from deteriorating. Fourth, when others raise an 
incident that makes conflicting identities salient, the CCP reacts with restraint to avoid 
a total breakdown of its relationship with others. It will choose less confrontational 
means to react to control its reaction. Fifth, even when the CCP acts offensively to 
prevent losing its critical interests, it acted with restraint and always showed a 
cooperative attitude for negotiation. Sixth, when the CCP feels that its critical interests 
or identities are secured, it will avoid escalating frictions to uncontrollable levels that 




restraint, seeks a shared identity or interests to offset frictions, or concedes less 
important interests defined by the conflicting identities.  
 
However, although UFS helped CCP preserve its communist identity and achieve its 
strategic goals while thwarting the Chiang-led anti-CCP coalition, this strategy also 
had its limitations. Because the CCP strongly identified with the conflicting identities, 
it will not abandon them or sacrifice the important interests they define in exchange 
for forming shared identities or interests with others. Thus, a shared identity approach 
may fail when the CCP feels that its communist and nationalist identity is threatened. 
For instance, from 1935 to 1936, the CCP’s reluctance to be assimilated into the KMT 
was the major reason that it could not form a shared anti-Japanese united front with 
Chiang. Further, frictions between the CCP and the warlord Yan Xishan were salient 
when the latter blocked all communication lines between Yan’an and the base areas 





SIT presents the general idea that China can simultaneously maintain a communist 
identity, pursue crucial nationalist interests, and preserve a relatively peaceful 
surrounding environment even if it could not transform its communist and nationalist 
identities. This can be done by thwarting a hard-balancing coalition through the 
recategorization strategy and China’s rational choice. First, it can seek shared 
identities and interests with other relevant actors that could cancel out the negative 
effects of competition derived from conflicting identities (recategorization strategy). 
Second, it could maintain the conflicting identities and interests and control the 
competition (rational choice). Further, China can adjust its strategic management of 
identities and interests according to the others’ response, as well as the distribution 
of power among relevant actors (rational choice) to achieve these tasks. This thesis 




its pursuit of the three tasks as its strategic management of identities and interests. 
However, SIT is not specific about how China achieves the three tasks 
simultaneously. Therefore, this thesis uses the CCP’s UFS during the Anti-Japanese 
War as an example of SIT to show how it could construct shared identities or interests 
and pursue conflicting interests defined by these identities, while controlling 
competitions in the context of power transition. This chapter first mapped out how the 
thesis uses UFS, which is different from its dominant view. It argues that the 
prevailing interpretation of UFS as a revolutionary strategy fails to take the domestic 
and international divide in its application. Moreover, the thesis uses the UFS as an 
example of SIT, a theory which aims to provide remedies for intergroup conflicts, 
could provide a practical framework for ameliorating the conflicts. Thus, its 
revolutionary aspect is beyond the scope of the thesis. Moreover, unlike the 
prevailing interpretation, this thesis focuses on shared identities/interests between 
states rather than individuals. Also, it will not engage in the unproductive debate over 
which of CCP’s actions are genuine or propaganda.  
 
Finally, this chapter has deduced the specific principles of China’s strategic 
management of identities and interests through the CCP’s UFS during the Anti-
Japanese War. These specific principles, such as CCP’s definition of strategic 
defensive and stalemate periods as well as how it sought shared identities/interests 
while downplaying conflicting ones with other relevant actors, are applied to the 
empirical chapters of the thesis that discuss how China attempts to maintain a 







Part 3. competition between China and the US/regional countries is inevitable 
Chapter 4: China’s nationalism and communist identity 
 
This chapter examines whether competition between China and the US or other 
regional countries on some important dimensions (e.g., territorial disputes or ideology) 
is inevitable. As noted, some IR scholars use SIT’s identity management strategies 
(social mobility, social creativity, and social competition) to analyze whether the 
competition is avoidable and if China’s peaceful rise is possible. First, they argue that 
social mobility is not a viable strategy to avoid competition because China’s strong 
identification with nationalist and communist identities lead to its inability to abandon 
these two identities (Gries, 2005, p. 250; Larson, 2015, p. 334; Krickovic and Zhang, 
2020). Instead, they argue that China pursued a social creativity strategy by finding 
other dimensions or traits for comparison with the US (Gries, 2005; Larson, 2015, p. 
334; Lee, 2016, p. 45; Krickovic and Zhang, 2020). They also claim that China can 
realize its peaceful rise without abandoning its identities through social creativity 
(Gries, 2005; Larson, 2015, p. 334, 2020; Lee, 2016, p. 46; Krickovic and Zhang, 
2020). Because they view competition between China and the US or other regional 
countries as avoidable, they did not analyze whether China’s view of the current 
regional status quo meets SIT’s three conditions that lead to competitions (unstable 
power relationship between China and established powers, especially the US, 
China’s dissatisfaction towards the current regional status quo, a cognitive alternative 
to the status quo) (Gries, 2005; Larson, 2015, p. 334; Lee, 2016). 
 
Within Chinese literature, many Chinese scholars seem to agree that competition 
between China and the US or other regional countries is avoidable. They also agree 
that China’s peaceful rise is possible because of harmonious traditional Chinese 
thoughts’ important influence on China. The “co-existing theory of international 
society” (guoji gongsheng lilun), which was developed by the Shanghai school, a 




of respecting and tolerating each other’s bottom-line interests should be promoted in 
the globalized world to create “co-existing” peace (Jin, 2011, pp. 16-21; Ren, 2019). 
The theory of integrating difference (heyi) developed by Wang Fan, a Professor of 
Chinese Foreign Affairs University, claims that by respecting, coordinating, and even 
integrating difference, states can have a long-lasting cooperative relationship with 
each other—this is the main theme of China’s foreign policy (Wang, 2018). Likewise, 
using traditional Chinese thought, Ye Zicheng (2007), a Professor of Peking 
University, asserted that the main theme of Chinese diplomacy attaches great 
importance on friendship on the basis of mutual respect and equality. Yan Xuetong 
(2014, pp. 126-127), a professor at Tsinghua University, believed that, to withstand 
Sino–US competition, China should distinguish friends and enemies, protect the 
interests of weak states, and increase strategic credibility by promoting Chinese 
values, such as justice, and civility. 
 
These theories or arguments downplay China’s strong identification with nationalism. 
The scholars of the Shanghai school neglect that the two countries’ bottom-line 
interests may be mutually exclusive, such as territorial disputes between regional 
countries and China (Jin, 2011, p. 16; Ren, 2019). Wang Fan (2018, p. 12) claimed 
that China’s policy of shelving sovereignty and pursuing joint development is a good 
example of the integrating difference theory because it respects differences and finds 
an effective solution in pursuit of mutual interests. However, in fact, this policy failed 
to “integrate difference” because many regional countries view it as a reflection of the 
nationalist pursuit of the Chinese because they need to recognize China’s 
sovereignty over the disputed area before the joint development. Ye (2007, p. 28) 
argued that China assisted Vietnam from 1960 to the 1970s mainly due to the 
brotherhood of communist states, as demonstrated by Zhou Enlai’s talk with 
Vietnamese leaders in 1974. However, Ye neglects that China and Vietnam clashed 
over Paracel islands in the same year of Zhou’s talk. Yan (2014) downplays that weak 
states may have conflicting interests with China and that many of them do not believe 




Moreover, while the scholars aim to create Chinese theories that can construct 
harmonious relationships among states, they explicitly or implicitly express 
dissatisfactions towards Western culture that “disrespects” diversity and “suppresses” 
China’s culture or political system (Jin, 2011, p. 16, p. 21; Wang, 2018; Ren, 2019). 
Thus, they ironically demonstrate ideological competition between China and 
Western countries. 
 
Using SIT, the findings of this chapter disagree with these scholars’ argument that 
the competition is avoidable. In contrast, this thesis agrees with the argument of IR 
scholars who use SIT that China is unwilling to abandon the two identities through 
social mobility because of its strong identification with them (Larson, 2015; Lee, 2016). 
However, this thesis does not agree with their argument that social creativity (finding 
new dimensions or traits for comparison) is a feasible strategy for China to rise 
peacefully without transforming its communist and nationalist identities (Larson, 2015; 
Lee, 2016). First, China cannot neglect the negative emotions or self-image caused 
by the nationalist identity by addressing other dimensions for comparison. 
Nationalism could be easily activated by and applied to present events, which could 
not be offset by China’s favorable comparison on a new dimension, such as its strong 
capability of infrastructure building. Second, China’s effort to find positive traits of its 
communist identity for comparison is unrecognized by the advantaged democratic 
states, which exacerbate China’s feeling of unfairness. Thus, social creativity is not 
a feasible strategy for China to avoid competition with the US nor other regional 
countries on strategic, territorial arrangements, or ideological dimensions. The thesis 
then analyzes the reasons why China meets the three conditions of social 
competition in detail.  
 
By concluding that the competition is inevitable, this chapter serves as the starting 
point for China’s strategic management of identities and interests, which is an 
example of SIT’s recategorization strategy and emphasis on the actor’s rational 




China and other countries, can the thesis identify other dimensions that are useful for 
China to construct shared identities or interests with them. In addition, by identifying 
the dimensions where competitions between China and other countries are inevitable, 
the thesis can analyze how China attempted to manage consequences derived from 
its actions that conflict with others’ interests. 
 
The chapter will analyze the two identities through SIT’s identity management 
strategies one by one. In the first part, the chapter will examine China’s interpretation 
of the century of humiliation (1840-1949) featured by an unfavorable comparison 
between weak China and strong imperial powers. The suffering of the Chinese nation 
and the unfavorable comparison in the century have deeply influenced the ordinary 
Chinese and the party state. Thus, social mobility and creativity strategies cannot 
improve China’s self-esteem that stemmed from unfavorable comparisons. 
Additionally, as will be explained in the first part, in terms of the three conditions that 
cause social competition (the disadvantageous group’s perception of having an 
unstable and illegitimate status relationship with the advantaged group and a 
cognitive alternative) (Larson, 2015; Hogg, 2016, p. 7), competitions between China 
and the US or some regional countries are inevitable with regard to territorial dispute 
and strategic dimension in East Asia, as China’s power continues to grow. The 
second part of the chapter will analyze how China uses social creativity to redefine 
the stigmatized traits of its communist identity, but is continuously subjected to a 
negative self-image because of an unfavorable comparison with liberal countries on 
the ideological dimension. Also, as a staunch pluralist, China’s rise will challenge the 
US-led promotion of liberal internationalism.  
 
The chapter recognizes that there is a debate about the meaning of China. Qin (2006, 
p. 13) argues that China has an “identity dilemma,” and is necessary to answer the 
question, “Who is China?” when the country integrates into the international order. 
Likewise, Xu (2010, p. 80) lamented that contemporary China lacks its own values 




argues that China should not define itself by relying heavily on the other, but as a 
civilization that could provide more universal values that ameliorate the self and other 
distinction. As noted earlier, many Chinese scholars define China as a country with 
a long tradition of benevolence and civility (Ye, 2007, p. 25; Wang, 2020). 
 
Despite the debate, this chapter focuses on the nationalist and communist identities 
of China because they constitute important parts of contemporary China’s meaning. 
When Qin (2006, p. 13) questioned who China is, he already somewhat defined 
China by differentiating it from other Western countries. He also argued that “the 
development of nationalism makes China feel pressurized by the international order” 
(Qin, 2006, p.13). In fact, the major theme of Qin’s (2006) article is less about the 
loss of China’s identities, and more about the incompatibility between its identities 
and the Western-led international order, as well as the need to find a way to help 
China integrate into the Western-led order with comfort. Xu’s (2010, p. 80) argument 
that China can define itself as a civilization that promotes universal value is somewhat 
idealistic. Based on conflicting identities, the definition of universal values can be 
conflicting. For instance, peace is a universal value. Chinese scholars promote co-
existing peace based on pluralism and aims to accommodate China’s communist 
identity in the liberal order (Jin, 2011, pp. 16-21; Ren, 2019). In contrast, Western 
scholars may support democratic peace that is based on solidarism and promotes 
democratization of authoritarian states. Thus, the Chinese “civilization” (Xu, 2010) 
cannot be detached from China’s identities, and can draw boundaries between the 
self and other. Likewise, as noted above, scholars who define China through its 
traditions neglect the important influence of the nationalist and communist identity on 
contemporary China.  
 
This chapter also recognizes that the dominant official narrative of Chinese 
nationalism is often challenged by alternative discourses (Callahan, 2006). However, 
the chapter focuses on the official construction of nationalism because the official 




than the alternative views. Most Chinese people gain knowledge about nationalism 
through national education and propaganda systems. As will be noted in the section 
on nationalism below, the official narrative on the century of humiliation guided 




Social identity refers to an “individual’s knowledge that he belongs to certain social 
groups together with some emotional and value significance to him of this group 
membership” (Tajfel, 1972, cited in Turner, 1982, p. 18). SIT assumes that people 
develop a positive/negative image of the self in terms of favorable/unfavorable 
comparisons with other groups (Hogg, 2016, p. 7). Groups that unfavorably compare 
themselves with other groups on many dimensions strive to “shrug off” the negative 
emotions about the self and enhance their positivity through identity management 
strategies (social mobility, social creativity, and social competition) (Hogg, 2016, p. 
7).  
 
Nationality is the common social group to which people categorize, attach emotional 
and value importance, and compare with other states. In the case of China, the most 
prominent feature of its nationalism is the interpretation of the century of humiliation 
(1840–1949). The main theme of the century of humiliation is the unfavorable 
comparison of power between weak China and strong imperial powers. In the 
interpretation, the late Qing Dynasty and ROC were unable to prevent strong imperial 
powers from invading and bullying China from 1840 to 1949 because these two 
governments were backward and corrupted. During this period, China was forced to 
cede territories to and sign unequal treaties with imperial powers. Thus, China viewed 
the unfavorable comparison of power between itself and imperial powers as the root 
cause of the nation’s suffering in the century of national humiliation. Also, through a 
patriotic education system, the CCP reminded the nation to never forget the 




experience in the century of humiliation. As a result, the experience and comparison 
between disadvantaged China and advantaged imperial powers in the century of 
humiliation ingrained the negative feelings of being weak and bullied in the Chinese 
people.  
 
Many scholars who discuss China’s nationalism tend to regard it as a tool of the CCP. 
They often argue that the CCP constructed nationalism to strengthen the legitimacy 
of the party (Zhao, 1998, p. 293; Callahan, 2010, p. 33; Roy, 2013, p. 14; Dickson, 
2016, pp. 35-36). For instance, the state-run patriotic education and propaganda 
system made great efforts to educate the Chinese on the great sacrifice of the CCP 
in saving the nation from the century of humiliation (1840-1949) (Zhao, 1998, p. 297; 
Callahan, 2010, p. 46; Roy, 2013, p. 14; Dickson, 2016, pp. 35-36). Other discussions 
on Chinese nationalism were centered on the communist party’s utilization of 
nationalism to pursue its domestic and foreign objectives. Guo (2012, cited in Zhao, 
2013, p. 537) suggested that through making the state become the key for nationalist 
aspiration and politically controlling nationalists’ anger and remarks, the CCP makes 
nationalism subordinate to its interests. Weiss (2013, p. 30) pointed out that, on the 
one hand, Chinese elites permit nationalist protests to signal their determination and 
difficulty in reaching a compromise in an international bargain. On the other hand, 
they stop these protests to reassure foreign partners of their willingness to cooperate 
(Weiss, 2013, p.30). Likewise, Steinberg and O’Hanlon (2014, p. 43) argued that 
Chinese leaders “have rallied nationalist sentiment when it is seen to serve national 
and party’s interests… and sought to turn it off when the leadership wished to create 
a more positive atmosphere.” 
 
These views are somewhat convincing. It is true that the CCP constructed 
nationalism and increased the Chinese people’s identification with the party through 
binding the party with national survival. The Chinese are immersed in patriotic 






However, just regarding nationalism as the party’s construction to gain leverage in 
an international bargain or avoid color revolution simplifies the relationship between 
Chinese nationalism and the party. This also weakens the significance of nationalism 
for the party state PRC. In essence, the CCP has been a nationalist party since Mao’s 
leadership and the PRC has been a nationalist country, rather than a pure communist 
state since its founding. Communism is the means for the state or party to achieve 
nationalist goals. CCP elites like Mao chose communism because of the view that 
the Chinese had made great efforts to learn Western ideology and science since the 
first Opium War in 1840, but failed, which led the imperial powers to continue to bully 
China (Mao, 1949). They believed that China was in a poor socio-economic condition 
(e.g., unbalanced regional development, being divided by imperial powers) (Mao, 
1965, cited in Li, 2013) and that the imperial power had enormous advantages over 
the country in nearly all aspects (Mao, 1965, cited in Li, 2013). If China pursued 
capitalism under such circumstances, it would inevitably become a vassal of imperial 
powers instead of finding independence and power (Mao, 1965, cited in Li, 2013). 
Hence, only communism can save China (Deng, 1989). Likewise, the lyrics and 
theme of the PRC national anthem is not about communism. It calls on the Chinese 
people to fight against enemies because the Chinese nation is in great danger. Since 
the founding of the PRC, the CCP has continued promising the Chinese people to 
make China an independent and great power and keep oppressors away. Viewing 
the party state as a nationalist and official historical books as its interpretation of 
history rather than its tool for maintaining legitimacy after the 1989 Tiananmen 
Square incident enhances the understanding of the party state’s thought, goal, and 
preference.  
 
This chapter argues that as a nationalist state, the unfavorable comparison with 
imperial powers in the century of humiliation and related negative feelings about the 
self cannot be managed through the social mobility and social creativity strategies of 




already voiced the need for China to abandon nationalism. Hu (2020, p. 39) argued 
that Chinese nationalism based on the century of humiliation is exclusive, offensive, 
and self-defeating and should be replaced with more universal values. Likewise, Xu 
(2010, p. 74) believed that it is a tragedy that the awareness of nation states and 
sovereignty dominate “Chinese subjectivity,” which must conflict with the West to 
preserve the existence of the self. Thus, Xu (2010, p. 77) argued that China should 
promote more universal values to control the “evil” of nationalism. Additionally, Chen 
(2015) asserted that Chinese nationalism is emotional and exclusive and will not be 
helpful for China’s peaceful rise. 
 
From a SIT perspective, these scholars falsely regard many negative but universal 
impacts of nationalism as unique traits of Chinese nationalism. SIT views that just 
random categorization is enough for the group to define the self and other and have 
in-group favoritism and outgroup hostility (Tajfel and Turner, 2001, p. 99). Like gender, 
nationality is the most common social category, to which people attach values and 
emotional importance. Thus, in terms of SIT, the distinction between the self and 
other, ingroup favoritism, and outgroup hostility are naturally high when people 
strongly identify with their states. The CCP’s nationalist narrative, therefore, does not 
lead to, but increases ingroup favoritism and outgroup hostility.  
 
Despite the scholars’ wish for abandonment, the PRC is reluctant to use the social 
mobility strategy to abandon nationalism and shrug off the negative self-image that 
stems from it. For instance, in his statement on China’s memorial day for the Nanjing 
Massacre in 2014, President Xi (2014, cited in People’s Net, 2014) stated that 
“forgetting history means betrayal.” Instead of promoting another national narrative 
to decrease outgroup hostility, the PRC strengthened its current nationalist narrative. 
Since 2017, history textbooks and Chinese literature have been adding more official 
narratives on the sufferings of the Chinese during the Anti-Japanese War (Li and 





Callahan (2006, pp. 185-186) argued that the discourse and textbooks on national 
humiliation have been revived since the 1990s to redirect the attention of the Chinese 
from domestic issues to foreign enemies. It seems that the PRC did not attach 
importance to its nationalist identity from 1947 to 1990 because “no new textbooks 
about national humiliation were published in China” (Callahan, 2006, p. 185) in this 
period. However, although no new textbooks about the humiliation were published, 
patriotic education about the century of humiliation did not weaken, which showed 
that the PRC did attach importance to its nationalist identity during this period. This 
is because the main content in history textbooks that were published by the People’s 
Education Press and were commonly used in Chinese schools during this period was 
about the struggles of the Chinese in the century of humiliation (People’s Education 
Press, 1960). 
 
Even if the century of humiliation was downplayed in textbooks from 1947 to 1989, it 
played an important role when Chinese leaders devised national policies during this 
time. This has been demonstrated by the leaders’ conceptualization of China’s grand 
naval strategy of near sea defense. In 1953, Mao stated that because China was 
bullied by imperial powers coming from the sea in the past, it should build a strong 
navy to resist possible interventions from the sea (Mao, 1953, cited in Wen and 
Zhang, 2018). Likewise, in 1985, Liu Huaqing, then Chinese Navy General, argued 
that because many imperial powers invaded China from the sea in the 19th and 20th 
centuries, Chinese navy must have the sufficient capability to deter military 
intervention from the first island chain (Liu, 2004, p. 439). In 1988, then Admiral 
Zhang Lianzhong (1988, cited in Dutta, 2005, p. 281) argued that “the nation’s 
suffering from lack of sea defense still remains fresh in our minds and the history 
should not repeat itself.” 
 
Besides the infeasibility of the social mobility strategy, it is hard for China to sidestep 
negative feelings derived from the century of humiliation through the social creativity 




because these feelings can easily be activated by and applied to present events. For 
instance, having felt oppressed and humiliated, many Chinese associated the US 
bombing of China’s Belgrade Embassy in 1999 with the century of humiliation and 
reasoned that the bombing was caused by the unfavorable comparison of power 
between China and the US (Gries, 2001, pp. 36-37). Likewise, China quickly 
associated the “unequal” trade negotiation between itself and the US in 2019 (Trump, 
2019, cited in Lawder and Bose, 2019) with unequal treaties it signed with imperial 
powers (People’s Daily, 2019). It also associated feelings of being bullied during the 
negotiation with its experiences during the century of humiliation (People’s Daily, 
2019). The strong and negative emotions of nationalists activated by the events that 
occurred at present can hardly be offset by social creativity strategies, such as 
China’s favorable comparison with other countries like Laos, or on other dimensions, 
such as, a strong capability for infrastructure building.  
 
As social mobility and creativity are infeasible for managing China’s nationalist 
identity and transforming its negative self-image into positive one, the chapter argues 
that the competition between China and the US or regional countries with regard to 
strategic dimension or territorial disputes is inevitable as China’s power grows. As 
noted in the second chapter, social competition occurs under three conditions. The 
first is that the status relationship between the advantaged and disadvantaged group 
is unstable (able to be changed) (Larson, 2015, p. 329; Hogg, 2016, p. 7). Second, 
the disadvantaged group deems the status relationship illegitimate (Larson, 2015, p. 
329; Hogg, 2016, p. 7). Third, the disadvantaged group has a cognitive alternative 
that refers to “an alternative social world-a sense of somewhere different that we want 
to go” and a plan “of how we might get there” (Reicher and Haslam, 2012, p. 55; Lyer 
et al, 2017, p. 751). All three conditions are met by China’s nationalism.  
 
First, while China’s power still lags behind the US, as many scholars have suggested, 
(Larson, 2015, p. 337; Christensen, 2015, p. 3; Brooks and Wohlforth, 2016), the 




of its status relationship with the US. China believes that it must strive to change the 
unfavorable comparison of power and improve its capabilities on all dimensions 
where it compares unfavorably with developed countries to prevent the century of 
humiliation from happening again. Among all capabilities that China wishes to 
improve, economic and military power are of priority. The century of humiliation has 
ingrained in China the view that only by becoming militarily and economically strong, 
can the weak deter their oppressors and maintain peace. Thus, Chinese elites do not 
deem national defense buildup as a betrayal of China’s promise of a peaceful rise, 
but believe it is a necessity to defend peace. For instance, after the US bombing of 
the Chinese Belgrade embassy in 1999, then Chinese President Jiang Zemin (1999) 
pointed out that the priority was to make China economically and militarily strong; 
otherwise, it would never be secure and have a peaceful environment since it was 
incapable of preventing aggressions. Likewise, the current Chinese President Xi 
Jinping (2018, cited in Gong and Hou, 2018) pointed out that China will stick to the 
path of peaceful development, but should clearly be aware that peace must be 
defended by the strong army. 
 
Second, in East Asia, China feels disadvantaged in the territorial disputes in varying 
degrees because its claims over sovereignty of the disputed territories or Taiwan do 
not meet reality. The Diaoyu islets are claimed by China and Japan, but are de facto 
controlled by the latter. Taiwan remains to have a de facto independence. Many of 
China’s claimed land features in the SCS are occupied by some Southeast Asian 
states in varying degrees.  
 
China views that the status quo of the Taiwan Strait and regional countries’ stance 
on their territorial disputes with China violate its sovereignty and are, therefore, 
illegitimate. This feeling of illegitimacy is one of the major reasons why China wishes 
to change its disadvantageous position on territorial disputes. This will result in 




Taiwan rely on the US to counter China’s military actions regarding the disputes, 
frictions between China and the US will also likely occur.  
 
Moreover, China feels that it is in a strategically disadvantaged and unfair position in 
East Asia. While the US and East Asian partners and allies view that the bilateral 
security system is positive-sum and maintains regional stability, China has often 
criticized that the US-led bilateral security alliance system is a relic of the Cold War 
and aims to contain China’s rise (Xue, 2016; Liff, 2018, p. 141). The fact that the US-
led hub-and-spoke security system is situated in the island chains opposite China’s 
long coastline has given China a sense of being besieged. China believes that the 
US is utilizing Taiwan as an unsinkable aircraft carrier to contain China (Zhu, 2000, 
cited in CCTV.com, 2000). Senior officers of the Chinese navy referred to the US-led 
island chains as the “shackles” of China (Mei, 2013).  
 
Finally, China has a clear cognitive alternative to its current position in East Asia. 
Chinese leaders talk about national rejuvenation. An article published by People’s 
Daily has called for the resumption of China’s status that is consistent with historical 
memory of it being a great power in Asia (Cao, 2013). National rejuvenation is, thus, 
an alternative future that China wishes to achieve. China also has a clear plan of 
achieving national rejuvenation. Many Chinese elites and scholars define national 
rejuvenation as “becoming a rich country and building a strong army” (fuguo qiangjun) 
(Xi, 2012, cited in Xinhua Net, 2012; Sun, 2018). In the context of East Asia, 
recovering lost territories is an important status marker of national rejuvenation. For 
instance, in his 2019 speech, Xi (2019) stated that the Taiwan issue is caused by 
China’s weakness and will, thus, be solved as China becomes powerful. Recovering 
Taiwan is, therefore, an indispensable step in achieving national rejuvenation. 
Breaking the perceived US-led encirclement is another important status marker of 
national rejuvenation because it demonstrates the capability of preventing China from 





China’s communist identity 
 
While China has been integrating itself into the liberal economic order and opening 
its market for decades, its Leninist and authoritarian regime remains. This regime has 
been negatively evaluated in the US-led order. The first criticism of China’s political 
system is that the CCP elites lack “legal-electoral legitimacy,” which refers to “laws 
as binding principle for all social groups… and top leaders are popularly elected on 
regular basis” (Zhao, 2009, p. 418). In Chinese society, whether or not the party is 
more powerful than law is a never-ending debate. Although the party denies this, it 
acknowledges that many government officials or leaders of party organizations do 
not obey the law (Xi, 2015, cited in People’s Daily, 2015). Moreover, top leaders and 
senior officials of the state are appointed by party organizations rather than through 
a national election. The second criticism is the state’s over-penetration to society 
(Economy, 2018, p. 62) or suppression of civil society’s development. The freedom 
of speech in Chinese society is suppressed. Domestically, online conversations, 
comments, or literature are censored. China also restricts the development of non-
governmental and party affiliated organizations. The third criticism is the state’s strict 
control over the spread of liberal ideas, such as China’s “great firewall,” which has 
prevented domestic netizens from connecting with many international websites and 
using social networking apps.  
 
Despite criticism from democratic countries, China has no intention to use the social 
mobility strategy by transforming into a liberal democracy. In many occasions, 
Chinese leaders have stated that they oppose the transformation of its communist 
identity. For instance, Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping (1986, cited in Zhang, 2018) 
stated in 1986 that he would never give up the CCP’s leadership and change the 
political system of the country. Likewise, Deng’s successors Jiang Zemin (1998, cited 
in People’s Net, 2001) and Hu Jintao (2008, cited in Nanfang Net, 2008) often stated 




of the communist identity. In 2019, President Xi (2019, cited in People’s Daily-CPC 
News, 2019) clearly stated that the “PRC is red and we must not lighten the color.”  
 
Shambaugh (2016, p. 99) argued that China’s policy is not unchanged, but has been 
dynamic since the 1950s; it has been in a cycle of “political tightening and loosening.” 
Shambaugh (2016, pp. 100-111) claimed that this is because political power has 
been periodically controlled by divergent political factions, which include 
“conservatives” that do not view political liberalization as a necessity and “political 
reformers” that favor “measured political liberalization.” In terms of the divergent 
views, China has shifted from a liberal neo-Authoritarianism that introduced political 
reforms (1980–1989) to neo-totalitarianism wherein the party substantially 
strengthened its control over all levels of the society (1989–1992), then to soft 
authoritarianism that loosened the party’s control over other systems such as the 
government (1998-2008), and eventually to hard authoritarianism (2009–2015) 
(Shambaugh, 2016, pp. 100-111).  
 
China does have the cycle of “political tightening and loosening” (Shambaugh, 2016, 
pp. 100-111). However, more than factional competition, this is due to the CCP’s 
perception of whether or not the party’s domination over other systems is secure. To 
the CCP, the core of the Chinese communist identity is the CCP’s domination over 
other systems in China since Mao’s leadership. This was reflected by the General 
Secretary’s report in the 19th CCP National Congress that “the most essential trait of 
socialism with Chinese characteristics is CCP’s leadership” (Xi, 2020). Since Mao’s 
leadership, the CCP has sometimes conducted political loosening measures, but 
never tolerated political reforms that would seriously threaten the party’s domination. 
In the political loosening period, the CCP strengthened the party’s domination if the 
leaders felt that its status was being threatened. For instance, Deng publicized an 
article in 1978 calling for emancipating thoughts and reforming polity (Deng, 1978). 
This article marked the starting point of the political reform period from 1980 to 1989. 




party and in society in 1979 (People’s daily-CPC News Net, 2014). For instance, 
some CCP elites criticized that it was inappropriate that the constitution guarantees 
the CCP’s leadership over the country (People’s Daily-CPC News Net, 2014). Many 
Chinese also strongly criticized the CCP’s leadership (People’s Daily-CPC News Net, 
2014). Having felt that the party’s domination was being seriously threatened, Deng 
ordered the suppression of the social democratic movement and set up the four basic 
principles that stressed the unchallengeable position of the CCP’s leadership 
(People’s Daily-CPC News Net, 2014). In 1984, CCP senior leader Chen Yun 
opposed the reform that would allow the Special Economic Zone Shenzhen to have 
its own currency for fear that it will threaten the CCPCC’s power by challenging the 
dominance of the Renminbi in China (Zhu, 2016, p. 29). The change from soft to hard 
authoritarian from 2008 to 2019 is not so much because political reformers lost the 
competition with conservatives, but rather because the party views that the CCP’s 
leadership was being threatened. In 2011, then Chinese President Hu Jintao stated 
in his report that after years of political loosening, the party faces trials concerning 
the decentralization of its power because members sacrifice the party’s collectivism 
to pursue individualistic interests, and people become less dependent on the party 
(Gong, 2011). These trials have been reiterated by CCP documents and leaders 
since 2011 (Zhou et al, 2012). As a result, the party introduced numerous measures 
to recentralize, such as increasing party members’ obedience to the party’s 
leadership through educational campaigns and strengthening grassroots party 
branches to reinforce its control over individual Chinese. Thus, while the CCP has 
been conducting several political loosening measures since 1950, the core of China’s 
communist identity remains unchanged because the CCP has never tolerated any 
reform that would seriously threaten the party’s domination over other systems since 
Mao’s ruling.  
 
Because the CCP is unwilling to abandon its communist identity, the social mobility 
strategy is ineffective in ameliorating people’s negative self-image towards the 




Chinese people’s positive attitudes towards the regime. The social creativity strategy 
postulates that to enhance its positive self-image, an actor can find new traits or 
dimensions for comparison (Tajfel and Turner, 2001, p. 104). This method is used by 
the CCP to sidestep negative attributes that democratic countries designate to its 
communist identity and emphasize the new and positive traits of the communist 
regime.  
 
First, the CCP has tried to convince the Chinese that, despite the communist regime’s 
limits on freedom of speech, it is good for the nation’s stability and development. CCP 
elites have often argued that maintaining the centralized political system is vital for 
the stability and unity of the country, which are prerequisites for national development. 
In 1989, Deng (1989) stated that “China must not be in chaos…we must let 
Chinese… understand, increasing control [over the society] is to maintain stability, 
facilitate reform and opening up, and national modernization.” Likewise, in 2000, 
Jiang (2000) stated that “through a combination of history and the reality, we should 
make people understand reasons that only socialism can save and develop China.” 
Jiang’s statement echoed the historical textbook narrative that, among political 
parties in the century of humiliation, only the CCP succeeded in putting an end to the 
partition of China and the imperial power’s unequal treatment of the Chinese people 
(Jiang, 2001). Also, Xi Jinping (2016, cited in Xinhua Agency, 2016d) stated in 2016 
that political education must “let students understand the historical inevitability of 
socialism with Chinese characteristics.” This echoed Jiang’s statement that “only 
socialism can save and develop China.” 
 
The second argument of the CCP is that despite the communist regime’s lack of 
electoral legitimacy, it is effective. As some scholars (Zhao, 2009, p. 416; Yang and 
Zhao, 2015, p. 65; Allison, 2017, p. 143) have rightly pointed out, the communist 
regime depends on performance legitimacy to win popular support, such as 
economic development. Chinese leaders often highlight that “the biggest advantage 




(Xi, no date, cited in Renping, 2019). That is, the centralized political system ensures 
a “strong state capacity,” which refers to the capability to maximize the state’s 
effectiveness in extracting natural, socio-economic, and human resources for power 
accumulation and national development (Tellis, 2013, p. 78). In 2018, a film produced 
by China Central Television (CCTV) titled “Amazing China” was released. This movie 
aimed to show the domestic audience the national accomplishments under the CCP’s 
leadership since 2012, the 18th National Congress of the CCP (CCTV, 2018). One 
accomplishment listed by the film was that China completed the construction of 
several bridges connecting the mountainous regions, which are among the top 10 
highest bridges in the world (CCTV, 2018), from 2012 to 2018.   
 
The CCP not only views the communist identity as stable and effective, but it also 
compares favorably with democratic countries on these new dimensions. First, the 
CCP views that the communist regime is much more stable than emerging 
democratic countries. In 2013, Xi (2013) compared China with many developing 
countries that have democratized after the Cold War. He argued that after 
democratization for more than a decade, these countries have still been embroiled in 
social unrest and can hardly restore stability. Second, the CCP stated that the 
communist regime is more effective than established democratic countries. In 2016, 
an official commentary (Zhongsheng, 2016) argued that the 2016 US Presidential 
election has revealed the shortcoming of a democratic political system. From the 
article’s perspective, Presidential candidates were busy speaking ill of each other 
rather than competing for policies that aimed to solve political polarization and the 
socio-economic problems of the US (Zhongsheng, 2016). The election also became 
a game of political contributions and the Presidential candidates served the interests 
of vested interests’ groups that donated to their campaigns rather than those of 
ordinary citizens (Zhongsheng, 2016). While the article did not mention the 
communist regime, it is reasonable to assume that by pointing out the shortcomings 
of the election, it indicated that the CCP’s performance legitimacy compares 




because, from the CCP’s view, the communist regime is more effective than 
democratic countries in solving deep-rooted social issues and implementing policies 
without constraints from interests groups.  
 
However, the CCP’s social creativity strategy is ineffective to a certain degree 
because the positive traits of the communist regime are not acknowledged, and the 
regime is still subjected to the negative evaluation of democratic countries. As a result, 
Chinese elites often feel of being unfairly treated when negative evaluation of the 
CCP regime is mentioned. In 2016, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi was angry 
about a Canadian journalist’s question concerning China’s human rights record 
(Buckley, 2016). He condemned the reporter for being biased and asked her whether 
she knew that China has lifted above six hundred million Chinese out of poverty and 
transformed the once backward country into the second largest economy in the world 
(Buckley, 2016). This is not the first time that a top rank Chinese official was irritated 
by questions regarding China’s achievement of liberal democratic values. In 2009, 
during his meeting with Mexican Chinese, Xi Jinping, then Chinese Vice President, 
argued that the contribution of China to the world is that “in the midst of international 
financial turmoil, China was still able to solve the problem of feeding its 1.3 billion 
people” (Blanchard, 2013). He also expressed anger that “some foreigners with full 
bellies and nothing better to do engage in finger-pointing at us" (Blanchard, 2013). Xi 
and Wang’s reply to negative evaluations of the communist regime have stressed its 
performance legitimacy as they pointed out China’s success in growing the economy 
and lifting the country out of poverty. However, they felt that the performance 
legitimacy had not been acknowledged and the regime is still subjected to negative 
evaluations. Xi’s remarks also demonstrate how he felt it was unfair that democratic 
countries occupy a higher status on the ideological dimension and lecture China on 
rightful actions. According to SIT, the disadvantageous group’s feeling of unfairness 
towards negative evaluations is the major reason that the group wishes to change 





Besides the feeling of unfairness, China has a cognitive alternative to the current 
status relationship between itself and the US on the ideological dimension, another 
sufficient condition for competition to occur. Some scholars (Boyle, 2016, pp. 35-36; 
Economy, 2018, p. 69; Friedberg, 2018, p. 50) argued that China’s rise will lead to 
the export of illiberal values and preservation of illiberal states. However, although 
China recognizes that its rise provides developing countries an alternative model of 
modernization (Xi, 2017), it promotes pluralism in the international community. For 
instance, when introducing his most important diplomatic concept community of 
common destiny, Chinese President Xi Jinping stated that countries “need to make 
sure that all countries respect one another and treat each other as equals” and 
“respect other countries' social systems and development paths of their own choice” 
(Xi, 2015). Also, to build the community of common destiny, Xi (2015) called for 
managing collective problems, such as climate change, and seeking a “win-win 
cooperation and common development.” The remarks of Xi (2015) clearly 
demonstrate the features of pluralism that respect sovereign equality and cultural 
diversity and set up a framework for seeking shared interests and handling collective 
problems on the basis of coexistence. By showing respect for cultural diversity and 
opposing “interference to others internal affairs” (Xi, 2015), China demonstrates its 
resistance to liberal internationalism, which often pressures non-democratic 





Scholars using SIT to analyze China’s rise generally argue that social creativity is a 
viable strategy for China to achieve a peaceful rise and help the country avoid 
competition with the US or other regional countries without having to abandon 
communist and nationalist identities. This chapter disagrees with their argument and 
argues that competition between China and the US or regional countries on several 




communist identities, it could not shrug off the negative self-concept derived from the 
two identities through social mobility and creativity. Also, China’s rise satisfies three 
conditions (unstable status relationship, feeling of unfairness, alternative future) that 
enable social competition (Larson, 2015). First, since the unfavorable comparison of 
power between China and the imperial powers during the century of humiliation has 
been ingrained in China’s mind, it is determined to improve its capabilities on nearly 
all dimensions with unfavorable comparisons to developed countries, especially 
economic and military power. This makes the status relationship between China and 
the US unstable. Second, nationalism makes China feel disadvantaged in territorial 
disputes and the geostrategic status quo of East Asia. China also feels of being 
treated unfairly when its communist identity is negatively judged by democratic 
countries. Third, the two identities have a profound influence on China definition of 
an alternative future to the current status. Consolidating sovereign claim and 
reversing disadvantageous geostrategic status regarded by China as a must for 
national rejuvenation. China also wishes to rise as a “modernized socialist great 
power” (Xi, 2019). Thus, it will continue to confront democratic countries on 
ideological dimension. It has promoted pluralist values as an alternative to the US’ 
promotion of liberal democracy. Finally, the unstable Sino–US status caused by 
China’s rise will threaten US leadership and make the latter constrain China’s rising 














Part 4. CCP/China’s historical application of strategic management of 
identities/interests (1944-2009) 
Chapter 5: CCP/China’s strategic management of identities and interests in 
Mao’s time (1944–1976)  
 
Chapter 4 challenged the argument of scholars that Sino–US competition can be 
avoided through social creativity wherein China chooses other dimensions for 
comparison. The chapter further argues that competition between China and the US 
or some regional countries on geostrategic and ideological dimensions is inevitable. 
Many realists may argue that China will face a US-led hard-balancing coalition in 
East Asia, which will probably result in war, due to the inevitability of the competition. 
 
However, the CCP’s UFS during the Anti-Japanese War, which is the practice that 
combines SIT’s recategorization strategy with its emphasis on the actor’s rational 
choice, provides insight that China could maintain its communist identity and crucial 
nationalist interests while thwarting a hard-balancing coalition to create a benign 
environment by strategically managing identities and interests. In other words, based 
on the view that the communist regime and crucial nationalist interests are secure, 
China could thwart a hard-balancing coalition by seeking shared identities/interests 
with other actors and downplaying conflicting ones. This chapter applies the UFS in 
the Sino–US/regional countries’ relations. It examines the extent to which the CCP, 
and later the PRC, could preserve its communist identity and protected crucial 
nationalist interests while breaking the US-led military and economic blockade to 
create a relatively peaceful environment during Mao’s time (1944–1976) through the 
strategic management of identities/interests. Drawing on the CCP’s UF framework, 
the main target the CCP sought shared identities or interests with during this period 




could only lift the blockade by bettering its relationship with the commander of the 
blockading forces. 
 
The main arguments of the chapter are as follows. First, the shared identity/interests 
approach did break the US-led military and economic blockade on China even if 
China did not change the political system and concede important nationalist interests, 
such as those related to the Taiwan issue. During the last few years of Mao’s 
chairmanship (1972–1976), China successfully broke the blockades by forming a 
strategic partnership with the US. Second, the strategic partnership reduced the 
salience of China’s communist identity and made the US compromise on conflicting 
interests related to China’s nationalist identity, such as withdrawing the US army from 
Taiwan. Third, the CCP downplayed the communist and nationalist identities to 
bettering the US-China relationship, such as proposing ideological armistice and 
tolerating Taiwan’s de facto independence.  
 
However, this strategy had limitations. First, the CCP was unwilling to concede when 
it perceived the communist regime and crucial nationalist interests were insecure; 
thus, the shared identity/interests approach may fail. This is the reason that led to the 
CCP’s failure to form an anti-Japanese alliance with the US in 1944 and receive US 
recognition in 1949. Second, the shared interests/identity may not be important 
enough to ameliorate frictions derived from conflicting identities. This was evidenced 
by China’s failure to use shared interests of easing the Taiwan Strait tension in 1955 
to pave the way for establishing a Sino–US diplomatic relationship.  
 
To begin, some scholars argued that the US and PRC had lost a chance for mutual 
accommodation from 1949 to 1950 (Cohen, 1997, p. 71; Chen, 2001, p. 39). They 
argued that US anti-communist and pro-KMT policies made the PRC an enemy 
because the CCP had sincerely wished to receive assistance from the US on 
economic reconstruction and balance against the Soviet Union in this period (Chen, 




and Chen (2001, p. 3) doubted the sincerity of the CCP’s overtures for US friendship 
in this period. Garver (1997, pp. 89-90) stressed that the CCP’s ideological distrust 
and internationalist revolutionary goal of defeating capitalism made the 
accommodation impossible.  
 
This chapter agrees with the skeptics that the chance did not exist in this period, but 
disagrees that the CCP’s overtures was insincere because the CCP had attached 
great importance to developing a benign relationship with the US for the most part 
during Mao’s time. Also, the chapter does not view that the CCP’s ideological distrust 
towards the US prevented it from pursuing a benign relationship with the US. The 
distrust persisted when the US and China reconciled in 1972. The 1972 
rapprochement demonstrates that the SIT is right; shared identities, in this instance, 
the Sino–US strategic partnership against the Soviet Union, would cancel out the 
negative effects of conflicting ones and enable conflicting parties to compromise with 
each other. As will be demonstrated later, the internationalist revolutionary interests 
might not matter too much in the CCP’s consideration of seeking a benign 
relationship with the US because they were not core interests related to its communist 
identity, even when it was under Mao’s ruling. Thus, Mao might not suffer such heavy 
psychological costs of abandoning internationalist revolutionary interests and 
pursuing accommodation with the US, as Garver argues (1997, p. 94) 
 
The chapter argues that the CCP attempted to unblock the US-led military and 
economic blockade during Mao’s time by establishing a benign relationship with the 
US without compromising core nationalist interests, such as the Taiwan issue, and 
destabilizing the CCP’s control of China. Although the US and the CCP, and later the 
PRC, did have some contacts to develop an amicable relationship from 1944 to 1945 
and from 1949 to 1950, the CCP failed to achieve the three goals simultaneously, 
mainly due to its reluctance to reach compromises regarding the core ideological and 
nationalist interests. In 1970s. the CCP had consolidated control over Chinese 




it achieve the three goals simultaneously. The following section will present these 
arguments. 
 
While the CCP, and later the PRC, and the US have competitive identities, it has 
viewed the importance of having a benign relationship with the US since 1944. First, 
it wished to gain economic and technological assistance from the US. During the anti-
Japanese War, Mao stated that the CCP could gain US military and economic 
support by cooperating with the US (Hu, 2003). According to Huang Hua, a senior 
CCP leader from 1941 to 1990s, Mao expressed his anticipation of cooperating with 
the US in 1944 to improve China’s post-war industrialization (Huang, 2007, p. 85). 
After the founding of the PRC in 1949, the CCP continued to perceive the importance 
of trading with and learning from the US-led capitalist camp for China’s development, 
despite Mao’s revolutionary rhetoric. In the 1956 speech that established guidelines 
for the PRC’s development, Mao (1956) pointed out that “enterprises of industrialized 
countries were…highly efficient and good at doing businesses, [we] should learn from 
them without compromising principles.”  
 
Due to the need to trade with capitalist countries, Mao stopped the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) from “liberating” HK in 1949. He argued that the city is located 
at an important trading route and was occupied by the UK. Thus, HK could be used 
as the PRC’s foreign trade port, allowing it to connect with capitalist countries when 
the country was blockaded by the West (Mao, 1963). By using HK’s special position 
for international trade, the CCP had many secret businesses with enterprises of 
Western countries, importing many embargoed resources and exporting many 
agricultural goods from 1949 to 1970 (Party history research group of CCPCC, 2010, 
p. 78). From the 1972 Sino–US rapprochement to 1974, the CCP seized the 
opportunity to implement “the four three projects,” which imported technological 
equipment from capitalist countries and expanded China’s foreign trade with them 
(Hua, 2012). This project was viewed by Deng Xiaoping as a pilot test for China’s 





Moreover, during Mao’s time, China viewed a benign relationship with the US as the 
key to establishing diplomatic relationships with many East Asian countries, which 
will enable them to have a relatively stable regional environment. China saw that 
many East Asian countries have cross-cutting identities with the PRC. They had 
shared identities/interests with China, such as resident powers of East Asia, and 
wished to reduce regional tension. However, one of their main identities at that time 
was the anti-communist allies or partners of the US. From China’s perspective, these 
countries might wish to establish diplomatic relationships with China because of the 
shared identity or interests, but they would not dare to do so under US pressure (Zhou, 
1954; Mao, 1955, 1958). Thus, according to Mao (1972, cited in Lin et al, 1998, p. 
255), “once the problem [of starting a benign US-China relationship] was solved, 
other problems [such as establishing diplomatic relationship with many East Asian 
countries] would be solved readily.” This view proved to be true. After the Sino–US 
rapprochement in 1972, China established diplomatic relationships with many East 
Asia countries, which created a relatively peaceful environment between itself and 
the US East Asian allies and partners. For instance, it established diplomatic 
relationships with Japan in 1972, and the Philippines and Thailand in 1975. 
 
To develop a benign relationship with the US, the CCP begun its strategic 
management of identities and interests. First, in the anti-Japanese War period, the 
CCP tried to form a better relationship with the US by seeking a shared anti-fascist 
partner identity with the US. In 1944, the CCP enthusiastically welcomed the US 
military observation group in Yan’an, the capital of the CCP regime at that time 
(Huang, 2007; Yang, 2010, p. 668). The CCPCC issued a directive to all party 
organizations in the base areas, calling the CCP’s contact with the observation group 
as the beginning of the party’s “diplomatic work” and asking party members to be 
“good at cooperating with the US group” (Huang, 2007, p. 58). In a welcome article, 
Mao (1944) wished “the US comrade in arms” to “intimately cooperate with CCP to 




commanders, such as Lin Biao and Chen Yi, made 10 reports to the group to explain 
the CCP’s anti-Japanese policies (Tao, 2016, p. 152). Mao created a detailed plan to 
demonstrate that the CCP could be a reliable anti-Japanese ally of the US. For 
example, he commanded the CCP’s army in Shandong to provide the observation 
group with information on Japanese troops stationed in Qingdao and Lian Yungang 
(Hu, 2003, p. 341). He also required party organizations in Taihang, Shandong, and 
Huazhong to build landing areas for US aircrafts (Hu, 2003, p. 341). In January 1945, 
Mao and Zhou wrote a letter to then US President Roosevelt, saying that the CCP 
wished to dispatch an unofficial team to the US to explain issues concerning China’s 
Anti-Japanese War (Yang and Zhang, 2009, p. 62).  
 
However, the CCP’s effort to form the shared anti-Japanese ally identity with the US 
failed because of its reluctance to sacrifice core interests related to the communist 
identity in exchange for forming the shared identity. From 1944 to 1945, the CCP and 
KMT had two major essential disagreements when the US mediated between them. 
The CCP had two core interests related to its communist identity. First, it insisted on 
forming a coalition government consisting of the CCP, KMT, and other political parties 
(Hu, 2003, p. 356). In other words, the KMT should recognize CCP as an equal 
political entity and the CCP must retain independent control of its occupied areas. 
Second, the CCP insisted on maintaining absolute control over its army (Hu, 2003, 
p. 356). However, the KMT insisted that the CCP must hand over its army to the KMT 
central committee and that KMT must remain to be the central government of China 
(Tao, 2016, pp. 168-169). From the CCP’s view, the US sided with the KMT to 
accelerate the formation of a trilateral anti-Japanese alliance and prevent China’s 
civil war, (Hu, 2003, p. 356). Then US representative Patrick Hurley had asked the 
CCP to accept the KMT’s requirements in exchange for US economic and military 
assistance (Hu, 2003, p. 356). He told Zhou that “we were about to help you, [we 
prepared] hundreds of thousands stuffs… to help you. but without this deal, I cannot 
help you” (Hurley, 1945, cited in Hu, 2003, p. 356). In January 1945, CCP sources 




356). Further, in April 1945, Hurley stated that the US only supported the KMT 
government out of all the other armed Chinese parties (Hu, 2003, p. 363). 
Consequently, the CCP sensed that simultaneously cooperating with the US and 
preserving its core interests was impossible (Yang, 2010, p. 459; Tao, 2016, p. 117). 
As a result, at the seventh party congress in July 1945, Mao stated that “we opposed 
the US government’s policy of supporting Chiang and opposing communist” (Tao, 
2016, p. 117).  
 
Chen (2001, p. 24) may view that CCP’s rejection of the US’ suggestion is not 
because of its unwillingness to sacrifice core-interests related to its communist 
identity. Chen (2001, p. 24) argued that in early 1945, the CCP changed its attitude 
towards the US because the Soviet Union’s advancement in Europe made the CCP 
believe that it could play its Soviet Union card against the US. However, Chen’s 
information is incorrect. CCP changed its attitude and formally rejected the US 
proposal on December 2, 1944 (Hu, 2003, p. 357). Second, Chen’s (2001, p. 24) 
argument indicated that the CCP would accept the suggestion of the US if it did not 
believe that the Soviet Union would engage in China’s Anti-Japanese War. However, 
the CCP would never hand over its army and base areas to the KMT in exchange for 
US assistance. This is demonstrated by the CCP’s formation of an anti-Japanese 
alliance with the KMT in 1936. As noted in Chapter 3, the CCP was nearing its demise 
in 1936, but still rejected to hand over its army to the KMT. If the CCP had not handed 
over its fragile army in the most difficult times, it is unreasonable to conclude that it 
would do so to receive US assistance. This is because the CCP had more leverage 
than it did in 1936. In November 1944, the CCP intended to make some compromise, 
but finally fully rejected the US proposal in December (Hu, 2003, p.357). However, 
even in the draft demonstrating its compromise, the CCP did not concede its two core 
interests. Although it stated that its army would be “included” in the national army in 
the draft, the CCP army was independent from the KMT army because the former 
proposed the establishment of a military coalition committee (Hu, 2003, p. 357). 




on reforming the defense committee and legislative Yuan to allow it, together with the 
KMT and other political parties, to have equal decision power (Hu, 2003, p. 357). This 
indicated that the CCP required the KMT to recognize the CCP regime legality in 
base areas. 
 
The failure of the CCP’s engagement with the US in 1945 led to its leaning to one 
side policy. In April 1945, Mao (1945, cited in Yang, 2010, p. 459) stated that “the US 
major policy was supporting Chiang…only Soviet Union was the major source of 
assistance for Chinese people.” The CCP also felt that it had a long way to go to 
develop a benign relationship with the US if the party wished to preserve its 
communist identity, and later its nationalist identity. Mao (1945, cited in Yang, 2010, 
p. 459) stated that the “CCP’s relationship with the US was ending… without being 
at the end of its rope, the US would not cooperate with us.” Likewise, in 1949, Deng 
Xiaoping (1949) argued that “imperial powers… wished us to yield to their 
demands…and we wished them to yield to our demands… we would definitely not 
yield to their demands but…getting them to yield to our demands was very difficult.” 
Thus, Deng (1949) concluded that “to avoid imperial powers’ blockade… we 
implemented lean to one side policy.”  
 
Deng’s argument reflected irreconcilable interests between the CCP and the US in 
1949. The CCP implemented the cleaning the house policy in 1949. First, the policy 
meant that the CCP would eradicate all imperial powers’ influence and networks in 
China (Garver, 1997, p. 70). By eradicating this influence, the party could prevent 
Western powers from mobilizing economic, social, and cultural resources to 
destabilize or even overturn the CCP government. Second, this policy meant that the 
CCP would not recognize any treaties signed by the Chiang government and imperial 
powers that guaranteed the imperial powers, especially the US, privileges in China 
(Gong, 1998, p. 32). This demonstrated nationalist interests by showing that the CCP 
founded a new China that freed the Chinese from unequal treatment. Besides this 




to the PRC (Huang, 2007, p. 81). This was related to the Taiwan issue. These three 
were bottom-lines that PRC would not concede to the US when establishing a 
diplomatic relationship. 
 
However, the three bottom-lines were irreconcilable with the US conditions of 
establishing a diplomatic relationship with the CCP government. In 1949, then US 
ambassador to China, Leighton Stuart, made clear that the CCP must demonstrate 
“accepted international practice with respect to treaties” to get US recognition (FRUS, 
1949, cited in Sheng, 1994, p. 490). In other words, it must obey the treaties signed 
by the US and KMT government. Another precondition was that the new PRC 
government must “extensively involve pro-democracy figures’ participation” (Stuart, 
1949, cited in Huang, 2007, p. 81). The CCP viewed most of these figures as US 
sources that would seriously destabilize its regime. At the meeting of the CCPCC 
politburo in January 1949, Mao (1949) argued that the US “began to dispatch its 
running dogs…[and] organize so-called opposition party to undermine our revolution 
inside [CCP regime].” Moreover, regarding the Taiwan issue, Christensen (1995, p. 
261) and Garver (1997, p. 92) argued that the US administration had considered 
abandoning Taiwan in 1949 and early 1950; however, it proved to be a difficult 
consideration to put into practice. The Sino–US dialogue concerning the Taiwan 
issue began in 1955. However, the dialogue did not bear anything substantial and 
ended in 1970. Also, the Taiwan issue was the sticking point in the Sino–US 
negotiation of establishing a diplomatic relationship in the 1970s.  
 
Sheng (1994, p. 483) argued that the CCP confiscated radios and detained the US 
consul Ward in Shengyang in 1948 to compel the US to exit China; thus, it was 
insincere in seeking US recognition. However, one main reason for the CCP’s 
confiscation of radios and the detainment of Ward was the Soviet Union’s demand. 
From 1948 to 1949, the CCP wanted to seek US recognition, but did not believe that 
it could without compromising the bottom-lines that were previously discussed. Thus, 




with the Soviet Union. Deng Xiaoping’s article (1949) demonstrated this point. Stating 
that “getting imperial powers to concede to our demands is very difficult,” Deng (1949) 
argued that “the earlier we lean to one side through actions, the more advantageous 
we will be.” In 1948, the general Consul of the Soviet Union in Shengyang directly 
demanded the CCP’s Northeast Bureau Party Secretary Gao Gang to confiscate all 
radios from the US, UK, and France Consular (Yang, 1994, p.107). The Soviet Union 
also made it clear that it opposed the presence of any Western Consular in Northeast 
China (CCP Northeast Bureau, 1948). To show loyalty to the Soviet Union through 
actions, Mao sent a directive to Gao Gang that “regarding any foreign affairs 
concerning Northeast China or the nation, we must consult with the Soviet Union” 
(Mao, 1948a). However, Mao (1948b) later argued that “even in the Northeast China, 
the US’s withdrawal must be decided by CCPCC, and even if the US withdrew, this 
did not mean that we will never establish diplomatic relationship with the US in the 
future.”  
 
Kissinger (2012, p. 118) argued that Mao once stated that the leaning to one side 
policy came about because the US would not give China a “full meal.” However, even 
if the US was ready to give China a full meal in 1949, such as US diplomatic 
recognition on the PRC, the PRC would be unwilling to pay the price for the meal by 
conceding its bottom-lines, such as giving up the one party rule political system. 
When the US offered the full meal in 1972, the CCP had almost eradicated the US 
“foundation” in China (Mao, 1949). Therefore, it was ready to accept the full meal 
without compromising the party’s control over the Chinese nation.  
 
Although recognizing divergent essential interests between the PRC and the US, 
Garver (1997, p. 92) argued that the CCP’s strong ideological belief, such as 
supporting the international socialist movement, made US accommodation in 1949 
impossible. However, although the CCP did support international revolutionary 
movements, it did not regard international revolution as a core interest related to its 




Vietnam War (1961–1975) could be viewed as its effort to meet internationalist 
obligations. For instance, Mao argued that Stalin began to view the CCP as a genuine 
internationalist rather than a nationalist after the PRC had sent troops to support Kim 
II Sung in 1950 (Wu, 1999, p. 327). However, the CCP’s decision to join the two wars 
was in fact due to its need to secure regime survival, more than international 
obligations. Although speaking of the CCP’s internationalist obligation, Peng Dehuai 
(1981, p. 258), the commander of the Chinese army that assisted Kim, stressed that 
“if the US stationed troops near Yalu river, it would directly threaten Northeast China 
and invade China whenever it wanted.” Likewise, Mao (1950, cited in Yang, 2020) 
argued that “if we ignored Korean issue… the US would follow Japan’s old path of 
invading China…assisting North Korea was to prevent the US from achieving its plan.” 
During the Vietnamese War from 1961 to March 1965, China mainly demonstrated 
its internationalist obligation through non-combat support to the Vietnamese 
communist party, such as public statements and material supplies (Kissinger, 2012, 
p. 204). Mao explicitly stated that “the Chinese were very busy with their internal 
affairs…the Vietnamese could cope with their situation.” (Kissinger, 2012, p. 204). 
China joined the Vietnam War in April 1965 due to the view that the US troop began 
to threaten South China since March 1965. For instance, the US began to bomb 
Northern Vietnam in March. In April, US air fighters intruded into China’s Hainan 
Island (Gong, 1998, p. 166). In April 12, Mao (1965, cited in Gong, 1998, p. 166) 
issued a directive that required CCP party organizations at all levels to “pay close 
attention to the situation in Vietnam” and “be aware of an adventurous enemy.” As 
demonstrated by the example of the Vietnam and Korean Wars, internationalist 
obligation was not a sufficient condition that led to the CCP’s decision of entering into 
war, but regime security was.  
 
The failure to accommodate the US in 1949 did not prevent the PRC from continuing 
its effort to seek shared interests with the US. This had been demonstrated by the 
1954-1955 and 1958 cross-strait crises. Chen (2001, p. 167) mainly analyzed the 




continuous revolution at home. Kissinger (2012, pp. 150-158) mainly analyzed how 
China and the US managed the crisis under control. Likewise, Chang and Di (1993) 
examined the interaction between the US and China during the crisis. Unlike their 
studies, this chapter focuses on how China attempted to construct a shared interest 
of easing cross-strait tension with the US to establish a relationship between the two 
sides. The two major results of the two crises were the beginning and resumption of 
Sino–US ambassadorial talks, respectively, which were the only means of direct 
official dialogue between the two countries from 1955 to 1970. 
 
Chang and Di (1993, p. 1509) rightly argued that Mao was adept at “using controlled 
military actions for discrete political purposes.” This argument is evidenced by the 
CCP’s actions during the two crises. Although the CCP claimed to have liberated 
Taiwan during both crises, many scholars agreed that it did not intend to do so 
because its actions were measured (Gong, 1998, p. 88; Chang and Di, 1993, p. 1512; 
Kissinger, 2012, pp. 154-155). The CCP was cautious to avoid even accidental 
skirmish with the US (Chang and Di, 1993, p. 1512). Although the CCP was 
determined to seize the Dachen and Yijiangshan Islands from the KMT during the 
1954–1955 crisis, Mao commanded PLA to wait because the US had military drills in 
waters near Yijiangshan (Mao, 1954, cited in Gong, 1998, p. 89). The CCP also 
delayed the military operation of seizing Dachen to reduce tension caused by its 
seizure of Yijiangshan. It did not attack the KMT when the US helped them evacuate 
personnel in Dachen (Gong, 1998, p. 90). The PLA was prohibited from opening fire 
at US vessels during the 1958 crisis. If the US fired at the PLA, the latter must not 
fire back without directives (Ye, 1993, pp. 192-193). By using measured military 
actions, one major goal of the CCP was to compel the US to negotiate the Taiwan 
issue. As Mao (1958) explained, due to the US–Taiwan security treaty, Taiwan acted 
as the PRC’s “noose on the US’s neck.” Thus, if the PRC gave Taiwan a kick, the US 





After occupying Dachen in January 1955, the PRC immediately attempted to create 
shared interests of easing cross-strait crisis tension with the US. In February 1955, 
then Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai (1955, cited in Yang and Zhang, 2007, p. 111) 
asked Sweden’s ambassador to China to tell then United Nations (UN) Secretary 
General Dag Hammarskjöld that neither the UN nor any other country had the right 
to discuss a cross-strait ceasefire with the PRC and KMT because it was China’s 
internal affair. However, Zhou (1955, cited in Yang and Zhang, 2007, p. 111) argued 
that the US was the relevant party of the cross-strait tension and should manage the 
crisis with China. Zhou (1955, cited in Yang and Zhang, 2007, p. 111) advocated that 
“the real solution to the tension was that the US must sit down and negotiate with 
PRC face to face.” Hammarskjöld felt that Zhou “was very eager to directly negotiate 
with the US” and “this was not to the Soviet Union’s taste” (FRUS, 1955-1957, cited 
in Tao, 2016, p. 372). The official commentary of People’s Daily in March (1955, cited 
in Gong, 1998, p. 96) stated that the PRC was willing to participate in an international 
conference including the US, UK, and Soviet Union to discuss the alleviation of the 
crisis. Moreover, Zhou made an announcement in April that “the Chinese government 
was willing to sit down to negotiate and discuss about… alleviation of the tense 
tension of Taiwan district with the US” (People’s Daily, 1955, cited in Tao, 2016, p. 
372). In May, Zhou replied to the UK and Indonesian representatives that mediated 
between China and the US that China was willing to “alleviate tense cross-strait 
tension” by directly negotiating with the US (Gong, 1998, p. 97).  
 
Chang and Di (1993, p. 1517) argued that Beijing’s signal of alleviating tension did 
not always obtain the desired results. This was because when Beijing did not take 
any military actions in the Strait to show sincerity for its bilateral negotiation in March 
1955, the US saw it as preparations for another round of aggression (Chang and Di, 
1993, p.1517). Tao (2016, p. 372) argued that the US did not consider Zhou’s 
suggestion of a bilateral negotiation in February 1955. It was Zhou’s public statement 
at Bandung conference in May that had finally received a positive response from the 




a result-oriented judgement, the chapter views that it had achieved one of its main 
goals despite the deficiencies. It tactically pulled the Taiwan “noose” and sought 
shared interests of easing cross-strait tension with the US, which successfully 
resulted in the ambassadorial talks between China and the US. 
 
The PRC had successfully formed a shared interest of easing cross-strait tension 
and began negotiations with the US; however, because it wished to gain more than 
the shared interest could offer since 1955, it did not get the desired results. Instead 
of just easing the tension, the PRC mainly aimed to require the US to endorse the 
PRC position regarding the Taiwan issue and pave way for the establishment of a 
diplomatic relationship between the two countries. For instance, in the 1955 talks, 
Chinese delegates asked the US to upgrade the ambassadorial talks to talks between 
Zhou and then US Secretary of State Dulles, and to withdraw its force from Taiwan 
(Gong, 1998, p. 100). However, the US refused to do this (Tao, 2016, p. 373) and 
required China to promise that it would not use force to recover Taiwan first (Kissinger, 
2012, p. 159). In addition, in the 1958 talks, the US required China to discuss an 
“immediate ceasefire” before talking about any other issues (Beam, 1958, cited in 
Chen, 2001, p. 194). In consequence, Chinese leaders were pessimistic about the 
talks’ results. They privately argued that “it was not a mature time to establish 
diplomatic relationship with the US, [because] the US would not accept our conditions, 
such as withdrawing force from Taiwan, and we could not accept their conditions” 
(Wu, 1999, p. 247).  
 
The US and China finally developed a benign relationship with the US in the 1972 
Sino–US rapprochement. That year, China and the US became the strategic partners 
that balanced against the Soviet Union. While it is true that China became the 
strategic partner of the US due to military confrontation with the former Soviet Union 
as many scholars have observed, it should be noted that the CCP realized its long-
term goal of forming a shared identity/interests to develop a benign relationship with 




temporary alliance than a promising step of breaking the Sino–US deadlock that the 
CCP had long strived for. Just as Mao (1972, cited in Lin et al, 1998, p. 252) argued 
in 1972, “the Sino–US ambassadorial talks [that had ended at 1970] was a Marathon 
that had lasted 15 years and talked 136 times, but was superficial and had no effect 
in breaking Sino–US deadlock.” Thus, the rapprochement gave the CCP a chance of 
finding “someone who was in charge to solve Sino–US problems” (Mao, 1972, cited 
in Lin et al, 1998, p. 252). Likewise, CCP senior leader, Chen Yi (1970, cited in Xiong, 
2006, p. 200) argued that “the ambassadorial talks lasted 15 years but did not get 
any result concerning establishing Sino–US relationship… Now, the situation 
changed, Nixon was eager to use China to balance against the Soviet Union, we 
must utilize the US-Soviet competition to establish the Sino–US relationship.” 
 
Besides seeking to form a shared identity/interests with the US, the CCP tried to 
downplay the conflicting ones to preserve a benign relationship with the US. To build 
this benign relationship, the CCP tried to make its communist identity less salient to 
the US by creating a more nationalist than communist image for itself in 1944. 
According to John Service (2004, p. 266), a US officer of the US observation team in 
Yan’an, besides speeches at formal meetings, leaders of Marxism or socialism were 
rarely mentioned. Decorations that represented the Soviet Union or socialism, such 
as the hammer and sickle, were rare (Service, 2004, p. 266). Instead of showing 
connection between the CCP and socialism, the CCP stressed that it constructed a 
Chinese system and behaved in a Chinese way (Service, 2004, p. 266). Moreover, 
to make the CCP’s communist identity less salient, the CCP had a heated discussion 
about whether or not the party should change its name in the seventh Plenary session 
of the sixth CCPCC congress in 1944 (Yang, 2010, p. 449). This was confirmed by 
Mao who told Service that the CCP had discussed about changing the party’s name 
in 1944 (Service, 2004, p. 260). According to the CCP’s southern Bureau’s advice to 
the CCPCC (1944, cited in Yang, 2010, p. 448), changing the name was meant to 
ameliorate the ideological distrust of the US towards the CCP by showing that it “was 




However, the CCP had felt that it could not simultaneously cooperate with the US 
and maintain absolute control of the regime and army since January 1945 (Hu, 2003, 
pp. 361-362). Thus, it began to put greater emphasis on the Soviet’s assistance and 
readdress communist identity. For instance, Mao stated in March 1945 that the CCP 
must mainly rely on the Soviet Union for assistance (Yang, 2010, p. 458). He re-
addressed China’s communist identity and formally rejected the suggestion of 
changing the CCP’s name because “the name was good… we should frankly 
emphasize that socialism was very beautiful “(Mao, 1945, cited in Yang, 2010, p. 
458).  
 
In 1970, the formation of a strategic partnership between the US and China made 
China’s communist identity less salient to the US because the US regarded 
competition with the Soviet Union as the priority. China’s communist identity 
consequently became less important during this period. Utilizing the importance of a 
strategic partnership, Mao attempted to downplay the communist identity by 
proposing “ideological armistice” with Kissinger (2012, p. 284). This meant that the 
US and China could preserve their distinctive ideologies, but put aside ideological 
competition and focus on the most important shared goal of resisting threat from the 
Soviet Union (Kissinger, 2012, p. 284). Further, on the basis that core nationalist 
principles were preserved, China downplayed its nationalist identity by suppressing 
nationalist ambition and conceding less important nationalist interests at the time. It 
knew that the Taiwan issue was the major obstacle in forming a benign relationship 
with the US. In the 1972 US–China negotiation, China’s core interests regarding 
Taiwan were recognized because the US acknowledged one China and promised to 
withdraw the US military from Taiwan (Kissinger, 2012, p. 273). On that basis, China 
suppressed its nationalist will that favors cross-strait formal unification and stated its 
tolerance to Taiwan’s long-term de facto independence (Mao, 1975, cited in Kissinger, 
2012, p. 307). China’s tolerance was probably derived from pragmatic considerations. 
First, it was nearly impossible that the mainland could recover Taiwan in the 1970s 




Taiwan was a less important nationalist interest for the mainland at the time. Second, 
bettering the Sino–US relationship could create a benign environment for China to 
develop. Thus, because China’s core interests over the Taiwan issue were 
recognized by the US, the cost of making it a sticking point of the Sino–US benign 
relationship exceeded the benefits. 
 
To sum up, this chapter examined the extent to which the CCP, and later the PRC, 
developed a benign relationship with the US to break the US-led military and 
economic blockade without sacrificing core nationalist interests, such as Taiwan’s 
sovereignty status, and destabilizing the CCP regime through a strategic 
management of identities and interests. The findings are as follows. First, seeking 
shared identities/interests and downplaying conflicting ones did help China break the 
US-led military and economic blockade without sacrificing core nationalist interests 
and losing the CCP’s control over the Chinese nation in 1972. In this year, China 
formed a shared strategic partnership with the US and downplayed nationalist 
interests regarding the Taiwan issue to reconcile with the US.  
 
Second, the CCP’s strategic management of identities and interests during this 
period demonstrated limitations. Failure to strike a balance among those goals was 
mainly due to CCP’s reluctance to concede important interests associated with 
communist and nationalist identities. The CCP’s reluctance to concede control over 
the army and base areas led to the failed shared identity approach, such as the CCP–
US anti-Japanese alliance. CCP’s reluctance to loosen control over the Chinese 
nation and obey US-KMT treaties led to its failure to get the US’s recognition in 1949. 
Moreover, the shared interest of easing the Taiwan Strait tension was not important 
enough to offset frictions caused by conflicting interests between China and the US 
and pave way for establishing a diplomatic relationship between them. Finally, the 
CCP joined the Korean and Vietnam Wars when regime survival was at stake, which 





Chapter 6 China’s Strategic Management of Identities and Interests in the 
defensive period (1978-2009). 
The previous chapter studies the CCP’s, and later the PRC’s, effort to break the US-
led military and economic blockade without losing control over the communist regime 
and conceding crucial nationalist interests, such as those related to Taiwan. Because 
China had successfully lifted the US-led military and economic blockade in 1972, the 
main mission for Chinese leaders in the defensive period was to maintain this 
relatively benign environment without compromising important nationalist interests 
and the CCP’s regime security. This chapter examines to what extent China achieved 
the three goals simultaneously through the strategic management of identities and 
interests in the defensive period. Specifically, it examines to what extent China’s 
shared identity/interests with the US or regional countries, and effort to downplay 
conflicting ones could ameliorate frictions deriving from communist and nationalist 
identities. It also examines to what extent China’s strategy of pursuing or defending 
important nationalist interests with restraint prevented unduly escalating frictions. 
 
To begin, China sought to continuously form shared identities or interests with the 
US or its allies to maintain a relatively peaceful environment in the defensive period. 
From 1978 to 1982, China sought shared identities as partners of the anti-Soviet 
hegemony with the US and its East Asian allies. First, China’s geographic location, 
territorial size, and large population gave it self-evident importance of being the 
strategic partner of the US. Just as the former National Security Adviser of the US 
Zbigniew Brzezinski (no date, cited in Sullivan, 1992, p. 4) said during the Cold War, 
China could be an important strategic partner for the US “simply by being China.” 
Likewise, in 1981, Deng Xiaoping (1981) asked US officials not to underestimate 
China’s importance in the global balance of power because, although China was 
“poor,” it has “a vast territory and large population.” Second, China often highlighted 
the common threat of Soviet expansion when talking with the US to stress the need 




Brzezinski in 1978, then Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua argued that “the Soviet 
Union is the most dangerous source of war” but coordinated pressure from China 
and the US could compete with the Soviet because the Soviet “bullies the weak and 
fears the strong” (JCPL, 1978, cited in Kissinger, 2012, pp. 251-252). Likewise, on 
his visit to the US in 1979, placing emphasis on China’s concern about the Soviet’s 
expansion, Deng (1979, cited in Kissinger, 2012, p. 362) proposed the formation of 
a de facto Sino–US strategic partnership to compete with the Soviet Union.  
 
From 1982 to 1989, China had tried to add weight to and increase the salience of the 
balancer role in the Sino–US relationship by gradually normalizing the Sino–Soviet 
relationship. By always reassuring the US that China would not lean to the Soviet 
Union (Kissinger, 2012, p. 390), Chinese leaders probably wished to show the US 
that China had an alternative and, thus, more leverage in the strategic partnership. 
Yahuda (1993, pp. 562-563) noted that China was oblivious that the US had also 
reconciled with the Soviet Union since 1983 and, thus, did not oppose the 
improvement of the Sino–Soviet relationship. However, despite improvement in the 
US–Soviet relationship since 1983, the Soviet factor increased the importance of the 
Sino–US strategic partnership and had effectively facilitated cooperation between the 
two countries. For instance, in 1983, the US allowed the transfer of some military 
technologies to China and extended the China–US trade deal period (Tao, 2016, p. 
654). The US also allowed the sale of non-lethal weapons to China (Xinhua Net, 
2014). In January 1985, the US admitted to discussing strengthening China’s 
defense system with them (Tao, 2016, p. 671). According to then US Defense 
Minister Weinberger (1983, cited in Tao, 2016, p. 654), through strengthening 
China’s economic and military independence, the US aimed to increase China’s 
capability to resist the Soviet threat and consolidate Sino–US shared interests. China 
often refers to the period from 1979 to 1989 as the honeymoon of the US–China 





Also, the strategic partnership led to the US’ compromise and reconciliation with 
China in late 1989 after Beijing suppressed student protestors. While imposing 
sanctions on China, US President Bush tried to restore cooperation with China due 
to his recognition of the importance of the Sino–US relationship in the Cold War era 
(Kissinger, 2012, p. 415). As special envoys of then President Bush, National 
Security adviser Brent Scowcroft and Under Secretary of State Lawrence 
Eagleburger, secretly went to Beijing to reconcile (Ross, 2002, p. 104). Then Bush 
administration allowed the US–China military transfer program to continue and 
discussed China accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
(Ross, 2002, p. 104). When meeting with Scowcroft in July, Deng (1989c) stressed 
“China’s special importance in stabilizing global balance of power” and argued that 
“the improved Sino-US relationship was one major contributing factor to global peace 
in decades.” Deng’s argument hinted the two countries’ strategic partnership and 
China’s importance in helping the US deter Soviet expansion. Deng (1989c) used the 
partnership as a leverage to ask the US to “restore the Sino–US relationship.”  
 
The 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union marked the end of the Sino–US strategic 
partnership. Under such circumstance, China tried hard to form new shared interests 
with the US on other dimensions, especially economic cooperation. When Deng’s 
successor Jiang was interviewed by an American journalist in March 1992, he warned 
that the US would lose over a lot of job opportunities if it did not value its shared 
economic interests with China (Tao, 2016, p. 712). In May 1992, a group of Chinese 
senior officials and entrepreneurs went to the US and signed trade deals worth two 
billion dollars (Tao, 2016, p. 712). In November 1993, Jiang went to Seattle to attend 
the APEC conference (Khun, 2004, p. 241). Upon landing in San Francisco for a 
stopover, Jiang met with US business leaders and encouraged that “American 
business community… will not let opportunities slip through its fingers” (Kuhn, 2004, 
p. 242). Jiang also argued that the huge Chinese market would provide enormous 
profits for the US, whose economy was highly complementary with that of China 




Boeing’s Everett factory, emphasized China was the largest consumer of Boeing 
aircrafts outside the US, and promised to sign nine billion worth of contracts with the 
company (Kuhn, 2004, p. 242).  
 
Just as China expected, Sino–US shared economic interests were proven to be 
effective in softening the US government’s punitive actions against China. For 
instance, in May 1992, 298 US companies and economic groups sent a letter to then 
US President Clinton, requiring the US government to extend China’s most favored 
nation status without the conditionality that it must improve its human rights record 
(Tao, 2016, p. 712). In May 1993, the US extended the most favored nation status 
for one year without any Chinese improvement on human rights records (Kissinger, 
2012, p. 466). Also, the Clinton administration finally abandoned the conditionality in 
1994 due to pressure from American enterprises that were doing business in China 
(Kissinger, 2012, p. 468). The shared economic interests have also been one of the 
most important shared interests between China and East Asian countries. For 
instance, China has become an increasingly important trading partner of East Asian 
countries since 1978. 
 
China also sought to form a shared identity with the US as an anti-terrorist colleague. 
After the 911 incident in 2001, when airplanes hijacked by terrorists from an Islamic 
extremist group crashed into the World Trade Center and Pentagon, Chinese 
President Jiang Zemin called US President Bush and expressed China’s willingness 
to support them in combatting terrorists (Xinhua Net, 2008a). Moreover, in 2001, 
Beijing voted for the UN 1373 resolution that endorsed the use of force by the US in 
defeating terrorists in Afghanistan for the first time since its entrance into the UN in 
1971 (Malik, 2002, p. 257; Wang, 2009, p. 45). The US, which focused its “war on 
terror” after the terrorist attack, acknowledged this shared anti-terrorist colleague 
identity. President Bush, who once categorized China as a strategic competitor in 
March that year (The Guardian, 2001), substantially softened his tone. He stated that 




China (Kuhn, 2004, p. 473). According to a quantitative study regarding the Sino–US 
relationship conducted by Tsinghua University’s Institute of International Relations 
(2019), 2002 to 2008 ranked as the second most amicable period in the Sino–US 
relations since 1950, with the first being the Sino–US honeymoon from 1979 to 1989. 
This demonstrates that the anti-terrorist colleague identity did help ameliorate 
frictions in the Sino–US relationship. 
 
In addition to continuously seeking a shared identity and interests with the US and 
East Asian countries, China made its communist and nationalist identities less salient 
to them during the Cold War. Some analysts argue that China’s keeping a low-profile 
was a response to Western criticism and sanctions after the 1989 Tiananmen event 
and the collapse of the Eastern bloc and Soviet Union (Chen and Wang, 2011, p. 
197; Cheng and Zhang, 1999, p. 101). However, this chapter argues that keeping a 
low-profile was a guiding policy in the defensive period. First, the strategic partnership 
from 1978 to 1990 had made China’s communist identity appear less salient to the 
US. For instance, in 1978, to form the strategic partnership, the Carter administration 
that viewed commitment to protect human rights as the essence of foreign policy 
gave a mooted response to China’s political executions in 1977 (Hilton, 2009, p. 602). 
However, the Carter administration justified normalization with China, not through the 
importance of the strategic partnership, but through its aim of encouraging China’s 
human rights achievement through engagement after normalization (Hilton, 2009, p. 
602). This justification was somewhat consistent with constructivists’ concept of 
socialization wherein the socializee will gradually conform to and endorse “expected 
ways of thinking, feeling and acting” through interaction with the socializer (Johnston, 
2008, p. 20). To facilitate successful socialization, the socializer needed to pressurize 
or punish the socializee to change behaviors (Johnston, 2008, pp. 24-25; Yuzawa, 
2013, p. 83). However, the response of the US to Beijing’s human rights violation 
demonstrated tolerance rather than punishment or pressure from 1978 to 1990. Thus, 
the argument that the US aimed to socialize China through engagement was not 




interacting with its Chinese counterpart, the Carter administration’s main concern 
was resisting Soviet expansion rather than criticizing China’s laogai system, which 
treated prisoners harshly (Edwards, p. 1999, p. 721). Moreover, although China did 
not significantly improve its human rights record, the Reagan administration had 
enhanced cooperation with them, which resulted in the Sino–US honeymoon period. 
Moreover, although he had imposed sanctions on China, Bush feared that the 
overreaction of the US would “throw China back into the hands of the Soviet Union” 
(New York Times, 1989, cited in Harding, 1992, p. 227).  
 
Second, China substantially downplayed the communist identity through substantive 
actions in the Cold War era. During this time, many Southeast Asian leaders 
witnessed that local communist parties supported by China seriously destabilized 
their regimes (Murphy, 2017, p. 54). Thus, they viewed China’s communist identity 
as salient and a major source of frictions. When Chinese leaders visited Southeast 
Asian countries from 1978 to 1979, they aimed to reduce the countries’ threat 
perception by reducing the salience of China’s communist identity. First, instead of 
building China’s image as a communist country, they often “presented China as a 
developing country” (Kallgren, 1979, p. 4) that would shift its focus from ideological 
expansion to inward-looking and national development (Liang, 2011). Also, during 
his visit to Southeast Asian countries in 1978, Deng publicly recognized that 
revolutionary diplomacy was wrong (Liang, 2011). To support Deng’s statement, 
China has stopped supporting radio channels of local communist parties in Malaysia 
and Indonesia since 1978 (Liang, 2011). When Deng visited Malaysia in 1978, he 
publicly stated that the CCP viewed its relationship with the Malaysian communist 
party as one it must forget (Deng, 1978, cited in Qianlong Net, 2010). All these 
actions marked China’s retreat from ideological competition and made its communist 
identity less salient and threatening to regional countries. Analysts often viewed 
these actions as China’s way of forming an anti-Soviet coalition and preparing for the 
fight against Vietnam (Kallgren, 1979; Kissinger, 2012, p. 360). This was the 




Huang Hua (2007, p. 208) argued, the long-term aim was to create a benign external 
environment for the country’s national development.  
 
To establish a benign relationship with the US and its allies, China downplayed its 
nationalist identity during the Cold War. It stated that sovereign disputes between 
itself and Japan could be set aside when Deng visited Japan in 1978 (Lungu, 2018). 
In this way, China made its nationalist identity less salient to Japan because it 
suppressed its nationalist ambition of recovering the islands and shelved one of the 
most conflicting issues between the two sides to better Sino–Japan relationship. Also, 
after the US had acknowledged China’s core nationalist interests regarding the 
Taiwan issue, such as shifting diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to mainland China, 
China conceded less important nationalist interests at the time. For instance, it 
acquiesced to some of the US’ defensive arm sale to Taiwan to accelerate the 
establishment of the Sino–US diplomatic relationship in 1979 (Luo, 2010, pp. 16-17). 
In 1984, after finding out about the Reagan administration’s private assurances to 
Taiwan that the US would increase its arms sale to them if the mainland became 
offensive, the mainland tolerated the assurance (Huang, 2007, p. 97).  
 
In late 1989, the disarmament talks between the Soviet Union and the US and the 
collapse of the Eastern bloc led to Deng’s fear that the Sino–US strategic partnership 
might not last long and China might once again face a US-led ideological rivalry 
coalition. Deng (1989a) feared “the new cold wars begun, one directed at… the third 
world, another one directed at the socialist world.” In 1991, China’s communist 
identity became highly salient because the Soviet Union’s demise had dissolved the 
strategic partnership. Thus, China tried to downplay the salience of its communist 
identity to the lowest level. In 1989, Deng mentioned his famous doctrine taoguang 
yanghui (TGYH), which means to “observe carefully, secure our position, cope with 
affairs calmly, hide our capacity and bide our time, be good at maintaining a low 
profile, and never claim leadership” (Kissinger, 2012, p. 438). This doctrine has been 




successor, Jiang Zemin, and the first term (2004–2009) of Chinese President Hu 
Jintao. In 1990, China rejected the suggestions of some developing countries about 
leading the Third World and international socialist movement (Deng, 1990). Some 
senior Chinese officials’ proposal of directly confronting the US and the West had 
also been turned down (Wang, 2011, p. 6). Moreover, Deng (no date, cited in Yang, 
2004, p. 9) asked his colleagues to cooperate with the West and “not criticize or 
blame others at will, not make excessive comments or act excessively.” By doing so, 
China aimed to show restraint regarding ideological issues and, thus, avoid making 
the ideological competition with liberal countries salient.  
 
Moreover, China made the communist and nationalist identities less salient to other 
countries by behaving more as a status quo power than a revisionist to the liberal 
order during this period. By acting more as a norm taker than breaker, China made 
a lot of adjustments to meet the requirements for participating in the liberal order. For 
instance, in the mid-1990s, it adjusted domestic institutions to meet the requirements 
for participation in international disarmament conferences (Johnston, 2008, p. 62). 
Additionally, to get access to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, it agreed 
to comply an unprecedented amount of international commitments required by the 
organization (Lardy, 2002, cited in Chin and Thakur, 2010, p. 126). China “showed 
considerable determination” in changing the legal infrastructure in terms of the 
organization’s requirements (General Accounting Office, 2002, cited in Johnston, 
2003, p. 16). Acting more as a status quo power than a revisionist power, China not 
only wanted to gain benefits, but also downplay ideological competition by 
demonstrating that it was integrating, rather than challenging the liberal order.  
 
China intended to make its nationalist identity less salient to regional countries by 
showing a sense of responsibility on preserving East Asia’s stability and prosperity. 
For instance, during the 1997–1998 Asian Financial Crisis, China stabilized the 
collapse of the East Asian region by withstanding the pressure of a devaluing 




save Thailand, the center of the crisis (Kuhn, 2004, p. 350). China’s action showed a 
sense of responsibility to the East Asian regional society because the devaluing 
Chinese currency would have enhanced China’s export competitiveness, but cause 
a “domino effect devaluation throughout the region” (Kuhn, 2004, p. 350). Also, from 
1990 to the early 2000s, China actively participated in ASEAN-led institutions, such 
as the ASEAN Regional Forum. It also signed a framework of a multilateral trade 
agreement with ASEAN in 2002 (Foot, 2006, p. 85). By doing so, China wished to 
assuage many regional countries’ fear of its nationalist goals to downplay the frictions 
caused by its nationalist identity. 
 
However, like Mao, CCP top leaders during this period demonstrated firmness on 
ensuring regime security in the face of potential liberal democratization in China. In 
1986, Deng (1986) felt that student protests promoting liberalization had gained 
momentum. Thus, he commanded party members to “show the flag” and “ignore 
Western criticism,” as well as ordered the suppression of student protestors (Deng, 
1986). Likewise, Deng’s successor, Jiang, was cautious about the potential liberal 
democratization of the regime, stressing that China should “unswervingly oppose and 
resist any false actions and discourse that betray the four basic principles” (Jiang, 
1995). In 1999, regarding the three dissidents’ attempt to establish the Chinese 
democratic party, Jiang stated these subversive actions would be “nipped in the bud” 
and China would never tolerate Western-style democracy (Jiang, 1999, cited in Kuhn, 
2004, p. 376). Similarly, in 2008, Chinese President Hu Jintao stressed his 
determination in maintaining the communist regime and resisting political 
liberalization (Xinhua Net, 2008b). 
 
Maintaining a relatively peaceful regional environment does not mean that China will 
concede important nationalist goals that conflict with other countries’ interests. As 
noted in Chapter 3, Chinese nationalists first wished for China to become 
economically and militarily strong. Second, in the context of East Asia, the nationalist 




encircled by the US-led island chains. Thus, it is determined to reverse this position 
to deter possible military blockade or challenges from the US-led island chains. Third, 
the nationalist identity makes China feel that it was disadvantaged regarding maritime 
territorial disputes in the region. During this period, China pursued these nationalist 
interests incrementally and steadily. 
 
First, a relatively peaceful environment helped China increase its economic power, 
which has paved a solid foundation for the modernization of its military. Since 1972, 
a benign Sino–US relationship has gradually removed the economic blockade on 
China. Deng (no date, cited in Wang, 2006, p. 41) viewed this as an opportunity that 
must be seized to attract investment and develop the economy. He, therefore (Deng, 
no date, cited in Wang, 2006, p. 41), required the whole nation to focus on economic 
development. For Chinese leaders who were deeply aware of a strong army’s 
importance for national defense, the primary task was also to pave the economic 
foundation for modernizing the Chinese army. Deng (1984) required the army to 
tolerate underdevelopment because “a good national economy is the foundation of 
true national defence modernization.” Boosting China’s economy must, therefore, be 
prioritized as the central national task. Likewise, Jiang (1998) pointed out that the 
“deepening reform and opening up and developing socialist market economy would 
definitely create a sufficient economic foundation for the army’s modernization.”  
 
This view proved to be true. According to the statistics of the Chinese National 
Bureau of Statistics, the growth of China’s annual gross domestic product (GDP) 
generally remained above 7.5% from 1999 to 2009 and rose to above 10% from 2004 
to 2008 (China Economic Net, 2013). This contributed to the annual rise of the military 
budget, which sped up national defense modernization. For instance, according to 
the statistics of the State Council Information Office (2009), the annual military budget 





A relatively peaceful external environment has also helped the strategic reform of the 
Chinese army. For instance, while China was eager to build a strong navy during 
Mao’s time (Mao, 1953, cited in People’s Net, 2016), the Chinese navy played a 
subordinate role to the Chinese ground, missile, and air forces due to China’s poor 
economy and fear of being caught in an imminent war. The major mission of the 
Chinese navy was to rely on China’s seashore and islands to resist the enemy’s 
landing operations and harassment (People’s Net, 2014). This situation changed 
after the reform and opening up because a relatively peaceful environment 
decreased the tension surrounding China’s borders. It enabled China to adjust the 
relationship among different Chinese forces and formulate new strategic 
requirements and guidelines for them. Specifically, the Chinese navy became equal 
with other forces during this period, and a new and independent naval strategy was 
established (Liu, 2004, p. 437). 
 
The navy strategy clearly reflects nationalist goals. It states that the main strategic 
missions of the navy are to “realize and protect national unification, sovereign and 
maritime rights and interests, deter and contain potential interventions of hegemon 
coming from the sea, and resist local war that is at sea and directs against China” 
(Liu, 2004, p. 438). Achieving these missions require them to be able to reverse the 
disadvantaged geostrategic status and break the US-led island chains encirclement 
by “seizing and keeping the command of the sea in major operational directions and 
effectively controlling several important sea lanes in the first island chain in the 
wartime” (Liu, 2004, p. 438). Based on these missions, then Navy General Liu 
Huaqing changed the navy’s mission from a nearshore to near sea defense, which 
shifted the Chinese navy’s operational zone from near China’s seashore to within the 
whole first island chain (Liu, 2004, p. 437). Liu also conceptualized that with China’s 
economic and technological development, the navy’s operational zone would 
gradually extend to the second island chain (Liu, 2004, p. 437). The setup of the navy 




because it is the roadmap for China’s reversal of its perceived disadvantaged 
geostrategic position in East Asia.  
 
Under the guidance of the strategy, the Chinese navy began its geostrategic 
development in East Asia in 1983. For the first time, it strengthened presence in the 
island chains by organizing an ocean cruise fleet that arrived at the James Shoal, 
which is deemed as China’s southernmost territorial seas (Shi, 2013, p. 963). It also 
conducted long voyages encircling the first island chain, and cruised in and out of 
major sea lanes within the island chain (Shi, 2013, p. 963). 
 
With the enlargement of the navy’s operational zone, China consolidated sovereignty 
over disputed land features and geostrategic outposts in the SCS. In 1988, after the 
Sino–Vietnam skirmish over unoccupied reefs, China recovered six reefs in the 
Spratly Islands (Liu, 2004, p. 540). This consolidated China’s sovereign claim over 
disputed land features and ended China’s lack of de facto controlled reefs and, thus, 
its strategic outposts in the Spratly Islands (Liu, 2004, p. 540).  
 
While making progress on reversing its perceived geostrategic disadvantages, 
China’s geostrategic development was restrained. In 1988, China attempted to avoid 
overt-escalation by choosing to control unoccupied reefs in the SCS rather than 
seizing the occupied reefs of other claimants. In 1988, the superpower competition 
with the Soviet Union dominated US strategic thinking. Thus, for the US, China’s 
identity as an important strategic partner against the Soviet Union was more 
important than a revisionist power that conflicted over tiny reefs. This made the US’ 
response to the incident moderate (Liu, 2004, p. 541). 
 
Foot (2006, p. 85) argued that China’s TGYH did not achieve ideal results from 1990 
to 1995 because its assertive actions in the SCS alarmed its neighbors. One of these 
assertive actions may refer to China’s seizure of the Mischief Reef in 1995. As the 




and always took offensive actions to secure its interests. The 1995 seizure of Mischief 
Reef was a necessary step for China to realize important nationalist interests 
because the occupation enabled it to get a strategic foothold in the Southern part of 
Spratly and cut off connection between Vietnam and the Philippines’ outposts in the 
Spratly (Fravel, 2008, p. 297). 
 
However, Foot’s argument that the Mischief Reef incident alarmed regional countries 
was flawed. First, all claimants but Brunei were in a competition of seizing land 
features in the Spratly from 1970 to 2000, and regional frictions existed throughout 
these years. In fact, China was more restrained compared with other claimant states. 
Vietnam seized 27 land features in the Spratly and China had seven. Moreover, 
Mischief Reef was the last land feature that China occupied in the Spratly. After it 
stopped seizing land features in 1995, other claimants continued. Investigator Reef 
and Erica Reef were occupied by Malaysia in 1998 (Chung, 2009, pp. 100-101). The 
Second Thomas Shoal’s sovereignty has been marked by the Philippines by 
grounding an antique warship since 1999 (Mogato, 2015).  
 
 
Second, although China was restrained when compared with other regional 
claimant’s actions, it underestimated the consequence of seizing Mischief Reef 
because it was surprised by ASEAN’s strong criticism (Emmers, 2009, p. 131). To 
ameliorate frictions, China moderated by making important concessions. For 
instance, instead of the country’s previous insistence on bilateral talks, it told ASEAN 
that it had planned to hold multilateral talks with them to discuss the disputes 
(Emmers, 2009, p. 131)  
 
From the discussion above, the chapter argues that by using controlled offensive 
actions, China did consider striking a balance between TGYH and the frictions 




avoiding escalation because of strong criticism from ASEAN, which demonstrated 
limits of China’s strategy.  
 
While China was cautiously preserving a stable external environment for national 
development in this period, it resorted to military means if it perceived that its 
nationalist interests were being seriously violated when incidents caused by other 
countries occurred, and that such trends had to be reversed. This perception was 
illustrated by China’s actions during the 1995–1996 Cross-Strait Crisis. 
 
Some analysts view that Beijing used offensive means during the crisis because the 
PLA had forced moderate civilian officials, such as Jiang and Qian, to take harsh 
actions (Suettinger, 2003, p. 3310; Swaine, 2001, p. 4143). However, the chapter 
agrees with other scholars’ argument that China took hard-line actions to prevent its 
core nationalist interests from being violated (You, 1997, p. 288; Ross, 2000, p. 87). 
As demonstrated in the memoir of then Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, like 
military leaders, civilian leaders felt the urgent need to resort to tough actions to 
prevent Taiwan from becoming independent and the US from withdrawing its support 
of the One China policy. First, China viewed that the US failed to keep its promise 
that it would not allow Lee to visit before the announcement of the approval of his 
visa in May 1995 (Qian, 2005). Second, China was not convinced that permission 
was granted to prevent congress from establishing binding laws regarding the US–
Taiwan relationship. This was expressed in the explanatory letter of then US 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher’s in June 7, 1995 (Qian, 2005). Moreover, 
China felt that the US wished to let China “swallow the bitter fruit” after taking some 
symbolic actions to assuage its concern (Qian, 2005). Thus, China had to “take 
strong actions” to make the US “really aware the issue’s seriousness” (Qian, 2005).  
 
Once decisions of taking offensive actions was made, Chinese leaders tried to strike 
a balance between securing important nationalist interests and preventing the 




actions with restraint. During the 1995–1996 Crisis, it deployed over 100,000 troops 
to Fujian province, fired missiles to target areas very close to Taiwan, and continued 
missile firings and military exercises despite warnings from the US (Ross, 2000, pp. 
106-108). However, most scholars agreed that China had controlled the strength of 
its military actions (You, 1997; Scobell, 2000, p. 233; Ross, 2000; Kuhn, 2004, p. 
279); for example, the missiles were of dummy warheads (Kissinger, 2012, p. 474). 
Jiang also refused the proposal of deploying the entire main force of the PLA first 
army to Fujian province, thinking that “too much action” would lead to overt escalation 
(Jiang, 1996, cited in Kuhn, 2004, p. 279). The location of the 1995 military drills, 
duration, and scope were also strictly controlled to prevent escalation (Scobell, 2000, 
pp. 236-237). 
 
Diplomatic means were used by China to avoid escalation. When Kissinger visited 
Beijing in July 1995, Jiang reassured him that China would not seize Taiwan 
(Kissinger, 2012, p. 475). The PLA also privately reassured the US that it would 
confine military exercises to waters within the mainland controlled Pingtan Islands 
(Suettinger, 2003, p. 3879). Suettinger (2003, p. 3310) noted that after the 1996 
missile test by China, US senior officials, such as Secretary of State Christopher and 
Defense Minister Perry, and Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqing, exchanged 
harsh words in Washington. However, the main mission of Liu’s visit to the US was 
to reassure that China would not cross the US redline and change the cross-strait 
status quo (Tayler, 1996, cited in Ross, 2000, p. 108).  
 
Suettinger (2003, p. 3936) pointed out the costs of China’s military actions in the 
crisis, arguing that although Beijing successfully prevented the US from supporting 
Taiwan independence, it prevented the Taiwanese from moving toward unification 
and strengthened the US’s security commitment to Taiwan. This chapter recognizes 
the costs of Beijing’s actions. However, Beijing may perceive the costs outweighed 
by the benefits. Chinese officials often argued that the US regarded Taiwan as an 




the cost of the US war against China’s forceful reunification with Taiwan had always 
existed in Chinese leaders’ minds. Second, as will be demonstrated by this thesis’ 
chapter on Taiwan, even most pro-unification Taiwanese do not accept Beijing’s 
unification proposal of one country two systems. Thus, whether Beijing acted or not 
will not affect the feelings of the Taiwanese towards unification on Beijing’s term. As 
Ross (2000, p. 118) rightly argued, from Beijing’s perspective, its coercive actions 




This chapter examines to what extent China stabilized its communist identity, 
pursued or defended crucial nationalist interests, and maintained a relatively peaceful 
surrounding environment in the defensive period through a strategic management of 
identities/interests. The chapter argues that the strategic management succeeded in 
achieving the three goals to a certain degree in the defensive period. China and the 
US had an amicable relationship from 1979 to 1989 and from 2002 to 2008 due to 
the salience of the shared strategic partnership and anti-terrorist colleague, 
respectively. Shared economic interests have also helped China gain the most 
favored nation status from and ameliorate ideological frictions with the US since 1994. 
Moreover, the shared strategic partnership and anti-terrorist colleague identity helped 
reduce the salience of China’s communist identity. In an attempt to downplay its 
communist and nationalist identities to alleviate the fear of regional countries and 
ideological competition, China discontinued support for the communist movement in 
regional countries, kept a low profile, and behaved as a status quo power. Further, 
the CCP maintained authoritarian control over the nation.  
 
Frictions occurred when China consolidated and defended important nationalist 
interests. However, China attempted to use controlled military actions and diplomatic 
means to avoid unduly escalation. It succeeded in some cases, such as the 1988 




However, China’s restraints in using offensive means failed to prevent escalating 
frictions in other cases, as demonstrated by ASEAN’s strong criticism after China’s 
seizure of Mischief Reef in 1995. 
 
Moreover, because the CCP did not concede its authoritarian control over the 
Chinese nation, ideological frictions had been salient until China constructed another 
shared identity/interest to which the US attached importance. For instance, although 
Deng proposed the TGYH, ideological frictions between China and the US were 
salient after the end of their strategic partnership in 1991. China’s efforts to construct 
shared economic interests with the US smoothed the frictions in 1994.  
 
These findings reinforce the overall argument of the thesis that China’s strategic 
management was to a certain degree effective in striking the balance through seeking 
shared identity/interests and downplaying conflicting ones. However, it also has 
limitations. China’s shared identity/interests approach may fail because the CCP did 
not want to concede its authoritarian control over the Chinese nation. Also, China’s 

















Part 5. China’s strategic management in the stalemate period (2009–present)  
Chapter 7. The stalemate period (1): Recentralizing the communist regime in 
the stalemate period. 
Drawing on the UF framework, the previous chapter studied China’s attempt to 
maintain a relatively benign regional environment without conceding the CCP’s 
authoritarian control over the Chinese nation and important nationalist interests, such 
as those related to Taiwan, through a strategic management of identities and 
interests. From the current chapter to Chapter 9, this thesis studies China’s strategic 
management in the stalemate period. Specifically, the main research objective is to 
identify the extent to which China consolidated the communist regime and pursued 
important nationalist interests while thwarting the formation of a US-led hard-
balancing coalition in East Asia during this period through the strategic management.  
 
This chapter answers the question regarding the extent to which China could stabilize 
the communist regime and prevent the formation of an anti-communist China 
coalition in East Asia during the stalemate period. According to the CCP’s UF 
framework in the Anti-Japanese War period, the stalemate period was featured by 
salient ideological and strategic competition between the CCP and Chiang. Facing 
the competition, the CCP’s priority was the consolidation of its control over base 
areas to ensure the communist regime’s survival. By applying the CCP’s UF 
framework during the Anti-Japanese War in the current Sino–US relationship, this 
chapter analyzes the CCP’s consolidation of its regime in the current Sino–US 
stalemate period.  
 
The CCP’s consolidation of its regime has already increased salient ideological 
competition with the US. However, the consolidation does not necessarily lead to a 
US-led hard-balancing coalition against Communist China in East Asia because 
other states’ choices of joining the coalition mattered. After analyzing the CCP’s 




and pluralist identities between China and regional countries could prevent the 
formation of the coalition.  
 
This chapter will be divided into four parts. The first part is about the CCP’s 
recentralization of power in this period. The second and third parts engage in the 
debates of whether recentralization will increase the stability of the CCP regime. The 
fourth part looks at how the shared pluralist identity between China and regional 
countries could reduce the salience of China’s communist identity in East Asia. 
 
CCP’s effort to recentralize power 
Like the CCP in the stalemate period during the Anti-Japanese War, the current 
leaders view the stabilization of the communist regime as fundamental to ensure 
regime survival and cope with the challenges in the current Sino–US stalemate period. 
According to an article published by People’s Daily (2019), CCP members should 
“unswervingly” defend the party’s leadership and communist regime to cope with “any 
risks and challenges that threaten the leadership… and China’s sovereignty, security 
and developmental interests.” Likewise, the Party committee of the Ministry of State 
Security of PRC (2020) stated in 2020 that “the more risks and challenges [China 
faces], the more [the nation] needs the party’s leadership.” 
 
Based on this belief, especially since the current President Xi Jinping came to power 
in 2012, the CCPCC has substantially recentralized power horizontally and vertically. 
First, at the top level, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s status as the core leader of the 
central committee has been established to avoid factionalism. Second, vertically, the 
CCP conducts political education campaigns that aim to raise the awareness of local 
cadres, party organizations, and the ordinary Chinese of the center’s status as the 
core of China’s political system. Since Xi came to power, he has advocated 
“managing the party strictly” (Li, 2016), which not only means an anti-corruption 
campaign, but also an anti-decentralization tendency of party members and 




were conducted at every level of the political structure. The education activity centers 
on the “two study and one action” campaign, which stresses obedience to the party 
leadership (Xinhua Net, 2019). In 2016, the CCP issued regulations, named new 
inner-party supervision rules, under the new situation that requires party members to 
“safeguard the Central Committee’s leadership” and “stick to principles that all party 
members must be obedient to the Central Committee” (CCPCC, 2016).  
 
Third, horizontally, the party re-establishes the party committee’s dominant status 
through a political arrangement by retrieving power from the government. In the work 
report of the 19th party congress, Xi (2017) stated that China will try to merge or 
combine provincial, county, and city levels’ party and political organs with overlapping 
functions. Doing so devolves power from government to the party committee and 
increases the difficulty of the government’s disobedience to the committee’s 
commands. First, the merger of party and political organs will probably be the mode 
of the “one institution with two names.” The newly merged organ will not have a new 
name, but keep its old names. While the newly merged organ will simultaneously be 
party and political organs, in terms of the “one institution with two names” model at 
the central level, it is highly possible that the new organ will be directly managed by 
the party committee. Thus, the government’s control over the old political organ 
before the merger will be lost. For instance, the State Council’s Information Office 
and Foreign Propaganda Office of the Central Committee are “one institution with 
two names,” and the institution is under the direct control of the central committee. 
Second, the combination of party and political organs does not mean they are merged 
into one new organ, but they share offices, the majority of staff, and resources. After 
the combination, the party organ will always be the leader of the political organ 
because its Deputy Secretary or Secretary will be the leader of the latter. For instance, 
the Deputy Secretary of the Central Committee’s Discipline Inspection Commission 
will become the Minister of the National Supervision Ministry after the two organs are 
combined. Consequently, the political organ that was once accountable to the 




government and party organ. As the local government’s control over some political 
organs has either been shared with or passed to the corresponding party committee, 
its disobedience to the committee will be increasingly difficult. 
 
The institutionalization debate  
 
Many scholars disagree with the CCP’s view that recentralization will enhance its 
regime’s stability and resilience. They argue that the CCP’s resilience in the face of 
“democratization waves” is due to the deepening institutionalization at the top, 
horizontal, and vertical levels (Nathan, 2003; Shambaugh, 2008, p. 176; Schubert, 
2008, p. 203; Brown, 2009). The arguments of authoritarian resilience are as follows. 
First, at the top level, the peaceful and stable succession of top leaders is 
institutionalized by setting up age limits for presidential term limits (Nathan, 2003, pp. 
7-8; Zeng, 2014, pp. 129-130). Collective leadership is also institutionalized, which 
weakens the over-centralization of power and ensures that the party is ruled by 
consensus (Fisher, 2018). These two institutionalizations substantially decrease the 
power struggle at the top level and greatly stabilize the power center of the regime. 
Second, horizontally, the party reduces interference to the works of the non-party 
organizations, such as the government and National People’s Congress (Nathan, 
2003, pp. 12-13). According to Nathan (2003, p. 13, p. 16), the political loosening of 
non-party organizations increases bureaucratic specialization, and “equips the 
regime to adapt more successfully to the challenges.” Third, vertically, the promotion 
of party cadres is much more based on their professional knowledges and capabilities 
(Nathan, 2003, p. 13; Zeng, 2014, pp. 134-136).  
 
The CCP’s recentralization of the regime has challenged these dominant arguments 
of authoritarian resilience since 2012. First, at the top level, Xi’s core leader 
establishment and removal of presidential term limits in 2018 seem to conflict with 
collective leadership (Lee, 2017; Fewsmith and Nathan, 2019) and the 




of the party’s role seems to weaken the autonomy of other non-party organizations. 
Third, vertically, loyalty to the party’s leadership has once again become the major 
dimension for cadres’ promotion.  
 
This section will assess whether recentralization will be more effective in stabilizing 
the CCP regime than the policies underpinned by the arguments on authoritarian 
resilience. 
 
First, removing the presidential term limit may be more effective in stabilizing the 
centralized power at the top level than retaining it. This is because the CCP General 
Secretary and Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), the other two 
important posts of China’s top 1 leader, do not have term limits. Thus, if the top 1 
leader obeys the presidential term limits, but does not hand over the other two posts 
to his/her successor, the power struggle will be tense at the top level. Some scholars 
argue that the leadership succession from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao in 2002 proved 
that its institutionalization led to a peaceful power transfer (Nathan, 2003; Li, 2012, p. 
598). However, the leadership succession was not as stable as it appeared. Although 
Jiang obeyed the presidential term limits in 2002, he did not hand over the Chairman 
post of CMC to Hu, and instead retained it for two years. This was one main reason 
that prevented Hu from fully consolidating his leadership and constrained him from 
introducing substantive reform (Zheng and Weng, 2016, p. 39). The constraining 
effects on Hu’s leadership was indicated by Xi’s praise for Hu’s simultaneous transfer 
of the three posts to Xi in 2012. Xi praised Hu for “being decent and exemplar” and 
“sufficiently considering the holistic development of the party, nation, and the army” 
(Xinhua Net, 2012). Thus, if Xi retains the CMC chairman or General Secretary posts 
when his 10-year Presidency ends, this will not only show disunity at the top level, 
but also increase the likelihood of a power struggle between the new Chinese 
President and Xi. To be sure, if Xi transfers all posts and obeys the term limits, 
leadership succession will be the most stable and the institution of succession will be 




transfer power after his 10-years Presidency, the CCP regime will be more stable by 
removing the term limit, rather than retaining it. 
 
Fewsmith and Nathan (2019, pp. 175-176, p. 179) argued that Xi’s recentralization 
intensifies the power struggle and is destabilizing because if he dies or steps down, 
the power struggle for succession will be tense. Also, Gilley (2019, p. 52) argued that 
provincial leaders are unsatisfied with Xi’s removal of term limits and will force him to 
retire when his term ends, which will be “a possible opening for democratic transition.”  
 
First, if Xi passes away while he is President, his successor will be Wang Qishan, 
who is the Vice President and a staunch supporter of Xi. The Vice Chairman of the 
CMC is Xu Qiliang, who is also a staunch supporter of Xi. Thus, Xi faction’s dominant 
status within the party will be to a large extent stable because the faction controls 
military power and the presidential post. Moreover, according to the party rule, if Xi 
plans to hand over his posts, his heir, who will be the Vice President and Vice 
Chairman of the CMC in the last term of Xi’s Presidency, will be decided by the 
Central Committee (Hu, 2012, p. 83; Zeng, 2014, p. 136). Thus, factional competition 
will be almost settled five years before Xi’s handover. Some scholars view that the 
2012 Bo Xilai case wherein the Party Secretary of Chongqing Bo Xilai challenged 
Xi’s status as Hu Jintao’s successor proved the existence of a power struggle among 
senior party members. However, instead of viewing Bo’s case as a factional power 
struggle, this section agrees with Nathan (2019, cited in Fewsmith and Nathan, 2019, 
p. 177) that it was Bo that challenged the party’s rule of leadership selection. Bo 
(2013, cited in Cao, 2013) recognized this rule but denied that he had attempted to 
violate it. He (2013, cited in Cao, 2013) said that he did not “want to be Chinese Putin” 
because the Central Committee had already made decisions about the leadership 
succession in the 2007 Party Congress. Bo’s lack of legitimacy to be the President 
was probably the main reason the majority of the CCPCC political Bureau reportedly 
endorsed to remove him from his post (Ansfield and Johnson, 2012). Further, 




a stable leadership transition. Finally, it is unlikely that provincial leaders are capable 
of forcing Xi to step down in 2022 because he has absolute control over the PLA, 
which has been the most important sign of power throughout CCP history. 
 
Besides the issue of leadership succession, some scholars view that Xi’s core 
leadership violate the mechanism of collective leadership and make the regime 
unstable due to the lack of limits on Xi’s power (Lee, 2017; Wang and Zeng, 2016; 
Fewsmith and Nathan, 2019; Baranovitch, 2020). However, although collective 
leadership may have check and balance effects at the top level, it has caused regime 
instability due to the lack of coordination and unity among ministries or top leaders 
(Miller, 2015, p.10; Zheng and Weng, 2016, p. 35; Hu and Yang, 2017, p. 12). Since 
2008, many CCP elites and scholars have voiced this concern. In 2008, Chi Fulin 
(2008, cited in Hainan Daily, 2008), the delegate of the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference, called for establishing an organ that coordinates the 
different interests of ministries under the Central Committee’s unified leadership to 
manage conflicting interests between central and local governments, or among 
different ministries. Likewise, an article published by the official Qiushi magazine in 
2012, argued that although collective leadership improves intra-party democracy, 
members of the Political Bureau lack coordination, have conflicting interests, and 
often shirk responsibilities when carrying out substantive reforms and making difficult 
decisions (Zheng, 2012). Wang Changjiang (2012), a professor of the Party School 
of the CCPCC, also argued that many ministries prioritized their own interests over 
national interests and utilized the reform to strengthen power, which caused social 
instability and power struggle among ministries.   
 
Unlike many observers who perceive the relationship between the core leader and 
collective leadership as zero-sum (Lee, 2017; Fewsmith and Nathan, 2019; 
Baranovitch, 2020), CCP leaders view the core leader as complementary to the 
collective leadership due to the defects of the latter. In 1983, Deng (1983) warned 




“every collective leadership needs a core…[because] the core of the first generation’s 
collective leadership was Mao… cultural revolution did not defeat us…I am the core 
of the second generation’s collective leadership…thus…despite purges of the two 
leaders…the party’s leadership is stable.” Likewise, in 1999, Jiang (1999) stated that 
“leading such a big party, ruling such a big country…must have a…core leader.” 
Deng and Jiang viewed the core leader as an important means to reduce the defects 
of collective leadership, such as suppressing factionalism, accountability for making 
tough decisions, and implementing important policies (Deng, 1989; Jiang, 1999). For 
instance, in 1936, the establishment of Mao as the core leader marked the dominant 
status of his guidance within the CCP and suppressed Wang Ming’s leftism that 
wished to defend base areas through positional warfare. Likewise, since 1978, Deng 
has set up a reform, opening up as China’s national policy, and suppressed party 
members that supported the Cultural Revolution. Feeling the need to integrate into 
the US-led order, Jiang was able to insist on China’s entry into the WTO despite 
strong opposition from the conservative faction within the party and state-owned 
enterprises (Jiang, 1999, cited in Kuhn, 2004, p. 392). Xi also made tough decisions, 
such as reclaiming land features in 2013 and locking down Wuhan province to 
prevent the spread of the coronavirus during the 2020 Spring Festival.  
 
According to Hu and Yang (2016, p. 12), the combination of a collective leadership 
and the core leader is the democratic centralism mechanism of the CCP. Ideally, the 
core leader is able to reduce the defects of a collective leadership, while the collective 
leadership can enhance intra-party democracy where members communicate 
information and opinions openly and thoroughly and constrain the core leader from 
excessively using his/her power.  
 
However, one major problem of this mechanism is that the collective leadership’s 
effective constraints on the core leader depends on the latter’s self-discipline. This is 
because, in practice, other members of the political bureau of the CCPCC have less 




collective leadership. Mao’s conduct during the Cultural Revolution demonstrate that 
the core leader can ignore the collective leadership and cause social chaos. In 1981, 
the CCPCC’s authoritative resolution about issues after the founding of the PRC 
criticized Mao for “placing himself above the Central Committee [and] continuing 
weakening and even breaking party and nation’s principle of collective leadership 
and mechanism of democratic centralism” (CCPCC, 1981). Jiang (2000) stated that 
the core leader must self-consciously obey the principle of collective leadership. He 
(Jiang, 2000) stated that “as the core of the third generation’s collective leadership…I 
always highlight the importance of handling relationship between individual and 
collective leadership, [our] work needs to rely on everyone’s wisdom.”  
 
Some scholars have pointed out the possible negative consequences stemming from 
Xi’s core leader. Fewsmith and Nathan (2019, p. 179) warned that Xi has fewer 
constraints than his predecessors and cannot be informed of wide views because 
most people are afraid of speaking the truth. The party committee’s retrieval of power 
from other non-party systems conflict with the scholars’ argument of “institutional 
differentiation within the regime” (Nathan, 2003, p. 12; Wang and Zeng, 2016, p.477). 
This, according to Wang and Zeng (2016, p.477), will cause social chaos due to the 
problematic policies caused by Xi’s personalistic dictatorship. Shambaugh (2016, pp. 
102-103) argued that “separating the party from the government” policy was the 
liberal approach to the CCP’s political reform that was killed due to events in 1989. 
Shambaugh (2016) may view this policy as the CCP’s transfer of political power to 
the government and, thus, proves that it was once somewhat open to the 
liberalization of the communist political regime. He also believed that liberalization 
will enhance the CCP regime’s authoritarian resilience (Shambaugh, 2016, p. 128).  
 
This section acknowledges that these are major concerns of Xi’s core leadership. 
However, the main point concerning with the CCP regime’s stability is not whether 
the recentralization of power strengthens Xi’s intervention in nearly all policy areas. 




instability caused by a collective leadership’s disunity as well as the importance of 
reducing factional competition and making tough decisions. From the perspective of 
the CCP, the non-party systems’ autonomy should always be limited. Shambaugh 
(2016, p. 102) seems to misunderstand that the policy of “separating party from the 
government” is a liberal approach. However, while this policy means that the CCP 
gives independent executive power to the government, the latter should not disobey 
CCP’s command (Beijing Daily, 2013). To the CCP, the ideal relationship between 
the party and non-party systems may be demonstrated by the National People’s 
Congress’ Standing Committee’s rejection of the national road law modification draft. 
In 1999, the Standing Committee meeting did not pass the State Council’s draft of 
modifying the national road law that changed monthly road maintenance fees into oil 
taxes because it did not offer a practical solution to potential problems, such as 
increased tax burden for peasants who rely heavily on oil for agricultural production 
(Tang, 1999, pp. 7-8). This case first illustrates that the Congress Committee 
independently exercised the power of establishing and revising laws. Second, the 
Congress’ autonomy is limited by the party’s leadership. Changing the maintenance 
fee into an oil tax was the major task of China’s tax reform at that time (Tang, 1999, 
p. 8). The congress did not oppose this task and was not expected by the CCPCC to 
do so. However, the congress had freedom to deliberate the law proposal’s technical 
issues, such as the methods of law implementation. In 2017, then Secretary of 
Central Discipline Committee, Wang Qishan (2017, cited in Xinhua agency, 2017a), 
in an attempt to correct the misunderstanding with the policy, declared that “under 
the party’s leadership, China does not have a separation of party and government 
but has division of labours between party and government.” This statement stresses 
the leadership–executive relationship between the party and other non-systems and 
reflects that institutional differentiation and autonomy must be based on the party’s 
guidance. 
 
As many CCP elites view recentralization as necessary and that non-party systems’ 




is to examine whether Xi obeys the principles of collective leadership or intra-party 
democracy. If Xi obeys the principle, his decision will be less dictatorial and can be 
better implemented by other non-party systems because other top leaders may 
oppose his views and openly communicate information. While it is hard to get internal 
information on how the Political Bureau or CCPCC works during the Xi era, Hu and 
Yang (2017, pp. 13-16) highlighted two important indicators. The first is the party 
documents and Xi’s speeches or directives since he came to power, which could 
show his willingness to obey the collective leadership principle. Even if he pays lip 
service to the principles, he may somewhat abide by them to convince his colleagues 
that his actions are in line with his words. The second is the numbers and themes of 
meetings in which major or all members of the CCPCC participated. The great 
numbers and important themes of the meetings at least demonstrate that participants 
communicate with each other and discuss major issues.  
 
First, examining the party documents and Xi’s speeches and directives show that Xi 
does demonstrate a willingness to obey intra-party democracy. In 2015, Xi (2015，
cited in 12371 Net, 2016) gave a speech that emphasized avoiding the over-
centralization of power and obedience to intra-party democracy. In 2016, Xi 
commanded party committees at all levels to learn Mao’s article that stressed 
importance of frank communication among committee members at committee 
meetings, as well as the avoidance of the one man rule (Xinhua Net, 2016). In the 
same year, the CCPCC (2016) issues principles of managing intra-party political life, 
which state that the party “must resolutely prevent and overcome [the phenomenon 
that] nominally, the party committee is led collectively but in fact one person or a 
small number of people determine everything.” 
 
Second, the CCPCC has held a number of meetings to discuss major national issues 
since 2012. For instance, the CCPCC political bureau held a meeting nearly every 
month from 2012 to 2020 (Hu and Yang, 2017; Shixizhi, 2020) where important 




meetings, members of the political bureau usually discuss annual reports from party 
groups of the National People’s Congress, State Council, National Supreme Court 
(Shixizhi, 2020). From February to May, the main topic of discussion was the 
management of the coronavirus (Shixizhi, 2020). In June, the meetings analyzed and 
discussed the issue of managing the PLA. In July, the CCPCC mainly discussed the 
14th national five-year plan and goals of 2035. The CCPCC also set up institutions 
for holding meetings in which all members of the Political Bureau focus on analyzing 
and discussing a single major issue (Hu and Yang, 2017, p. 16). For instance, every 
year, the CCPCC holds a specialized meeting that analyzes national economic 
conditions and plans for the next year’s national economic policies (Hu and Yang, 
2017, p.16). Since 2013, it has held an annual central meeting on works relating to 
foreign policies (Hu and Yang, 2017, p. 16). While some members may be afraid to 
speak the truth in meetings, some discussions may depend on statistics, which is 
less subjective than storytelling. Every year, members of the political bureau have at 
least six collective learning sessions where they learn, discuss, and make reports 
with Chinese experts that specialize in major national issues (Hu and Yang, 2017, p. 
16). This will also improve Xi’s policy making process by providing more balanced 
views about these issues. 
 
Zhang (2019, pp. 19-20) argued that Xi’s did not inform Premier Li Keqiang and 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs about his decision to reclaim land features in the SCS in 
2013 because, when the PLA was reclaiming land features, the Foreign Ministry and 
Premier were trying hard to ameliorate the tense relationship with neighboring 
countries. According to Zhang (3029, pp. 19-20), this reflects disarray in China’s 
decision-making. However, the section argues that the actions of the PLA and the 
Premier or Foreign Ministry were not contradictory. First, the amelioration of the 
relationship can help Beijing reduce the pressure being placed on it by ASEAN 
regarding the land reclamation. Second, the establishment of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs claims that because the Philippines’ relationship with China was already bad 




accompli to reverse the perceived strategic disadvantage brought about by the 
Philippines’ arbitration tribunal (Zhang, 2019, p. 19). According to some scholars, the 
Foreign Ministry in fact helped the PLA create the fait accompli from 2013 to 2015 by 
delaying the process of Code of Conduct for SCS (COC) negotiation and bearing with 
the criticism of land reclamation (Panda, 2015). Thus, it seems that the PLA and 
Foreign Ministry were coordinated when handling the issue of the reclamation.  
 
In addition to Xi’s attempt to retrieve power from non-party systems, his emphasis on 
party cadres’ obedience to the party’s leadership seems to contradict with the 
institution that cadres’ promotion is based on “meritocracy” (Zeng, 2014, p. 116). 
Nathan (2003, p. 11) argued that cadres promotion based on performance would 
increase the neutrality of staff and reduce factional competition. However, as Pang, 
Keng, and Zhong (2018, p. 91) indicated, “if every cadre gets promoted for spurring 
local GDP growth rate, who would care about CCP.” The rise of local protectionism 
proves that the concern of increasing GDP growth of their administrative regions to 
get a promotion will make local officials disobey the party center’s leadership. For 
instance, local party committees and governments utilize their managerial and 
political powers to create a preferential environment for local industries and products 
while constraining, and even blocking, those from other parts of China from 
participating in local markets (Xu, 2002, p. 84; Zhang, 2012, p. 51; Xing and Li, 2012, 
p. 58). This has resulted in provincial economic separation and prevents the center 
from creating a unified market (Xu, 2002, p. 85; Zhang, 2012, p. 51). Moreover, a lot 
of the center’s commands that conflict with its subnational counterparts’ fever of 
developing the economy have been passively or selectively executed. For instance, 
senior governors of Gansu province passively executed the center’s commands of 
environmental protection in 2017 for fear that it will harm economic development, 
which heavily relies on coal (CCTV news, 2017). 
 
Zhou (2011, p. 80) argued that the party center’s requirement of cadres’ loyalty to 




will decrease local government’s effectiveness in managing local affairs because the 
party’s command may not adapt to the local’s specific conditions. However, this may 
be the cost that the CCP is willing to pay. As noted in the introduction, CCP senior 
officials generally view a centralized system as essential in coping with struggles on 
ideological and geostrategic dimensions; thus, local cadres’ responsiveness and 
accountability to the center’s commands must be increased.   
 
To sum up, some scholars argued that the CCP regime’s resilience is due to 
deepening institutionalization. First, the institutionalization of leadership succession 
has greatly reduced the power struggle at the top level. Second, collective leadership 
has a check and balance effect on top leaders and improves intra-party democracy. 
Third, the non-party systems have more autonomy than before. Fourth, elites’ 
promotion is mainly based on capabilities and achievements. However, Xi’s 
recentralization of power since 2012 has challenged these arguments. Thus, 
scholars like Nathan (2019, cited in Fewsmith and Nathan, 2019) hold the pessimistic 
view that Xi’s recentralization will lead to the CCP regime’s instability.  
 
Contrary to Nathan’s view, this section argues that, although recentralization has 
defects, it could consolidate the CCP regime. First, although Xi’s removal of the 
presidential term limits increases the instability of leadership succession at the top 
level, the removal can stabilize power at the top level better than retention of the term 
limits if Xi does not plan to transfer his leadership to others after his 10-year 
presidency. Moreover, instead of viewing the relationship between collective 
leadership and core leader as zero-sum, the section views it as complementary 
because the core leader can reduce the defects of a collective leadership, such as 
increased factional competition and inability to make hard decisions. Xi’s 
centralization of power reduces the autonomy of non-party systems, but enhances 
the regime’s stability by increasing coordination among different systems and the 
CCP’s capability of making hard decisions. A major defect of the mechanism that 




collective leadership can enhance intra-party democracy and constrain the core 
leader, these constraints depend on the latter’s self-discipline. However, by 
examining Xi’s speech and actions, the section argues that he somewhat obeys the 
principle of collective leadership. Third, although stressing cadres’ loyalty will reduce 
effectiveness in managing regional affairs, CCP seems to be willing to pay the price 
to increase party cadres’ responsiveness and accountability to the party center.  
 
The legitimacy of CCP 
 
Some analysts argue that the CCP’s recentralization since 2009 will decrease its 
popular legitimacy and cause regime instability, or even demise. Fewsmith (2019, 
cited in Nathan and Fewsmith, 2019, p. 176) contended that an increasingly 
centralized regime will find it hard to govern a diverse society. Also, Shambaugh 
(2016, p. 128) argued that Chinese people and cadres are tired of the CCP’s 
propaganda and pretend to conform to the party education campaign, which is a 
telltale sign of the CCP regime’s collapse. Likewise, Gilley (2019, p. 54) indicated 
that the fearless Chinese youth who are tired of the CCP regime’s paternalistic control 
will gang up against its repression and pursue freedom and regime change.  
 
The observation of Fewsmith (2018, cited in Fewsmith and Nathan, 2018) is right; a 
diverse Chinese society conflicts with a system that is centralized. Moreover, China’s 
opening up has enhanced the Chinese people’s understanding of liberal values. The 
widespread use of the internet also facilitates the spread of liberal ideas at a societal 
level. For instance, the Chinese have been getting familiar with liberal ideology by 
watching movies that convey liberal ideas or visiting liberal countries. The state may 
probably deepen their worries about ideological competition when many mass 
incidents in the cities occur. This is because words and phrases that are of liberal 
origin like “civil participation, democracy and rights” are becoming tools for protestors 
to legitimize their collective protests (Wu and Yang, 2013, p. 81). Those deplorables 





However, the point is not whether the Chinese are somewhat dissatisfied with the 
party’s ruling, but whether this dissatisfaction will lead to a national wide bottom-up 
violent rebellion, which will eventually result in the collapse of the CCP. The section 
argues that the chance of such a scenario occurring is slim in the Xi era.  
 
First, while the Chinese who are influenced by liberal ideas and dissatisfied with the 
communist regime do pose threat to CCP’s domination, the masses should at least 
meet the four basic conditions to become a strong political force and compel the party 
to make substantive concession. In terms of experience from the CCP’s rise in China, 
the first and basic condition is that the political force needs to have economic sources 
that can at least be used to maintain its survival. This is why the CCP had an urgent 
need to seek assistance from the Soviet Union when it was nearing its demise in 
1935. The second condition is that there should be someone responsible for 
organizing and mobilizing the dissatisfied masses on a long-term basis. Without 
organization, power is scattered. If their strategies are not carried out for the long 
term, the political forces cannot gain enough influence and will not become 
sustainable. Third, like the CCP, which taught peasants why they should fight in the 
Anti-Japanese War, the political force needs to at least have a clear goal that can 
convince people to join. Fourth, the existing power relationship between the political 
force and the one they wish to resist is unstable. In the Anti-Japanese War period, 
KMT’s Chiang never fully controlled China. Thus, the CCP viewed that challenging 
Chiang was possible when it accumulated enough power.  
 
These four conditions can explain the reasons why the increasing number of mass 
incidents in China has not developed into long-term nationwide protests and rebellion 
since the 1990s. The mass incidents in China mainly pursue environmental 
protection, labor disputes, land acquisition and the demolition of buildings, 
educational inequality, and healthcare disputes (Zhang and Liu, 2015; Zhang and Liu, 




However, although the number of mass incidents is rising, they are short term, do not 
link up, and have no or few organizations to offer long-term economic support and 
mobilization. For instance, land acquisitions and the demolition of buildings have 
been the major cause of mass incidents since the 2000s. In April 2016, over 1,200 
law enforcement officers from a district in Haikou City demolished 104 “illegally 
constructed” buildings in a village (Zhang and Liu, 2016, p. 4). The demolition 
triggered violence between villagers and the officers, heated up online discussion 
and protests, and gained wide media coverage (Zhang and Liu, 2016, p. 4). However, 
the mass incident only lasted fewer than 10 days (Zhang and Liu, 2016, p. 4). It was 
also confined to the village and did not develop into a district- or city-wide protest 
against the demolition policy even if violent demolitions have been the major cause 
of mass incidents for years. One main reason is that few organizations in China are 
responsible for linking a single incident with a deep social or political root cause (Feng, 
2015, p. 78), providing long-term economic assistance to protestors, and mobilizing 
people that have suffered a similar incident in other cities to support the villagers 
through demonstrations. Without the linkage, protestors may feel anger towards the 
officers’ misconducts rather than the CCP’s regime. People who participate in online 
protests may also share the protestors’ concern and emotions, but they do not view 
the issue as immediately related to their interests because the incident happened in 
another city. Without economic assistance and the organizers who mobilize other 
cities’ potential protestors, the protests may not last long, and potential protestors 
may not have the courage to take to the streets.   
 
The Internet provides fertile soil for the emergence of such organizations in China 
because it reduces the costs of mobilizing the masses, facilitates relatively secret 
coordination between protestors and organizers, and helps organizers easily spread 
information and linkage between the incident and regime defects to the whole nation. 
According to an article published by Xinhua Net in 2015, an organization consisting 
of lawyers, executors, internet opinion leaders, and paid professional protestors 




combining actions online and offline (Huang and Zou, 2015). First, a law firm in 
Beijing served as the headquarter of the organizers (Huang and Zou, 2015). When 
an incident happened, the lawyers of the law firm organized a WeChat group. They 
used the group to secretly coordinate different organs within the organizations, offer 
personnel training, and post some videos, pictures, and descriptions of the incidents 
to agitate people and link the cases with political issues, such as the regime’s 
suppression of civilians (Huang and Zou, 2015). Then, internet opinion leaders 
posted/reposted and commented on the pictures or videos, raising public concern 
and anger towards the government and exerting enormous social pressure on them 
(Huang and Zou, 2015). After the incident flared up, cooperating with online 
commentaries and protests, the organizers would pay professional protestors to lead 
the demonstration on the streets or in front of the government buildings (Huang and 
Zou, 2015).  
 
While these incidents put enormous pressure on the government, they still do not 
develop into long-term nation-wide protests and demonstrations, or even violence. 
First and foremost, this is because China’s power is centralized at the top level. A 
unified Central Committee can ensure power is controlled by the center and stabilizes 
the power relationship between the dissatisfied masses and the party. Deng (1989b) 
argued that “as long as CCPCC is united…any unrest can be resisted…but if the 
center is itself in disarray, the result would be hard to tell.” Also, as noted earlier, 
Deng (1989b) argued that Mao and his unchallengeable power was the major reason 
that the Cultural Revolution and 1989 nationwide student protests did not lead to the 
collapse of the CCP. Xi’s core leadership is also an important indicator that factional 
competition at the CCPCC is suppressed and centralized power is stable.  
 
Because the unequal power relationship between the party and the organizations is 
stable, the former is able to use coercive means to suppress the latter and prevent 
organized long-term mass incidents, but the latter are difficult to resist effectively. For 




to control the flow of information on the Internet since 2015, including permanently 
suspending the Chinese Twitter Weibo accounts of many internet opinion leaders 
(Zhang and Liu, 2015). This greatly decreases the ability of opinion leaders to amplify 
the incidents, evoke public sentiments, and rally people by linking the incidents with 
political issues. Also, the police and intelligence officers disbanded many 
organizations and arrested the organizers who have economic and personnel 
resources to mobilize people to achieve certain goals (Huang and Zou, 2015). Thus, 
although young deplorables mentioned in the article of Gilley (2019, p. 54) hate the 
CCP regime, it is hard for them to gather together and challenge the regime’s 
dominance without organizers’ economic assistance, training, and mobilization. Also, 
police officers have beaten and suppressed protestors who called for the cancellation 
of the construction of waste incineration power plants in mass incidents in Luoding 
and Wuhan cities in 2015 and 2019, respectively (BBC News, 2019).  
 
The CCP also uses non-coercive means to prevent further escalation of local 
incidents to the national level. First, in many cases, the local governments conceded 
to the protestors’ demands. For instance, regarding the Haikou mass incident 
mentioned above, officers who have violently beaten women were arrested and the 
governor in charge was forced to resign (Zhang and Liu, 2016). The local 
governments also halted the construction of plants that were not environment-friendly, 
which were also protested about in several mass incidents (BBC News, 2019). These 
concessions responded to the direct causes of the incidents and prevented them 
from cumulation and spillover. For instance, after the resignation of the governors 
and arrest of the violent officers, the heat surrounding the discussion on the Haikou 
mass incident reduced dramatically in 2016 (Zhang and Liu, 2016). The protests also 
stopped after the government cancelled the construction of plants that are not 
environment-friendly. Second, some policies have been established to tackle the root 
causes of the incidents. For instance, the central government issued a new national 
policy governing land acquisition in 2011, which aims to prevent forceful land 




relocated (The State Council, 2011). Additionally, the central government has sent 
inspection teams to appraise local governments’ environmental protection records 
since 2015 and directly receive and solve mass complaints about the local 
governments’ poor performance on environmental protection (Xinhua Daily 
Telegraph, 2019). Third, although the CCP may lose its legitimacy on some issues, 
the legitimacy deficit may be cancelled out if the CCP obtains legitimacy from other 
issues, such as crisis management. As Schubert (2008, p. 194) argues, “deficits in 
legitimacy which might occur at one point within this system can be compensated by 
gains in legitimacy at another point resulting in overall regime support.” For instance, 
the CCP gained a high satisfaction rate because of its high effectiveness in containing 
the coronavirus in 2020.  
 
Finally, compared with the organizations, the CCP had a more complete system for 
increasing the ability of mobilization and cultivating the masses’ habit of obedience. 
As noted earlier, it has conducted a nation-wide party education and building 
campaigns since 2012. While these political education activities may result in the 
“feigned compliance” of party members as Shambaugh (2016, p. 128) argued, they 
are important for consolidating the center’s power and increase the masses 
obedience to the party’s commands. First, they deliver information about the center’s 
policies, goals, and political path to party members. Citizens will also be notified 
through political campaigns, banners, media, and slogans. Thus, nearly every 
Chinese has been aware of the political campaign calling for respecting the center’s 
commands. Second, like the military’s routine training, these political activities 
strengthen or cultivate people’s habit of obeying commands, which is critical for 
effective political mobilization (Zhou, 2011, p. 77). The frequent educational activities 
maintain and increase people’s awareness of the center’s authority and their 
participation in the activities is in itself an act of recognition and obedience (Zhou, 





To sum up, this section explains the reasons why the CCP’s recentralization of power 
will not collapse due to the development of a diverse society. The section argues that, 
although the rising awareness on civil participation, democratic values, and social 
and economic problems increase the number of mass incidents in China, the 
incidents are unlikely to develop into nation-wide unrest and challenge the CCP’s 
domination in the Xi era. This is because values and ideas are not enough to escalate 
a single mass incident to a nationwide level. The three other conditions also matter. 
First, few organizations in China can support the protestors through demonstrations 
by linking a single incident to a deep social or political root cause, providing long-term 
economic assistance to protestors, and mobilizing other people that have suffered a 
similar incident in other cities. Although the internet does provide fertile soil for the 
emergence of such organization, the CCP’s centralized power is stable and the party 
uses mixed strategies to prevent several incidents from developing into nationwide 
unrest. First, regarding potential organizers or opinion leaders, the party uses 
coercive measures to prevent opinion leaders from linking several cases with regime 
defects and suppressing the emergence of organizations that are able to mobilize 
people for the long-term. Also, the party often suppressed the protests. Second, the 
party often uses soft measures to placate the masses. For example, it forces violent 
officers and governors in charge to resign and adjust policies. Third, party education 
is important for cultivating the masses’ obedience to the party’s leadership (Zhou, 
2011, p. 77). 
 
Shared Asian and pluralist identities reduce pressure of ideological 
competition on China 
 
The CCP’s recentralization of power will increase ideological competition between 
China and the US. However, Sino–US ideological competition does not necessarily 
lead to an anti-communist China coalition in East Asia. China is located in a region 
where states generally share values, such as the importance of “authority,” “non-




individuals” (Huntington, 1996, p. 225). These shared values underpin Asian identity 
and do not prioritize liberal values, such as limited government rights. They also 
reduce the pressure of ideological challenges on China, which feels more pressure 
from extra-regional countries than regional countries. For instance, in contrast to 
international pressure on Beijing’s approach to the HK protest, ASEAN countries in 
general remain silent. At a 2020 meeting between South Korea and China, President 
Mun Jae-in acquiesced to President Xi Jinping’s statement that HK is China’s internal 
affairs (Rfi, 2020).  
 
Second, China’s promotion of pluralism in East Asia may downplay ideological 
competition by transforming the ideological competition between communism and 
anti-communism into that between pluralism and solidarism. During the Cold War, 
many East Asian countries were the US’s anti-communist allies or partners. While 
they were not liberal countries, such as Malaysia, they viewed China as an enemy 
because China threatened their regime security by supporting the communist 
movement in their countries. Thus, China communist identity was conflicting and 
salient to them. Resisting communism is one main reason that underpinned the 
foundation of ASEAN in 1967. However, by promoting pluralist norms, China can 
become an ally to most countries that support pluralist norms, such as coexistence, 
and resist the US-led liberal internationalism that imposes liberal values on others 
(Hurrel, 2007, cited in Buzan, 2014, p. 114). Since East Asian countries surround 
China, a pluralist East Asia, to some degree, becomes a buffer zone for resisting 
ideological challenges from liberal countries.  
 
Some analysts argue that Japan is increasingly hardline in preventing China from 
challenging the existing rule-based liberal order (Brown, 2018, p. 862; Koga, 2020). 
Tamaki (2020, p. 385) even claimed that the liberal order for Japan is “ontological” 
rather than “transactional.” However, this argument neglects that one main reason of 
Japan’s economic rise is the strategy of developmental state, which stresses the 




free market and individualism model (Foot, 2017, p. 832). Japan was under strong 
criticism of its protectionist measures and was pressurized by the US to open up its 
domestic market from the 1980s to 1990s (Foot, 2017, p. 832). The modifications of 
its economic model have been viewed by many in the West as its willingness to 
integrate into and raise its status in the liberal economic order (Foot, 2017, p. 839). 
However, the Japanese have not accepted these modifications without deep anger 
and frustration. Many of them also do not view the modification as Japan’s integration 
into the US liberal order. For instance, Teo (2019, p. 122) viewed the changes as US 
suppression of Japan’s rise. The former Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo 
(2018) blamed the 1985 plaza accord that brought about the dramatic appreciation 
of the Yen in a short time for causing “huge negative impacts on Japanese market, 
industries, and economy.” Japanese conservative elite, Masahiko Hosokawa (2018), 
interprets the Japanese concession as a sign of the country’s weakness by saying 
that the reason for the concession was that Japan, whose security has relied on the 
US, had no power to retaliate at that time. Moreover, in 2012, Japan’s dominant 
Liberal Democratic Party’s draft of a revised constitution removed individualism and 
norms of liberal democracy from the existing constitution and added a “Japanese 
communitarian vision of democracy that significantly strengthened the role of state” 
(Pyle, 2018, p. 366).  
 
As many of Japan’s values diverge with those of the US, its support of the US-led 
liberal order is not staunch. The content of Japan’s Indo-pacific strategy lacks the 
promotion of democratic values and improvement of human rights records (Tamaki, 
2020, p. 394). In June 7, 2020, Japan refused to participate in the joint statement of 
the US, UK, Canada, and Australia, which condemned China’s passage of the 
national security law on Hong Kong (Xiaoshan, 2020). In June 30, 2020, Japan joined 
the G7 countries’ statement that had asked China to reconsider the passage of the 
law (Kasai, 2020), but refused to sanction the country (Ou, 2020). In 2021, Japan is 
the only G7 country that does not impose sanctions on China “over the alleged 




deepening economic relationship with China is keeping it from imposing the sanction 
(CNA, 2021). However, this also demonstrates that Japan does not regard liberal 




This chapter analyzes the CCP’s stabilization of its regime in the stalemate period. 
Specifically, it is about to what extent the CCP recentralized its power and prevented 
an anti-communist coalition in East Asia. The first part analyzes how the CCP 
attempted to stabilize its communist regime through the recentralization of power. 
The next two sections assess the two major arguments of the pessimists who argue 
that, instead of consolidating the regime, recentralization will lead to the collapse of 
the CCP. The first argument is that the decreasing institutionalization of the 
authoritarian regime will lead to the collapse of the CCP. The second is that an 
authoritarian regime is not suitable for an increasingly diverse society. Contrary to 
the pessimists’ opinions, the chapter argues that despites defects, the CCP’s 
recentralization has stabilized the communist regime to a large degree. First, Xi’s 
removal of presidential term limit increases the uncertainty of leadership succession, 
but the removal is better than retention of the term limits for stabilizing the regime if 
Xi does not plan to retire after his 10-year presidency. Moreover, although Xi 
increases intervention in other non-party systems, which may result in his dictatorship, 
he still obeys the collective leadership principle to a certain degree. Additionally, while 
the center’s command will increase local governments’ management costs, the party 
center is willing to pay them in order to cope with the perceived great ideological and 
geostrategic challenges. Second, although the Chinese people are somewhat 
dissatisfied with the party’s ruling, the mass incidents are unlikely to develop into 
nationwide unrest during the Xi era. China has a shortage of organizations with 
sufficient economic resources and that are able to mobilize the dissatisfied groups 
on a long-term basis. Moreover, the unequal power relationship between the party 




the emergence of such organization, placate the dissatisfied masses, and cultivate 
their habits of obedience.  
 
After analyzing the CCP’s recentralization of power, the chapter argues that China’s 
shared Asian identity with regional countries and promotion of pluralist values 
relieves the pressure of ideological challenges on China. This chapter contributes to 
the overall argument of the thesis that in the East Asian context, the CCP had 
successfully stabilized its centralized control over the communist regime and 
prevented the formation of an anti-communist coalition by seeking shared Asian or 























Chapter 8: the stalemate period (2): China’s efforts to seek shared interests 
and identity with regional countries through Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). 
 
The preceding chapter analyzed the extent to which China stabilized its communist 
identity and prevented an anti-communist coalition from forming in East Asia. From 
this Chapter to the next, this thesis examines the extent to which Beijing realized 
important nationalist interests and prevented the formation of a US-led hard-
balancing coalition during the stalemate period through the strategic management of 
identities and interests. Specifically, this Chapter examines to what extent BRI has 
helped Beijing prevent the formation of the coalition through increasing the salience 
of shared economic interests or constructing pluralist identity with regional countries. 
Although many scholars note that one important function of BRI is to maintain a 
relatively peaceful environment by preventing the US from forming a coalition against 
China (Rolland, 2017, p. 135; Zhou and Esteban, 2018, p. 487; Gong, 2019, p. 637; 
Paul, 2019), they do not analyze this function in detail (Paul, 2019). Thus, the thesis 
also makes a contribution in this regard.  
 
According to SIT’s recategorization strategy, shared identities contribute to a 
peaceful relationship (Hogg, 2016, p. 8) and cancel out the negative effects of 
frictions derived from conflicting identities (Brown, 2000, p. 345). As shared interests, 
such as interdependence, enhance the cohesion of in-group or shared identities 
(Brown, 2000, p. 35), they may also have a similar effect on China’s relationship with 
regional countries as the shared identity does.  
 
The main argument of this chapter is as follows; First, based on shared interests 
including regional economic integration and cooperation, China has attempted to 
increase salience of the shared economic interests through BRI. BRI is a feasible 
way to help China increase this salience because many regional countries regard 




economic benefits through infrastructure investments and domestic consumption in 
the Chinese market. While costs will be incurred, such as over-reliance on China’s 
investments, they are manageable, as many regional countries are not passively 
accepting Beijing’s dictate and actively control and balance the inflows of these 
investments. Second, China has sought to form a shared identity with regional 
countries through shared pluralist values. These findings reinforce the thesis’ overall 
argument that shared identity/interests could help Beijing construct benign 
relationships with regional countries, even if there continue to be frictions caused by 
China and regional countries’ conflicting nationalist identities. Furthermore, these 
benign relationships may cancel out the negative effects of such frictions, thereby 
helping Beijing thwart the formation of a hard-balancing regional coalition. 
 
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section analyses Beijing’s attempt 
to use BRI to increase the salience of shared interests with regional countries. The 
second section analyses China’s attempt to seek a shared pluralist identity with 
regional countries.   
 
Increased salience of shared economic interests through BRI 
Regional countries will gain benefits and pay costs by joining BRI. If the cost exceeds 
the benefits, they are unlikely join BRI. However, if they can gain a lot of benefits and 
manage costs, they will probably view BRI as an attractive option. Based on this 
hypothesis, this section is divided into three parts. The first part looks at how China 
attempts to use BRI to increase the salience of shared interests by further enhancing 
economic integration and cooperation with regional countries. The second part looks 
at the costs that regional countries will pay to join BRI. The third part looks at whether 
these costs are manageable.  
 
To begin with, China shares interests of economic integration and cooperation with 
other regional countries. These shared interests meet the needs of regional states 




Enhancing economic development is one of the most important objectives of many 
East Asian countries because their regime legitimacy is derived from good economic 
performance (Foot, 2014, p. 191). This important objective makes regional states’ 
economic cooperation with China highly necessary. The rise of China’s economic 
power has been accompanied by a growing need for resources and a rise in domestic 
consumption, thereby attracting intra-regional trade and foreign business investors 
(Ueda, 2017, cited in Liu, 2017; Nehru, 2017, p. 22). Since 2009, China has been the 
largest trading partner of ASEAN (Department of Asian Affairs of Ministry of 
Commerce of PRC, 2016). Similarly, China has also been Japan’s largest trading 
partner for many years. According to China’s Ministry of Commerce, Japan and South 
Korea were among China’s top ten sources of foreign direct investment in 2017 (Li, 
2017). For most Southeast Asian countries, which are relatively under-developed and 
wish to attract foreign investment to develop their economy, China’s investments 
have contributed significantly to their economic growth and employment. For instance, 
until 2018, China invested more than 4000 enterprises in ASEAN countries and 
employed more than 300 thousand local people (Gao, 2018, cited in Sina economics, 
2018).  
 
In addition, the East Asian regional production network has also become increasingly 
integrated. According to a report from the WTO, East Asian countries have formed a 
system of “tri-polar trade through China” (Inomata, 2011, p. 76). Under the tri-polar 
trade system, the materials and components of products are produced by regional 
states and exported to China (Inomata, 2011, p. 76). China then assembles these 
components into final products and exports them to the US (Inomata, 2011, p. 76). 
This network has made it very difficult to isolate China, as it binds together many of 
the export-oriented East Asian countries (Beeson and Breslin, 2014, p. 107). 
Moreover, as China has well-functioning infrastructure, sufficient human resources, 
high productivity, and mature business supply chains (Liu, 2016, p. 37; Bloomenthal, 
2019), it has become an indispensable node that connects imports and exports within 




and most East Asian countries are forming a community of interests, as a hit to 
China’s economy would have negative spillover effects on other regional economies. 
For instance, most East Asian countries or business groups were deeply worried 
about Trump’s 2018 trade war with China, because tariffs would have hurt the 
integrated regional supply chain and done significant harm to their export-oriented 
economies (Nikkei Chinese, 2018; Geddie, 2018). This is because the trade war 
would increase costs of production, cause a decline in their exports to China, and 
decrease price competitiveness of goods that are assembled in China (Nikkei 
Chinese, 2018; Geddie, 2018). 
 
Against this backdrop, BRI, which was announced by Xi in 2013, aims to further 
deepen the economic cooperation and integration with regional countries. The BRI 
consists of “the Silk Road Economic Belt” and the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road,” 
which aims to “promote the connectivity of Asian, European and African continents 
and their adjacent seas” (The National Development and Reform Commission 
[NDRC], Ministry of Foreign Affairs [FMPRC], and Ministry of Commerce of the PRC 
[MOFCOM], 2015). Due to the focus of this research, this chapter analyzes how 
China increased the salience of shared interests with East Asian countries through 
the economic components of BRI. For example, China aims to increase economic 
integration through enhancing intra-regional connectivity, such as railways, ports, 
and a cross-border power network (NDRC, FMPRC, and MOFCOM, 2015). These 
infrastructure constructions are supported by China’s huge investment in these 
developing countries, which have poor infrastructure that requires significant 
investments. In 2010, ASEAN adopted the Master Plan of ASEAN Connectivity 
(MPAC) to facilitate ASEAN countries’ integration. in this initiative, 15 priority 
infrastructure projects were envisioned, but ASEAN countries have since faced 
serious funding challenges (Das, 2015). The maximum lending ($50 billion per year) 
from established economic organizations, such as the Asian Investment Bank and 
the World Bank (Rosales, 2017), is far from enough to satisfy ASEAN’s needs 




Development Bank [ADB], 2017, cited in Rosales, 2017). China’s BRI has, thus, 
provided another attractive opportunity for ASEAN to finance its projects (Das, 2015). 
Testament to this is that all ASEAN countries participated as founding members of 
the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which is a part of BRI, in 
2015 (Xinhua, 2017). In the Philippines, China has already built 11 infrastructures 
and is currently negotiating an additional 10 (Beijing Daily, 2021). Similarly, in 2021, 
China is building Vietnam’s first light rail transit in Hanoi (One Belt One Road [OBOR] 
net, 2021). Likewise, in September 2020, China completed the construction of 
Batang Rajang Bridge, which is the biggest infrastructure building project in Eastern 
Malaysia thus far (Liu, 2020). China’s investment in the infrastructure of ASEAN 
countries also expands Chinese investments, which were previously focused on 
manufacturing, mining, and retail in ASEAN countries (Gao, 2018, cited in Sina 
economics, 2018). Expanding Chinese investments in different areas will not only 
increase China’s presence in the region, but it will also further tie regional countries 
to China.  
 
Also, the BRI aims to increase salience of regional countries’ shared economic 
interests with China through enhancing intra-regional economic cooperation and 
trade (NDRC, FMPRC, and MOFCOM, 2015). To do this, China first attempted to 
reduce tariffs and non-tariffs barriers through signing or upgrading Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs) with regional countries and improving the regional business 
environment to facilitate trade and investment (NDRC, FMPRC, and MOFCOM, 
2015). For instance, China has been continuously upgrading the FTA between China 
and ASEAN, which was signed in 2010, and pushing for a trilateral FTA among China, 
Japan, and South Korea (China News Net, 2019). It also accelerates intra-regional 
trade and exports by measures such as further reducing trade barriers and improving 
customs clearance procedures in 2019 (People’s Net, 2019). In addition, BRI 
enhances intra-regional trade and economic integration by proposing a network of 
“cross-border e-commerce” among countries along Belt and Road (NDRC, FMPRC, 




this proposal into a reality by promising to help small and medium size enterprises 
from regional countries enter and exploit the Chinese market. In 2016, Alibaba signed 
a strategic agreement with the Thai government (Nation Thailand, 2016). In 2018, 
Alibaba planned to substantially increase sales of Japanese goods through its online 
shop and retail outlets in China (Cho et al, 2018). In 2019, Alibaba signed contract 
with Vietnam’s e-commerce giant Fado to promote products of Vietnamese small and 
medium size enterprises in China (Vietnam Investment Review, 2019). Also, in 2020, 
Alibaba planned to “onboard 5000 Indonesian merchants to its platform by 2025” 
(Eloksari, 2020). By doing so, China clearly wishes to further tie the Chinese market 
with both regional governments and subnational actors within the regional countries, 
such as enterprises and even individuals who do business through e-commerce. 
 
China’s huge domestic consumption market facilitate China’s cooperation with 
regional countries in developing emerging technologies because they wish to start or 
expand business in China. This helps China thwart the possible formation of a 
“China-free” tech supply chain by the US, particularly in the cases of semi-conductors, 
electric-vehicle batteries, and medical products (Huyama and Nakamura, 2021). In 
August 2018, China and Japan have agreed to cooperate in standardizing the next 
generation of fast chargers for electrical cars to gain easier access to the Chinese 
market (Kimura, 2018). Furthermore, to satisfy rising consumption in China, Japan’s 
Hitachi High-tech is producing medical reagent and automatic medical analysis 
devices in China in 2021 (Nikkei Chinese, 2021b). In the case of semi-conductors, 
Japanese companies that are producing non-cutting edge wafer products, such as 
Ferrotec Holdings, have substantially increased their investments and production in 
China in 2021 (Nikkei Chinese, 2021a). 
 
Taken together, East Asian countries share economic interests with China because 
of the deep economic cooperation and integration that already exists. This economic 
cooperation and integration form a community of interests within the region, because 




have negative spillover effects on these countries. Against this backdrop, China 
seeks to increase the salience of shared interests by directly targeting regional 
countries’ need to develop economy. China’s national foreign policy strategy BRI 
(NDRC, FMPRC, and MOFCOM, 2015) aims to increase intra-regional business 
investment and exports, the two most important means for a country to develop 
economy. Through BRI, China substantially increases outbound investments to 
regional countries, which satisfies their needs to attract foreign investment in 
infrastructure building. Also, China’s further opening up of the domestic consumption 
market provides incentives for regional countries to strengthen economic ties with 
China by promising to import more from neighboring countries. Moreover, China’s 
huge consumption market can help the country thwart the formation of a China free 
supply chain. 
 
In the long run, the ideal achievement of BRI is to make the regional production 
network more China-centered and create closer ties in the community of interests 
between China and regional countries by making China both a regional manufacture 
hub and a main consumption market of regional exports. This aim is demonstrated 
by Chinese Vice Premier Liu He’s article of constructing “internal and external big 
circulations” in 2020 (Liu, 2020). In this article, Liu (2020) states that “the most 
prominent feature of a great power’s economy is to realize internal circulation, which 
provides huge domestic market and supply capacity, and supports and drives 
external circulation.” By exploiting China’s huge domestic market and supply chain, 
Liu (2020) argues that China can “attract worldwide commodity and 
resources…enhance international division of labors and cooperation…and increase 
economic interdependence.”  
 
However, despite China’s efforts to increase the salience of shared interests with 
regional countries through BRI, many analysts have observed regional countries’ 
fears about the costs of endorsing the Chinese proposal. The first concern of regional 




(Chaturvedy, 2014, p. 17; Arase, 2015, p. 41; Chung and Voon, 2017, p. 427; Chen, 
2017, p. 352; Brown, 2018, p. 107). Regional states that have maritime territorial 
disputes with China fear that if they fully support BRI, they will be entrapped by China 
and let the latter use its economic power to either attract or punish them in exchange 
for their concession on territorial claims (Chen, 2017, p. 352). Also, they do not trust 
Beijing’s claim that BRI represents friendship as this claim is in contrast with China’s 
assertiveness in the SCS and ECS (Arase, 2015, p. 41; Brown, 2018, p. 107). Second, 
by endorsing China’s infrastructural projects, regional states need to agree to have a 
Chinese presence in their country and, to some degree, involvement in their internal 
affairs (Chung and Voon, 2017, p. 420). Thus, many people in countries like Myanmar 
are increasingly warning against sovereignty erosion by external powers’ 
involvement (Malik, 2018, p. 375) and Chinese “economic colonialism” that “plunders 
into not just forests, but their resources in general” (Manthorpe, 2015). Third, another 
concern regarding BRI is about the quality and process of constructing China-backed 
infrastructures that are often not environmentally friendly, are indifferent to local 
communities’ interests and culture, lack technological transfer and local employment, 
and disobey local rules (Brown, 2018, p. 112; Malik, 2018, p. 376).  
 
Finally, some analysts have expressed concerns about the “debt trap” of BRI. They 
arguments are as follows: China has “extended grace periods and longer term loans 
than other institutions” to developing countries, which in fact are not able to afford 
these loans; when the countries cannot repay such debts, they are forced to use 
“strategic equities” or to somewhat accept China’s “political influence” in order to 
obtain China’s forgiveness (Parker and Chefitz, 2018, pp. 4-5). It seems that this 
argument has been proven in the case of Malaysia, as the newly-elected Prime 
Minister Mahathir Mohamad canceled the China-backed East Coast Rail Link (ECRL) 
railway in 2018 because his administration believed that the project was unaffordable 
and the “unequal treaties” were substantially increasing Malaysia’s national debt 





The first observation of the analysts is right, as many Southeast Asian countries that 
are concerned with policy autonomy and sovereignty will not completely support 
China’s grand infrastructure plan. However, as their usual practice, Southeast Asian 
states that are investment driven and eager to improve infrastructures will show a 
certain degree of support to China’s grand plan, as they wish to maximize their 
interests through the infrastructure investment competition among great powers. For 
instance, commenting on the competition between the World Bank, in which Japan 
backed ADB and China backed AIIB, Cambodian elite Dr. Sok Siphana (2015, cited 
in Miller, 2017, p. 47), who had led talks for his country’s entrance to the WTO, said 
that “competition is good, because now we can shop around.” Likewise, Indonesia’s 
main Political Minister, Luhut Panjaitan (2015, cited in Rondonuwu, 2015), 
commented on China–Japan’s competition of constructing high-speed railways (HSR) 
in Indonesia in 2015 saying, “Let them race to invest [in] Indonesia. It’s good for us. 
It’s like a girl wanted by many guys, the girl then can pick whoever she likes.” One 
senior Thai leader (2017, cited in Lampton et al, 2020, p. 99) made a similar argument 
by saying “Thailand is like a beautiful lady who will wait and see.” In other words, 
Thailand stated that it would cautiously “keep its options open and create a space for 
[great powers’] courtship” (Kuik, 2015, cited in Lamption et al, 2020, p. 99).  
 
With regard to the second observation that the regional states’ concern of China’s 
indifference to local environment, rules, and culture hinders the progress of BRI, it is 
right that Chinese enterprises do have these problems, which need to be alleviated 
or solved. These problems have already caused negative consequences on some of 
China’s mega projects. For instance, Myanmar’s Letpadaung copper mine project 
was suspended from late 2012 to 2013 because of local protests against the 
environmental damage and local dissatisfaction about land-grabs (Ei Ei Toe Lwin, 
2013). Another kind of evidence was China’s slow progress in building the Jakarta-
Bandung high speed railway in Indonesia from 2016 to 2018 due to problems of land 
acquisition (Dorimulu, 2018). Nonetheless, problems including local protests of 




new mega infrastructures in a third country because building the infrastructure will 
inevitably violate established interests of some sub-national actors (such as local 
landowners, famers, and villagers). For instance, like China, Japan, who is another 
big investor in the region, faced protests of 3500 Indonesians for building a coal-fired 
plant in 2016 because of local concern for environmental damage and public health 
deterioration (Kyodo, 2016). Also, in 2018, Japan stopped funding the construction 
of India’s first bullet train project because of Indian farmers’ protests regarding land 
acquisition (Vishwadeepak, 2018). Thus, on the one hand, countries that are building 
infrastructures should address local concerns and enhance communication with local 
communities. On the other hand, the governments of host countries probably need 
to make a trade-off between different interests, such as improvement in national 
transportation versus the interests of landowners or farmers. In many cases, the host 
countries choose to bear the costs of local dissatisfaction in exchange for achieving 
greater national objectives. For instance, the major reason for Myanmar leader Aung 
Sann Suu Kyi (2013, cited in Lawi Weng and Thet Swe Aye, 2013) to resume 
construction of the China-backed copper mine in 2013 is that the country was under-
developed and needed foreign investments to develop its economy and create job 
opportunities. She (Aung Sann Suu Kyi, 2012, cited in Global Times, 2012) asked 
local people to put the interests of the nation first. Furthermore, under her 
administration, which took power in 2016, a lot of China-backed projects that were 
strongly resisted by local communities have quietly resumed because of the need to 
increase economic growth (Wan, 2018).  
 
Third, the argument of China’s debt trap diplomacy (Parker and Chefitz, 2018, pp. 4-
5) seems to underestimate regional developing states’ bargaining power in the formal 
negotiation process of building infrastructures with China. This argument assumes 
that regional developing countries have no other choice but to “give in to” China’s 
debt trap and make concessions on sovereignty once it accepts unaffordable loans 





The basic fact is that regional developing states that intend to build infrastructures or 
attract foreign investments, but are in shortage of funding or advanced technologies, 
have to bear a debt burden and, to some degree, they have to be under the political 
or strategic influence of foreign countries. In other words, accepting foreign influence 
is the price that they must pay. Although it is true that BRI has political or strategic 
intentions, using investments to achieve political and strategic influence is not a 
unique Chinese practice. Every country or external institution uses soft loans to do 
the same. Soft loans from Western countries or institutions have conditions, like 
improving human rights and political reform in developing countries. Japan has long 
been adept to using developmental aid to secure political, economic, or strategic 
interests (Reilly, 2013, p. 141). For instance, one main aim of Japan’s aid to China in 
the 1980s was to enhance Japanese firms’ access to the Chinese market and secure 
China’s raw material exports to Japan (Reilly, 2013, p. 144). Since 2010, Japan 
resumed funding infrastructure construction in Myanmar’s Thilawa Speicial Economic 
Zone to deepen economic and diplomatic engagement with Myanmar (Reilly, 2013, 
p. 153). Also, the US’ infrastructure agreement with Japan and Australia in 2018 
clearly has the strategic aim of countering BRI (Pearlman, 2018). Just as the 
Philippines’ Finance Secretary Carlos Dominguez III (2018, cited in Rivas, 2018b) 
said, “We are not naïve, we know all Official Development Assistance (ODA) projects 
of all countries are designed to influence.” Thus, for regional developing states, the 
issue here is not whether they should borrow loans from other countries rather than 
from China, because borrowing other countries’ loans may also make them overtly 
and strategically reliant on countries. Also, they may shoulder more and more debt if 
the loans cannot be repaid. For regional countries, the crucial point is how to 
maximize their interests through reducing the debt burden and avoiding over-reliance 
on a single power’s influence, while also utilizing external powers to build 
infrastructures. Like Carlos Dominguez III (2018, cited in Rivas, 2018b) said, “while 
countries use ODA to influence, it is up to the government how to take advantages 





With regard to utilizing Chinese loans and avoiding over-reliance on one country, 
regional countries are not passive recipients that obey China’s demands, but they 
are rather active players.  
 
One major strategy used by many regional countries is to balance the investments of 
external powers. Avoiding over-reliance on Japanese loans is a major reason why 
the Philippines chooses China, whose interests rate (2%–3%) is much higher than 
Japanese loans (0.25%–0.75%) (Pernia, 2018, cited in Interaksyon, 2018), to build 
some infrastructure in the Philippines (Pernia, 2018, cited in Rivas, 2018a; Padin, 
2018). Malaysia’s Mahathir welcomed Japan’s investments to reduce Malaysia’s 
overt support for China’s infrastructure projects in 2018 (Menon and Daga, 2018), 
Likewise, in 2018, Myanmar permitted Japan and India to construct its east-west 
route, while China was building its north and south route (Malik, 2018, p. 373). Also, 
in 2018, while negotiating with China over the Bangkok-Nong Khai HSR, Thailand 
permitted Japan to construct a 672 km Bangkok-Chiang Mai railway (Lampton et al, 
2020, p. 103). 
 
Second, regional developing countries are actively seeking to reduce costs of 
building infrastructures in the negotiations with China. For instance, the major reason 
that China defeated Japan in the bidding for Jakarta-Bandung HSR in 2015 was that 
the Chinese proposal required neither Indonesian state funding nor a governmental 
guarantee (Kyodo, 2015). This means that the Indonesian government shoulders no 
responsibility if the country cannot repay the loan in the future. Thus, no debt trap 
exists in this HSR project. Also, in 2016, Thailand decided to fund the Bangkok-
Nakhon Ratchasima railway on its own, but would utilize Chinese equipment, and 
construction firms because Thailand’s government had not gotten China’s 
concession of reducing loan interest rate from 2.5 percent to 2.0 percent (Lampton 
et al, 2020, p. 98). Likewise, in 2016, Myanmar successfully reduced the cost of 
Chinese investment in Kyaukpyu deep water from 7.3 billon to 1.3 billion US dollars 




guarantee to the project (Li, 2018). Likewise, in 2019, Malaysia has successfully 
reduced the substantial cost of the ECRL through bargaining with China (Mahathir, 
2019 cited in Rekhi, 2019). After the re-negotiation, ECRL’s cost was substantially 
reduced from 65.5 billion Malaysia Ringgit (RM) to 44 billion RM (Lampton et al, 2020, 
p. 113).  
 
Moreover, the new Mahathir Malaysian government claimed that the country had 
fallen into China’s debt trap in 2018 because Najib’s government used lucrative 
projects to reciprocate China’s help of bailing out the debts of 1 Malaysia 
Development Berhad (1MDB) (Lampton et al, 2020, p. 124). However, Malaysia’s 
debt was in fact manageable since existing evidence does not support Mathathir’s 
claim. First, the annual average Malaysia’s federal government debt to GDP ratio is 
50.1% from 1978 to 2018 (CEIC data, cited in Zhang, 2020, p. 134). According to an 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) report in 2020, the ration in 2015, 2016, 2017, 
2018, 2019, and 2020 was 53.6%, 51.9%, 50.1%, 51.2%, 52.7%, and 52.6%, 
respectively (IMF, 2020). In other words, Malaysia’s federal government debt to GDP 
ratio in these years were slightly higher than the annual average debt ratio of the 
country. Thus, the country’s debt did not substantially increase due to Chinese loans. 
Second, in principle, the higher federal government guaranteed debt to the national 
debt, the more likely the country would have debt risk (Zhang, 2020, p. 134). 
According to statistics from the Malaysian government in 2019, in 2018, the year that 
the new government made the debt trap claim, Malaysia’s government guaranteed 
debt was 266.5 billion RM, and the total national debt was 741 billion RM (Daim and 
Teoh, 2019). Thus, the government’s guaranteed debt accounted for approximately 
30% of the total national debt in 2018. This ratio demonstrates that Malaysia’s debt 
risk was low in 2018. Because China’s funding was part of, rather than all of the 
government’s guaranteed debt, it is unlikely that Malaysia would have fallen into a 
China’s debt trap. Third, according to an IMF report from 2018, Malaysia’s external 
debt to GDP ratio had, in fact, declined since 2016 (IMF, 2018, p. 50). To be sure, 




the total external debt as of September 2017 (IMF, 2018，p. 50), which may increase 
the risk of Malaysia not being able to repay the loans (Zhang, 2020, p.137). However, 
the same IMF report (2018, p. 51) expected the short-term debt share to steadily 
decline. Moreover, according to experts of Malaysia’s central bank, until January 
2019, Malaysia’s international reserves were US $102,1 billion and, thus, ensured 
the state’s capability to repay short-term external loans (The Star, 2019). 
Furthermore, Malaysia’s debt service ratio from 2013 to 2019 was 17.3%, 17.9%, 
21.4%, 23.5%, 22.7%, 23.0%, and 23.1%, respectively (IMF, 2020). According to 
established international practice, if a developing country’s debt service ratio is above 
25%, it will probably be unable to repay the debt (Baidu Baike, no date). The debt 
service ratio of Malaysia from 2013 to 2019 did not cross this red line.  
 
In light of the discussion above, this chapter argues that the economic plan of BRI is 
feasible to help China increase the salience of shared economic interests with 
regional countries by deepening economic ties with them on the basis of existing 
regional economic integration and cooperation. This is because many regional 
countries regard BRI as more of an opportunity to exploit than a risk to avoid. BRI 
offers huge economic benefits through infrastructure investments and access to the 
Chinese domestic market. Although there may be costs, such as over-reliance on 
Chinese investments, they are manageable as many regional countries have 
bargaining power and are able to control and balance the inflows of investments. This 
validates the principle of the strategic management of identities/interests, which is 
set out by SIT and holds that shared identity/interests would contribute to a peaceful 
relationship between conflicting parties.  
 
This also reinforces the overall argument of the thesis that shared economic interests 
would help China construct benign relationships with regional countries on economic 
dimension, even if there are other points of friction such as territorial disputes. 
Additionally, these benign relationships would help cancel out the negative effects 




as Japan, the Philippines, and even Vietnam, are deepening their economic ties with 
China despite ongoing territorial disputes.  
 
Constructing a shared pluralist identity between China and regional countries 
through BRI 
 
 In addition to shared material interests, BRI, as China’s grand national strategy, has 
an ideational element that helps China seek a shared identity with regional countries. 
According to SIT, one way to form such a shared identity with others is through 
exhibiting shared values, ideas, or visions (Hogg, 1992, cited in Brown, 2000, p. 27). 
This is an important detail for this thesis’ main argument because, if China can 
manage identity in this way, the shared identity could enhance in-group feeling 
between China and regional states, thereby canceling out frictions caused by 
conflicting identities and preventing them from joining a hard-balancing coalition 
against China. 
 
With regard to the ideas and values exhibited through BRI initiatives, analysts’ 
arguments can be divided into two categories. The first is that China wishes to use 
BRI to reconstruct Sino-centric tribute regional order or “empire” that China is at the 
center of the order while the neighboring states are at the fringes (Wu, 2015, cited in 
Clover and Hornby, 2015; Blanchard, 2017, p. 250; Callahan, 2018, p. 6; Pompeo, 
2018, cited in Gehrke, 2018). Speaking of a tribute system or empire, these authors 
indicate that China aims to build a Chinese hegemonic regional order through BRI. 
This is because the essence of the tribute system is Chinese hegemonic superiority 
and authority over neighboring states, although many Chinese analysts argue that 
regional states were ruled in a benevolent manner through this system (Jian, 2009, 
pp. 133-137; Shang, 2009, p. 30; Wang, 2017, p. 93). However, this type of argument 
is refuted by Chinese officials. Indeed, China has very cautiously implemented BRI 
in an attempt to avoid such an interpretation. For example, China has named Belt 




treating Belt and Road as Chinese initiatives, China aims to connect the Chinese 
initiative with national plans and initiatives of regional countries or institutions (duijie), 
such as connecting BRI with Indonesian president Jokowi’s Global Maritime Fulcrum 
doctrine or ASEAN connectivity 2025 (Wang, 2015, cited in People’s Net, 2015). 
China also wishes to connect BRI with Japan’s freedom and open Indo-Pacific (Wang, 
2015, cited in People’s Net, 2015), and the two countries have begun to discuss 
cooperation on infrastructure building in the third country in 2018 (Kyodo, 2019). In 
this way, China aims to show that it considers other countries or institutions’ initiatives 
to be equally important as BRI.  
 
Callahan (2018, p. 7) argued that, although China claimed that BRI is inclusive, BRI 
reminded the regional states about the “sphere of influence” logic or Japan’s East 
Asia co-Prosperity Sphere. Likewise, Allison (2020, p. 30) argued that China is 
creating a regional sphere of influence in which it demands other regional states’ 
deference or exerts predominant control over the region. If China aimed to create a 
sphere of influence or an East Asia co-Prosperity sphere through BRI, it would have 
been able to deeply influence internal affairs of regional countries to ensure their 
obedience to BRI. For instance, in 1938, the year Japan declared that it would create 
the co-prosperity sphere of East Asia, Japan was invading China to ensure that its 
demands would be fully obeyed. However, up to now, China demonstrates limited 
capability to influence regional states’ BRI participation decisions. For instance, it is 
not uncommon that after leadership transitions in regional states, China has to 
significantly renegotiate BRI arrangements that were endorsed by previous 
governments (Lampton et al, 2020, p. 97), rather than forcing the mew government 
to obey to the negotiated arrangements. In some instances, the new governments 
have turned down some of the previously negotiated BRI agreements. For example, 
in 2014, the Thai military government turned down the previous government’s 
(Yingluck, 2011–2014) agreement with China, which held that Thailand would barter 
rice to use China’s equipment and technology to construct HSR (Meyer, 2014). Also, 




been negotiated with China by Thailand’s Abhisit administration in 2010 (Lampton et 
al, 2020, p. 97). Likewise, as noted earlier, after Mahathir came to power in 2018, 
key terms of the ECRL building contract have been significantly renegotiated and two 
pipelines had been suspended. Also, since 2015, China had tried to cultivate good 
ties with Aung San Suu Kyi government and resumed many previously stalled 
projects in Myanmar (Myers and Beech, 2021). However, the military coup that 
overthrew the Aung San government in 2021 made the fate of those projects 
uncertain again. Some analysts may argue that due to sanctions on democratic 
countries on Myanmar, the military junta would be increasingly dependent on China’s 
investments and, thus, may endorse more BRI projects. However, it is worth noting 
that many BRI projects had been stalled by the military government (2010–2015), 
such as Myitsone Hydropower Dam. In 2019, Aung San government began to 
renegotiate the key terms of the Dam construction deal with China (Global Times, 
2019). Thus, to China, Aung San seems to be a more cooperative partner than 
military junta.  
 
Moreover, even if China pressures regional countries to accept its desires in BRI 
negotiations, regional states can withstand if they think that China’s demands are in 
conflict with their highly valued national interests. For instance, when negotiating the 
construction of HSR with China, Thai negotiators refused to permit China to develop 
land surrounding the HSR route because Thailand thought that land rights are “the 
greatest asset” of the worker union and the King (Lampton et al, 2020, p. 101). Also, 
from 2017 to 2018, China pressured Malaysian leaders, including Prime Minister 
Najib, to help China win the Kuala Lumpur-Singapore HSR project (Liu and Lim, 2019, 
p. 225). However, Malaysia thought that China’s wish to own terminus of the HSR 
was against its national interests and, thus, did not yield to China’s demand, even if 
then Prime Minister Najib was accused of asking China to bailout 1MDB’s debts (Liu 
and Lim, 2019, p. 225). Likewise, when negotiating HSR in 2015, Indonesia 




Chinese and Indonesian state-owned enterprises rather than the government-to-
government model, which China preferred (Pavlićević and Kratz, 2019, p. 162).  
 
Smith (2021, p. 75) noted that regional states have bargaining power and China has 
often made concessions. However, Smith (2021, p. 75) also reported that China 
wished to use concessions in exchange for regional states’ formal recognition of its 
dominant status and order. This is the “formal inequality, but informal equality 
structure” of the hierarchical Sino-centric benevolent order claimed by many Chinese 
scholars, whereby China needs regional states’ recognition of and deference to its 
superior status in return for China’s tolerance and concession (Smith, 2021, p. 73). 
Smith (2021, p. 75) supported this argument by using evidence that China conceded 
to Malaysia’s demand to substantially reduce costs of ECRL in exchange for getting 
Mahathir’s public endorsement to Xi’s BRI at 2019 Belt and Road Forum in Beijing, 
which demonstrates Malaysia’s submission to Xi’s Sino-centric order. However, 
contrary to Smith’s (2021, p. 75) argument, at the press conference after the 
meetings of the forum, Mahathir (2019, cited in Wong, 2019) explained that he 
supported BRI because he corrected his misunderstanding that BRI is China’s 
“domination plan.” Mahathir (2019, cited in Wong, 2019) said that “at the beginning, 
we thought that the BRI was for China to dominate in ASEAN and Asia.” However, at 
the forum, he (Mahathir, 2019, cited in Wong, 2019) realized that “this initiative is not 
being dominated by China. This will be a creation by all involved nations” because 
“suggestions from small countries…were being considered” and they were treated 
equally as developed countries. Thus, the Mahathir case supports China’s claim that 
BRI is equal and weakens Smith’s (2021, p. 75) view that China uses concession to 
get other states to submit to its domination.  
 
As the discussion above demonstrates, first, creating a Sino-centric order through 
BRI is not feasible because China demonstrates a limited capability to influence the 
internal affairs of regional countries, and regional countries are often able to 




China’s preferences. Second, China attempts to show equality through BRI rather 
than a hierarchical but benevolent Sino-centric order.  
 
Although China is unable to create an exclusive Sino-centric order through BRI, it 
can form a shared identity with regional countries based on shared values. As noted 
in the introductory section, forming a shared identity can cancel out the negative 
effects of conflicting identities and, thus, deter regional states from joining an “anyone 
but China club” that aims to contain China (Zhou and Esteban, 2018, p. 494). This 
reinforces the main argument of the thesis that a shared identity approach is a viable 
means for China to thwart the formation of a regional hard-balancing coalition.  
 
However, the second category of scholars’ observation is that China lacks the 
capability to promote new shared ideas, values, or vision in the region and, thus, will 
find difficulties to further ally with regional states, although BRI may successfully 
enhance economic cooperation between regional states and China (Xue, 2014; Yale, 
2015; Malik, 2018, p. 378). However, China does not need to promote new shared 
ideas, values, and visions because the ideas and values that China promotes already 
exist and have sincere supporters in the region.  
 
Since the end of the Cold War, two types of regionalism have coexisted in the East 
Asian region. The first is the US-centric regional order that promotes economic or 
political liberalization. This type of regionalism visualizes a totally liberalized regional 
economy through multi-lateral institutions that consist of “formally negotiated, legally 
binding, and comprehensive agreements” (Stubbs, 2018, p. 141) and provides strong 
support for democracy (Alcaro, 2018, p. 4). This type of regionalism also has a 
solidarist feature because of the view that international society should have more 
rights to inspect or even intervene in the domestic politics of states that do not respect 
the human rights of their people (Ikenberry, 2009, pp. 80-81). The second type of 
regionalism is ASEAN-led regionalism. It strictly adheres to the Westphalian notion 




on avoiding embarrassment and confrontation among regional countries and a 
“nonbinding, voluntary approach to liberalization which emphasized tackling the 
easiest issues first” (Stubbs, 2018, p. 142). While China is not the founding member 
of the first regionalism, it has been deeply engaged in the establishment of the 
second regionalisms’ values and norms.  
 
The values and norms of the ASEAN-led regionalism originated from the 1955 
Bandung conference in which China was one of major participants. In this conference, 
official representatives from 29 Asian and African countries formally met for the first 
time to discuss issues (Office of The Historian, no date). In terms of the topics, the 
main theme of their discussion was to provide the world the way, vision, and values 
by which these newly emerged states present themselves and deal with IR. It was in 
this conference that China’s five principles of peaceful coexistence were shared, 
which stress sovereign equality, non-aggression, non-interference to internal affairs, 
mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty, cooperation on mutual interests, and 
peaceful coexistence (Office of The Historian, no date); these principles were fully 
included in the 10 principles of the Bandung conference (Xinhua，2005). Also, 
influenced by previous regional gatherings, such as the Asian relation conference in 
1947 and the Bogor summit in 1949, the conference procedure was not rigid or legally 
binding (Acharya, 2009, pp. 79-81). Additionally, any issue that could cause a 
confrontation or disagreement was avoided in the conference agenda; instead, 
differences were tolerated and decision making was based on consensus, rather than 
majority voting, to avoid hurting participants’ feelings and enhance a sense of unity 
(Acharya, 2009, pp. 79-81).    
 
The principles and procedures of the Bandung conference continue to have a 
profound influence on the values and norms that China and ASEAN promote. Indeed, 
striking commonalities can be found in China’s and ASEAN’s statements and policies. 
The pluralist norms of respecting sovereign equality and territorial integrity and 




have been enshrined in the ASEAN charter (2007). The Bandung conference’s 
procedures have been adopted by ASEAN as the ASEAN way, which promotes these 
ideas and norms in the ASEAN-led regionalism. ASEAN has become a hub and 
bridging node of various ASEAN-led institutions, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF) (1994), ASEAN Plus Three (APT; 1997), East Asia Summit (EAS; 2005) 
(Caballero-Anthony, 2014, p. 568).  
 
These pluralist values and procedures are also demonstrated in China’s promotion 
of the principles of BRI. In this initiative, China calls for peaceful coexistence among 
different types of political regimes and cultures, as well as tolerance of differences 
between cultures (NDRC, FMPRC, and MOFCOM, 2015). As Xi’s major foreign 
policy, BRI is tied with Xi’s new Asian security concept that puts emphasis on one of 
China’s five principles of peaceful coexistence, solving disputes through negotiations, 
and building mutual trust incrementally (Xi, 2014). Because of these commonalities, 
China does not need to destroy ASEAN-led regionalism and construct another one. 
Instead, China can seek a shared pluralist identity with ASEAN on the basis of their 
shared values.  
 
Despite the possibility of forming a shared pluralist identity with ASEAN, conflicts 
between China and ASEAN may arise if the former were to replace the latter and 
lead the pluralist regionalism because the most important interest of ASEAN in the 
region is to preserve its centrality. However, this is not the case, as Chinese senior 
officials have repeatedly praised the central role that ASEAN plays in leading regional 
cooperation, and they have reiterated their strong support for ASEAN-led regionalism 
(Wen, 2011, cited in China News, 2011; Xi, 2015, cited in Zheng, 2015). For China, 
it is reasonable to back ASEAN-led regionalism because supporting it can help China 
gain more benefits. First, taking part in ASEAN-led regionalism can enable China to 
alleviate regional fear about China’s domination in the region, whereas attempting to 
lead this identity could raise such a fear. Second, by joining the multilateral 




also free from the fear of being dominated by other great powers because of 
ASEAN’s relative lower national strength (Stubbs, 2014, p. 533). Also, during 
decades of participation, China has found that ASEAN multilateralism is an effective 
political means to balance the US’ bilateral alliance system in the region (He, 2015, 
p. 215). Finally, in the process of institutional design and building, ASEAN has 
cautiously and skillfully secured its central role and ASEAN-led mechanism in the 
institutions through deciding membership, entry requirements, decision-making 
procedures, and agenda setting of institutions(Caballero-Anthony, 2014, pp. 571-
572). Furthermore, the organization has established institutions to ensure that 
ASEAN is the indispensable node that connects them (Caballero-Anthony, 2014, pp. 
571-572). Thus, it is hard for China to replace ASEAN within the current institutional 
settings and arrangements.  
 
Analysts often argue that China pays lip service to ASEAN-led regionalism. However, 
China’s obedience to ASEAN-led regionalism should not be examined in an either-
or manner, but in terms of the extent because, as a “nascent security community” 
(Acharya, 1998, p. 202), ASEAN-led regionalism loosely constrains its member 
states and external regional powers. Regarding the shared interests of ASEAN and 
China, China does strongly support ASEAN-led pluralist values. For example, in 2003, 
China was the first non-ASEAN country to sign ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation (TAC) (Stubbs, 2018, p. 145). Official approval of the treaty has become 
a pre-requisite for countries that wish to enter the ASEAN-led EAS (Stubbs, 2018, p. 
145). In TAC, the norms that govern inter-state relations are very similar to China’s 
five principles of peaceful coexistence (Severino, 2006, p. 279). Likewise, China’s 
support of ASEAN-led informal and consensus driven approach increases the US’s 
challenges in terms of promoting liberal regionalism (Stubbs, 2018, p. 144). As 
Yuzawa (2012, p. 83) noted, in 2012, China’s support of the “ASEAN way of dialogue 
and consultation” prevented the US from making the Annual Security Outlook of ARF 
substantive, such as containing information of regional countries’ military programs. 




non-interference to Myanmar’s internal affairs (Jaipragas and Yuniar, 2021). 
Additionally, China strongly supported the ASEAN-led Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP).  
 
Moreover, ASEAN does have a constraining effect on China’s actions, although 
China does not fully endorse ASEAN’s leadership when it comes to managing SCS 
disputes. In 1995, under pressure from ASEAN, China for the first time reluctantly 
agreed to discuss SCS disputes at an informal meeting between senior officials of 
ASEAN and China, despite its preference of dealing SCS disputes bi-laterally (Lee, 
1999, p. 35). Also, China signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the SCS 
(DOC) with ASEAN in 2002, which is an ASEAN-led approach to SCS. I 
demonstrated in my article, although China made DOC vague in 2002, it did to a 
certain degree obey the DOC from 2002 to 2008 (Hu, 2021, p.21). Likewise, in 2013, 
due to ASEAN’s strong insistence on starting the COC talks, China reluctantly but 
officially recognized ASEAN’s role as the legitimate manager of SCS disputes by 
endorsing ASEAN’s COC approach (Xinhua, 2016).  
 
Some analysts may argue that China just pay lip service to ASEAN’s leadership in 
managing the SCS disputes because China would ensure its own COC version rather 
than making substantive concessions to ASEAN in the COC negotiation. To be sure, 
China will probably not concede to ASEAN’s every demand. However, existing 
evidence suggests that China has made several substantive concessions in the COC 
negotiation. Some scholars suspected that China would ensure a non-binding COC 
(Castro, 2020; Storey, 2017). However, although China did not accept a legally 
binding COC, it conceded to ASEAN’s demand for a binding COC (CGTV, 2019). 
Moreover, according to the Philippine Foreign Secretary Teodoro Locsin, Jr (2019, 
as cited in Santos, 2019) in 2019, in the COC negotiation, China “softened its 
insistence on controversial provisions”, such as giving up “provisions excluding the 




that China would not make (Castro, 2020; Hoang, 2020). These examples 
demonstrate that ASEAN does somewhat constrain China.  
Conclusion 
 
Throughout this Chapter and the following one, the thesis looks at the extent to which 
Beijing has realized important nationalist interests, such as sovereignty related rights 
in the SCS, and preventing the formation of a US-led hard balancing coalition in the 
stalemate period through the strategic management of identities. This chapter looks 
at the extent to which BRI has helped Beijing achieve this goal through forming or 
increasing the salience of shared economic interests and a pluralist identity with 
regional countries. According to SIT, shared identity and interests create a benign 
relationship among conflicting groups. China increases the salience of shared 
economic interests with regional countries through BRI, which is attractive to many 
regional countries that wish to use investments and exports to boost GDP. BRI further 
binds regional countries’ economies with China, such as boosting intra-regional 
connection, upgrading FTA, and tying middle and small companies of regional 
countries with the Chinese market. China also increases salience of shared 
economic interests through substantially increasing investment on infrastructure 
building in regional countries. The costs may incur when regional countries attempt 
to deepen their economic ties with China (i.e. environmental degradation, over-
reliance on China, and the debt trap). However, as this chapter demonstrates, 
regional countries do have bargaining power and are capable of managing the costs. 
Also, China sought a shared pluralist identity with regional countries, which is the 
prevailing ideology in East Asia and underpins the ASEAN-led regionalism. Some 
analysts argue that China’s obedience to ASEAN’s leadership is insincere. However, 
this chapter argues that China does strongly support ASEAN-led regionalism when 
the two sides’ interests converge. Although China does not fully obey ASEAN’s 
leadership in managing SCS disputes, ASEAN does have constraining effect on 





The findings of this chapter reinforce the overall argument of this thesis that shared 
interests and identities would help China construct benign relationships with regional 
countries even if other frictions like territorial disputes continue to exist. Additionally, 
these benign relationships would help cancel out negative effects caused by 
conflicting identities/interests. However, although China tried hard to maintain these 
benign relationships by seeking shared pluralist identities/interests, China’s 
uncontrolled actions in the SCS or ECS could make regional countries prioritize 
conflicting identities and interests over the shared ones and join a rivalry bloc to 
contain China, and lead to China’s unpeaceful rise. The next chapter will explore the 
extent to which China has prevented such a scenario by pursuing nationalist interests 
in a restrained way to mitigate the potential threat of such actions during the 






















Chapter 9: The stalemate period (3)—China’s effort to pursue its nationalist 
goals in a restrained way 
 
The preceding chapters have demonstrated that, in the stalemate period, China has 
attempted to prevent a hard balancing coalition and, thus, maintain a relatively 
peaceful external environment by increasing the salience of shared interests through 
BRI and seeking a shared pluralist identity with regional countries. This supports the 
overall argument of the thesis, which is that shared identities/interests could 
contribute to benign relationships between China and regional countries. However, 
although China has made a lot of effort to seek shared interests and identities with 
regional countries to preserve a peaceful environment, its nationalist actions, if 
uncontrolled, will probably make regional countries prioritize conflicting identities and 
interests over shared ones, and join a rivalry bloc to contain China, and lead to 
China’s unpeaceful rise. This chapter then analyze how China strikes a balance 
between its goals of pursuing or consolidating nationalist interests and preserving a 
relatively peaceful regional environment in this period. I argue that through a strategy 
of pursuing the nationalist interests in a restrained manner, which is part of the 
strategic management of interests and identity, this is possible.  
 
Ba and Kuik (2018, pp. 232-236) viewed China’s effort to seek shared 
identities/interests with regional countries and actions of pursuing nationalist interests 
as China’s “push and pull.” That is, China proactively engages with regional states 
through economic ties, while undermining China’s relationship with regional states 
through military actions in the SCS (Ba and Kuik, 2018, pp. 232-236). Boon (2017, p. 
640) argued that China’s regional strategy is “hardening the hard while softening the 
soft,” meaning that China is vigorously enhancing attractiveness by pulling the 
regional states into its political and economic influence while being increasingly 





In contrast, over recent years, an increasing number of scholars have noticed China’s 
restraint in pursuing nationalist interests. That is, while China is hardening the hard, 
it has acted in a restrained manner that mitigates the threatening potential of that. 
Wu and You (2019, p. 54) argued that “assertiveness’’ has become a blanket term 
that is used in a non-nuanced manner to blur the larger picture.” They further argued 
that scholars highlighting China’s assertiveness fail to recognize China’s effort to 
avoid conflicts when conducting coercive actions (Wu and You, 2019, p. 54). Likewise, 
Zhang (2019, p. 119) pointed out China’s restraint when it strengthens sovereignty 
claims. He (Zhang, 2019, p. 119) argued that, contrary to the dominant argument that 
China acts as a bully in SCS disputes, China not only “employs coercion infrequently,” 
but also “less often uses military means” and mainly relies on non-military means to 
defend sovereignty when its power grows. Also, some scholars apply the concept of 
gray zone operations to analyze China’s military actions in the region. Despite 
different definitions, many scholars agree that gray zone activities refer to a state’s 
actions to gradually alter the status quo by conducting low-intensity military activities 
and avoiding “escalation’’ to the “phases dominated by military actions” (Green et al, 
2017, p. 21; Mazaar, cited in Erickson and Matinson, 2019, p. 3). Petersen (2019, pp. 
17-19) argued that China aims to gradually alter the status quo by “keeping the cost 
of asserting…rights as low as possible.” 
 
The argument of China’s increasing assertiveness stresses its actions of 
consolidating sovereignty, but seems to pay rare attention to China’s restraints in its 
actions (Hoang, 2016, p. 188; Do, 2018, pp. 213-214). However, the argument of 
China’s restraint does not consider its effectiveness in conducting these actions. 
Here, effectiveness refers to whether China has achieved its goals of pursing 
nationalist interests and preserving a relatively peaceful environment by not overt 
escalating conflicts and seriously deteriorating its relationship with other states (Wu 





To systematically analyze China’s restraint in pursuing or defending important 
nationalist interests, this chapter provides three criteria for examining China’s 
restraints. First, China’s actual actions are compared with the available options that 
it could have taken before the incidents. Second, China’s actions are compared with 
other claimant states’ similar actions when such incidents happen. Third, the chapter 
specifies regional countries’ response to China’s actions. They are declarative 
responses, demonstrative responses, low intensity confrontations, medium intensity 
confrontations, and high intensity confrontations, which will be explained in the first 
part of this chapter.  
 
The main flaw of the gray zone thesis is that it holds that China aims to challenge the 
regional status quo, but does not specify the status quo. If status quo is defined as 
the US-hub and system that China views as encirclement, it is right that China aims 
to challenge the status quo. However, if the status quo is defined as regional disputes, 
many of China’s actions, which have been viewed by scholars as gray zone 
operations, are responses to other disputants’ behaviors and have no prior intention 
to change the status quo (Zhang, 2019, p. 24), For instance, China has used the 
coast guard to escort Chinese fishermen in the SCS since 2009 because Chinese 
fishermen were detained and shot by other claimant countries’ para naval forces or 
navy in disputed waters (Swanie and Fravel, 2012, p. 7). Also, as will be noted in the 
last section of this chapter, China began to patrol the territorial waters of Diaoyu 
Islands because Japan had planned to purchase the islands and, thus, alter the 
status quo in 2012. Thus, these actions could not be explained as “gray zone 
activities,” but rather as China’s effort to realize “rights and stability balance” (Zhang, 
2019, p. 2). Although these actions will increase China’s deterrent capabilities in the 
first island chain, the increased deterrent capability is a consequence rather than a 
direct pursuit of China’s goals.   
 
The chapter will be divided into three parts; the first part is the regional countries’ 




operations in the region. In this part, it will analyze China’s actions, which are 
regarded by many scholars as being assertive, such as Chinese coast guards’ 
regulation of foreign fishermen operating in disputed waters or Chinese coast guards’ 
interference in other states’ oil drilling activities. The third part will analyze how China 
strikes a right and stability balance through the example of Japan’s nationalization of 
the Diaoyu islands. 
 
The chapter argues that, in the stalemate period, China has pursued nationalist 
interests in a restrained way to avoid unduly escalating frictions caused by its 
nationalist actions and, thus, breaking up China’s relationship with regional countries. 
Regarding China’s gray zone operations, China’s actions were restrained compared 
to its most assertive options. Also, these actions are often of a similar intensity or 
even less assertive than other claimant countries’ actions in similar situations. China 
also set upper limits to manage the consequences arising from its nationalist actions. 
Moreover, when others’ actions make China believe that its important nationalist 
interests have been damaged, China will use offensive means to respond, but will 
attempt to manage the consequence of its response to avoid a complete breakdown 
of its relationship with the other relevant parties. For instance, it will use offensive 
means in a restrained way and diplomatic means to show a willingness to negotiate. 
Regional countries’ responses to China’s gray zone actions or its efforts to strike a 
right and stability balance generally range from declarative response to medium 
intensity confrontation, which demonstrates that China did manage tension with 
relative success. This supports the overall argument of the thesis that China’s 
restraint when pursuing or defending important nationalist interests can possibly 
maintain a relatively benign environment and prevent the formation of a hard-
balancing coalition by mitigating the threatening potential of such actions. 
 
 





Other states’ responses to China’s actions are classified into five categories. The first 
category of response is the declarative response that is about “verbal assertions via 
non-coercive statements,” such as protests, “diplomatic notes, domestic legislation 
and administrative measures” (Chubb, 2021, p. 88). The declarative response is the 
least escalatory response because it often uses diplomatic means and does not 
involve physical presence in the disputed area or seriously threaten China’s 
sovereignty claims (Chubb, 2021, p. 88). When states use declarative response, 
tension often ends after several rounds of tit for tat protests. 
 
The second is a demonstrative response, which refers to regional states’ actions of 
demonstrating sovereignty claims without directly confronting China (Chubb, 2021, p. 
88) or seriously threatening its sovereignty claims, such as domestic protests, 
building on land features, and official visits to land features. A demonstrative 
response is more escalatory than a declarative response because it involves more 
physical assertion or consolidation of regional states’ claimed sovereignty and 
compromises China’s sovereignty claims more than a declarative response does 
(Chubb, 2021, p. 89). However, because regional countries use such responses to 
avoid direct confront China or do not seriously threaten China’s claims, they 
cautiously reduce the potential for escalation and will not cause heightened tension 
in the region. For instance, in 2012, to challenge China’s plan of devising a tourist 
route around the waters of Paracel Islands, the navies of Vietnam and the Philippines 
held football matches on their controlled disputed land features (Zhou, 2012). Also, 
in 2021, to keep up with other claimant states’ build-up of outposts in the disputed 
land features and to monitor China’s presence in the Spratly Islands, the Philippines 
decided to further fortify its occupied Thitu Island in the Spratly (Heydarian, 2021). 
These two actions physically demonstrated the two countries’ claimed sovereignty 
and challenged China’s claims. However, the football match was a non-military 
means to defend the two countries’ claimed sovereignty and, thus, did not seriously 
threaten China’s sovereignty claims. Also, as building on land features is a normal 




89), China’s response was declarative. The Chinese Defense Ministry stated a firm 
opposition to the Philippines’ plan to further fortify the Thitu Island in 2021 (Pengpai 
News, 2021). China may continue developing outposts in the SCS to respond to the 
Philippines’ plan. However, as both sides built up the land features without physically 
engaging with each other, the tensions are generally controllable.  
 
The third is low intensity confrontation, which refers to regional states’ actions of 
directly confronting China, but cautiously avoiding overtly provoking China and 
escalating the incidents by using limited confrontational means. For instance, they 
may “internationalize” the disputes by using ASEAN-led forums or international 
media to “enlist support from other major powers to counter China” (Thayer, 2016, p. 
209). Also, they may use one or a few warships or airplanes to patrol the disputed 
water, be in a standoff with China, or attempt to compel Chinese coast guards or 
fishing vessels to leave the claimed area (Thayer, 2016, p. 210). Also, they may 
conduct military drills on their own. For instance, in 2021, to challenge China’s 
sovereignty claim in the Scarborough Shoal, the Philippines conducted a military drill 
near the shoal (AFP, 2021). Alternatively, they may enhance limited military or 
diplomatic cooperation with the US or other extra-regional powers. China is sensitive 
to these actions because these actions “internationalize” the disputes, involve 
external powers. Moreover, they challenge China’s sovereignty claims by using 
limited application of military or para-military forces in a more substantive manner 
than declarative and demonstrative responses do. Thus, these actions may make 
China feel more pressure to moderate or stop and ameliorate its relationships with 
regional countries. 
 
When regional states choose to respond through low-intensity confrontation, the 
tension in the sea and frictions in their relationship with China escalate. However, the 
frictions are still manageable because they cautiously avoid overtly provoking China. 
For instance, they may simultaneously enhance cooperation with and keep distance 




with the US for the first time, but the military drill was non-combat (Parta, 2011). 
Under Duterte administration, the Philippines has conducted hundreds of military 
trainings and drills with the US every year, while publicly downplaying the strategic 
relationship between the two countries (Heydarain, 2021). Meanwhile, regional 
countries may be ready for de-escalation. For instance, in 2010, SCS disputes were 
on the agenda of the ARF (Murphy, 2017, p. 61). At the meeting, delegates 
representing some ASEAN countries directly confronted Chinese delegates and 
raised concerns over the SCS disputes (Emmerson, 2010). Moreover, Chinese 
delegate Yang Jiechi reacted angrily to then US Secretary Hilary Clinton’s statements, 
such as that “the US would play an active role in facilitating COC completion and 
DOC implementation” (Clinton, 2010, cited in Emmerson, 2010). Fearing the disputes’ 
escalation, ASEAN tried to keep its distance from the US. After the meeting, then 
Philippine Foreign Secretary Alberto Romulo said “it’s between ASEAN and China 
[regarding the DOC]” (Baveria, 2014, p. 94). Likewise, to de-escalate tension, the 
Director of ASEAN’s Political and Security Directorate, Termsak Chalermpalanupap 
(2010, cited in Baveria, 2014, p. 94), said “as far as the DOC is concerned…ASEAN 
and China can handle their differences without involvement of a third party.”  
 
The fourth is medium intensity confrontation. As with low intensity confrontation, 
regional states choose medium intensity confrontation to directly confront China, 
while also not overt provoking China and escalating the incident. However, their 
actions are stronger than those of low intensity confrontation. For example, they may 
use ASEAN-led forums or international media to not only express concerns, but also 
to protest against China’s actions. Also, they may send many, rather than a few, para-
military vessels to directly confront China’s operation or presence in the disputed 
waters. Alternatively, they may deepen their cooperation with external powers in 
response to China’s action. However, at the same time, they will hold space for a 
potential dialogue and control the intensity of their actions to avoid further escalation. 
Vietnam’s actions regarding China’s oil rig operation in disputed waters in 2014 is an 





The fifth is high-intensity confrontation, which refers to states’ use of strong means 
to directly confront with China with little, if not no, consideration of de-escalation and 
amelioration. For example, they may directly call China a threat or use similar words 
or phrases (Kuik, 2013, p. 433). They may also use political measures that would 
seriously threaten China’s sovereignty claims, such as submitting the disputes to an 
international tribunal despite China’s resistance. They may send strong signals of 
hard-balancing measures, such as the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement 
(EDCA) signed by the Philippines and the US in 2014. More importantly, they may 
refuse to reconcile with China. For instance, after China got de facto control over the 
Scarborough Shoal in 2012, the Philippines rejected China’s proposal to withdraw its 
remaining vessels from the shoal and de-escalate tension so long as the Philippines 
did not mention the disputes at the 2012 ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting (Green 
et al, 2017, p. 120). When regional states choose actions of high intensity 
confrontation, their relationships with China breaks down. 
 
China’s gray zone operations in the region  
This section will analyze cases of China’s gray zone operations in the region. This 
will include examination of China’s actions, which are regarded as being assertive by 
many scholars. These cases include China’s enhanced presence in the region, CCG’ 
regulation of foreign fishermen operating in disputed waters, and its interference in 
other states’ oil drilling activities. In all these cases, China’s restraints will be 
examined by comparing the actual actions that China took with other available 
options, and with regional states’ actions in similar situations. Regional states’ 
responses will also be examined to test effectiveness of China’s restraints. 
 
China’s enhanced presence in the region 
 
To begin with, as noted in chapter 3, the two main nationalist interests for China are 




Chinese nationalists have long considered China to be at a disadvantage in terms of 
its regional geostrategic position and sovereign disputes because the country is 
surrounded by US-led island chains, and its disputed land features are controlled by 
others to varying degrees. Thus, China has determined to change this disadvantaged 
status, which is reflected by maritime active defense strategy contemplated by the 
then People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Commander Liu Huaqing in 1985. While 
this content has been mentioned in chapter 6, it is worth recapping here. The first 
phase of this strategy is called offshore active defense, whereby the PLA navy’s 
operational zone is in the first island chain and aims to have enough deterrence 
capability to deter others moves that are viewed by China as seriously violating its 
sovereignty (Liu, 2004, p.438). In his book, Liu states that the navy’s mission is to 
“protect sovereignty…seize and keep the command of the near sea in major 
operational directions, effectively control several important sea lanes of 
communication in China’s sea area when necessary” (Liu, 2004, p. 438). Liu (2004, 
p. 437) did not confine the navy’s operations to the first island chain, but rather 
expected the operation to extend to the second and third island chains, as the navy’s 
capability grows. The mission that has been listed by Liu, if completed, would 
substantially increase the navy’s capability of anti-access and area-denial, which 
“restrict the access and deny the freedom of movement to US forward forces 
operating in” the first island chain (Johnson, 2017, p. 274). While offshore active 
defense is the strategy of PLAN, it is reasonable to infer that the strategic goals of 
protecting sovereignty, deterring the US-led encirclement that is based on the first 
island chain and operating in the second or third island chains are also applied to 
PLA Airforce and Rocket Force. This is because China is balancing its security focus 
of protecting China’s landmass with ensuring maritime sovereignty and security, as 
well as securing strategic sea lanes (The State Council Information Office of the 
People's Republic of China, 2015).  
 
In line with Liu’s strategy, the continued geostrategic development from offshore to 




documents since 2009. While offshore active defense was set up by Liu Huaqing in 
1985, building a “maritime great power” was first officially publicized by the CCP 
General Secretary’s report at the 18th national congress of CCP in 2012, as part of 
the national plan (Hu, 2012). This official statement indicates that active defense in 
China’s offshore and distant water is transferred from a strategy of a single PLA force 
to a national plan that requires cooperation among the PLA Airforce, Rocket Force 
and Navy. The statement also demonstrates that China officially began maritime 
expansion. The 2015 Defense White Paper (The State Council Information Office of 
the People's Republic of China, 2015) clearly shows the development of China’s 
maritime active defense and continued realization of Liu’s plan by articulating that the 
mission of the Chinese navy was changing from active offshore defense to the 
“combination of ‘offshore water defense’ and ‘open sea protection.’” This means that 
China is confident that PLAN is able to exert a certain degree of deterrent capability 
in the first island chain and begins to operate in the second island chain. The white 
paper also states that the PLA Airforce will “shift its focus from territorial air defense” 
to both defense and offense and build an air-space defense force structure” (The 
State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, 2015), 
demonstrating China’s attempt to enhance the Airforce’s presence and actual combat 
training in the first island chain (Shen, 2018, cited in CCTV News, 2018).  
 
In line with the defense paper, China uses domestic policies and its military to 
increase its presence in the first island chain. In 2012, with regard to the first island 
chain, China replaced the three agencies that administer Paracel Islands, Spratly 
Islands, and Sand Islands, as well as the waters surrounding the islands, with the 
establishment of Sansha City, which functions the same as the three offices (The 
Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, 2012). In 2013, 
China announced the establishment of the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in 
ECS, which covers disputed Diaoyu Islands, and asked all aircrafts that fly into the 
zone to identify themselves with China beforehand (Nakayama, 2014). China also 




emergency military measures (Nakayama, 2014). The setup of ADIZ demonstrates 
that the PLA Airforce is expanding its defense area from territorial air defense to 
China’s offshore waters. Since 2016, in line with the mission of active defense in 
China’s offshore waters, the air force regularizes its combat air patrol in the SCS 
(PLA Airforce, 2016). Also, since 2010, China has increased the frequency and scale 
of navy exercises in the SCS (Swaine and Fravel, 2012, p. 35). Moreover, China has 
sought to realize the mission of “open sea protection.” The PLA Airforce has gradually 
regularized patrols and training that go beyond the first island chain since 2015 
(Huang, 2015), and the navy has begun to do so since 2010 (Shi, 2013, p. 1).  
 
However, China has pursued these actions in a restrained manner compared to the 
most assertive measures it could have taken. The establishment of Sansha City is a 
domestic political action. This action did not directly confront other states and is just 
a demonstration of China’s claimed sovereignty. Moreover, instead of announcing 
the plan of abruptly establishing ADIZ, China informed Japan in 2010 and South 
Korea in early November 2013 about this plan (Green et al, 2017). Also, despite its 
claim, China has not enforced the ADIZ by using military forces to prevent others 
military or civilian airplanes that had not sent flight plans from entering into the ADIZ 
(Green et al, 2017, p. 160). For instance, in November 2013, 10 Japanese aircrafts 
entered China’s ADIZ without submitting flight plans to China, but they were not 
confronted with Chinese air fighters (Yoshida, 2013). Also, in 2013, a South Korean 
reconnaissance airplane entered into China’s ADIZ without prior notification, but it 
was also not prevented by Chinese air fighters (Green et al, 2017). To reduce 
Southeast Asian countries’ threat perception, China has refrained from establishing 
ADIZ in the Spratly Islands. Regarding China’s patrol within the island chains, 
according to the testimony of the US Pacific Command Commander Admiral Locklear 
(2014), the Chinese navy and air force mostly conduct actions “safely” and 
“professionally.” Additionally, most of China’s navy exercises are conducted in 
undisputed water (usually in the waters near the south of Guang Zhou and Hainan 





Compared with other states’ actions, China’s actions are of a similar intensity level. 
The announcement of Sansha City is similar to the Philippines’ announcement that 
renamed the SCS the Western Philippine Sea in 2011 (Bordadora, 2011). It is also 
similar to Vietnam’s inclusion of Spratly and Paracel islands in the country’s national 
maritime law in 2012 (China News Net, 2012). Second, China’s ADIZ, according to 
the then US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel (2014, cited in Nakayama, 2014), was 
“neither new nor unique,” as many countries had established their own ADIZ long 
before China’s establishment of the zone. Third, PLA Navy and Airforce’s exercises 
and combat patrols operations in the first island chain or beyond are not unique, as 
military drills of regional countries are often conducted in the region. For instance, in 
2011, Vietnam held live fire navy exercise in the SCS (Swaine and Fravel, 2012, p. 
16). Also, in 2020, US and Japan conducted military drills in the SCS (Kelly, 2020). 
 
Regional countries’ response to China’s increased presence in the first island chains 
or beyond has ranged from a declarative response to low intensity confrontation. 
Regarding China’s set up of Sansha City, Vietnam and the Philippines protested 
against the city’s establishment, which represent declarative responses. Regarding 
China’s ADIZ, regional countries used limited confrontational means towards China, 
but avoided overt-escalation; therefore, their actions constitute a low-intensity 
confrontation response. South Korea and Japan publicly protested China’s 
establishment of ADIZ (Green et al, 2017). Also, they used limited military means to 
counter it. On December 3, 2013, South Korea conducted naval exercises within 
China’s ADIZ (Green et al, 2017, p. 164). On December 13, 2013, Japan and South 
Korea conducted military drills inside China’s claimed ADIZ (Green et al, 2017, p. 
165). However, after 2013, the frictions caused by China’s ADIZ subsided. This 
demonstrated that these two countries intentionally de-escalated the tension. 
 
Moreover, regarding China’s patrol and military exercises, regional states’ responses 




means to monitor or intercept China’s patrols but avoided overt-escalation. For 
instance, in 2021, Japan sent a destroyer and two aircrafts to monitor China’s 
Liaoning aircraft carrier Liaoning passing the waterway between Okinawa and 
Miyako Island (Lo, 2021). Also, Japan always scrambles several aircraft to intercept 
Chinese aircrafts flying near its territory (Reuters Staff, 2019). To be sure, there were 
incidents that increased frictions. For instance, Also, in June 2014, Japan claimed 
that Chinese Su-27 fighters flew within 30 meters of Japan’s military airplanes 
(Fackler, 2014). in August 2014, China claimed that Japan’s aircraft flew very close 
to a Chinese aircraft that was patrolling the ECS (Reuters Staff, 2014). However, 
such frictions often subside after a round of arguments between the two countries, 
as both eventually tone down their strong rhetoric to de-escalate the situation. 
 
Some analysts point out that Japan have chosen a hard-balancing approach against 
China’s strategic development in the region because China’s increased military 
presence in the SCS could threaten the trade flows that Japan heavily depends on 
(Brown, 2018, p. 867). The chapter recognizes that this is a concern for Japan. 
However, Japan’s response is not hard-balancing but still low-intensity, if not medium 
intensity confrontation, that uses limited or stronger military means to counter China’s 
actions while also avoiding overt-escalation. Japan did not view China’s actions as 
being overtly provocative. In the 2020 Defense White Paper, the Japanese Defense 
Ministry (2020, p. 217) defined China’s activities and related impact on the region as 
“gray zone situations.” Japan views frictions caused by these actions as being 
manageable, although Japan also acknowledge that these actions “harbor the risk of 
rapidly developing into graver situations” (Japanese Defense Ministry, 2020, p. 41). 
In response, Japan enhances strategic communication and uses flexible counter-
measures to prevent the “occurrence and escalation of emergencies” (Japanese 
Defense Ministry, 2020, p. 217), while also using limited hard-balancing measures 
such as ordering “SDF…immediately [to] take appropriate measures” and 
cooperating with other countries to respond (Japanese Defense Ministry, 2020, p. 




when responding to China’s increased presence in the region. So far, Japan declined 
to participate in the US Freedom of Navigation Operations, although it has increased 
its military presence and sent helicopter destroyers to conduct naval exercises with 
the US in the SCS (Hughes, 2018, p. 93; Valencia, 2021). Furthermore, Japan does 
not allow its navy vessels to enter into the territorial seas of China’s reclaimed islands, 
as such moves are seen as overtly provoking China (Wang, 2020). Also, Japan tried 
to maintain a constructive relationship with China to manage disputes. For instance, 
in 2020, the Chinese and Japanese Defense Ministries agreed to set up a direct 
hotline to manage tensions caused by the Diaoyu island disputes (Kyodo news, 2020).  
 
 
The CCG’s actions related to fishing within the first island chain 
 
Some analysts point out that there could be backlash from regional states because 
the CCG are increasingly asserting China’s sovereignty rights in the SCS and 
solidifying China’s presence in the region, especially its assertiveness in regulating 
foreign fishermen (Glaser and Funaiole, 2019, p. 193). 
 
To analyze this issue, this chapter first listed the options available to coast guards in 
terms of regulating foreign fishermen, with escalatory levels ranging from 0 to 10. 
These actions are inaction (Level 0), following fishermen (Level 1), chasing fishermen 
(Level 2), expelling fishing vessels (Level 3), using water cannons or firing warning 
shots (Level 4), confiscating catches or seizing equipment (Level 5), harassing 
fishermen (Level 6), arresting fishermen and confiscating fishing vessels (Level 7), 
sinking fishing vessels (Level 8), arresting fishermen, confiscating fishing ships, and 
using law court to charge them (Level 9), and shooting at the fishing vessels, causing 
death or injuries of fishermen (Level 10). This sequence is arranged through the 
degree that the coast guards cause material costs or physical threat to fishermen. 
Thus, chasing fishermen is less of an escalation than arresting them because it 





The common actions of CCG in waters surrounding Paracel Islands range from level 
2 (chasing fishermen) to level 7 (arresting fishermen). For instance, in 2009, China 
expelled 147 Vietnamese fishing boats, and detained 33 fishing boats and more than 
400 Vietnamese fishermen that were fishing in the waters of the Chinese-controlled 
Paracel Islands (Fravel, 2011, p. 305). In July 2014, China arrested 6 Vietnamese 
fishermen operating in waters of Paracel Islands (BBC News, 2014). On some 
occasions, China’s actions would reach level 8 (sinking fishing vessels) (Fravel, 2011, 
p. 305). In 2014, China reportedly sunk a Vietnamese fishing boat in the waters of 
Paracel Islands (Glaser and Funaiole, 2019, p. 193). In 2020, China reportedly sunk 
a Vietnamese fishing boat in the waters of Paracel Islands (Vu, 2020).  
 
CCG’s actions in Scarborough Shoal have been more restrained than those in the 
waters of Paracel Islands. In general, China’s actions have been level 2 (chasing 
fishermen) and level 5 (confiscating catches) since 2012, the year China’s de facto 
control of the shoal established (Rauhala, 2016). On occasions, there were reports 
that China used water cannons, fired warning shots (Level 4), or rammed fishermen’s 
boats (Level 8) (Thayer, 2011; Reuters Staff, 2015). Although there were reports that 
the CCG confiscated the fishermen’s catches (Level 5), officials from the Philippines 
denied that the CCG’s actions classified as harassment (Level 6) (Reuters Staff, 
2018). To date, there were no reports that China arrested fishermen or confiscated 
their ships. Some analysts may say that the CCG’s actions were more assertive than 
its actions in the Paracel Islands because, although the CCG did not arrest the 
fishermen, the CCG prevented them from fishing in the waters of the shoal from 2012 
to 2016. However, in the waters of Paracel, Vietnamese fishermen could operate 
even if CCG arrested them. However, this was due to the degree of difficulties in 
preventing fishermen’s access to the shoal and to the waters of the Paracel Islands. 
Fishermen generally operate in the lagoon of the shoal (Fu, 2021), and thus, the CCG 




accessing it. The Paracel Islands are surrounded by open waters. Thus, the CCG 
could not prevent Vietnamese fishermen from accessing the water.  
 
In the waters surrounding Senkaku, the CCG only followed (Level 1) or occasionally 
expelled fishermen by using a warning (level 2), and China officially promised Japan 
that the CCG is only allowed to do these two activities (RFA, 2021). Also, to date, in 
the waters of Spratly Islands, the CCG has not been reacting to foreign fishermen 
operating in waters claimed by China.  
 
Compared with other countries’ Coast Guards or Navies, the CCG’s actions in the 
waters of Paracel Islands are of similar intensity or even less assertive. First, 
expelling foreign fishing boats (Level 3), confiscating their catches (Level 5), 
confiscating the boats and arresting fishermen (Level 7), and sinking the boats (Level 
8) are common maritime jurisdiction methods used within disputed waters. For 
instance, according to official statistics from the Chinese Agriculture and Rural Affair 
Ministry (MOARA), there were over 380 incidents of Chinese fishermen being 
attacked, detained, or shot by neighboring countries between 1989 and 2010; this 
involved 750 fishing vessels and over 11300 Chinese fishermen (Beijing Youth Daily, 
2014). Also, before China’s de facto control of the Scarborough Shoal, the Philippines’ 
navy and coast guard’s usual practice towards Chinese fishermen operating in 
waters near the shoal was to arrest them and confiscate their catches and ships 
(Level 5 and 7) (Green et al, 2017). Moreover, Indonesia often blows up confiscated 
foreign fishing vessels that were operated within the waters of Natuna Islands (Chan, 
2017). When it detains fishermen, besides confiscating catches and fishing ships, the 
Philippines usually publicly puts them on trial, even if they were arrested in the 
disputed waters (Level 9) (AP News, 2014).  
 
Second, several maritime jurisdiction activities in the disputed waters involved 
excessive use of force. According to statistics from the Chinese MOARA, 25 Chinese 




countries’ gunshots from 1989 to 2010 (Beijing Youth Daily, 2014). In 2009, 
Vietnamese vessels shot at Chinese fishing vessels three times, resulting in three 
wounded fishermen (Fravel, 2011, p. 305). In 2011, according to a report, two 
Vietnamese fishermen operating in Spratly Islands were wounded due to gunshot 
wounds caused by armed officials of the Philippines (Zhang, 2011). In 2013, the 
Philippines Coastal Guard shot at a Taiwanese fishing boat operating in the 
overlapping area of the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) between the Philippines 
and Taiwan, which resulted in one death (Chung, 2013).  
 
In contrast, China has refrained from putting the detained fishermen on trial. Also, 
since 2009, there have been no reports of foreign fishermen dying or being wounded 
due to the CCG’s gunshots. Moreover, as noted earlier, apart from arresting 
Vietnamese fishermen operating in the waters of Paracel, China has not arrested 
fishermen from other countries that were operating in waters claimed by China. Some 
analysts may argue that China is more assertive than other countries because it 
detained more Vietnamese fishermen in Paracel than other claimant states did in 
disputed waters. However, this should take into account the fact that Vietnam’s 
fishing activities in the SCS have been rampant (Valencia, 2020). For instance, from 
June 24 to August 18 in 2020, Malaysia detained 487 Vietnamese fishermen that 
were allegedly fishing in their waters illegally (AP News, 2020), which could include 
Vietnamese fishermen operating in the disputed waters between the two countries. 
Also, China detained more than 400 Vietnamese fishermen in disputed waters in 
2009 because there were substantially more Vietnamese fishing boats in the waters 
of the Chinese controlled Paracel Islands (Fravel, 2011, p. 43).  
 
In general, regional countries’ responses to the CCG’s regulation of foreign vessels 
have been declarative. In other words, they often protest against China’s arrest of 
fishermen, confiscation of catches, or sinking fishing boats. For instance, in 2010, 
Vietnam demanded that China release Vietnamese fishermen (Tran, 2010). In 2020, 




Also, in 2018, the Philippines demanded China to stop confiscating catches from their 
fishermen (Reuters Staff, 2018). Some analysts may say that regional countries’ 
responses were due to their fear of China’s power. However, Southeast Asian states 
use this type of response to react to each other’s arrests or killing of fishermen. For 
instance, in 2016, Vietnam protested against the Indonesian navy’s killing of a 
Vietnamese fisherman in the SCS (Murray, 2016). Also, in 2020, Vietnam demanded 
that Malaysia investigate the Malaysian coastguard’s killing of a Vietnamese 
fisherman (AP News, 2020).  
 
China’s activities regarding oil exploration 
 
China’s activities regarding oil exploration have long been regarded as an example 
of China’s assertiveness in the SCS. China prevented other states’ survey ships or 
oil rig from operating in waters that China considers to be disputed. For instance, in 
May 2011, one of the three Chinese vessels cut the cables of a Vietnamese survey 
ship that was operating in waters that is claimed by Vietnam, but also claimed by 
China as EEZ of Spratly Islands (BBC News, 2011). In March 2011, China forced a 
survey ship from the Philippines to leave the area surrounding the Reed Bank, which 
was within the Philippines’ EEZ but overlapped with China’s claimed EEZ (Storey, 
2012, p. 58).  
 
Compared to the other actions that China could have taken, cutting the cables is 
more assertive than protesting the survey ships/oil drilling and threatening foreign 
companies to cancel contracts with claimant states. However, when compared with 
the most assertive option, China’s actions were restrained. For instance, China did 
not send a lot of CCG vessels to confront other countries’ oil exploration activities. 
Also, China did not put any oil well drilling in disputed waters, even in the waters of 





Compared with other states’ actions when China deployed oil rigs in disputed waters, 
China’s actions are of similar intensity. In 1994, when China deployed oil survey ships 
in disputed water, three Vietnamese naval vessels appeared and opened fire on the 
Chinese ships (Hayton, 2014, p. 127). In 2007, Vietnamese naval vessels forcefully 
prevented a Chinese oil exploration ship from operating in Spratly Islands (Wu and 
You, 2019, p. 66). In 2014, Chinese and Vietnamese coastguards were in a tense 
confrontation because the Vietnamese tried to prevent the Chinese oil rig from 
operating in the waters near the Chinese controlled Paracel Islands, but within 
Vietnam’s EEZ (Fravel, 2017, p. 255). Some analysts may argue that China is more 
assertive than other claimant states because China more frequently prevents other 
countries’ oil survey ships or wells from operating. However, this is because, unlike 
other claimant states, China has not had an oil well operating in the disputed waters 
and has only deployed oil survey ships or rigs four times from 1992 to now (in 1992, 
2007, 2014, and 2019) (Wu and You, 2019, p. 66). If China has oil wells or frequently 
sends survey ships operating in disputed waters, it will no doubt be fiercely 
confronted by other claimant states’ coast guards or navies.  
 
Regional states’ response to China’s actions regarding oil exploration are of a 
medium intensity. That is, they use stronger political or military means to confront 
China while also avoiding overt escalation. For instance, in 2014, Vietnam deployed 
29 coast guards and fishing vessels to confront China’s deployment of Haiyang 
Shiyou (981 oil rig operating in the area of Vietnam claimed EEZ) (Ross, 2020, p. 54). 
Also, Vietnam successfully initiated an “international propaganda war” against China 
by placing foreign journalists on the vessels (Thayer, 2016, p. 213). Moreover, 
Vietnam enhanced its military cooperation with the US. Amid the tension, the US 
General Martin Dempsey became the highest-ranking US military officer to visit 
Vietnam since the Vietnam war (Fravel, 2017, p. 255). On this visit, he mainly 





However, to avoid escalation and overt provocation, Vietnam kept “its navy out of 
area” when confronting China and did not involve the US in the dispute settlement 
(Thayer, 2016, p. 212). Also, Vietnam was reconciliating by sending an envoy to 
Beijing to ameliorate frictions and to reconcile with Beijing (Thayer, 2016, p. 212). 
When other states react strongly to China’s deployment of oil rigs, China often makes 
concession to de-escalate tension. For example, Beijing withdrew its oil vessels four 
times to de-escalate tension with Vietnam (in 1994, 2007, 2014, and 2019) (Wu and 
You, 2019). Furthermore, China promised the Duterte administration that it would not 
unilaterally exploit oil in the waters of the Reed Bank (Viray, 2018). 
 
China’s upper limits to the military presence in the first island chain 
 
This chapter also argues that China has set up upper limits on its military presence 
in the first island chain. Among all three of China’s flashpoints across East Asia, 
China states that it wishes to solve the sovereign disputes of Diaoyu Islands and SCS 
land features through negotiation (FMPRC, 2012; PLA News, 2016). This statement 
indicates that China will not forcefully occupy the Diaoyu Islands and land features in 
the SCS that are occupied by other claimants. As East Asian countries value 
sovereignty highly, China’s seizure of their occupied or de facto controlled land 
features may make them see China as using military force to compel them to concede 
their territories. As a result, they may view China as a threatening enemy and join a 
hard balancing coalition to confront China. However, China’s setup of the upper limits 
means that it will never cross regional countries’ bottom line, thereby reducing the 
likelihood that other countries will view China as a major enemy and they will be 
willing to abandon the shared interests or identity with China.  
 
The perception that China will not invade the homeland of regional countries has 
already led scholars to argue that regional countries will not choose sides due to 
limited threat perception. Zhen and Paul (2020, p. 7) argued that China’s military 




other states do not perceive China’s military strategy to pose an existential threat to 
them. Likewise, Ross (2020, p. 55) argued that regional states will “avoid taking sides 
in US-China relations because they do not fear either the US or China’s occupation 
of their countries.” Also, Nguyen (2020, p. 5) argued that Vietnam will keep engaging 
with China because China had not yet posed an “existential threat to Vietnam’s 
independence and sovereignty.”  
 
These observations have been validated by the official analysis or the elites’ remarks 
of regional countries. A 2012 report from the Vietnam Academy of Social Science 
argues that China does not pose a “lethal threat” to Vietnam’s sovereignty and 
independence and will not threaten Vietnam’s sovereignty beyond the disputed area 
(Nguyễn, 2012, cited in Zhao, 2020, p. 107). It views the SCS disputes as a “partial 
dispute” between the two countries ((Nguyễn, 2012, cited in Zhao, 2020, p. 107). This 
view is endorsed by Vietnamese President Nguyễn Phú Trọng (2019, cited in Zhao, 
2020, p. 107), who argued that “for the first time in history, we have a stable external 
environment, which needs to be cautiously protected.” This remark compares 
Vietnam’s current relatively stable environment with the historical wars between 
Vietnam and China or the US, which had seriously threatened Vietnam’s survival. 
Likewise, in 2016, when explaining the reason that he reconciled with China, the 
Philippines’ President Duterte stated that China “has never invaded a piece of my 
country all these generations” (TRT World, 2016). Also, in 2019, Malaysia’s Prime 
Minister Mahathir (2019, cited in Jaipragas, 2019) stated that his country will work 
with China because “we have had China as a neighbor for 2000 years, we were never 
conquered by them.” 
 
China’s indication that it would not occupy the disputed land features that were 
controlled by other states will further reduce their threat perception. Liff (2019, p. 208) 
argued that Japan’s worst-case scenario and redline hypothesis of the Diaoyu 
Islands is that Chinese paramilitary forces landed on the islands and forced Japan to 




China. However, this is unlikely to happen because, according to the spokesman of 
the Chinese Ministry of National Defense, Wu Gang, seizing the islands is not the 
responsibility of CCG (Wu, 2018, cited in Ministry of National Defense of People’s 
Republic of China, 2018). Also, in 2017, the China school of Vietnam Academy of 
Social Science’s former Director Nguyen Huy Quy (2017, cited in Zhao, 2019, p. 26) 
argued that “if China could promise that it would not use force to seize Vietnam’s 
occupied land features before peaceful settlement of Spratly disputes, Vietnam could 
promise not to… utilize the US to intervene in disputes between Vietnam and China.” 
Although China has not made a public promise, it has never seized Vietnamese 
occupied land features in Spratly Islands. Even in the 1988 skirmish between China 
and Vietnam, China did not attack features occupied by Vietnam after it defeated the 
latter’s forces at the unoccupied Johnson Reef (Fravel, 2008, p. 296).  
 
An exception was China’s de facto control over Scarborough Shoal after the 
Philippines retreated in 2012. Although the shoal had not been occupied by the 
Philippines or China before, China’s de facto control of the shoal resulted in a high 
intensity confrontation from the Philippines. In other words, the Philippines strongly 
reacted to China’s control of the shoal without considering de-escalation. The Aquino 
administration submitted the disputes to an international arbitration tribunal and its 
relationship with China broke down in 2013. This is proof that seizing land features 
will immediately and substantially increase regional countries’ threat perception 
towards China, pushing them to choose more hardline measures to balance against 
it. Also, the redline that the Philippines set when the Duterte administration de-
escalated tension with China is that China should not violate the Philippines’ 
sovereignty by reclaiming Scarborough Shoal and removing the Philippines warship 
BRP Sierra Madre that anchored in the second Thomas Shoal (Viray, 2018).  
 
Conclusion 
To sum up the whole section, in the stalemate period, China increased its presence 




using force, China pursues its objective in a gradual and restrained way, which is 
consistent with many scholars’ definitions of gray zone activities. Also, regional 
responses to such actions were generally of low intensity, as they used limited 
military means to confront China while also avoiding escalation. Second, by looking 
at the two most often cited examples of China’s assertiveness, this chapter found 
that the CCG’s actions regarding foreign fishing or oil exploration activities in disputed 
waters were restrained compared to the most assertive courses of action they could 
have taken. Furthermore, their actions were of a similar degree of intensity to those 
of claimant states. Sometimes, China’s actions are less assertive than those of 
regional countries, such as in the case of the CCG’s regulation of fishing activities. 
Regarding the CCG’s actions towards foreign fishing, regional countries’ responses 
are generally declarative. In terms of China’s deployment of oil rigs or survey vessels, 
regional countries’ responses were generally of medium intensity confrontation, 
which means that they used stronger actions to confront China, but were also ready 
for de-escalation. Third, China sets upper limits whereby it would not occupy other 
claimant states’ land features, which substantially reduces others’ perception that 
China is a pure enemy that needs to be contained through a hard-balancing coalition. 
One exception was China’s de facto control of the Scarborough Shoal in 2012, which 
led to the lowest point of the relationship between China and the Philippines. The 
importance of these findings to my overall argument is that this section demonstrates 
that China did pursue nationalist interests in a restrained way and most of these gray 
zone activities managed frictions. The most assertive response to China was 
Vietnam’s medium intensity confrontation in the 2014 oil rig drilling disputes, yet both 
China and Vietnam prevented this from escalating.  
 
The section recognizes that China’s hard power is a reason that regional states 
choose de-escalation with China. However, China’s restraints were also an important 
contributing factor to the de-escalation. For instance, if China occupied the Diaoyu 
Island, Japan would have probably not chosen to deescalate tension with China, as 




Defense Ministry, 2020). Also, in the 2014 incident, China’s moderation by 
withdrawing from the oil rig is the reason that Vietnam de-escalated tension. Also, 
one reason that China and the Philippines’ relationship ameliorated was China’s 
adherence to the Duterte administration’s red lines, which stresses the Philippines’ 
sovereignty over the disputed land features, which will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
 
China strikes right and stability balance  
 
Frictions between China and regional countries are caused not only by China’s 
consolidation of claimed sovereignty and geostrategic development, but also by 
regional countries’ actions that make China believe that its important nationalist 
interests are being damaged. The arguments of this section are as follows. First, 
when important nationalist interests regarding sensitive issues are involved in the 
incidents, China will use military means to react, but in a restrained way to avoid 
unduly escalation of the incidents, which could result in completely breaking down 
China’s relationship with other relevant parties. Moreover, while using offensive tools, 
such as economic sanctions, diplomatic protests, or military means, China will signal 
its willingness to negotiate with the other party in an effort to mediate the tension. 
 
Here, this chapter takes Japan’s nationalization of the Diaoyu Islands in 2012 as a 
case study. The nationalization aroused the anger of Chinese nationalists and 
created tension between Japan and China during this year. This case is a typical 
illustration of how China responds to incidents that are considered a violation of its 
important nationalist interests. Moreover, what makes this case worth studying is that, 
after the incident, China’s nationalist goals were advanced because China utilized 






To begin, the sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands has been disputed by mainland China, 
Taiwan, and Japan since 1971 when the US returned the administrative right of the 
islands to Japan as part of Okinawa through the Ryukyu Reversion Agreement (Pan, 
2007, p. 73). The dispute could easily get on the nerves of both Japanese and 
Chinese nationalists. Thus, regarding the dispute, China and Japan’s nationalist 
identities are mutually exclusive and conflicting.  
 
Japan, who has de facto control over the islands, insists that they are Japan’s territory, 
and thus, no sovereign dispute over the island exists (Togo, 2015, p. 83). China’s 
position on the island’s sovereignty is that the islands belong to China, but Japan and 
China have sovereign dispute over them (FMPRC, 2015a). China also argued that, 
to cultivate a peaceful relationship between China and Japan, the two sides would 
have to agree to leave the dispute aside. This has been the case since 1978, the 
year that China and Japan signed the Treaty of Peace and Friendship (FMPRC, 
2015a). As Japanese leaders acquiesced China’s approach of putting aside 
sovereign disputes in order to normalize the relationship between the two countries 
in 1978 (Togo, 2015, p.83), China views this approach as establishing a consensus 
between the two sides (FMPRC, 2015a). Overall, from 1978 to 2010, an acquiesced 
status quo over the disputed Diaoyu Islands was formed between the two sides. 
Japan maintained de facto control over the islands, while China kept criticizing Japan 
for violating its sovereignty but suppressed domestic nationalists’ protests and did 
not use force to challenge Japan’s de facto control (Reilly, 2014, p. 203; Togo, 2015, 
p. 83; Fravel, 2016, p. 26).  
 
On September 10, 2012, then Japanese Prime Minister Noda announced the 
government’s decision to purchase and, thus, nationalize the three isles of Diaoyu 
Islands (Reilly, 2014, p. 209). The announcement made the sensitive Diaoyu dispute 
salient in Sino–Japanese relationship and evoked Chinese nationalist anger. Also, 
China viewed the announcement as a serious violation of China’s important 




consensus of leaving aside the dispute, which is deemed by China as the foundation 
of the Sino–Japan relationship (FMPRC, 2015a). Second, Prime Minister Noda’s 
public stance that there is no dispute over the sovereignty of Diaoyu Islands on July 
7, 2012 (Reilly, 2014, p. 209), is in stark contrast with China’s assertion that a 
sovereign dispute over the Diaoyu Islands exists (FMPRC, 2015a).  
 
In response, China strongly countered Japan’s nationalization of the Diaoyu Islands 
to reverse the perceived damage of important nationalist interests through offensive 
means. On the diplomatic front, then Chinese President Hu Jintao, Premier Wen 
Jiabao, Chairman of Chinese National People’s Congress’ standing committee Wu 
Bangguo, and Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi publicly expressed that Japan’s 
nationalization of the Diaoyu Islands was illegal and China firmly opposed it (China 
News Net, 2012). China also required Japan to recognize that sovereign disputes 
over Diaoyu Islands exist between the two countries (Togo, 2015, p. 87: Fravel, 2016, 
p. 33). On the economic front, China tightened the inspection of Japanese imports 
and slowed down the approval of Japanese workers’ visas (Daily Yomuri, 2012, cited 
in Reilly, 2014). Also, thousands of Chinese protestors went to the streets, attacked 
Japanese cars and smashed windows of Japanese restaurants and shopping malls 
(Reilly, 2014, p. 209). Regarding coercive means, Chinese vessels started to 
regularize or dramatically increase patrols within the 12 nautical miles and contiguous 
zone of the Diaoyu Islands, respectively, to defend China’s sovereign claim over them 
(Fravel, 2016, p. 33).   
 
These are the two ways that China consolidated its sovereign claim over the islands 
and challenged the previous status quo that lasted from 1978 to 2010. First, it breaks 
the ambiguity that maintained the old status quo. While Japan’s position that no 
dispute exists over the island has remained unchanged since it gained de facto 
control over the islands in 1971 (Togo, 2015, p. 87), China asserted its sovereign 
claim over Diaoyu Islands but did not require Japan to acknowledge China’s position. 




different interpretations of the sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands. In 2012, by requiring 
Japan to acknowledge that a sovereign dispute over the islands exists between the 
two countries, China sought to compel Japan to have the same interpretation of the 
Diaoyu Islands’ sovereign status as China. Second, since 2012, Chinese vessels 
have regularly patrolled the territorial water of the Diaoyu Islands and has, thus, 
challenged Japan’s de facto control over them (Fravel, 2016, p. 32). This contrasts 
the old status quo of the dispute before 2010 that China did not use force against 
Japan’s control over the islands.  
 
While China strongly counters Japan’s nationalization, it cautiously demonstrated 
restraints in the actions to avoid a complete breakdown of the Sino–Japan 
relationship. While firmly opposing Japan’s nationalization, then President Hu Jintao 
(2012, cited in China News Net, 2012) stated that the door for negotiation remained 
open. Additionally, the Spokesman of the Foreign Ministry, Hong Lei (China 
Economic Net, 2012), stated that China negotiated with Japanese counterparts at all 
levels. Also, when the anti-Japanese protests got out of control, the central 
government began to reign in the protests, requiring local governments to maintain 
social order, substantially increasing the number of police officers in these areas, and 
asking Chinese people to be rational patriotists (Wan, 2012). With regard to the 
Chinese vessels entering the territorial waters of Diaoyu Islands, China deployed 
vessels from the CCG rather than the PLAN because deploying vessels from the 
PLAN could be seen as an escalation. As noted earlier, China wishes to show that 
its intention is to defend its sovereign claim rather than seize the islands by force (Wu, 
2018, cited in Ministry of National Defense of People’s Republic of China, 2018).  
 
To date, the main missions of the Coast Guard has been to patrol within waters of 
the Diaoyu Islands and occasionally follow and expel Japanese fishermen (Zaobao, 
2021). Also, in 2021, even though it issued the Coast Guard Law, China promised 
Japan that only the CCG would be allowed to do these missions (Zaobao, 2021). 




stated that China must not allow Chinese fishermen to operate within the territorial 
waters of Diaoyu Islands (12 nautical miles) (Zaobao, 2020). China obeyed Japan’s 
demand and further asked fishermen to operate 30 nautical miles away from the 
Diaoyu islands (Zaobao, 2020). 
 
Compared to the Japanese coastguard’s actions, China’s actions are more 
restrained. For instance, Japanese coastguards often use forceful means to regulate 
Taiwanese fishing boats operating in disputed waters, such as forcefully detaining or 
colliding with Taiwanese vessels (Zheng, 2016; Liao, 2020). Moreover, the Japanese 
coastguard’s arrest of Chinese fishermen and plans to charge them through court led 
to heightened tension between China and Japan in 2010.   
 
Japan’s reaction to China’s “assertive actions” regarding the Diaoyu islands has been 
viewed by some scholars as a strong signal that Japan is alerted by the China threat 
and will join the US-led hard balancing coalition against it (Lim and Cooper, 2015, p. 
715; Liff, 2019, p. 468). For instance, in 2014, Japan relaxed restrictions of its 
collective self-defense in response to China’s actions in the Diaoyu Islands dispute 
(Liff, 2019). Also, in 2014, Japan secured the US’ commitment to the Diaoyu Islands 
dispute for the first time (Hughes, 2015, pp. 75-76). 
 
However, this chapter argues that China’s threat regarding the Diaoyu Islands is not 
as strong as some analysts have argued. It should be noted that Japan has territorial 
disputes with all its Northeast Asian neighbors and the Diaoyu Islands disputes is the 
least threatening to Japan. First, among all the territorial disputes, Japan has de facto 
control over the Diaoyu Islands, while Russia occupies Northern territories and South 
Korea occupies the Dokdo Islands. Second, comparing other claimant states’ actions 
regarding the disputes, China’s actions are the mildest. The most assertive actions 
of China regarding the Diaoyu Islands to date is periodically deploying coastal guard 
vessels to patrol the territorial sea (Liff, 2019, p. 207), or to follow or expel Japanese 




Minister Medvedev visited Northern territories despite Japan’s call to cancel the trips 
(Sakhalinski, 2019). In 2020, Russia deployed S-300 missiles to Iturup Island, one of 
the Northern territories (Reuters Staff, 2020). In regards to the Dokdo Islands 
disputes, South Korea conducted large scale military drills on and around the islands 
twice a year (The Straits Times, 2019). If the Diaoyu Islands disputes led to Japan’s 
hard balancing against China, Japan would react more fiercely to Russia and South 
Korea, as their use more assertive behaviors to violate Japan’s sovereignty rights. 
However, in 2017, Japanese Prime Minister Abe actively engaged with Russia 
despite Russia’s lukewarm attitude towards solving the disputes (Brown, 2017). Also, 
Japan often fiercely protested South Korea’s military drills. Japan’s reactions 
demonstrate that, although territorial disputes are of Japan’s concerns, Diaoyu 
Islands disputes are not sufficient to cause Japan’s pure-hard balancing actions 
against China. This is because Japan has chosen a more conciliatory stance in the 
face of more serious territorial disputes. 
  
Japan’s response to China’s “assertive actions” within the waters of Diaoyu Islands 
is, thus, still of medium intensity confrontation. That is, it used stronger military means 
to confront China, while avoiding further escalation. For instance, while relaxing its 
restrictions of collective self-defense, Japan preserved autonomy by establishing 
three conditions of triggering collective self-defense (Hughes, 2020, p. 32). The three 
conditions are empty and, thus, give the Japanese government more flexibility to 
define the need of military actions (Hughes, 2020, p. 32). Hughes (2020, p. 32) 
argued that the empty conditions facilitate Japan and the US’ military cooperation. 
However, they may give Japan an excuse to decline the US’ request for assistance 
if it considers it to not be aligned with Japanese interests. Also, in 2014, while getting 
the US security commitment to Diaoyu Islands, Abe held an ice-breaking meeting 
with Chinese President Xi Jinping and reached a four-point consensus (Kaiman, 






This chapter analyzes how China balances its goals of fulfilling nationalist interests 
that aim to break the US-led island chains and consolidate the sovereign claim, while 
also maintaining a relatively peaceful regional environment in the stalemate period. 
The chapter argues that China has, thus far, struck the balance with some success 
by pursuing nationalist interests with restraint. To systematically analyze China’s 
restraints in pursuing these actions, this chapter compared China’s actual actions 
with alternative courses of action it could have taken, as well as regional states’ 
similar actions, and specified regional states’ responses to China’s actions. These 
responses are declarative, demonstrative, low intensity confrontations, medium 
intensity confrontations, or high intensity confrontations. Through three case studies 
of gray zone activities, such as China’s increased presence in the first island chain 
or beyond, the CCG’s regulation of foreign fishermen in the disputed waters, and 
China’s activities regarding oil exploration, this chapter concluded that China did 
show restraint compared with the most assertive actions that it could have taken. 
Also, China’s actions were of similar intensity or even less assertive than those of the 
claimant states. Moreover, regional states’ responses range from declarative to 
medium intensity confrontations, which demonstrate their willingness to de-escalate 
tension with China. Although China’s hard power is one reason that regional states 
do not want to overtly provoke China, China’s restraints were also a contributing 
factor that led to their willingness to de-escalate tension. Further, China has set upper 
limits for its consolidation of sovereign claims, which indicate that it will not occupy 
others’ de facto controlled land features. Thus, it will not cross the bottom line of 
regional states and make them prioritize conflicting identities and interests over 
shared ones. The one exception was China’s de facto control of the Scarborough 
Shoal in 2012, which will be a case study in the next SCS chapter. China’s control of 
the shoal clearly demonstrated that its occupation or de facto control of the disputed 
land features led to the breakdown of relationship between China and regional 
countries. China’s restoration of this relationship in 2016 was also based on its 
promise of no longer threatening the Philippines’ control over land features such as 





When an incident that is caused by others happens and makes China believe that its 
important nationalist interests are being threatened, China has used offensive means 
in response. However, at the same time, it will avoid escalating the situation to an 
uncontrollable level so as not to risk completely breaking down its relationship with 
the other countries.  
 
The findings of this chapter demonstrate that China’s nationalist goals will be 
managed strategically in the interests of regional peace. This chapter contributes to 
the overall argument of the thesis by further demonstrating that China’s strategy of 
pursuing or defending nationalist interests in a restrained way can possibly mitigate 






















Part 6. Case studies 
Chapter 10: China and the SCS dispute 
 
This chapter looks at China’s approach to the SCS dispute, which has been widely 
recognized as an important test for its peaceful rise. Specifically, this chapter 
examines the extent to which China pursues or defends its nationalist interests 
without overtly escalating the tension and breaking down its relationship with 
neighboring countries through the strategic management of its interests, which is set 
out by SIT. In other words, this chapter explores to what extent China 
defends/pursues important nationalist interests, such as defending sovereignty 
claims, in a restrained way to strike a balance between its two goals. This chapter 
also explores whether China could seek to establish shared interests with regional 
countries or ASEAN to ameliorate frictions. As such, this chapter contributes to the 
overall argument of the thesis by examining the limitations and effectiveness of 
China’s strategic management of interests regarding SCS disputes. This chapter will 
focus on China’s strategic management of its interests, whereas the next chapter will 
focus more on China’s strategic management of identities. 
 
Regarding China’s actions in the sea, some scholars argue that China’s increasingly 
assertive actions over the past decade aim to overturn the regional status quo (Hoang, 
2016, p. 190; Friedberg, 2018, p. 28). Also, many scholars argue that China’s 
increasingly assertive actions in the sea hinder further improvement in the 
relationship between China and Southeast Asian countries or ASEAN (Goh, 2011; 
Goldstein, 2013, p. 267; Hoang, 2016, p. 187; Ba, 2016, pp. 113-116; Ba and Kuik, 
2018, p. 236). These scholars probably believe that the more China assertively 
pursues its nationalist interests in the SCS, the more unpeaceful its rise will be.  
 
In contrast, some scholars argue that China has done so in a gradual and incremental 




2015, p. 4; Erickson and Martinson, 2019). Some analysts name China’s actions as 
“creeping assertiveness” (Storey, 1999, p. 95; Lim et al, 2017, p. 212). Other scholars 
also argue that China has always employed force in a restrained way, albeit for 
different reasons. Fravel (2017, pp. 234-259) argued that China often uses assertive 
action to strengthen its strategic interests and position in the disputes when it feels 
its claims being seriously challenged by neighbors, but it is meticulously restrained 
when it comes to managing frictions and avoiding greater US involvement in a dispute. 
This type of argument seems to indicate that China has attempted to strike a balance 
between the pursuit or defense of crucial nationalist interests and the maintenance 
of benign relationships with others.    
 
The findings of this chapter first disagree with the scholars that consider China to be 
aiming to revise the status quo in the SCS (Mazarr, 2015, p. 4). In the SCS, every 
claimant state has flawed sovereignty claims, except Brunei, but they have been 
competing to strengthen their respective claims for decades. Thus, there is no 
established status quo in the SCS for China to revise or overturn.  
 
Second, the chapter agrees with the scholars (Zhang, 2019, pp. 135-140; Fravel, 
2017, p. 234) who argue that China has always pursued crucial strategic interests to 
defend its claims in a restrained way to avoid a complete breakdown of its relationship 
with other states. However, the findings of this chapter’s case studies demonstrate 
that, although China has sometimes succeeded in striking this balance, it has also 
failed in other cases, such as China’s de facto control over the Scarborough Shoal, 
which resulted in a breakdown of the relationship between China and the Philippines 
from 2012 to early 2016.   
 
Third, many scholars often focus on the contesting views of China and other regional 
countries over territorial disputes (Hoang, 2016, p. 187; Friedberg, 2018), but they 
neglect the fact that China and regional countries/ASEAN also have shared interests 




relationship with each other. These shared interests helped China de-escalate 
tension. ASEAN also wishes for China to acknowledge the bloc’s shared interests in 
regards to managing the disputes. However, the shared interest strategy may fail 
because of China’s unwillingness to concede the conflicting interests in exchange for 
the formation of shared interests. 
 
These findings reinforce the overall argument of the thesis that China’s strategic 
management of interests are helpful for China to pursue or defend important 
nationalist interests without overt escalation or breaking down its relationship with 
regional states. However, the strategy also has some limitations because China’s 
restraints may not be enough to compensate for other states’ perceived losses, and 
the shared interests may fail because of China’s unwillingness to put aside its 
important nationalist interests. 
 
Third, this chapter agrees with Fravel’s (2017, p. 259) argument that China often uses 
offensive actions to pursue or defend its crucial strategic interests when it feels that 
it is at a disadvantage in terms of ongoing disputes. However, in contrast to his focus 
on Sino–US relations, this chapter’s focus is on China–claimant states/ASEAN 
relations. China and claimant states’ actions of consolidating or defending their 
respective sovereignty claims are the major cause of tension in the sea. Thus, how 
China manages these conflicting relations is important for de-escalation in the sea.  
  
The chapter will be divided into four parts. The first part uses SIT’s three conditions 
(feeling of being at a disadvantage, unstable power relationship, cognitive alternative) 
that trigger competitions to explain why China has determined to reverse its 
perceived disadvantage regarding the disputes. The second part will examine 
China’s strategic management of its interests through two case studies that have a 
profound impact on China’s sovereignty claims, as well as its relationship with 
regional states and ASEAN. They are the 2012 Scarborough Shoal incident and the 




to 2016. Specifically, this chapter explores the extent to which China could possibly 
defend/pursue important nationalist interests in a restrained way to avoid unduly 
escalation and a breakdown in its relationship with regional states. As in the 
preceding chapter, China’s restraints will first be examined through comparisons 
between its actual actions and other courses of action that it could have taken, as 
well as between its actual actions and regional states’ similar actions, and regional 
countries’ response to China’s actions in the incident. Also, as in the preceding 
chapter, the regional countries’ response will be specified into five categories 
comprising declarative and demonstrative responses as well as low intensity, 
medium intensity, and high intensity confrontations. This chapter also explores 
whether China could seek shared interests with regional countries or ASEAN to 
ameliorate such frictions.  
 
Inevitable competitions regarding SCS disputes between China and other 
claimant countries 
 
In SIT, social competition occurs when the status seeker thinks that the current 
relationship is unfair or unstable and has a cognitive alternative to the current unequal 
relationship (Brown, 2000, pp. 329-330; Hogg, 2016, p. 7). The cognitive alternative 
is defined as “an alternative social world - a sense of somewhere different that we 
want to go” (Reicher and Haslam, 2012, p. 55; Lyer et al, 2017, p. 751). All these 
conditions have been demonstrated by China’s perception regarding the unsettled 
status quo of SCS disputes, which has led to inevitable competition.  
 
To begin, among all claimants of disputed land features in the SCS, China makes the 
most expansive claim. Among all land features in the SCS, the sovereignty of Paracel 
(xisha qundao) is asserted by mainland China, Taiwan, and Vietnam (Raine and 
Mière, 2013, p. 13). The Spratly Islands’ (nansha qundao) land features are entirely 
claimed by China, Taiwan, and Vietnam and partly claimed by the Philippines, 




qundao) are claimed by Taiwan and China (Raine and Mière, 2013, p. 13). 
Macclesfield Bank and Scarborough Reef (zhongsha qundao) are entirely claimed 
by mainland China and Taiwan, while sovereignty of the Reef is also asserted by the 
Philippines (Raine and Mière, 2013, p. 13). Thus, in terms of the claims made by 
disputants over the land features in the sea, China claims all of them while others 
claim parts of them. 
 
The pieces of evidence that underpin all of these claims have weaknesses in terms 
of international law; first, this is because no state can prove exclusive, effective, and 
continuous control over land features without some protest from other states (Dyke 
and Valencia, 2000, p. 50; Storey, 2012a, p. 54). Second, China, Vietnam, and the 
Philippines use historical evidence to support the sovereignty claims on the disputed 
islands, but other historical evidence may undermine these same claims. A 1928 
Chinese commission report wrote that the Paracel archipelago is the southernmost 
part of China (Dzurek, 1996, cited in Roy, 2016, p. 4). From 1956 to 1974, Vietnam 
officially recognized China’s sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly islands through 
official meetings with the Chinese ambassador to Vietnam, official newspaper and 
textbook (FMPRC, 2014). Then Prime Minister of North Vietnam, Pham Van Dong, 
made an official statement in 1958 that endorsed China’s definition of its territorial 
sea being 12 miles from Chinese territories, including the islands in the SCS (FMPRC, 
2014; Buzynski, 2015, p. 8). One piece of evidence that is used by the Philippines to 
support sovereignty claim over the disputed land features is that an adventurer from 
the Philippines, Tomas Clomas, visited the islands and declared ownership over 
them in 1956. However, the declaration of Tomas Clomas was protested by mainland 
China, Taiwan, and South Vietnam immediately after it had been made (Buszynski, 
2015, p. 9; Hayton, 2014, p. 68). This means the declaration cannot be used as valid 
evidence to claim sovereignty in terms of international law, which requires acquiesce 
from other claimants. In 2009, the Philippines amended maritime law stating its 
sovereign jurisdiction and control over the disputed features “shall be determined as 




United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea [UNCLOS]” (Republic Act 9522, 2009, 
cited in Inquirer.net, 2012). While the amendment of law is perceived by the 
Philippines as a move to make its sovereign claim more consistent with UNCLOS 
(Inquirer.net, 2012), Article 121 of UNCLOS (1994) is mainly about determining 
whether rocks are entitled to an EEZ and continental shelf rather than determining 
which state is entitled to own the rocks. Malaysia and Brunei claim sovereignty on 
the land features through the assertion that the land features were within their 
continental shelves or EEZs (Roy, 2016, p. 5, p. 7), but states are eligible to obtain 
exclusive ownership of resources, rather than sovereignty of land features, through 
EEZs and continental shelves in accordance with UNCLOS (1994). 
 
Despite the weakness in China’s claim, the expansive claim on land features details 
expansive maritime interests that China claims that it is entitled for. In accordance 
with UNCLOS (1994), states have jurisdiction and exclusive rights of “exploring, 
exploiting, conserving and managing natural resources,” such as fisheries and oil, 
within their EEZ (that is usually 200 nautical miles from its baseline) and their 
continental shelves. Also, according to Article 121 (3) of UNCLOS (1994), “rocks 
which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no 
EEZ and continental shelf.” China states that all the land features it claims are islands; 
hence, they are fully entitled to the territorial sea, contiguous zone, EEZ, and 
continental shelf (FMPRC, 2016a). Thus, China claims to have expansive maritime 
rights and jurisdiction within EEZs and continental shelves that include the disputed 
islands.  
 
The expansiveness of China’s claim is further extended by its historical right claim to 
the nine-dashed line that encircles almost 80 percent of the SCS. Some scholars and 
elites from Southeast Asian countries question whether the line means that China 
claims exclusive ownership over the entire SCS (Storey, 2012a, pp. 54-55; Raine 
and Mière, 2013, p. 33). Official Chinese documents and speeches suggest that it 




navigation in the high sea of the SCS (Geng, 2018, cited in Li, 2018). This statement 
demonstrates that China does not claim sovereignty or jurisdiction over the entire 
SCS except disputed land features and related rights. Second, the historical rights 
that China claims within the nine-dashed line are non-exclusive, as demonstrated by 
China’s paper on the SCS dispute between the Philippines and China (FMPRC, 
2016b), which denounced the Philippines’ argument that China claims exclusive 
rights over the entire SCS.  
 
Hayton (2014, pp. 249-251) argued that while the Chinese Foreign Ministry may 
recognize that it is illegal to claim exclusive ownership of the entire SCS through the 
nine-dashed line, the CCG and National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) have acted 
as if the line means China’s territorial claims extend to almost all of the SCS. This is 
because these actions “took place far from any China claimed features and therefore 
seemed incompatible with any claims based on UNCLOS” (Hayton, 2014, p. 146). 
Also, although Hayton (2014, p. 99) agreed with this thesis that all states’ claims were 
not fully unconvincing, he argued that all Southeast Asian claimants have somewhat 
and broadly staked their claims to the disputed land features and related right in 
accordance with UNCLOS, but China still insisted on the illegal nine-dashed line 
(Hayton, 2014, p. 119, p. 263).  
 
This chapter disagrees with Hayton (2014, p. 263) because China has, in reality, like 
other claimant states, gradually interpreted disputes or its claims in line with UNCLOS, 
while still maintaining the nine-dashed line claim. Many cases that Hayton (2014, pp. 
249-251) considered to be the Coastal Guard and CNOOC’s realization of the nine-
dashed line claim were interpreted by Chinese officials in accordance with articles of 
UNCLOS rather than through the historical right of the nine-dashed line, except 
traditional fishing ground claims over some parts of the EEZ in Natuna Island. China 
appears to interpret the Paracel and Spratly islands as archipelagos, which could 
entitle China more EEZ and internal water than several land features could. Thus, 




China claimed land features (Hayton, 2014, p. 146), it may still claim that the incidents 
happened in the overlapping areas between the islands’ EEZ and those of other 
claimant countries. For instance, in 2012, Vietnam claimed that the Chinese Marine 
Surveillance (CMS) cut off cables of Vietnam’s oil survey ship operating in its EEZ; 
China argued that the ship was in fact operating in the EEZ of Spratly Islands, over 
which China has sovereignty rights (FMPRC, 2012). China also indicated this official 
interpretation to justify the 2012 case when the CNOOC opened a bid for oil 
exploration in Vietnam’s EEZ (Hong, 2012, cited in Hou, 2012). Likewise, in 2012, 
China protested against the Philippines’ bid for oil exploration in its EEZ by arguing 
that China has sovereignty rights over Spratly Islands (Ji, 2012).  
 
Scholars may argue that China’s interpretation of UNCLOS constitutes a violation 
rather than an alignment. Ngo (2020, cited in Yingxuan, 2020), the Vietnamese 
Professor, noted that China has increasingly interpreted its sovereignty claims from 
UNCLOS rather than from the nine-dashed line. But he (Ngo, 2020, cited in Yingxuan, 
2020) argued that China’s expansive claims, which are based on the interpretation 
that the land features form an archipelago, is more illegal than the nine-dashed line 
because it “uses UNCLOS terms to revise UNCLOS.” Likewise, Vu (2019, p. 102) 
argued that China’s claim of drawing a baseline or EEZ from the two island groups’ 
archipelago status is weak and unlawful in terms of UNCLOS because only an 
archipelago state is eligible to draw archipelagic baseline.  
 
However, other scholars may view these criticisms as being somewhat hypocritical, 
because states often broadly interpret, ignore, or use international law/tribunal 
awards to strengthen their sovereignty claims and pursue their self-interest (Bateman, 
2016). For instance, the US claims to be the staunch defender of UNCLOS, but has 
not ratified the convention yet as this ratification would harm its sovereignty interests 
(Hayton, 2014). Also, Japan uses Okinotorishima to claim EEZ and continental shelf 




in 2012 states that Okinotorishima is not entitled an island status and,thus EEZ and 
continental shelf rights (Hughes, 2018, p. 87). 
 
This section will not engage in this normative debate. The main aim here is to use 
SIT as framework to analyze the reasons why competition of land features and 
related sovereignty rights between China and claimant countries is inevitable. 
 
The three conditions that cause competition (the disadvantaged actor’s feeling of 
illegitimacy towards the current status quo, unstable status relationship between the 
disadvantaged and advantaged actor, and the cognitive alternative to the status quo) 
are all reflected in China’s perception towards the disputes. This makes competition 
in the sea inevitable. 
 
First, China’s expansive claims to the sea can be viewed as China’s cognitive 
alternative to the unsettled status quo of the disputes because the claims are in stark 
contrast with the reality in the sea. First, while China claims most land features in the 
sea, it is not the country that occupies most of them. This unfavorable comparison 
makes China feel disadvantaged in the disputes. Thus far, all of the land features 
have been occupied by other claimants to varying degrees (Fravel, 2012, p. 34). 
Vietnam occupies 27 land features of the Islands and ranks top among all claimants 
(Fravel, 2012, p. 34). The Philippines, mainland China, Malaysia, and Taiwan occupy 
8, 7, 5 and 1, respectively (Fravel, 2012, p. 34). Thus, China’s occupation of land 
features are not only far less than it claims, but also pale in comparison to those of 
Vietnam and the Philippines. This unfavorable comparison has resulted in successive 
Chinese leaders’ perception that China has been in a disadvantaged position 
regarding the Spratly Islands (Liu, 2004, p. 53). They have thought that China has 
been disadvantaged in terms of the consolidation of sovereignty over land features. 
Also, they have thought that China has been at a disadvantaged geo-strategic 
position in the sea because it does not have enough geo-strategic outposts in Spratly 





In addition, China thinks that other states’ occupations violate China’s sovereignty 
and maritime interests and are, thus, illegitimate (Liu, 2004, p. 535). Moreover, China 
views others’ attempts of consolidating sovereignty and related maritime rights over 
land features as a continuous challenge to China’s legitimate claim to the SCS. For 
instance, in 2014, Vietnam protested against China’s deployment of an oil rig in its 
EEZ, while China contended that the oil rig was deployed in the EEZ of Paracel 
Islands, a part of which overlaps with that of Vietnam (FMPRC, 2014). China also 
frequently protests Vietnam’s “illegal actions” when Vietnam fishermen fishing within 
waters surrounding the Paracel Islands, whose sovereignty is also claimed by 
Vietnam (Hua, 2014, cited in People’s Net-Global times, 2014). 
 
Finally, besides having a cognitive alternative to the unsettled status quo and feelings 
of unfairness and disadvantage, another reason that China is determined to reverse 
its disadvantaged status is that power relations between Southeast Asian claimant 
states are unstable. As China’s power grows, it is capable of doing more than other 
claimants with regard to advancing its strategic or maritime interests in the SCS. This 
was acknowledged by the then US Defense Secretary Ashton Carter (2015, cited in 
Pincus, 2015) in 2015 when he stated that “It’s true that almost all nations that claim 
parts of South China Sea have developed outposts over the years…of different scope 
and degree… [but China is] one country [that] has gone much further and much faster 
than any other.” 
 
To sum up, in terms of SIT, China is highly likely to reverse its perceived 
disadvantaged position in the sea. This is because it views the current status 
relationship as being unfair and putting it at a disadvantage and has a cognitive 
alternative to the current status quo.  
 
First, China’s expansive sovereign claim over the land features and maritime rights 




Second, China’s occupation of seven land features in the Spratly Islands is in stark 
contrast with its claim over sovereignty of the entire island group and Vietnam’s 
occupation. Successive Chinese leaders feel that China is disadvantaged in terms of 
consolidating sovereignty and related rights and geostrategic position in the SCS. 
Thus, China has two critical nationalist goals regarding disputes in the sea. It wishes 
to consolidate sovereign claims over the disputed waters and reverse the 
disadvantaged geostrategic status. Third, China feels that other states’ attempt to 
strengthen their geostrategic positions and sovereign claim in the sea is an 
illegitimate challenge to its sovereignty claims. Fourth, the status relationship 
between advantaged land features of Southeast Asian occupiers and China becomes 
more unstable as China’s hard power grows. Drawing on the strategic management 
principle deduced from SIT, the next section shows how China aims to manage 
interests to pursue these goals without escalating the incidents to larger conflicts and 
breaking up China’s relationship with other countries.  
 
China’s strategic management of interests regarding two important SCS 
dispute incidents 
 
This section looks at the extent to which China has struck a balance between 
pursuing nationalist interests and avoiding the over-escalation of disputes and 
breakdown its relationship with regional states by strategically managing its interests 
or identities. That is, to what extent can China strike this balance through seeking 
shared interests or identities with ASEAN or claimant countries and pursuing or 
defending the crucial nationalist interests in a restrained way. This section recognizes 
that, from 2009 to 2016, the tension and frictions between China and other claimant 
states in SCS have resurged and heightened because all claimant states, except 
Brunei, were actively consolidating their sovereignty claims (Romero and Lee-Brago, 
2009; Fravel, 2012, p. 44; Raine and Mière, 2013, p. 120). Some frictions were 
caused by China’s actions and others were not. This section chooses two cases in 




the Scarborough Shoal incident in 2012, and the Philippines’ submission of SCS 
disputes to the international arbitration tribunal and related awards (2013–2016). The 
two cases have a profound impact on China’s relationship with regional countries and 
China’s sovereignty claims in the SCS. The Scarborough Shoal incident led to the 
breakdown of the relationship between China and the Philippines from 2012 to the 
first half of 2016. Also, the Philippines’ submission in 2013 was the direct cause of 
China’s reclamation of land features in Spratly and had a negative impact on China’s 
sovereignty claims. To what extent China struck this balance through strategic 
management in these two cases is illustrative of the management’s limitations and 
effectiveness.  
 
Like the preceding chapter, to systematically examine China’s actions of 
consolidating sovereignty in SCS, China’s restraints are measured in three ways 
throughout this chapter. First, China’s actual actions are compared with the 
alternative options that it could have used before the incidents. Second, China’s 
actions are compared with other claimant states’ similar actions. The third criterion is 
regional countries’ responses, which are declarative response, demonstrative 
response, low intensity confrontation, medium intensity confrontation and high 
intensity confrontation. The meanings of the responses are comprehensively 
explained in the previous chapter. 
 
The following will present case studies to analyze the extent to which China has 
struck the balance between avoidance of overtly escalating the incident and breaking 
down relationships with regional states, and consolidation of crucial nationalist 
interests, such as defending sovereign claims over disputed waters and land features.  
 
Through the case studies, the chapter argues that China’s strategic management of 
interests did demonstrate effectiveness in managing tension in the sea, while 
defending China’s perceived important nationalist interests by defending the interests 




crises with ASEAN or claimant countries. However, this strategy also has some 
limitations. For example, although China may demonstrate restraint when compared 
with the most assertive options it has at its disposal, it is not always more restrained 
than other claimant states. Also, its restraints may not be able to compensate for 
other’s perceived damage of their sovereignty interests. Also, China’s effort to 
construct shared interests has failed to ameliorate frictions because China’s 
unwillingness to concede important nationalist interests in exchange for the formation 
of the shared interests 
 
Case Study 1: 2012 Scarborough Shoal incident  
Phase 1 (April 10–13) 
On April 10, the Philippines deployed its largest navy vessel BRP Gregorio del Pilar 
to arrest Chinese fishermen that had been operating in the lagoon of the Scarborough 
Shoal (Fravel, 2017, p. 243). On April 10, two unarmed CMS Vessels (CMS 75 and 
CMS 84) gained calls from the fishermen and prevented the Philippines from 
arresting them, as well as confiscating catches and the fishing ships by positioning 
themselves at the Lagoon’s mouth (Green et al, 2017, p. 100). A standoff, thus, 
began between the two CMS Vessels and the Philippines Navy ship.  
 
On this day, China attempted to strike a balance between defending nationalist 
interests and avoiding overt-escalation of the incident by acting in a restrained way. 
The Chinese government ships stayed in the shoal and prevented fishermen from 
being arrested, which was a demonstration of China’s claimed sovereignty and 
maritime right over the shoal. However, compared with China’s most assertive 
options that it could have taken before the incident, its actual actions were restrained; 
for example, China could have sent the armed navy or government vessels to the 
shoal. Also, China could attempt to forcefully compel the Philippines to stop arresting 
the fishermen. Moreover, compared with the Philippines’ actions, China’s actions 





The Philippines’ response to China’s actions was categorized as low intensity 
confrontation in that it directly confronted China through limited means, while still 
avoiding overt escalation, and was ready for de-escalation. First, it maintained the 
status of standoff with China. Second, it sought to de-escalate tensions. On April 12, 
the Philippines replaced the navy vessel with an armed coast guard vessel to 
demilitarize its presence at the shoal (Green et al, 2017, p. 102). Moreover, to avoid 
overtly provoking China, the Philippines indicated that it would solve the incident 
bilaterally with China and not involve the US in the dispute settlement. On April 12, 
when being asked whether the Philippines would ask the US for help to solve the 
incident, the spokesperson of the Philippines Department of Foreign Affair (DFA), 
Raul Hernandez, stated that the country’s Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario was 
already communicating with the Chinese Ambassador, Malian Ma Keqing, to find a 
diplomatic solution that would be “acceptable to both sides” (GMA News, 2012a). 
Finally, the Philippines sought shared interests with China in de-escalating the 
tension. On April 12, Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario was optimistic about China 
and the Philippines’ mutual goal of finding a “win-win solution” (Green et al, 2017, p. 
102).  
  
Like the Philippines, China sought shared interests to de-escalate the situation, and 
demonstrated restraint in its actions. On 11 April, while declaring China’s sovereignty 
over the shoal, the Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Liu Weiming, stated that China 
hoped to work with the Philippines to de-escalate the tension based on the need to 
maintain peace and stability in the SCS (Liu, 2012, Cited in FMPRC, 2012). To be 
sure, China sent another armed Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (FLEC) 
vessel 330 on April 12 after the navy vessel left (Jamandre, 2012), which was viewed 
by some as Chinese provocation (Green et al, 2017, p. 102; Castro, 2016, p. 170). 
However, this move may have been pre-planned (Green et al, 2017, p. 102) because 
China may not have known that the Philippines had decided to withdraw the navy 
vessel beforehand. Moreover, after China found that the Philippines’ navy vessel left, 




2012b). This may have been an attempt to reciprocate the Philippine’s withdrawal. 
On April 13, to de-escalate tension, all Chinese fishing vessels and the armed FLEC 
300 withdrew from the shoal (Yap, 2012). Only CMS 84 was at the shoal (Yap, 2012). 
Many elites from the Philippines acknowledged that this move was positive for easing 
the tension (Yap, 2012; Green et al, 2017, p. 103). 
 
However, on this day, negotiation between the two countries failed because China 
asked the Philippines to withdraw its last vessel first to reciprocate China’s withdrawal 
of all fishing vessels and two government vessels, but the Philippines refused to 
withdraw first (Green et al, 2017, p. 103).  
 
In summary, during Phase 1, in the Scarborough Shoal incident, China’s strategic 
management of interests did manage the crisis and avoided the breakdown of its 
relationship with the Philippines, even though the negotiation failed. In this crisis, due 
to the shared interest of de-escalating the tension, China and the Philippines 
attempted to calm down and solve the crisis through cooperation. Also, China 
prevented fishermen from being arrested by the Filipino navy, but still acted with 
restraint to avoid escalation, which balanced China’s need to simultaneously defend 
sovereignty interests and avoid over-escalating the incident. 
 
Phase 2 (April 14–April 26) 
 
From April 14 to April 16, compared with its available options, China continued to 
demonstrate restraint to strike a balance between defending nationalist interests and 
managing tension. First, the last Chinese vessel remained in the shoal to 
demonstrate China’s sovereignty claims related to the shoal. Second, China 
demonstrated restraint compared with its most assertive options. Despite failing to 
negotiate a mutual withdrawal, China did not allow its fishermen to go back to the 
shoal (Fu, 2021; Green et al, 2017). Also, China did not increase the number of 




unarmed government vessel, CMS 84, remained at the shoal (Green et al, 2017, p. 
103). Although China dispatched unarmed CMS 75 to return to the shoal on 14 April, 
CMS 75 did not arrive until April 16, although the distance between the shoal and the 
vessel was only 200 miles (Green et al, 2017, p. 103). This may be because China 
wished to de-escalate the tension before the second round of negotiation on April 16 
by delaying the vessel’s arrival. Moreover, China did not prevent Filipino fishermen 
from operating “in and out” of the shoal’s lagoon (Calonzo, 2012).  
 
Compared with the Philippines’ actions from April 14 to April 16, China’s actions 
showed more restraint. As noted, the Filipino fishermen were still operating at the 
shoal after Chinese fishermen had left (Calonzon, 2012). Second, on April 16, the 
day that the second negotiation was held between the two countries, the Philippines 
sent an archeological ship to operate in the lagoon of the shoal, which was 
considered to be a provocation by China (Fu, 2021). There were reports that the 
Chinese vessel attempted to “harass” the archeological ship (Green et al, 2017, p. 
103). However, the Chinese Foreign Ministry did not confirm the reports, but asked 
the ship to leave the lagoon (Liu, 2012, cited in Xinhua Net, 2012). On April 18, the 
Filipino Northern Luzon Command chief Lieutenant General Anthony Alcantara 
confirmed that the ship left the shoal, but denied that the ship had been under 
Chinese threat (Evangelista, 2012).  
 
Despite these frictions, both China and the Philippines reported that the tension at 
the shoal was not high during this time. The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson 
Liu Jianming stated on 16 April that “the situation at the Scarborough Shoal was 
somewhat eased” (Liu, 2012, cited in Xinhua Net, 2012). Similarly, on 16 April, the 
Filipino Lieutenant General Alcantara (2012, cited in Calonzo, 2012) stated that they 






However, although the situation at the shoal was relatively stable, after the second 
negotiation over the dispute settlement failed on April 16 similarly to the first 
negotiation (Green et al, 2017, p. 105), the Philippines began to escalate its response 
going from low intensity to medium or even high intensity confrontations. In other 
words, it directly confronted China in the diplomatic dimension with little consideration 
of amelioration. First, since April 17, the Philippines began to internationalize the 
disputes, which dissatisfied China. On April 17, the Philippines declared that it would 
pursue international arbitration to solve the Scarborough Shoal dispute (Green et al, 
2017, p. 105). On April 19, the Philippines announced that it would unilaterally pursue 
the arbitration despite China’s resistance (Green et al, 2017, p. 106). On April 21, the 
Filipino Secretary del Rosario publicly asked ASEAN states to stand up to China’s 
“new aggressiveness” (Agence France-Presse, 2012).  
 
Second, China failed to construct the shared interest in de-escalation with the 
Philippines in Phase 2. According to then Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Fu Ying, 
from 15 April to Mid-May, she summoned the Philippines chargé d’affaires to Beijing 
several times to discuss de-escalation, but the latter chose to “just listen and did not 
reply” (Fu, 2021). Also, Fu claimed that China tried hard to contact the Philippines 
through diplomatic channels to solve the incident, but the DFA “totally ignored” “any” 
request to hold bilateral talks and the Secretary del Rosario favored using 
international media to “send harsh messages” to China (Fu, 2021).  
 
Some studies outside China seemed to verify Fu’s claim. Regarding the stalled talks 
between Beijing and the Philippines, the report from the International Crisis Group 
(ICG) (2012, p. 9) in 2012 noted that bilateral talks between the DFA and the Chinese 
embassy in Manila “broke off” for almost a month, and discussions of the incident 
were “hamstringed” due to “the prolonged absence of the Filipino ambassador to 
Beijing,” which was viewed by China as the Philippines’ lack of interests in “finding a 
diplomatic solution.” Ratner (2013) and Green et al. (2017, p. 106) argued that the 




ambassador to the Philippines in communicating its position with Beijing. However, 
even so, the Philippines could still have directly corrected any perceived 
misunderstandings through its chargé d’affaires in Beijing, or at least kept 
communication channels open instead of unilaterally breaking off talks between the 
Chinese embassy in Manila and the DFA.   
 
Regarding Fu’s claim that the Philippines preferred to internationalize the disputes, 
Fravel (2015, p. 107) argued that the Philippines “appeared to challenge Beijing” in 
an “especially public way,” such as “actively appealing to ASEAN or the US for 
support in the early days of the standoff.” Castro (2016, p. 170) argued that the 
Philippines wanted to pursue international arbitration but China insisted on “quiet 
bilateral diplomatic negotiations to end the deadlock.” Also, the ICG report noted that 
some ASEAN countries believed that the Philippines overplayed its hand and 
privately suggested the country “tone down its rhetoric” (ICG, 2012, p. 27). Likewise, 
Thayer (2012) noted that “some ASEAN members…have expressed misgivings 
about how Manila confronted Beijing.”  
 
Probably responding to the Philippines’ statement of pursuing international arbitration 
from April 18 to April 19, China dispatched its fastest FLEC vessel 310, which was 
heavily armed to replace CMS 84 at the shoal on 20 April (Green et al, 2017, p. 106). 
Also, there were reports that some Chinese fishing vessels had returned to the shoal 
(Green et al, 2017, p. 106). Moreover, the standoff between China and the Philippines 
intensified because both placed navy vessels near their respective coast guards 
(Green et al, 2017, p. 106).  
 
However, on April 23, China withdrew two of its three coast guard vessels at the 
shoal (China Daily, 2012; Green et al, 2017, p. 106) to strike a balance between de-
escalating tension and defending sovereignty claims. The last ship and fishing boats 
in the Shoal were a demonstration of China’s sovereignty and maritime claims over 




Although there were reports that the Chinese vessels did not go far, they at least 
withdrew over the horizon because even Filipino officials who insisted that the 
vessels did not leave admitted that they could not see the vessels from the shoal 
(Green et al, 2017, p. 107).  
 
However, on the same day, the Philippines continued escalating tension. It sent 
another armed vessel to the shoal and monitored Chinese fishermen in the lagoon 
(China Daily, 2012; Green et al, 2017, p. 106). President Aquino III reiterated that the 
deployment served to realize the Philippines’ sovereign right (Avendano and Yap, 
2012). The Foreign Secretary del Rosario publicly warned that this incident showed 
that China was “a larger threat” (Dizon, 2012). On April 26, del Rosario stated that 
he would ask the US for help and “maximize benefits” from the US-Philippines mutual 
defense treaty (Green et al, 2017, p. 108).  
 
In summary, China’s strategic management of interests almost failed to manage the 
crisis in this phase, except from April 14 to April 16. On these days, the restraints in 
China and the Philippines’ actions and shared interests in ameliorating tension still 
played an important role in maintaining a relatively stable situation at the shoal. 
However, from April 16 to April 26, China and the Philippines had not only conflicting 
interests regarding the sovereignty of the shoal, but also essentially conflicting 
approaches of solving the deadlock. Thus, due to these essential differences, China 
failed to construct shared interests in de-escalating tension with the Philippines. Also, 
China’s unilateral de-escalation on April 23 did not make up for the divergences 
between the two sides.  
 
Phase 3 (April 26–July) 
In this phase, China dramatically hardened its actions in the shoal and became 
tougher in its relationship with the Philippines (Green et al, 2017). According to Fu 
Ying (2021) and Zhang’s (2019, p. 15) interviews with officials from the Foreign 




ease the tension, but it wanted to take full control of the shoal by internationalizing 
the disputes. Also, the Chinese elites made the judgement that if China did not take 
harsher measures to prevent the Philippines from unduly challenging China’s 
sovereignty, China would lose the shoal (Zhang, 2019, p. 15).  
 
In this period, China took some harsh measures to prevent the Philippines from 
continuing to damage China’s important nationalist interests, such as losing the shoal. 
Among China’s actions, two actions had the most significant impact on its sovereignty 
claims and relationships with relevant actors, such as the Philippines and ASEAN. 
 
The first is China’s application of the “cabbage strategy” from May 9. The Chinese 
fishermen or the utility boats of coast guards operating in the lagoon were the first 
layer. The second layer was the large coast guard vessels staying at the mouth of 
the lagoon. The third layer was the Chinese navy vessels positioned over the horizon 
that were “close enough for their presence to be known to the Manila and far enough 
for Beijing to manage the crisis without militarizing it’’ (Taffer, 2015, p. 95). These 
layers were like a cabbage enclosing the disputed area, thereby preventing other 
claimants from entering the area (Glaser and Funaiole, 2019, p. 192) or from their 
vessels operating in the area (Zhang, 2013, cited in Global Times, 2013). On May 21, 
the Chinese maritime presence reached its peak because approximately 97 Chinese 
ships were staying in and around the shoal, including 5 government ships, 16 fishing 
vessels, and 76 utility boats (Green et al, 2017, p. 115).  
 
Many Chinese scholars were satisfied with this strategy for successfully striking a 
balance between defending China’s sovereignty rights and avoiding overtly 
escalating frictions. According to Zhang Zhaozhong, the retired PLA Rear Admiral, 
this strategy first successfully defended China’s sovereignty by ensuring a stable 
fishing ground for Chinese fishermen (Zhang, 2013, cited in Global Times, 2013). 
Second, this strategy demonstrated China’s restraints because it did not militarize 




of the Philippines vessels (Zhang, 2013, cited in Global Times, 2013). Likewise, 
Zhang (2013, p. 29) argued that China was restrained because it used government 
ships to deter the Philippines from challenging China’s sovereignty rather than using 
military force to initiate a war or fully seize the shoal.  
 
However, although China may demonstrate restraint compared with its most 
assertive options, such as militarization of the shoal, China was more assertive than 
the Philippines during this phase. When China escalated, the Philippines decreased 
its response level from the high intensity confrontation to low intensity confrontation 
in this phase. In other words, it confronted China in a moderate way and sought de-
escalation. First, on May 16, although the Philippines did not withdraw its government 
ship, it announced a fishing ban to forbid its fishermen from operating in the shoal to 
de-escalate tension (Green et al, 2017, p. 114). In contrast, although China had a 
fishing ban in May, China allowed its fishermen to continue operating in the area (Fu, 
2021). Second, in May, the Philippines sent special envoys to China and met with 
high-level Chinese officials to discuss de-escalation (Green et al, 2017, pp. 115-116). 
Third, on June 6, Aquino softened his tone and stated that he would not seek 
international support at this time to “provide the best environment for solution to the 
entire issue” (Esmaquel II, 2012).  
 
From May to 15 June, China continued seeking shared interests of de-escalation with 
the Philippines. Between May and July, Fu Ying and the Philippines’ special envoy 
Senator Trillanes met 16 times to discuss de-escalation and a sequential withdraw 
(Green et al, 2017, pp. 116-117). Since May 26, the number of Chinese ships 
operating at the shoal was reduced, although most of the boats that China withdrew 
were utility boats rather than coast guard vessels (Green et al, 2017, p. 116). After 
June 6, China reciprocated the Philippines’ unilateral withdrawal of vessels in the 
lagoon by removing all its government ships or boats from the lagoon (Fu, 2021; 





However, the Philippines fully withdrew from the shoal on 15 June due to US 
mediation of a mutual retreat from the shoal, although Chinese ships remained 
(Fravel, 2017, p. 243). Fu denied that she promised anything to the US because she 
did not get authorization to make the promise (Fu, 2021). Nevertheless, the result 
was that China changed the status quo and got de facto control of the shoal.  
 
Regarding its actions, compared with available options, China was assertive because 
the government ships could leave the shoal but still get de facto control of it. However, 
China had not chosen the most assertive option to demonstrate restraint. For 
instance, China neither occupied nor militarized the shoal. However, this restraint 
could not alleviate the Philippines’ anger towards China’s de facto control over the 
disputed area.  
 
Second, although the incident was triggered because the Filipino navy had tried to 
arrest Chinese fishermen operating in the disputed waters, the Philippines de-
escalated tension by withdrawing all vessels, which makes the Chinese presence in 
the disputed area more assertive than that of the Philippines.  
 
As a result, China’s relationship with the Philippines broke down and the Philippines 
resorted to using high intensity confrontation responses through which it directly 
confronted China without considering de-escalation. For instance, the Philippines 
sought ASEAN’s unified criticism of China’s control over the shoal in 2012, at the 45th 
AMM meeting (Storey, 2016, p. 141). This incident was one of the main reasons that 
the Philippines pursued the arbitration tribunal in 2013.  
 
Also, China failed to achieve shared interests in its de-escalation with the Philippines. 
In July, China asked the Philippines to downplay the disputes at the AMM meeting in 
exchange for removing the remaining three coast guard vessels from the shoal 
(Green et al, 2017, p. 118). However, the Philippines rejected China’s lobby (Green 





To sum up, before June 15, China’s strategic management of interests seemed to be 
effective. China’s cabbage strategy successfully compelled the Philippines to de-
escalate tension and retreat from internationalization of the disputes without conflicts 
between the two sides. Also, China successfully sought shared interests with the 
Philippines in de-escalating the tension through bilateral talks. However, after June 
15, although China’s de facto control of the shoal demonstrated restraint in 
comparison with the most assertive options China had, such as militarizing the shoal, 
this restraint could not compensate for the Philippines’ perceived loss of the shoal. 
China’s approach of seeking shared interests also failed because China’s de facto 
control of the shoal led the Philippines to prioritize the disputes over the shared 
interests. As a result, China’s relationship with the Philippines broke down. 
Furthermore, contrary to China’s preference, the SCS disputes became 
internationalized due to the Philippines’ submission of the disputes to the 
international tribunal. The reason that China succeeded before June 15 and failed 
after that day may be because it had crossed the Philippine’s bottom line by 
controlling the shoal.  
 
Conclusion 
This case study finds that China’s strategic management of interests successfully 
ameliorated tensions in the Scarborough Shoal incident and defending its nationalist 
interests simultaneously in Phase one and the first half of Phase 3. However, the 
management of interests failed to achieve these goals during Phase 2 and the later 
part of Phase 3. In all the phases, compared with the most assertive options China 
had, it demonstrated restraint when defending its nationalist interests. For instance, 
it used unarmed coast guards to prevent the Philippines’ navy vessel from arresting 
Chinese fishermen. In Phases 1 and 2, China’s actions at the shoal were restrained 
compared with the Philippines’ response. In the first half of Phase 3, although China 
was more assertive than the Philippines, China’s cabbage strategy did not take 




was some room for reconciliation. However, as China’s de facto control over the 
shoal crosses the Philippines’ red line, its restraint could not make up for the 
Philippines’ perceived loss of the shoal after June 15.  
 
Second, China successfully sought shared interests in its de-escalation with the 
Philippines in Phase 1 and the first half of Phase 3. However, in most of Phase 2, 
this strategy failed because China refused to holding bilateral negotiations. Also, in 
Phase 3, because of China’s de facto control of the shoal, the shared interests could 
not ameliorate the Philippines’ perceived loss of the shoal. As a result, China’s 
relationship with the Philippines broke down.  
 
Case Study 2: China’s strategic management of interests in response to the 
Philippines’ submission of SCS disputes to the arbitrational tribunal  
 
In 2013, the Philippines submitted its SCS disputes with China to an international 
arbitral tribunal. They sought to delegitimize China’s major claims, such as arguing 
that the EEZs from the disputed land features and the nine dashed line were unlawful 
according to UNCLOS (DFA, 2013). The Philippines also demonstrated staunchness 
in pursuing this arbitration despite China’s call to manage these disputes bilaterally 
in 2013 (Fravel, 2017, p. 251). Moreover, the tribunal began its process despite 
China’s repeated warnings (Fravel, 2017, p. 251). Thus, China was unable to stop 
the tribunal process that would undermine many of its important claims over the SCS 
(Fravel, 2017, p. 251). The decision of the arbitral tribunal came out in 2016, and it 
was a landslide victory for the Philippines. To list a few, the tribunal ruled that China’s 
historical maritime claims within the nine-dashed lines were invalid (PH v. PRC, 2016). 
Second, it ruled that all the Spratly land features and the Scarborough Shoal were 
not islands; as such, they could not fall under the scope of EEZs (PH v. PRC, 2016).  
 
This arbitration activated China’s nationalist identity, as China considered this an 




argued that the Philippines distorted the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS) to pursue its self-interests and harm China’s legal sovereignty 
right (Yang, 2016, as cited in Xinhua Agency, 2016c). China’s view of the arbitration 
is also linked to its belief that it was disadvantaged in the SCS disputes. As noted in 
the introduction, Chinese elites believe that other claimants occupy most of the land 
features in Spratly Islands, which strategically and militarily disadvantages China (Liu, 
2004, p. 334). Due to this perception, some Chinese scholars argue that some 
ASEAN claimants wish to use a so-called legal approach to unfairly compel China to 
recognize its disadvantaged position in the SCS (An, 2017). The arbitration served 
to solidify this view. This chapter will not judge China’s view or engage in a normative 
debate about whether China should have accepted the awards or not. The focus here 
is to empirically analyze whether China could defend its sovereignty claims while 
simultaneously managing tension in the sea and maintaining a benign relationship 
with the neighboring countries.  
 
To prevent serious damage of China’s nationalist interests, Chinese President Xi 
decided to reclaim the land features in Spratly to “fundamentally reverse the strategic 
trend in the SCS” (Xuexi Shibao, 2017). Also, from 2 July to 11 July 2016, China 
conducted large-scale military drills to show its rejection of the tribunal awards, which 
would be issued on 12 July. Moreover, at the 2016 meeting between Duterte and Xi 
Jinping, Xi reportedly threatened to go to war if the Philippines tried to enforce the 
tribunal’s decisions (Mogato, 2017). 
 
China’s response to the arbitral awards has been regarded by some scholars as a 
demonstration of China’s overt offensiveness. Zhao (2018, pp. 8-9) characterized the 
Chinese response as a “forceful rejection” and “military muscle flexing.” Likewise, 
Babbage (2016, p. 34) considered China’s statement “strident,” and viewed the 
military and para-military actions as “belligerent.” However, contrary to the argument 
of these scholars, when applying these offensive means, China tried to strike a 




nationalist interests by exercising restraint. First, China’s actions were restrained 
compared with the most assertive alternative courses of action it could have taken. 
Regarding land reclamation, China only reclaimed its controlled land features rather 
than seizing other claimants’ occupied land features. Additionally, it did not reclaim 
the Scarborough Shoal or seize other claimants’ land features during this process. 
This was probably because Beijing considered these moves to be too provocative 
and potentially destructive to China’s relationship with ASEAN countries. Since 
China’s de facto control of the shoal seriously deteriorated its relationship with the 
Philippines, its reclamation of the shoal could have led to the total destruction of the 
relationship.  
 
Also, China was less assertive than other claimant states in terms of duration of 
reclamation. This is because the Philippines and Vietnam reclaimed land features 
first (Wu and You, 2019, p. 54) and continued reclaiming and building on the land 
features when China was reclaiming them. For instance, from 2013 to 2015, Vietnam 
reclaimed several land features and built military facilities on them, such as Sandy 
Cay and the West London Reef (Pincus, 2015). In 2014, the Philippines allocated 
money to upgrade airfields and navy ports in the occupied Thitu Island (Pincus, 2015). 
Additionally, after China stopped reclaiming land features in Spratly in mid-2015, 
Vietnam continued its land reclamation in the Spratly and ignored ASEAN’s 2016 
statement that expressed “serious concern” over land reclamation activities (Asia 
Maritime Transparency Initiative, 2017). Some analysts argued that, compared with 
China’s reclamation, other claimant states’ actions were just “a drop in a bucket” 
because China’s reclamation was much bigger and faster (Poling, 2015). This 
chapter recognizes this fact. However, as Chubb (2021) argued, land reclamation is 
a “demonstrative action,” which does not physically engage with other claimants and, 
thus, the escalatory probability of such actions is not high.  
 
Second, the drills were restrained compared to what China could have done before 




than Spratly Islands, the area of which maritime disputes were deliberated by the 
tribunal. Although some analysts say that China’s H-6K bomber patrolled the 
Scarborough Shoal in 2016 (Zhao, 2018, p. 9), the bomber was not equipped with 
missiles, and it is unknown whether the patrol occurred when the drills were 
conducted (The Observer, 2016). Second, the drills ended on July 11, one day before 
the tribunal issued its decision. This could be interpreted as China’s attempt to not 
directly use military force to confront the awards. Third, China did not occupy the 
Scarborough Shoal. Occupying the shoal would have been the strongest rejection of 
the tribunal because the Scarborough Shoal incident triggered the Philippines’ pursuit 
of the tribunal. Fourth, China did not pull out of UNCLOS despite the fact that the 
tribunal delegitimized nearly all of China’s claims over the SCS. Compared with 
claimant states’ actions, China was more assertive because no claimant states had 
military drills at the time. 
 
Third, at the 2016 meeting, while Xi threatened Duterte to go to war if the Philippines 
enforced the tribunal’s decisions, Duterte also established red lines and told Xi that 
he would go to war with China if China disobeyed them (Associate Press, 2018), 
which will be discussed later. Thus, when Xi’s threat is contextualized in this way, it 
appears to be less like a powerful state coercing a weak state; instead, it seems to 
be more of a negotiation in which both sides established red lines to facilitate 
reconciliation.  
 
Regarding land reclamation, ASEAN’s response was of medium intensity in that they 
strongly condemned China’s actions but were willing to de-escalate. For instance, 
the 2015 AMM statement expressed concern over China’s land reclamation and 
stated that the reclamation work “eroded trust…undermined peace, security and 
stability in the SCS” (ASEAN, 2015). The 2016 statement also noted a “serious 
concern” over land reclamations in the SCS (ASEAN, 2016). The wordings of these 




(Storey, 2018, p. 118). However, ASEAN also demonstrated restraint by not directly 
calling out or shaming China to maintain a space for dialogue.  
 
Regarding China’s drills and responses to the tribunal and the related decisions, all 
Southeast Asian states responded in a restrained manner to de-escalate the situation 
(Storey, 2016, p. 3). For instance, on July 12, the day that the awards were issued, 
the Philippines issued a statement that merely “welcomed the awards” and asked 
Filipinos to “exercise restraint and sobriety” (Storey, 2016, p. 2). Indonesia’s 
statement asked the parties to “exercise self-restraint” and “avoid activities that could 
undermine peace and stability in East Asia” (Storey, 2016, p. 3). Likewise, Vietnam’s 
statement merely stated that the country “welcomes…the ruling” and that it “strongly 
supports the settlement of disputes…in peaceful means, including legal and 
diplomatic process” (Reuters, 2016).  
 
Moreover, many ASEAN members tolerated the slow progress of the COC for the 
SCS from 2013 to 2016 (Thayer, 2017, p. 6). Some scholars argue that the slow 
progress was because China “dragged its feet” (Panda, 2015; Zhang, 2018).  
 
ASEAN and ASEAN countries’ tolerance of the slow COC progress have been 
regarded by many scholars as their weakness in the face of China’s advantageous 
hard power. Panda argued that only after China was “satisfied with its position in the 
SCS disputes,” such as completing land reclamation and rejecting the awards, could 
the ASEAN-driven approach progress. Likewise, Zhang (2018, p. 78) argued that 
ASEAN managed the SCS disputes by “making a pragmatic compromise under the 
principles.” In other words, facing China’s advantageous hard power, ASEAN made 
pragmatic compromises by tolerating China’s change to the status quo in order to 
proceed with the COC negotiations (Zhang, 2018).  
 
This chapter recognizes ASEAN’s tolerance was because of their power disparity 




makes the most maritime claims. Thus, China’s approval is a must if any dispute 
management mechanism is to be effective. Thus, China had the leverage to compel 
ASEAN to tolerate the country’s land reclamation and delay the COC talks.  
 
However, the chapter argues that China’s restraint when conducting offensive 
actions also maintained space for dialogue and reconciliation with ASEAN. For 
instance, in 2016, the Duterte administration reconciled with China and put aside the 
tribunal’s decisions on the condition that China did not cross the red lines set out by 
the Duterte administration. For instance, Duterte warned that if China reclaimed the 
Scarborough Shoal or removed the Philippines’ rusty warship from the second 
Thomas Shoal, the Philippines would break down its relationship with China and go 
to war (Associate Press, 2018). Also, Duterte did not allow China to extract resources 
on its own in the waters the claimed by the Philippines (Associate Press, 2018). China 
obeyed all these demands to reconcile with the Duterte administration. Moreover, as 
noted earlier, land reclamation is a “demonstrative action” (Chubb, 2021), and thus, 
this helped China keep the tension at a moderate level. Also, China was refrained 
from taking more assertive actions that would escalate tension, such as attacking 
other countries navies or coast guards (Fravel, 2017, p.259). These actions 
demonstrate that China attempted to act within ASEAN states’ limits to maintain a 
space for reconciliation.  
 
Moreover, ASEAN members’ cautious response was also due to their common 
interest of de-escalating and ameliorating the relationship. Non-claimant ASEAN 
states’ interests in this regard have also been widely noted, as well as those of 
assertive claimant states. Thayer (2016, p. 201) argued that Vietnam had its 
“cooperation and struggle” strategy when dealing with SCS disputes. That is, while 
deterring China from challenging Vietnam’s sovereignty claims, Vietnam continued 
to engage with China to reconcile and manage the tensions at sea (Thayer, 2016). 
Vietnam’s goal of striking a balance between maintaining a stable relationship with 




leaders’ remarks. For instance, in October 2019, when Vietnamese citizens 
expressed their concern about China’s challenges to Vietnam’s sovereignty claims 
in the SCS, Nguyễn Phú Trọng, the Vietnamese General Secretary, answered that 
Vietnam needs to preserve a stable external environment for development, while 
protecting its territorial entirety (Vietnam News Agency [VNA], 2019). Likewise, in 
December 2020, Vietnam’s Vice Minister of Defence Nguyen Chi Vinh (2020, cited 
in VNA, 2020) highlighted the importance of ensuring Vietnam’s sovereignty rights in 
the SCS, while also maintaining an amicable relationship with China.  
 
Also, China was lucky that the Duterte administration came to power in 2016, as the 
administration stressed de-escalation and amelioration. In 2018, then Philippines’ 
Foreign Secretary Cayetano (2018, as cited in Jaipragas, 2018) explained the 
decision: “If you want development…you have to have peace…we focus first on stop 
bleeding.” Also, Cayetano (2018, as cited in Jaipragas, 2018) stated that “we don’t 
allow this dispute to define the overall relationship of China and the Philippines.” 
Some observers may argue that the Philippines does not always adopt a de-
escalation and amelioration strategy when handling the disputes because Duterte’s 
predecessor, Aquino III, was more confrontational in this regard. However, compared 
to other predecessors, aside from Aquino III, Duterte’s handling of the Philippines–
China SCS disputes represented continuity. For instance, after China seized the 
Mischief Reef in 1995, while strengthening military ties with the US, the Philippines’ 
then President Ramos continued engaging with China to de-escalate tensions and 
maintain a benign relationship (Heydarian, 2017). Also, in 2009, to maintain a stable 
relationship with China and avoid escalating the disputes, the Arroyo administration 
did not participate in Vietnam and Malaysia’s joint submission of extended continental 
shelf claims in the SCS to the UN (Heydarian, 2017).  
 
China actively sought shared interests in its de-escalation with the Philippines. On 
16 May, China congratulated Duterte’s victory of the Presidential election and “placed 




divergences through friendly talks” (Xinhua Agency, 2016a). On the same day, the 
Chinese ambassador to the Philippines Zhao Jianhua met with Duterte to express 
China’s hope of promoting a traditional friendship and solving divergencies between 
the two countries (Xinhua Agency, 2016b). In August 2016, Fu Ying met with 
Duterte’s special envoy Ramos to discuss de-escalating the SCS disputes (Fu, 2021).  
 
Zhao (2018, p. 9) may disagree with this chapter’s argument that ASEAN sought to 
de-escalate tension with China. Instead, he (Zhao, 2018, p. 9) argued that ASEAN’s 
restraint was because China used its economic might to maneuver ASEAN members, 
asked Cambodia for a favor, and successfully prevented ASEAN from denouncing 
China and directly mentioning the awards in its 2016 AMM statement. However, it 
seems unlikely that ASEAN would issue a statement that highlighted the Philippine’s 
victory or publicly criticized China in 2016, even without Cambodia’s rejection. As 
noted earlier, all ASEAN members’ statements regarding the awards were restrained 
and aimed at de-escalation (Storey, 2016). Thus, even without Cambodia’s rejection, 
many ASEAN members probably did not wish to directly mention the awards and 
denounce China in the statement so as not to escalate tension. As the former 
Malaysian Prime Minister Najib said at the September 2016 AMM, ASEAN must deal 
with disputes “delicately with healthy dose of sensitivity” and “in a harmonious 
manner” (Abas, 2016). Also, when discussing the wording of the statement, then 
Philippine Foreign Secretary Yasay did not strongly insist on including the awards’ 
name in the joint statement (Torres, 2016), which reflected the country’s preference 
for de-escalating tension over enforcing the tribunal’s decisions.  
 
However, although Southeast Asian states shared this interest in de-escalating 
tensions with China, they had different approaches to managing such disputes. 
ASEAN states preferred to manage SCS disputes through an ASEAN-led approach. 
Aa a grouping of Southeast Asian states built for promoting “regional peace and 
stability” (ASEAN, 1967), ASEAN has interests in managing the disputes that deeply 




help to constrain China’s assertive actions at sea than to bilaterally negotiate with 
China (Odgaard, 2003). Non-claimant members also endorse the ASEAN-led 
approach. In 1999, Thailand’s Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan (1999, as cited in 
Chung, 2009, p. 102) said that SCS issues must be discussed at the AMM because 
conflicts at sea “would be adverse to all of us.” Similarly, although Cambodia opposed 
the “internationalization of the disputes,” it stated that they must be managed within 
the ASEAN–China framework (Tan, 2012). Based on this preference, ASEAN worked 
to create a COC for managing SCS disputes. However, China was reluctant to 
acknowledge ASEAN’s interests of managing the SCS disputes and insisted on 
managing the disputes through bilateral talks. Thus, from 2011 to 2013, China 
refused to participate in the talks of the ASEAN-led COC (Zhang, 2018). 
 
However, in 2013, China adjusted its policy and went from resisting COC talks to 
formally acknowledging ASEAN’s shared interests in managing the crisis in SCS. In 
2013, China formally supported Brunei’s suggestion of a “two track approach” 
whereby sovereign and maritime disputes would be solved directly by claimants and 
“China and ASEAN countries should work together to maintain peace…in the Sea” 
(Xinhua, 2016). In September 2017, China and ASEAN formally held COC talks 
(Thayer, 2017). By emphasizing its willingness to work with ASEAN to maintain 
peace (Xinhua, 2016), China formally acknowledged that ASEAN’s shared interests 
with China in terms of co-managing the crisis of SCS disputes. Through the 
endorsement, China could have wished to reduce frictions, and ameliorate China’s 
tense relationship with ASEAN countries that was caused by the Scarborough Shoal 
incident and China’s subsequent reclamation in the SCS.  
 
Once China felt that its national interests were secure, it worked to actively construct 
shared interests with ASEAN in managing crisis in the SCS by actively participating 
in ASEAN-driven COC negotiation to alleviate friction and maintain benign 
relationships with ASEAN states. By 2016, China believed that its nationalist interests 




in Spratly and consolidated the sovereignty of disputed land features by finishing the 
reclamation in 2015 (BBC news, 2015). Second, it asked the Philippines to put aside 
the arbitration award (Villamor, 2017). Once nationalist interests were considered to 
be secured, China worked hard to alleviate regional tension with the help of ASEAN 
by accelerating COC talks. In 2017, China and ASEAN finalized the framework of the 
COC (Dancel, 2017) and adopted a “single draft COC negotiating text” (Geddie and 
Shepherd, 2018). In 2018, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang affirmed that China wished 
to complete the COC within three years (Xinhua, 2018).  
 
To sum up, this case study found that China’s strategic management of interests 
were effective in terms of ameliorating tension in the sea, while also defending 
China’s important nationalist interests, such as reversing China’s perception of 
having a disadvantaged geostrategic position and defending its sovereignty claims. 
China used offensive means to defend its perceived disadvantage or serious damage 
of nationalist interests, such as reclaiming its occupied land features, conducting 
military drills, and threatening the Philippines with war. However, China also sought 
to strike a balance between overtly escalating the incident and defending the 
important nationalist interests. Compared with the most assertive available options 
that China could have taken, the country’s actual actions demonstrated restraint. First, 
the land reclamations activities were restrained because China only reclaimed its 
occupied land features and did not reclaim the Scarborough Shoal. Also, the military 
drills were conducted in the waters near Paracel Islands rather than Spratly Islands 
to avoid over-escalation. China’s threat to the Philippines was less of a powerful 
country’s coercion of a weaker state than a negotiation where both sides established 
red lines to facilitate reconciliation. Compared with other claimant states’ actions, 
China’s land reclamation was not more assertive than other claimants’ similar actions 
in terms of the duration of the reclamation, as other claimants reclaimed land features 
much earlier than China and continued even after China stopped. Even if China’s 
land feature reclamation was faster and bigger than those of other states, the 




with other claimants and overt-escalate tension. China’s hard power was one of the 
main reasons that ASEAN states tolerated slow progress of the COC negotiation. 
However, China’s restraint also served to maintain some space for dialogue and 
reconciliation.  
 
ASEAN states’ shared interests with China in de-escalating and ameliorating the 
relationship also helped China manage the tension. Moreover, China was lucky that 
the Duterte administration reconciled with China and reconstructed shared interests 
in the de-escalation of the tension. Thus, ASEAN countries’ reaction to China’s 
response to the arbitral tribunal was restrained. Moreover, China conceded to 
ASEAN’s demand for the COC negotiation and acknowledged ASEAN’s shared 
interests in managing SCS disputes. When China felt that its important sovereignty 
interests were secure, China actively constructed shared interests in managing the 




This chapter explored the extent to which China pursued its nationalist interests, 
while also managing tension in the sea and maintaining a benign relationship with 
regional countries by strategically managing interests. In other words, to what extent 
did China strike this balance through pursuing or defending important nationalist 
interests in a restrained way, while seeking shared interests with other relevant actors? 
The main argument is that China attempted to strike a delicate balance through 
strategic management; although it succeeded in the case of the 2013-2016 arbitral 
tribunal regarding the SCS disputes, it also failed in the case of Scarborough Shoal 
incident. 
 
First, through the case studies of the Scarborough Shoal incident in 2012 and the 
Philippines’ 2013 submission of the SCS disputes to an international arbitral tribunal 




restraint when using offensive means to defend its sovereignty claims compared to 
the most assertive courses of action it could have taken. China did not always act 
with more restraint than other claimant states in these incidents. However, if China 
demonstrated restraint to avoid overt escalation and did not occupy or control other 
claimants’ claimed land features, the space for reconciliation could be maintained. 
This has been demonstrated through the case of the Scarborough Shoal incident. 
China’s cabbage strategy did not aim to gain de facto control of the shoal, and thus, 
even the most confrontational Philippine President Aquino sought de-escalation with 
China by sending envoys to the country. However, after June 15, China had de facto 
control over the Shoal. While China did not occupy the shoal in an attempt to show 
restraint, this restraint could not compensate for the Philippines’ perceived loss of the 
disputed area. Thus, the Philippines further escalated tension and broke down its 
relationship with China because it directly and fiercely confronted China without 
considering de-escalation. China’s reconciliation with the Duterte administration was 
based on China’s promise that it would not further infringe on the Philippines’ 
sovereignty, such as occupying the shoal or getting de facto control of other land 
features that the Philippines claimed, such as the second Thomas Shoal. To be sure, 
in the case study on China’s response to the arbitral tribunal, China’s hard power was 
one of the main reasons that ASEAN states tolerated the slow progress of the COC 
negotiations and China’s land reclamation activities and that the Philippines put aside 
the arbitration award. However, China’s restraint maintained a space for dialogue 
and reconciliation because China acted in accordance with ASEAN states’ red lines. 
 
Second, in both case studies, China’s effort to seek shared identities/interests with 
ASEAN/ the Philippines was effective for de-escalation. In Phase 1 and the first half 
of Phase 3, the shared interests of de-escalation helped China ease the tension in 
the sea. Also, in the case study of China’s response to the arbitral tribunal, China 
endorsed ASEAN as the manager of SCS disputes and sought shared interests in 
de-escalating tension. The shared interests in de-escalating tension is one of the 




restrained. However, this approach also had some limitations. For instance, China’s 
unwillingness to soften its insistence on bilateral negotiations led the Philippines to 
further escalate the disputes in phase two of the Scarborough Shoal incident. 
Furthermore, because China maintained de-facto control over the shoal, it failed to 
establish shared interests with the Philippines. 
  
The findings of this chapter contribute to the overall argument of the thesis that 
China’s strategic management of interests helped alleviate frictions and maintain a 
benign relationship with regional countries, even in regional flashpoints. However, 
this strategy also has some limitations. Although China may have demonstrated 
restraint compared to the most assertive alternatives at its disposal, it was not always 
more restrained than other claimant states. Also, its restraint may not have been 
sufficient to compensate for other states’ sovereignty interests. Also, China’s 
unwillingness to concede important nationalist interests in exchange for the formation 


















Chapter 11: Relations with Taiwan 
 
The preceding Chapter examined China’s strategic management of interests 
regarding SCS disputes. This chapter examines China’s management of identity and 
related interests regarding the Taiwan issue. Compared with SCS disputes that 
China promised to solve through negotiations, the Taiwan issue is a more prominent 
flashpoint in the region because PRC has never excluded the option of forcefully 
recover Taiwan since ROC retreated to the latter in 1949. Thus, it is important to 
examine the Taiwan issue in order to address the research question of the thesis, 
that is, can China simultaneously maintain a relatively benign environment and 
pursue crucial national interests? 
 
Specifically, this chapter examines this question through Beijing’s strategic 
management of identities and interests. In other words, to what extent has China 
deterred Taiwanese independence and facilitated unification, the two crucial 
nationalist interests, while also preserving a relatively stable Taiwan Strait by seeking 
shared interests/identities and downplaying conflicting ones. Additionally, to what 
extent has China defended or pursued these two goals through using offensive 
actions in a restrained way. 
 
Some scholars view coercion, including deterrence and compellence, as the means 
for Beijing to achieve peaceful unification, but disagree over whether Beijing could 
successfully attain the goals through this method. Schreer (2017) and Roy (2016) 
argued that the mainland has successfully deterred Taiwan‘s de jure independence, 
but will not succeed in pushing Taiwan into unification because Taiwanese people 
strongly identify with ROC/Taiwan’s sovereign identity. Others are certain that the 
mainland will succeed in pushing Taiwan into the unification process. According to 
Sutter (2011, p. 4), “China’s economic, military, and diplomatic leverage over Taiwan 




eventual reunification with China.” Tan (2020, p. 23) argued that the reality is that “all 
Taiwan can really do is…achieve the limited objective of deterring open war and to 
buy enough time to somehow arrive at a peaceful accommodation of …China.”  
 
Other scholars have explored whether the mainland could win the hearts and minds 
of Taiwanese people, thereby deterring Taiwan’s de jure independence or promoting 
peaceful unification. Yang (2019, p. 21) argued that the mainland could choose to 
win over the Taiwanese public through engagement and integration, thereby creating 
an environment that is conducive to unification. Tang (2019, pp. 6-7) argued that 
through economic engagement and interpersonal communication, Beijing could 
construct one China identity with ordinary Taiwanese and thus consolidate 
foundation for unification.  
 
This chapter’s findings disagree with scholars who argued that Beijing could seek 
unification with Taiwan through engagement. The chapter instead argues that, 
Beijing’s unwillingness to soften its insistence on the PRC’s sovereignty over Taiwan, 
leads to Bejing’s failure to construct one China identity with Taiwanese, makes a non-
coercive unification nearly impossible, and increases costs deterring Taiwan 
independence.  
 
Also, this chapter agrees with scholars who argued that Beijing could successfully 
push Taiwan into unification talks through coercion. However, this chapter argues 
that Beijing may not be able to wait until it perceives that it is able to compel Taiwan 
to accept unification talks. In other words, Beijing may not be able to strike a balance 
between maintaining a stable Taiwan Strait and defending or pursuing its crucial 
interests regarding Taiwan. First, as Beijing’s shared Chinese identity approach failed, 
Beijing is heavily reliant on using offensive means in a restrained way to strike a 
balance between defending the one China principle and maintaining a relatively 
stable strait. However, despite Beijing demonstrating restraint, the cross-strait 




actions to defend the principle. Also, due to shrinking shared interests and salient 
strategic competition between the mainland and the US, the US is less tolerant of 
Beijing’s emphasis on the PRC’s sovereignty over Taiwan. Beijing will probably 
recover Taiwan by force if the US clarifies its commitment to Taiwan or allows Taiwan 
to enter international organizations without Beijing’s permission.  
 
These findings are important for the thesis’ examination of the extent to which China 
could possibly strike a balance between maintaining a relatively peaceful 
environment and defending or pursuing important nationalist interests through the 
strategic management of identities/interests because the limitations of the strategy 
have been demonstrated. First, the shared identity/interests approach will fail 
because of Beijing’s unwillingness to concede crucial nationalist interests. In this 
case, Beijing’s shared a One China identity approach failed to pursue formal 
unification with KMT and decreased the costs of deterring Taiwan’s de jure 
independence due to its unwillingness to soften insistence on PRC’s sovereignty over 
Taiwan. Second, Beijing’s restraint in offensive actions may not always achieve the 
balance as Beijing is using increasingly strong actions to defend the one China 
principle, thus heightening tension in the strait. As a result, war in the cross-strait is 
not inevitable but likely to happen. 
 
This chapter will be divided into four parts. The first part clarifies the interests that 
Beijing would not concede and Beijing’ conflicting interests/identities with Taiwan and 
the US. The second, third, and fourth parts present Beijing’s strategic management 
with KMT from 2008 to 2016, the DPP from 2016 to 2020, and the US from 2016 to 
2020, respectively.  
 
Conflicting interests between Beijing and Taiwan/the US  
 
To start the strategic management, the first step is to clarify the interests that the 




With regard to the mainland’s view of the Taiwan issue, the nationalist interest 
towards the Taiwan Strait is the one China principle (Deng, 1983; Jiang, 1995; Hu, 
2008; Xi, 2019). The one China principle first means that there is one China in the 
world and Taiwan is part of it. Preserving the one China principle means that Taiwan’s 
pro-independence movement needs to be deterred. This principle also means that 
the Taiwanese government must acknowledge that Taiwan belongs to China. 
Moreover, the principle means that PRC is the sole legal government of China in 
international society. This is the main manifestation of PRC’s sovereignty over 
Taiwan, because Taiwan will not have international sovereignty and can only be 
recognized as being part of China, which to a large degree defaults to the PRC. 
Taiwan’s participation in international organizations as a sovereign country (under 
the name of ROC or Taiwan) is categorized by Beijing as a pro-independence move 
since this implies that there are two Chinas or one China and one Taiwan (Jiang, 
1995; Hu, 2008). Furthermore, one China principle means that Beijing, as the central 
government, enjoys the right to decide whether the local government in Taiwan is 
allowed to participate in international organization or sign treaties with other states.  
 
Moreover, the second bottom line nationalist interest for the mainland is unification, 
whereby Taiwan formally becomes a province or Special Administrative Region of 
the PRC. Because of the CCP’s self-identification as the guardian of a nation, the 
mainland views the current status quo as a reminder of China’s disadvantaged and 
fragile position in the face of imperial power and external forces in the century of 
humiliation. Xi’s (2019) speech regarding the Taiwan issue reflects this position. In 
this speech (Xi, 2019), Xi has traced Taiwan issue back to 1840, the year that imperial 
powers began to invade China, and argued that the Taiwan issue was caused by an 
impotent Chinese nation that failed to defend against imperial powers’ invasions. 
Thus, the mainland has attached value and emotional significance to Taiwan’s formal 
unification. For the mainland, recovering Taiwan means national rejuvenation, 





However, Beijing’s one China principle and unification goal conflict with Taiwan’s 
strong identification of its sovereignty state status. KMT, one of the two major political 
parties in Taiwan, views the current status quo as being unfair because it does not 
acknowledge ROC’s representation as a sovereign state in international society. 
Since KMT retreated to Taiwan in 1949, the ROC maintained its status as a sovereign 
state that gained diplomatic recognition from 70 states by 1969 and represented 
China in the UN until 1971. Since 1971, although the ROC has been gradually losing 
diplomatic recognition, its self-identification as a sovereign state has never been 
weakened. KMT adheres to the ROC’s constitution, which stipulates that the 
mainland and Taiwan belong to one China (Zhu, 2015, cited in Taiwan People news, 
2015; Ma, 2018, cited in Liu, 2018). However, it defines one China as the ROC (Zhu, 
2015, cited in Taiwan People news, 2015; Ma, 2018, cited in Liu, 2018,) and thinks 
that the ROC’s sovereign status in international society is of vital importance for 
ROC’s existence and Taiwan’s self-esteem. This is in conflict with the mainland’s 
preference that one China is PRC, which also functions as the central government of 
Taiwan. Furthermore, regarding cross-strait relations, KMT’s major concern is to 
preserve the ROC’s existence and self-esteem by maintaining the ROC’s diplomatic 
recognition from foreign countries, and participating in international organizations 
rather than unifying. 
 
KMT’s dissatisfaction towards Taiwan’s shrinking international space and strong 
identification of Taiwan’s sovereignty is shared by the DPP, another major political 
party in Taiwan. The DPP is more dissatisfied with the status quo than KMT, as it 
actively pursues de jure independence of Taiwan. DPP members view China as the 
mainland or PRC and see Taiwan as another country. Extremist DPP members wish 
to declare Taiwanese independence, which includes changing its national name 
ROC into the Republic of Taiwan (ROT) and revising the current ROC constitution 
from covering “mainland” and “Taiwan” to Taiwan only. DPP members are staunch 
supporters of Taiwanese independence, and they have taken the lead in seeking 




about using the official name Taiwan rather than the Chinese name Taipei when 
participating in international sports competitions, such as the 2020 Olympic Games 
in Tokyo (ETtoday, 2018b). Another DPP faction pursues two Chinas and claims that 
Taiwan does not need to declare de jure independence because it is already an 
independent country whose name is ROC (Taiwan) (Lai, 2019, cited in Udn, 2019).  
 
The One China principle also conflicts with Taiwan’s identification as a liberal state. 
As liberal democratic values are the major standard for comparison in the US-led 
order, Taiwan derives a positive self-image from being a democratic regime and 
consider this to be superior to the mainland’s authoritarian political system. The DPP 
derogates the mainland’s political system and interprets the current status quo as 
Beijing preventing Taiwan from using its state membership to participate in 
international organizations. This is considered by them to be proof of the authoritarian 
mainland’s abusive attempts to dictate Taiwan’s future as a liberal democratic state 
(Chen, 2018).  
 
Besides the conflicting interests between Taiwan and Beijing, Beijing’s unification 
goal conflicts with US interests, another relevant actor in the Taiwan issue. First, it is 
almost a scholarly consensus that the US’ mutual deterrence policy has successfully 
preserved the status quo of the cross-strait by deterring the mainland from pursuing 
formal unification, and preventing Taiwan from pursuing de jure independence (Lin, 
2009, p. 84; Bush, 2013, p. 18; Womack, 2016, p. 9). Beijing has felt that it is 
constrained by the US, as it “stands by” Taiwan when it acts coercively to contain the 
movement or compel Taiwan to go in supporting unification or the One China 
principle (Jiang, 1998, cited in Lampton, 2014, p. 126). This feeling is not 
unwarranted as many Taiwanese politicians from different political parties have 
expressed that Taiwan’s security reliance on the US has protected the island from 






Also, Beijing’s one China principle somewhat conflicts with the US’ One China policy. 
In terms of the Taiwan issue, the US recognizes the ”PRC as the sole legal 
government of China” and opposes two Chinas or one China and one Taiwan (Glaser 
and Green, 2017). However, the US only acknowledges Taiwan as being part of 
China/the PRC (Glaser and Green, 2017). Thus, the US’s one China policy is 
ambiguous in regards to PRC’s sovereignty over Taiwan, which contrasts the one 
China principle that stresses the PRC’s sovereignty over Taiwan.   
 
The mainland’s strategic management of identities and interests with KMT 
(2008 to 2016) 
 
The mainland’s approach to the Taiwan issue has been consistent with its principles 
of strategically managing identities and interests. That is, on the basis that important 
interests derived from conflicting identities are preserved, China can maintain a 
relatively peaceful environment by seeking shared identities or interests with other 
relevant actors, while also downplaying conflicting ones. In this period, the mainland 
has tried to maintain a relatively peaceful cross-strait relationship by forming shared 
identity/interests with KMT while preserving its bottom line of the one China principle. 
Downplaying conflicting identity was operationalized through conceding less 
important conflicting interests, such as Beijing’s tolerance to the KMT’s reiteration 
that one China is ROC in private settings.  
 
First, the mainland has formed a shared identity with KMT through the 1992 
consensus. The former General Secretary of the National Security Council in Taiwan, 
Su Qi (no date, cited in Xiao, 2018, p. 122), rightly stated that with regard to the one 
China principle, “KMT said ‘yes, but [one China is ROC]’ while the DPP said ‘no’.” 
The mainland definitely opposes the DPP’s position, whereas it has shared the one 
China identity with KMT. This shared identity is reflected in the consensus that has 
been reached by Taiwan’s Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the mainland’s 




by the governments of both sides in 1992. The 1992 consensus states that both the 
mainland and Taiwan adhere to the one China principle and strive for national 
unification (SEF, 1992, cited in SEF, 2016; ARATS, 1992, cited in Taiwan Affairs 
Office of the State Council PRC, 2016).  
 
The mainland gets what it wants from sharing the one China identity with the KMT 
through the 1992 consensus. When the KMT governs Taiwan, the mainland has been 
able to preserve its bottom-line interests of one China principle. This is evidenced by 
the KMT administration’s acknowledgement of the 1992 consensus from 2008 to 
2016. Ma Ying-jeou, who was the Taiwanese President during this period, reiterated 
that his administration “adhered to the 1992 consensus and did not seek two Chinas, 
one China one Taiwan and Taiwan independence” (Xiao, 2018).  
 
As the mainland’s bottom line interests were secured through the one China identity, 
it intentionally downplayed the nationalist interests that conflicted with the KMT’s 
interests. First, regarding the sensitive debate of whether China is PRC or ROC, the 
mainland downplayed its nationalist interests by tolerating Taiwan’s interpretation 
that China is ROC in cross-strait exchanges between the two sides. For instance, in 
the closed-door meeting between Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou and the 
mainland’s President Xi Jinping in Singapore 2016, Ma reiterated the ROC’s position 
on the one China principle (Xiao, 2018, p. 345). Also, the mainland side acquiesced 
Ma’s statement that he was the ROC President and Xi asked Ma about the origin of 
his “President office” at the dinner between the two sides (Xiao, 2018, p. 368).  
 
Besides tolerating Taiwan’s interpretation of one China between 2008 and 2016, on 
the basis that the KMT government had acknowledged the 1992 consensus, the 
mainland made the PRC’s sovereignty over Taiwan less salient by helping Taiwan 
preserve its international sovereignty. For example, it stopped switching other 
countries’ diplomatic recognition from ROC to PRC (Xiao, 2018, p. 166) and relaxed 




Presidency, Taiwan only lost diplomatic ties with Gambia in 2013 and Beijing publicly 
stated that it had not had any contact with Gambia and learned about this from the 
news (Hong, 2013, cited in China Daily, 2013). Also, as a breakthrough of Taiwan’s 
expansion into international space, Taiwan returned to the UN System and 
participated in the World Health Assembly (WHA) as an observer in 2009, 38 years 
after its UN membership was replaced by the PRC in 1971 (Chan, 2013, p. 102; Xiao, 
2018, p. 164). As sovereignty of ROC/Taiwan is strongly identified by most 
Taiwannese (Tsai, 2019; KMT, 2019), successive Taiwanese governments have 
consistently worked to avoid losing Taiwan’s diplomatic recognition or participate in 
international organizations to maintain ROC’s existence as a sovereign state. The 
mainland’s actions made its nationalist identity less salient to Taiwan by helping it 
preserve international sovereignty, thereby alleviating another cross-strait friction.  
 
Finally, the mainland attempted to make communist identity less salient by trying to 
assuage Taiwanese people’s negative feelings about the mainland’s political system. 
The mainland first attempted to do this by relieving Taiwan’s suspicion that their 
political system would be tarnished after unification by reiterating that it would “take 
good care of Taiwanese emotions, interests and political system” in the negotiations 
(Deng, 1983; Jiang, 1995; Hu, 2008; Xi, 2019). The mainland also tried to reduce 
Taiwan’s negative evaluation of its political system. For instance, Xi (2014, cited in 
Xinhua net, 2014) requested “Taiwanese compatriots to understand the mainlander 
compatriots’ choice of political system” when he met a delegation led by the KMT’s 
senior leader Lien Chan in 2014. By attempting to assuage Taiwan’s concerns and 
asking for their understanding, the mainland wished to downplay ideological friction 
and deactivate Taiwan’s identity as a democratic regime 
 
While downplaying the identities or interests that conflict with Taiwan’s preferences, 
the mainland has not sacrificed its bottom-line nationalist interests, including its 
commitment to the one China principle. First, while stating that they would take care 




shared one China identity (Deng, 1983; Jiang, 1995; Hu, 2008; Xi, 2019). Also, 
although the mainland tolerated the KMT’s interpretation of the 1992 consensus in 
the cross-strait exchanges, it never recognized this interpretation (SEF, 2016) and 
refused to tolerate Taiwan’s attempt to publicly demonstrate the ROC’s sovereignty 
in the presence of third parties. For instance, in 2016, when Ma met Xi in Singapore, 
Taiwan insisted that it planned to state the ROC in the public speech to demonstrate 
its sovereign status (Xiao, 2018, p. 345). The mainland strongly rejected Taiwan’s 
plan, despite Taiwan’s insistence (Xiao, 2018, p. 345).  
 
Finally, under Ma’s Presidency, when Taiwan’s international space expanded, the 
mainland insisted on the PRC’s sovereignty over Taiwan in international society. For 
instance, Taiwan’s participation as an observer in the name of Chinese Taipei in the 
WHA in 2009 was a breakthrough for Taiwan. However, a leaked document form 
within the World Health Organization (WHO) reflected Beijing’s preference to 
Taiwan’s status in international society by stating that Taiwan “is considered, within 
the United Nations system, as a province of China, under the jurisdiction of the 
Chinese government in Beijing” (Romberg, 2012, p. 8). Moreover, the mainland 
attempted to act as the central government that enjoys the right to determine 
Taiwan’s participation in international organizations. This is demonstrated by the 
statement in a leaked WHO memo (Mo, 2011), which reported that “procedures used 
by the WHO to facilitate relations with Taiwan and how these relations operate were 




The period from 2008 to 2016 has been widely recognized as a period of relative 
peace in the Taiwan Strait. Also, by seeking a shared one China identity with the 
KMT and downplaying interests that conflict with Taiwan’s preference, such as 
tolerating the KMT’s interpretation that one China is ROC, the mainland successfully 




Meanwhile, Beijing maintained the one China principle, which stressed the PRC’s 
sovereignty over Taiwan. However, no progress was made on unification under 
Beijing’s terms, because the conflicting identity and related interests represent the 
very problems that formal unification ought to solve. Downplaying them will not only 
stall progress in terms of formal unification, it will also increase the cost of deterring 
Taiwan from seeking independence. 
 
The major problem is the status of ROC, as ROC supporters wish to have equality 
between the ROC and the PRC. Even most pro-unification Taiwanese figures have 
stressed the equality. This has been demonstrated by the proposal made by Hung 
Hsiu-Chu, who is generally viewed as a pro-unification KMT member. The proposal 
conceived the ROC and PRC as two equal and legal states under one China, which 
required the PRC to acknowledge the ROC ’s equality and legality of fostering 
government to government relationships with other countries (Hung, 2017, cited in 
Xu, 2017). Likewise, Shao Zonghai (2010, p. 201) argued that, if the mainland is a 
country, Taiwan must also be a country, and if the mainland is a central government, 
Taiwan must also be a central government. Huang Nian (2013), the Editor in Chief of 
Taiwan’s united daily news, argued that the PRC and ROC could equally share 
China’s sovereignty, whereby the PRC would be the socialist China and the ROC 
would be the democratic China. 
 
While the PRC tolerates the KMT’s interpretation that China is the ROC to downplay 
conflicting identities, it has never publicly recognized this interpretation. Some 
mainland scholars argue that the PRC should recognize the ROC, thereby making 
unification possible. Zhang Nianchi (2010), the Director of the Shanghai school of 
East Asian studies, acknowledges that peaceful unification must start from Beijing’s 
recognition of the ROC and argues that “mutual respecting political reality [many 
Taiwanese strong identification with ROC] should be on the negotiation table” if the 
PRC wishes to conclude a peace accord. Likewise, Liu Guoshen (2008, p. 4) argued 




not, the ROC represents China in international society on some occasions. Also, 
Chen Kongli (2011) indicated that, if the mainland was courageous enough to make 
concessions on the ROC’s status, Taiwan may make concessions in return. 
 
However, despite these scholars’ calls, the PRC has never abandoned its nationalist 
goal of being the central government of China. Thus, Beijing is unlikely to recognize 
the ROC as another equal government. In 1963, Zhou Enlai proposed that Taiwan 
could retain almost everything, including its army, on the condition that it recognized 
Beijing as the central government and handed over diplomatic rights to Beijing (China 
Taiwan Net, 2007). That is, the PRC could concede nearly everything except that 
Taiwan is a local government and gives up its international sovereignty. This has 
been Beijing’s basic template regarding Taiwan’s future, which has not dramatically 
changed for decades. According to Zhou’s proposal, it seems that to Beijing, the 
status quo based on 1992 consensus that Taiwan remains de facto independence 
but almost loses international recognition somewhat equals to Taiwan’s de facto 
unification. While the KMT does not recognize Beijing as the central government, it 
recognizes that Taiwan belongs to China through the 1992 consensus. China 
defaults to the PRC in international society. Also, to a large degree, the PRC enjoys 
the right of being the central government of Taiwan in international society by 
permitting Taiwan’s participation in international organizations no matter whether 
Taiwan recognizes it or not. Thus, the DPP’s argument that the 1992 consensus is 
one country two systems is somewhat reasonable.  
 
However, ignoring the ROC makes Beijing’s non-coercive formal unification nearly 
impossible. Because of the mainland’s ignorance, the KMT was vulnerable to 
criticism for its inability to protect Taiwan’s sovereignty. For instance, the DPP’s 
senior member Huang Chuangxia (2014) argued that Ma “belittled the ROC.” 
Likewise, Lai Chin-te (2020, cited in Lin, 2020), a DPP leader, stated that the KMT 
sticks to the 1992 consensus but ROC does not exist in the consensus. This criticism 




In 2009, the Ma administration refused the mainland’s push for political talks (Zhang, 
2012, p. 119). The primary reason of Ma’s refusal was his insistence that Beijing must 
“face up to the reality”, which indicates the existence of the ROC (Shao, 2010; Rfi, 
2012). For the KMT, the mainland’s public recognition of the ROC would erase its 
stigma of selling out Taiwan’s sovereignty to the PRC. Under such circumstances, 
the KMT might be able to convince Taiwanese that starting political talks would not 
damage the ROC’s sovereignty because the PRC and ROC are equal sovereign 
entities.  
 
Also, derecognition of the ROC increases the mainland’s cost of deterring Taiwan’s 
independence movement and promoting non-coercive unification. As the KMT was 
vulnerable to criticism of losing Taiwan’s sovereignty, Ma was very cautious about 
moves that could lead to this criticism. When Ma was first elected as Taiwanese 
President in 2008, the KMT occupied the majority of the Legislative and Executive 
Yuan, but it promised not to correct the DPP revised textbook guidelines, which 
promote de-Sinification (China Times. 2019). When Ma made some minor revisions 
to the textbook guidelines in his second term, he was strongly criticized for “selling 
Taiwan to the PRC” (Li, 2014), thus forcing Ma to give up (China Times, 2019). Ma’s 
failure to revise the guidelines resulted in a surge of young Taiwanese people that 
strongly identify with Taiwanese sovereignty. This increases Beijing’s difficulty of 
constructing a one China identity with young Taiwanese people and, thus, the costs 
of deterring Taiwanese independence or promoting non-coercive unification.  
 
In summary, from 2008 to 2016, Beijing sought a shared one China identity with the 
KMT and downplaying its conflicting interests, which included tolerating the KMT’s 
interpretation that one China is the ROC in private settings, not competing to shift 
other countries’ diplomatic recognition from ROC to the PRC, and allowing Taiwan to 
participate in international organizations. Meanwhile, Beijing defended the one China 
principle through KMT’s endorsement of the 1992 consensus, resistance to the 




participation in international organizations as the central government. Through its 
strategic management of identities and interests, Beijing defended the one China 
principle and maintained a relatively peaceful Taiwan Strait without explicit use of 
force during this period. However, because Beijing has never softened its insistence 
on the PRC’s sovereignty over Taiwan and recognized the existence of ROC, the 
KMT, which has been stigmatized as the traitor of ROC/Taiwan, was neither 
courageous enough to start political talks nor to revise textbook guidelines. Thus, 
non-coercive unification was nearly impossible, and the costs of deterring Taiwanese 
independence increased.  
 
These findings reinforce the main arguments of the thesis that the strategic 
management of identities/interests did help Beijing strike a balance between 
maintaining a benign environment and defending crucial nationalist interest, which is 
deterring Taiwan independence without using explicit force. However, the shared 
identity strategy fails due to Beijing’s unwillingness to concede its conflicting interests, 
which is PRC’s sovereignty over Taiwan.  
  
The mainland’s strategic management with the DPP from 2016 to 2020 
 
This section is divided into two parts. The first part analyses the strategic 
management from 2016 to 2019, and the second part analyses the strategic 
management in 2020. This is because cross-strait relations underwent a lot of 
changes in 2020. 
 
At the start of 2016, Beijing attempted to construct a one China identity with the DPP. 
In February 2016, the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi expressed hope that the 
DPP government would promote cross-strait peace in terms of “their constitution” 
(BBC News, 2016) that stipulates that the mainland and Taiwan belong to one China. 
This remark has been reciprocated by the DPP. The DPP’s Spokesman Yang 




strait policy in terms of current constitution. In May 2016, Tsai made the biggest 
concession as a DPP President to Beijing by promising that she would respect the 
ROC constitution in her inauguration speech (Tsai, 2016). 
 
However, Beijing pushed the DPP further by asking Tsai to complete the “unfinished 
answer sheet” (Zhang, 2016). This meant that, to start official contact with Beijing, 
Tsai needed to publicly state her support of the 1992 consensus rather than the 
ROC’s constitution. The reason that Beijing backtracked from Wang’s earlier 
statement was probably its unwillingness to recognize the ROC. Wang’s statement 
aroused Taiwan’s anticipation that the PRC started to recognize the ROC’s existence 
and legitimacy (Zhong, 2016). Beijing denied that Wang’s statement means 
recognition of the ROC’s constitution and stated that his central point is the one China 
principle (Feng, 2016). 
 
Beijing’s shared one China approach failed, as Tsai was unwilling to endorse the 
1992 consensus. Instead, her stance became hardened and reiterated that the DPP 
was willing to start official contact with Beijing if the latter did not set preconditions 
(DW, 2018). Also, the DPP began to reiterate its one China, one Taiwan or two 
Chinas policy. In October 2016, Tsai stated that “Taiwan is a sovereign independent 
state” (Hutzler and Hsu, 2016). In 2018, Tsai stated in her speech that her 
administration would defend sovereignty of the “ROC Taiwan” despite enormous 
pressure of “China” (Zheng, 2018). In 2019, Tsai (2019, cited in Chung, 2019) 
reiterated that “the mainland should respect that ROC Taiwan has existed for a long 
time.”  
 
On the one hand, although one China identity approach failed, Beijing has continued 
deepening ties with Taiwan. First, although mainlander tourists and Taiwan’s 
agricultural product exports to the mainland have decreased since the DPP came to 
power in 2016, Beijing continues the Cross-straits Economic Cooperation Framework 




mainland issued 31 preferential policies and provinces issued specific policies in 
accordance with the 31 policies, which facilitated Taiwan’s integration into the 
mainland in areas ranging from civil exchanges, economy, education, and culture 
industry (China Youth Net, 2019). Third, in 2019, the mainland issued 26 preferential 
policies that further deepened the integration, such as encouraging Taiwan’s 
participation in the mainland’s technological development and industrialization (China 
Youth Net, 2019).  
 
On the other hand, because of Tsai’s unwillingness to endorse the 1992 consensus, 
both sides’ conflicting interests became more pronounced in the cross-strait 
relationship. First, from 2016 to 2019, Taiwan lost diplomatic recognition from six 
countries (Li, 2019). Second, since 2017, Taiwan has been excluded from the 
international organizations that it entered during Ma’s presidency, such as the WHA 
and International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Third, Beijing prevented Taiwan 
from concluding FTAs with other countries (Xiao, 2018). All of these actions 
weakened ROC/Taiwan’s international sovereignty and strengthened the PRC’s 
sovereignty over Taiwan. First, shifting recognition from the ROC to the PRC 
demonstrates that Taiwan is part of the PRC. Second, it is the central government’s 
right to decide whether a local government should enter an international organization 
and sign the FTA or not.  
 
Moreover, from 2016 to 2019, Beijing conducted several military actions to show 
resolve in deterring Taiwan’s independence movement. Since November 2016, the 
PLA Airforce began island patrols and increased the frequency, quantity, and variety 
of the aircrafts used, including H-6k bombers and Su-30 fighters (Xin, 2020, p. 539). 
In December 2016, China’s aircraft carrier Liaoning patrolled the outer sea of the 
Taiwanese island for the first time (Haiwai Net, 2016). In 2018, the Liaoning carrier 
fleet conducted live fire drills in the sea near the east of Taiwan (PLA News, 2018). 




independence because the east of Taiwan is a mountainous region and was, thus, 
considered a secure place in wartime when the PLA could not disembark on it.  
 
However, while becoming more assertive, Beijing also tried to not provoke conflicts 
in the strait from 2016 to 2019. Beijing tightened control over Taiwan’s international 
space on diplomatic dimension, which would not result in armed conflict. Before 2019, 
the aircrafts that patrolled Taiwan never crossed the medium line between the 
mainland and Taiwan, which was believed to be the maritime border-line between 
the two sides (Sun, 2020). Instead, the Liaoning aircraft carrier fleet patrolled the 
outer sea area of Taiwan (Haiwai net, 2018). Moreover, in 2016, Beijing had a chance 
to justify its actions if it intended to conquer Taiwan, but it did not do so. In 
2016,Taiwan mistakenly fired a missile targeting the mainland that hit a Taiwanese 
fishing boat (Chen, 2016) . Beijing’s response was mild. It requested Taiwan to 
explain the situation (Sina, 2016) and downplayed the incident on the mainland’s 
social media channels. However, if Beijing intended to forcefully conquer Taiwan, this 
could have been an opportunity for justification because Taiwan fired the first shot, 
despite the fact that it was unintentional. A comparable example was Beijing’s seizure 
of land features in Spratly Islands after a skirmish with Vietnam in 1988. Beijing 
argued that the skirmish happened because Vietnam fired an initial shot. Whether or 
not Vietnam fired this first shot deliberately was probably unimportant in that moment. 
What was important was that Beijing could use the first shot as justification to recover 
the land features.   
 
From 2016 to 2019, the Tsai administration was probably aware of Beijing’s intention 
of making the tension manageable. In this period, the Tsai administration condemned 
Beijing for suppressing Taiwan, but was not nervous about the cross-strait conflicts. 
In 2017, although Tsai expressed her concern about “mainland China’s military 
expansion in the region,” she (Tsai, 2017, cited in DW News, 2017) was confident 
that the “cross-strait relationship would not become uncontrollable.” Also, Tsai (2017, 




makers” who “cannot exclude the idea that cross-strait problem cannot be solved 
through force but through peaceful means.” In 2018, Tsai reiterated her judgement 
that “the cross-strait relationship would not become uncontrollable” (Zhou, 2018). 
She believed in Taiwan’s ability to maintain the status quo and argued that “in this 
changing regional environment, maintaining the status quo would help Taiwan utilize 
this time to deepen its reforms” (Zhou, 2018).  
 
In this period, Beijing was content with its management of the cross-strait relationship, 
especially its capability of balancing its nationalist interests of defending the one 
China principle with preserving a relatively peaceful cross-strait environment. In 2017, 
an article written by the Taiwan Work Office of CCPCC (TWOCCPCC) (2017) 
reported that in the face of complex challenges brought about by the DPP 
administration, Beijing had “maintained the one China principle, preserved a 
generally peaceful cross-strait environment…and taken firm control of cross-strait 
relations.” Likewise, in 2018, a central research group of TWOCCPCC (2018) wrote 
that the mainland had “properly dealt with the changing political situation of 
Taiwan…firmly deterred Taiwan’s pro-independence movement, and vigorously 
maintained peace and stability in the cross-strait.” Also, in 2019, Liu Jieyi, the Director 
of the TWOCCPCC, made a similar judgement, stating that “since May, 2016, 
we…firmly contained various forms of Taiwan’s pro-independence movements…and 
ensured peace and stability in the cross-strait.”  
 
According to the statement above, one theme of Beijing’s content was derived from 
its ability to maintain one China principle. As noted earlier, the one China principle 
includes two sub-principles; the first is the PRC’s representation as China in 
international society, which means that Taiwan should not be internationally 
recognized as a sovereign state or other countries should not have high-level 
government to government contact with Taiwan. The second is that Beijing acts as 
the central government of Taiwan in international society. That is, Beijing would 




international organizations or economic pacts. However, in 2020, both sub-principles 
were violated. First, in May 2020, US Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex 
M Azar II made a visit to Taiwan and met with Tsai (Qin, 2020a). In September, the 
US Under Secretary of State Keith Krach visited Taiwan (Qin, 2020b) and became 
the highest-level official to have visited Taiwan in decades. All of these actions 
challenge the first sub-principle of one China principle. Second, Beijing’s power of 
containing Taiwan’s international space has been weakened. In 2020, Beijing was 
angered by Taiwan’s attempt to enter the WHO by advocating for its capability to 
contain the coronavirus or shaming Beijing for suppressing Taiwan’s right to obtain 
information about the virus (China News Net, 2020). Also, in September 2020, the 
US ambassador to the UN, Kelly Craft, had lunch with the director of Taipei Economic 
and Cultural office in New York and expressed her support for Taiwan’s participation 
in the UN (Lederer, 2020).  
 
Beijing views all these actions as serious violations of its crucial nationalist interests 
and warned that “any neglect, challenge, or denial of the one China principle will be 
doomed to fail” (Cankao Xiaoxi, 2020). Since Beijing believes that its important 
nationalist interests had been seriously damaged, it took on more assertive actions 
in 2020 to respond. In August 2020, the PLA conducted live fire drills near North and 
South of Taiwan twice (Xiaoshan, 2020b). On September 9 and 10, PLA conducted 
large scale drills within the Southwest of Taiwan’s ADIZ and the nearest drill area 
was 90 nautical miles away from Taiwan (You, 2020). On September 18, 18 PLA 
aircrafts entered Taiwan’s west, southwest, north, northwest airspace, some of which 
were near Taiwan’s territorial airspace (Zaobao, 2020).  
 
Beijing measured the strength of these actions. First, these actions are less assertive 
than seizing the Taiwan controlled Pratas Island, which was a PLA plan that was 
leaked by Japanese Kyodo news (Xiaoshan, 2020a). Second, according to the 




participate in the military drills on September 10 and 11 (You, 2020). Third, the PLA 
navy did not participate in the military drills on September 18.  
 
However, these actions made the cross-strait an increasingly contentious area. 
Unlike the reaction from 2016 to 2019, the Tsai administration was increasingly 
worried about conflicts in the cross-strait throughout 2020. In August 2020, Tsai 
explicitly admitted that she was worried about accidental conflicts in the cross-strait 
(CNA, 2020). In the evening of September 11, Taiwan’s Defense and Foreign 
Ministries held urgent press conferences and warned that the mainland’s actions 
could seriously deteriorate regional peace (RFA, 2020). In September 18, the 
Defense Ministry asked the mainland to “show restraint” and “not escalate cross-strait 
tension” in order to “cherish peace” (DW News, 2020). However, it is likely that 
escalation will continue if Beijing have believed that the one China principle has been 




From 2016 to 2019, although its shared identity approach failed, Beijing managed to 
maintain a relatively peaceful cross-strait environment without compromising its 
crucial nationalist interests of preserving the one China principle. Beijing consolidated 
one China principle through coercion, but refrained from provoking conflicts in the 
cross-straits. Also, Beijing tried to ameliorate frictions by strengthening Taiwan’s 
integration into the mainland.  
 
Regarding unification, Xin (2020, p. 550) argued that Beijing’s “dual track strategy” in 
this period, which combined coercion with engagement, had counterproductive 
effects. The effects included alienating Taiwan’s heart and mind, weakening “identity 
foundation for unification” and increasing the challenge of making Taiwan favor 





Xin’s argument is based on the assumption that if Beijing promotes engagement with 
Taiwan and does not use coercion to cause tension, the former will strengthen 
Taiwan’s “identity foundation for unification” (Xin, 2020, p. 551). However, this 
assumption has proved to be invalid. This is because, when Beijing unilaterally 
offered enormous economic interests to Ma administration and did not provoke any 
tension from 2008 to 2016, KMT did not wish to start political talks and Taiwan did 
not lean towards unification. As noted earlier, as long as Beijing was unwilling to 
acknowledge the existence of ROC, it would weaken the identity foundation and 
would even alienate pro-unity KMT members, let alone those supporting 
Taiwan/ROC (Taiwan) independence.  
 
Also, although Beijing’s strategic management from 2016 to 2019 did not entice 
Taiwan to favor unification, it did help the mainland preserve a relatively peaceful 
environment to increase its power advantages over Taiwan and thus ability to compel 
Taiwan to accept unification talks. Chen Xiancai (2020), the Director of Taiwan 
research center at Xiamen University, argued that, because neither the DPP nor the 
KMT was willing to start unification talks with Beijing and a forceful reunion would 
cause causalities, Beijing could consider compelling Taiwan to accept unification. 
The mainland officials do not publicly support this idea of compelling Taiwan. 
However, when they are confident about Beijing’s capability of handling the Taiwan 
issue, one of their major arguments is the mainland’s increasingly advantageous 
power over Taiwan. For instance, in 2018, the research group of TWOCCPCC (2018) 
wrote that, as the mainland’s power grows, “the strategic advantage that our power 
compared more favorably with Taiwan will continue increasing…[thus] when dealing 
with relations with Taiwan, we have more favorable conditions and stronger 
capability.” The “favorable conditions and strong capability” means that Beijing has 
more instruments at its disposal to pursue unification, and compelling Taiwan is one 





Beijing could compel Taiwan into unification by increasing the latter’s cost of rejecting 
unification talks. This is because Taiwan has always prioritized cost and benefit 
calculations over identities. One prominent evidence of Taiwanese pragmatism is 
that most pro-independence Taiwanese prefer the status quo due to the high cost of 
achieving de jure independence (Schreer, 2017, p. 54). In the most recent survey 
that was published by Taiwan’s National Chengchi University, which was 
commissioned by the Taiwan Foundation of Democracy in 2020, 67% of the 
respondents regard themselves as Taiwanese (BBC news, 2020). However, the 
strong sense of Taiwanese identity does not mean that Taiwanese will pursue de jure 
Taiwan independence. In terms of the survey, the majority of Taiwanese people (52%) 
wished to maintain the status quo (BBC news, 2020). According to many surveys and 
scholars’ analysis, their preference of the status quo is due to fear that Beijing will 
forcefully recover Taiwan if it were to declare de jure independence ((Kastner, 
2015/2016, p. 79; Hsieh, 2017, p. 10; Schreer, 2017, p. 54). 
  
This pragmatism has also been demonstrated in their view of the future cross-strait 
relationship based on surveys conducted by the National Chengchi University and 
Duke University from 2002 to 2019. These surveys can be regarded as the most 
impartial surveys of Taiwanese opinions on Taiwan–mainland relationship because 
they are only for research purposes and do not have political orientations. These 
surveys show that most Taiwanese prefer de jure independence, but more 
Taiwanese think that unification is likely to happen in the future than those who think 
that Taiwan will become independent (Niu, 2019, cited in Han, 2019). As the 
mainland’s power has grown in recent years, the number of Taiwanese that think 
unification is likely to happen is rising accordingly (Niu, 2019, cited in Han, 2019). In 
the 2019 survey, only 23.3% respondents said that they will resist the mainland if the 
war between the mainland and Taiwan begins, including those who only choose to 
protest the mainland or donate money (National Chengchi University, 2019); 50.8% 
of respondents would choose to not resist the mainland and 23% chose to not 




war (National Chengchi University, 2019). These results demonstrate that, if the 
mainland pushes for unification and the cost of maintaining the status quo exceeds 
the benefits, the majority of Taiwanese people will accept unification talks. Also, 
because the majority of Taiwanese people will not resist the mainland’s push for 
unification if the cost of resistance is too high, they view unification as the most likely 
outcome in the cross-strait’s future. 
 
Many scholars may argue against the idea that Taiwan would be compelled to accept 
unification talk if the cost of resistance would exceed the benefits. The often-cited 
evidence is the 2014 sun flower movement that a great number of Taiwanese 
opposed a service trade deal between the KMT administration and the mainland out 
of fear that deepening economic ties between them would seriously undermine 
Taiwan’s sovereignty and democracy and increase the mainland’s penetration into 
Taiwan (Rowen, 2015, pp. 5-6). This movement resulted in the KMT’s suspension of 
the trade deal and the DPP’ s landslide victory over the KMT in the 2016 Presidential 
election. Likewise, in the 2020 election, the DPP once again had a landslide victory 
over the KMT; one of the main reasons for this was that the Hong Kong protests in 
2020 raised Taiwan’s deep fear of losing its sovereignty and democracy. Scholars 
may argue that these events demonstrate Taiwan’s willingness to sacrifice its 
economic interests and dependence on the mainland to preserve Taiwan’s 
sovereignty and democratic system. 
 
First, contrary to these scholars’ arguments, the sunflower movement was more of 
an DPP’s attempt to mobilize popular movement and regain power, as opposed to 
the genuine Taiwanese nationalist protests that aimed to preserve Taiwan’s 
sovereignty through sacrificing economic interests. This is because the DPP 
abandoned sunflower movement’s goals once it regained power. First, in 2014, the 
protestors required the government to withdraw from the deal (DW, 2014). However, 
in the inauguration address in 2016, Tsai (2016) stated that “over twenty years of 




outcomes, which both sides must collectively cherish and sustain.” The outcomes 
included trade deals between Beijing and Taiwan. After the DPP won the election in 
2016, it called to restart negotiations of the service trade deal (Ke, 2016, cited in Cui, 
2016), but Beijing rejected this call (Ma, 2016, cited in Qi and Hui, 2016). in 2020, the 
DPP called to continue ECFA, the FTA that the service trade deal is based on, which 
the DPP had previously called “sugar coated shells” when it was the opposition party 
in 2010 (Ding, 2020). Also, the establishment of a supervisory mechanism over the 
Taiwan–mainland deals, which was the sunflower movement’s main goal, has been 
delayed up to now, although the DPP has been the majority party in the Legislative 
Yuan for 5 years (Li, 2019). Moreover, contrary to sunflower movement’s goal, 
Taiwan’s dependence on the mainland’s economy has increased during Tsai’s 
Presidency from 2016 to 2020. In 2020, Taiwan’s exports to the mainland and Hong 
Kong reached new high, accounting for 43.9 of Taiwan’s total exports (Fu and Wu, 
2021). These examples demonstrate that except that DPP regained power in 2016, 
thus far none of Sunflower movement’s goals has been realized. The DPP did not 
truly resist the trade deal or economic dependence on the mainland, but instead 
wished to mobilize citizens in order to regain its political power through the movement.  
 
Regarding the 2020 election, Taiwan’s nationalist concern was not the only reason 
for the DPP’s victory and, thus, may not prove the argument that the DPP won 
because Taiwan was willing to sacrifice its economic interests to preserve 
sovereignty and democracy. A counter example of this is that Han Kuo-yu, a KMT 
member that publicly endorsed the 1992 consensus, won the 2018 Taiwan mayoral 
election in Kaohsiung, which had been a stronghold of the DPP for decades, by 
highlighting the economic benefits provided by the mainland (Chen, 2018). In both 
the 2018 and 2020 elections, the same cause led to different outcomes. Although the 
Taiwanese people highly valued Taiwan’s sovereignty and the KMT endorsed the 
1992 consensus in both elections, the KMT won the former and lost the latter. Thus, 
Taiwan’s nationalist concern is not a sufficient condition of the DPP’s landslide victory 




eagerness for an overnight success. The KMT Presidential candidate Han Kuo-yu 
lacked legitimacy when competing for the presidency. He won the mayor election in 
late 2018 and became the mayor for half a year. As a result, his Presidential 
campaign in 2019 led many Taiwanese people to distrust him (KMT, 2020, cited in 
Guo, 2020). Also, Han’s abrupt announcement that he would run for president 
angered leaders of different KMT factions, as they had also wished compete for 
KMT’s Presidential candidate position. This directly resulted in the KMT’s disunity 
and ineffectiveness of mobilizing human, social, and capital resources to support Han 
(KMT, 2020, cited in Guo, 2020). If Han had not joined the Presidential election, he 
would have remained the most popular political figure in Taiwan in 2019, and a united 
KMT would at least have been able to compete with the DPP.  
 
Moreover, even if strong identification with Taiwan’s sovereign status and democratic 
system is the only reason for the sunflower movement and the KMT’s failure in the 
Presidential election, this chapter still argues that Taiwan would be pushed into 
unification talks with the mainland once the cost of resistance would exceed the 
benefits. This is because protests or elections are not costly, Taiwanese people can 
oppose certain policies because they just need to take them to the streets or vote. 
To be sure, the protestors occupied the legislative Yuan and Executive Yuan in the 
2014 sunflower movement. This may have resulted in them being sentenced to jail, 
thereby increasing their cost of protest. However, they probably were not afraid of 
this because of DPP’s backing. In fact, when the Tsai government came to power in 
2016, the administration immediately revoked the criminal charges against 126 
protestors (Taiwan Today, 2016). Also, to be sure, the sunflower movement in 2014 
and the DPP’s Presidency from 2016 to 2020 changed Taiwan’s mainland’s policies. 
However, they did not change the essence of the status quo that Taiwan is in general 
excluded from the international community, which is the root cause of Taiwanese 





The costliest way for the Taiwanese to prove their strong identification with Taiwan’s 
sovereignty is to voluntarily join the army, through which they can show that they are 
willing to be trained tough or sacrifice their lives to resist unification or bear the 
enormous cost of declaring de jure independence. However, this is the cost that many 
young Taiwanese people do not wish to bear. It is not a secret that most young 
Taiwanese do not want to join the army (Sima, 2020). Even the leaders of the 
sunflower movement shirked responsibility of protecting Taiwan‘s sovereignty and 
democracy when they were required to join the military service. For instance, Lin 
Feifan, the leader of the sunflower movement and the DPP’s Vice Secretary, joined 
the alternative civilian service that only worked in civilian institutions rather than the 
military organ (Cheng, 2015). Chen Weiting, another leader of the sunflower 
movement, also joined the alternative civilian service (ETtoday, 2016). Lin Xuzuo, 
the major organizer of the sunflower movement, did not join the army because he 
claimed to have serious anxiety (Zhou, 2016).  
 
Second, many young Taiwanese people are opposed to changing the voluntary 
military service into full conscription, reflecting the limits of their determination to 
defend Taiwan. For instance, many young people vigorously participated in the 
sunflower movement in 2014 and were in favor of voting for the DPP in 2016, which 
shows a strong determination to defend Taiwan’s sovereignty and democracy. 
However, their determination to defend Taiwan dramatically reduced, and they 
threatened to vote against the DPP when DPP considered introducing full 
conscription before the 2016 election (Zhang and Chen, 2016). As a result, the DPP 
swept the issue under the rug to win young Taiwanese people’s votes. This is an 
solid piece of evidence that shows that, for young Taiwanese citizens, the cost of 
protest and voting is much lower than joining the army; therefore, they are willing to 
bear the cost of the former but not the latter.  
 
This also shows that, while Taiwanese people strongly identify with Taiwan’s 




of them are reluctant to be trained tough or sacrifice their lives to defend Taiwan. 
Thus, when the cost of resisting unification becomes too high, they may be more 
inclined to accept unification talks. 
 
Kastner (2015/2016, pp. 61-62) argued that Taiwan’s growing identification with 
sovereignty would make Beijing pessimistic about the future of unification and, thus, 
initiate conflicts. However, Beijing’s confidence that it could push Taiwan into 
unification increases Beijing’s willingness to maintain the status quo and wait until 
the time is ripe. As demonstrated in the preceding section, even if Taiwanese citizens 
strongly identify with Taiwan’s sovereignty, Beijing remained confident in its ability to 
deter the independence movement and maintain a relatively peaceful environment 
from 2016 to 2019. In 2019, Xi (2019) called for unification. However, there were no 
substantive changes in the mainland’s interaction with the DPP in 2019.  
 
Although Beijing is willing to wait until it can successfully compel Taiwan to accept 
unification talks, Taiwan’s increasingly courageous attempt to challenge the one 
China principle may escalate cross-strait frictions. This has been demonstrated by 
Beijing’s increasingly strong military actions in 2020, which aimed to deter the DPP’s 
violation of the one China principle, in regards to high-level official contact between 
Taiwan and the US, and Beijing’s authority as the central government of Taiwan in 
international society. While Beijing showed restraint in these actions, they have also 
aroused Taiwan’s fear of cross-strait conflicts and increased tension in 2020.  
 
In summary, in the DPP era, because of the failed one China approach, Beijing 
increasingly relied on using offensive measures in a restrained way, to strike a 
balance between maintaining a stable Taiwan strait and defending the one China 
principle. This strategy worked from 2016 to 2019. Maintaining a stable strait could 
help Beijing increase power to compel Taiwan to unification. However, in 2020, this 
strategy failed to strike a balance. Although Beijing demonstrated restraint in its 




military actions also heightened tension, which could reach a tipping point. These 
findings reinforce the overall argument of the thesis that China’s strategy of defending 
its crucial nationalist interests in a restrained way has limitations and may not always 
succeed in striking the right balance.  
 
The mainland’s strategic management with the US from 2016 to 2020 
 
This section is divided into two parts. The first part analyses the strategic 
management from 2016 to 2019, whereas the second part analyses the strategic 
management in 2020.  
 
In order to deter Taiwanese independence, the mainland has sought shared interests 
with the US to preserve the current status quo and downplayed its ambition of 
recovering Taiwan. As noted earlier, the mainland’s strong nationalist will of reversing 
the status quo conflicts with the US’ preference of maintaining it. However, as the 
mainland has been well aware that it is not able to reunite with Taiwan easily, it needs 
to preserve the status quo, which constrains Taiwan’s de jure independence 
movement. Thus, Beijing downplayed its nationalist identity, which prefers reversing 
the status quo. First, Beijing changed the rhetoric of its policy from liberating Taiwan 
to peaceful unification since 1978, although the option of forcefully recovering Taiwan 
has not been excluded. This change signals that the mainland’s use of force mainly 
aims to deter Taiwan’s pro-independence movement (Xi, 2019). This change 
downplayed the mainland’s nationalist identity because it made the mainland’s cross-
strait policy less offensive and more aligned with the status quo. Since 1978, Beijing 
has not attempted to use force to conquer Taiwan, as it had done in the 1950s.  
 
From 2016 to 2019, this change helped Beijing have more shared interests with the 
US, because both oppose Taiwan’s de jure independence, albeit for different reasons 
(the US wishes to maintain cross-strait stability, whereas Beijing wants to defend the 




Moriarty, told Tsai that, if Taiwan insisted on a referendum to change the Taiwanese 
Olympic team’s name from Chinese Taipei to Taiwan, the US would not help, and 
Beijing may kick Taiwan out from International Olympic Committee (Cui, 2018). Also, 
the US publicly opposed Taiwanese pro-independence extremists’ movement, which 
aimed to pave the way for Taiwan’s independence referendum in 2019 (Li, 2019).  
 
Also, from 2016 to 2019, while the US has gradually changed its China policy from 
engagement to competition (Green, 2017; Hsiao and An, 2018), it generally attached 
greater value on maintaining China–US cooperation in other dimensions and, thus, 
refrained from posing great challenges to Beijing’s one China principle. For instance, 
in 2019, President Trump once halted the sale of a F16v to Taiwan in order to 
conclude a trade deal with the mainland (Walcott and Worland, 2019). Also, in 2018, 
the US, passed the Taiwan Travel Act, which permitted senior US government 
officials to meet with their Taiwanese counterparts (Lai, 2018). This move effectively 
eliminated the unwritten restrictions that the Taiwanese President, Vice President, 
and Defense Minister were not allowed to visit Washington D.C. (Zheng, 2019). 
However, the US made an unofficial visit to Taiwan to participate in events 
celebrating the US–Taiwan relationship in 2019 (Focus Taiwan, 2019). Likewise, Tsai 
was not allowed to visit Washington when she transited from the US to countries with 
which Taiwan had diplomatic ties in 2019 (Strong, 2019). 
 
Also, during this period, the US challenged Beijing’s one China principle and China 
responded, but the two sides were able to keep frictions under control. For instance, 
in 2016, as President elect Trump received a congratulations call from Tsai, making 
him the first President elect of the US to speak with a Taiwanese President since 
1979 (Phillips, et al, 2016), China requested Trump to state his commitment to the 
one China principle when Trump and Xi had their first phone call in 2017 (Blanchard 
and Holland, 2017). When Trump promised to “honor the One China policy” 
(Blanchard and Holland, 2017), the relationship went back to normal. In this instance, 




a good relationship with the US. Although it requested Trump to publicly support the 
one China policy, China downplayed the importance of the call, as the Foreign 
Minister Wang Yi stated that it was “just a small trick” of Taiwan (Phillips, et al , 2016).  
 
Likewise, in response to the US’ arms sale to Taiwan and the sail of warships across 
the strait in 2019, PLA air fighters crossed the middle line of the cross strait (Global 
Times, 2019). However, the action only targeted Taiwan and was for deterrence 
purposes only because the air fighters did not confront the US vessels and chose to 
cross the southwest of the cross-strait rather than Taiwan’s capital Taipei. In this way, 
China aimed to show its resolve in defending its sovereignty over Taiwan, while 
simultaneously maintaining a stable relationship with the US.  
 
As noted earlier, from 2016 to 2019, Taiwan and Beijing did not worry that the frictions 
of the cross-strait would get out of control. This also demonstrates that the US and 
China managed the Taiwan issue because, in the past decades, cross-strait crises 
were related to frictions between the two countries in regards to the Taiwan issue. 
This was evidenced by the 1995–1996 crisis that was caused by the Clinton 
administration granting Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui permission to visit the US 
in 1995 (Ross, 2000, p. 87). 
 
However, in 2020, the US government was less restrained in its handling of the 
Taiwan issue compared with its actions from 2016 to 2019. According to the US 
Assistant Secretary of State, David Stilwell, the US would not change its one China 
policy, but rather make “adjustments” to “restore the balance” in response to China’s 
aggression, which included depriving Taiwan’s diplomatic allies (Maginer, 2020). 
Although the congress has passed several bills to “restore the balance” since 2018 
(Maginer, 2020), the US government has been measured in implementing these bills 
from 2018 to 2019. In contrast, the US government subtaintively implemented the 
bills in 2020. As noted above, unlike in 2019 when the US paid an unofficial visit to 




US governors, the Health Secretary Alex Azar (Qin, 2020a) and the US Under 
Secretary of State Keith Krach, officially visited Taiwan in 2020 (Qin, 2020b). Also, in 
2020, the US was active in its support of Taiwan’s participation in the WHO as an 
observer, which included the Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, calling for the WHO’s 
Director-General Tedros to invite Taiwan (Fletcher, 2020).   
 
Although the US argued that this readjustment is because of China’s increasingly 
assertive policy towards Taiwan, this argument is not convincing because Beijing’s 
policies regarding the DPP administration are not new. The competition between the 
mainland and Taiwan over other countries’ diplomatic recognition was tense when 
the DPP governed Taiwan from 2000 to 2008. In this period, 6 countries shifted 
diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC (Nan, 2019). Also, from 2000 to 
2008, the mainland suppressed the DPP’s efforts to extend Taiwan’s international 
space by preventing Taiwan from participating in international organizations even in 
the name of Chinese Taipei. However, unlike in 2020, the US’ actions during the 
2000s demonstrated a tolerance towards Beijing’s suppression of Taiwan (Sutter, 
2019). Some observers argue that the US’ tolerance in the 2000s was because the 
DPP’s Chen administration in the 2000s was a revisionist government, whereas the 
Tsai administration from 2016 to 2019 was status quo oriented. However, although 
the Tsai administration was less assertive than the Chen administration in terms of 
pursuing Taiwan’s de jure independence, it still pursues a salami slicing strategy that 
gradually separates Taiwan from the mainland (Roy, 2017, p. 1137). For instance, in 
2018, Taiwan abolished the Taiwan and Fujian provincial governments, which were 
representations of Taiwan being a part of China (BBC News, 2018). Also, in 2020, 
some DPP members proposed replacing “to meet the needs before unification” in the 
additional articles of the ROC’s constitution with “to meet the needs for national 
development” (Wang, 2020). Although this action did not declare Taiwan’s de jure 





Therefore, the root cause of the US’ readjustments was not China’s assertiveness, 
but the shrinking shared interests and less salient shared identity between both sides, 
which makes the conflicting interests salient. The economic interdependence 
between China and the US made Trump downplay the Taiwan issue from 2016 to 
2019 despite the congress’ bills (such as asking China to buy more US’ agricultural 
products) (Bolton, 2020, cited in Everington, 2020). However, the coronavirus 
pandemic in 2020 intensified frictions between the two countries and made economic 
interdependence less of a US priority. Trump (2020, cited in itv, 2020) stated that 
“100 trade deals wouldn’t make up for” the losses caused to the US by the pandemic. 
Moreover, Trump once said that China is the “desk in the oval office” and Taiwan is 
the “tip” of his marker (Bolton, 2020, cited in Everington, 2020) to stress the 
importance of maintaining a stable major power relationship with China. However, 
when the major power relationship became increasingly competitive, the US was less 
ambiguous about the difference between the One China principle and its One China 
policy. Beijing’s one China principle emphasizes on the PRC’s sovereignty over 
Taiwan but the US’s one China policy does not recognize this. As noted earlier, in 
2020, the US was less tolerant of the PRC’s claimed sovereignty over Taiwan by 
supporting Taiwan’s participation as an observer in the WHO and in the name of 
Chinese Taipei. This does not contradict the US’ one China policy because this action 
does not result in two Chinas or one China, one Taiwan. However, this does conflict 
with the one China principle because Taiwan may enter international organizations 
without PRC’s permission.  
 
As demonstrated in the preceding section, China views the US’ readjustment as a 
serious violation of its one China principle and escalates tension through military 
actions to show its resolve in defending the principle. If the US’s readjustment 
continues, Beijing and the US may slide into the game of chicken, whereby both sides 
wish the other would concede. To respond the US’ readjustments, Beijing has already 
been less restrained in its actions in 2020 compared to how it acted in 2019. For 




line and were in the Southwest of Taiwan, far from Taiwan’s capital of Taipei. 
However, in 2020, more air fighters frequently crossed the medium line and some air 
fighters were in the north of Taiwan, which is near to Taipei (BBC News, 2020). Also, 
in 2020, Beijing denied the existence of the medium line for the first time (BBC News, 
2020). The official commentary of the mainland’s state television declared that these 
actions were aimed at compelling the DPP to stop “colluding with external forces” 
and warned that if the DPP does not backtrack, it will “definitely receive a devastating 
blow” (CCTV news, 2020). If the US continues restoring the balance to compel Beijing 
to stop pressurizing Taiwan, such as the Secretary of the State’s visit to Taiwan or 
Taiwan’s participation in international organizations without Beijing’s permission, 
Beijing may initiate more assertive military actions to compel the US to backtrack. 
Although Beijing may try to show that its intention is to deter rather than to conquer, 
thus avoiding an over escalation of tension, the cross-strait will become highly 
contentious.  
 
In fact, this almost happened. According to Taiwanese media, the US had planned 
to send its Ambassador to the UN, Kelly Craft, to visit Taiwan in January 2021, but 
cancelled this visit because the mainland warned the US that PLA air fighters would 
follow Craft’s airplane, enter Taiwan’s territorial airspace, and open fire if Taiwanese 
air fighters resisted the PLA Airforce (Renran, 2021). In this case, Beijing 
demonstrated that its resolve to deter US support to Taiwan, thereby avoiding the 
US’s miscalculation whereby Beijing would forcefully conquer Taiwan by entering 
Taiwan’s territorial airspace. However, the tension was heightened because of the 
warning.  
 
Also, although the status quo did not change from 2016 to 2019, the changing 
distribution of power between Beijing and the US destabilized the US’s mutual 
deterrence policy. The mutual deterrent policy is based on the US’ absolute hard 
power advantages over the mainland. Since the establishment of diplomatic 




constrained by the US which “stands by” Taiwan (Jiang, 1998, cited in Lampton, 2014, 
p. 126). Based on its absolute advantage, the US has maintained its “strategic 
ambiguity” in the mutual deterrence policy, that is, the US does not explicitly say 
whether it would intervene if Beijing used force to reunify Taiwan (Hsu, 2010, p. 142). 
This strategic ambiguity prevents Beijing from pursuing forceful unification due to its 
fearing of the US’s possible intervention (Hass and Sacks, 2020). However, as 
Beijing’s power has grown, US scholars have begun to question whether this 
strategic ambiguity is enough for the US to help Taiwan deter Beijing.  
 
Hass and Sacks (2020) argued that the US should “make explicit claims that the 
United States would respond to any Chinese use of force against Taiwan,” because 
“ambiguity is unlikely to deter an increasingly assertive China.” Also, the US Captain 
of the Marine Corps, Mills (2020) argued that, in preventing Beijing from forcefully 
conquering Taiwan, the US should reconsider basing its army in Taiwan.  
 
The scholars or military officers’ suggestions are based on the assumption that 
clarifying the US’ security commitment on Taiwan will send a clear signal to Beijing 
and prevent it from taking the risk of forcefully reunifying Taiwan. However, if their 
suggestion is put into practice, Beijing will begin to forcefully recover Taiwan 
regardless of its disadvantaged power in comparison to the US. These authors may 
forget the history in which the US and China established the diplomatic relationship. 
In the 1970s, to defend Beijing’s sovereignty over Taiwan, Beijing insisted on three 
bottom line requirements of establishing the diplomatic relationship with the US: the 
US shifting diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the mainland, withdrawing its 
troops from Taiwan, and stopping its official security commitment/treaty to Taiwan 
(FMPRC, 2000). These were requirements that the US must meet if it wished to 
establish a diplomatic relationship with Beijing, and these are still valid today. This 
has been demonstrated by the Chinese Deputy Chief of Mission to the US Li Kexin’s 
statement that “The day that a U.S. Navy vessel arrives in Kaohsiung is the day that 




reflects the requirement that the US must not base its military force in Taiwan. It can 
be deduced from Li’s statement that the other two requirements are also red lines of 
Beijing’s use of force to reunify Taiwan. In other words, if the US clarifies its security 
commitment to Taiwan or diplomatically recognizes Taiwan, Beijing will use force to 




From 2016 to 2019, Beijing has sought to construct shared interests to oppose 
Taiwan’s de jure independence with the US, although the two sides share this interest 
for different reasons (i.e. the US wishes to maintain regional stability and Beijing 
wishes to defend the one China principle). Beijing and the US’ shared interests on 
other dimensions constrained the US from seriously challenging the one China 
principle. Beijing has also downplayed its ambition of unification through making its 
Taiwan policy more status quo oriented. Also, when the US challenged Beijing’s one 
China principle, Beijing reacted in a restrained way to strike a balance between 
defending the principle and preserving a relatively stable relationship with the US. 
The cross-strait status quo was relatively peaceful because neither Taiwan nor 
Beijing felt that armed conflicts would happen. Thus, throughout this period, China 
has managed to maintain a relatively peaceful cross-strait, while simultaneously 
defending the one China principle.  
 
However, in 2020, the shrinking shared interests between China and the US made 
strategic competition increasingly apparent. Thus, the US is less tolerant of Beijing’s 
emphasis on the PRC’s sovereignty over Taiwan. As a result, the cost of defending 
the one China principle is increasing because China is using more coercive tools to 
defend the principle in response to the US’s high-level government to government 
contact with Taiwan and support of Taiwan’s participation in the international 
organization. This has substantially escalated tension in the cross-strait. China and 




change their assertive policy. Although China may exercise restraint to avoid 
escalating the situation, the cross-strait tension is still rising. 
 
Also, if the US abandons its strategic ambiguity and clarifies its security commitment 
to Taiwan, PRC will view this as an event that separates Taiwan from the mainland. 
China will use force to recover Taiwan, which will cause conflicts in Taiwan strait. 
 
These findings demonstrate the viability and limitations of the strategic management 
of identities/interests, which contributes to the overall arguments of the thesis. First, 
shared interests did help China strike a balance between maintaining a relatively 
stable environment and defending the one China principle. The importance of shared 
economic interests and shared major power identity reduce the salience of the 
conflicting interests between China and the US, particularly in terms of the Taiwan 
issue. This has effectively constrained the US from challenging Beijing’s one China 
principle despite its differences from the US’s one China policy from 2016 to 2019. 
Second, in 2020, the shrinking shared interests between China and the US made 
their major power relationship competitive. Consequently, China overtly relied on 
pursuing its nationalist interests in a restrained way to strike the balance. China was 
escalating the tension in the strait, which may have reached it tipping point, despite 




This case study contributes to the overall arguments of the thesis by demonstrating 
the viability and limitations of Beijing’s strategic management of identities/interests in 
striking the balance between maintaining a relatively peaceful environment and 
defending/pursuing crucial nationalist interests. First, Beijing’s strategic management 
from 2008 to 2019 was relatively successful. Beijing’s shared one China identity and 
its ability to downplay its conflicting interests with the KMT from 2008 to 2016 helped 




without Beijing’s explicit use of force. Second, the importance of shared interests and 
major power identities between China and the US from 2016 to 2019 reduced the 
salience of conflicting interests between China and the US regarding Taiwan. Third, 
Beijing’s reliance on using offensive means in a restrained way effectively struck this 
balance from 2016 to 2019. However, limitations of the strategy are prominent. 
Beijing’s reluctance to recognize the ROC’s status resulted in the failure of its shared 
One China identity approach, which makes non-coercive unification impossible. 
Beijing’s over-reliance on using offensive means in a restrained way also failed to 
strike the balance in 2020, because despite Beijing’s restraint, the tension in the 
Taiwan strait heightened. Also, the shrinking shared interests made the US less 
tolerant of Beijing’s one China principle, which stresses the PRC’s sovereignty over 
Taiwan. If Taiwan would enter international organizations without Beijing’s 
permission or if the US would explicitly state its commitment to Taiwan, a war in the 

















Chapter 12 Conclusion 
Many optimists that have believed that China’s peaceful rise is possible often argued 
that through engagement, China’s communist and nationalist identities and related 
illiberal or threatening behaviors can be socialized or transformed into behaviors that 
are more socially acceptable in the international community (Johnston, 2008; ampbell 
and Ratner, 2018, p.61). Other optimists argued that China is more of a status quo 
power, norm taker, or responsible stakeholder than a revisionist power (Johnston, 
2003, Chin and Thakur, 2010, Etzioni, 2011, p.549). However, as China’s power rises 
while its two identities remain unchanged, many such optimists have become 
frustrated (Campbell and Ratner, 2018, p.60-61; Pomfret, 2018). Moreover, it 
appears that pessimists that have viewed China as a revisionist power that 
challenges the interests of many regional countries and US leadership in East Asia 
(Goldstein, 2007, p.640, Christensen, 2015, p.2) have dominated the once-heated 
debate over whether China is a status quo or revisionist power.  
 
Consequently, a new and important question arises, that is, can China peacefully rise 
in East Asia without changing its communist and nationalist identities? As 
demonstrated in the introduction, answers to this question from China’s perspective 
are underexplored within the Chinese and Western literature. This thesis makes initial 
progress in this regard. 
 
Theoretical Contribution. 
Part 1 details the analytical framework of this thesis, which includes Chapter 2 on SIT 
and Chapter 3 on UFS, and demonstrates the thesis’s theoretical contribution to the 
literature. In Chapter 2, the thesis highlights that the current theoretical frameworks 
used by scholars have weaknesses when analyzing China’s actions and their related 
impact. First, some optimistic defensive realists, liberal institutionalists, and 
constructivists underestimated the important influence of the two identities on China. 




recovering Taiwan and neglects to acknowledge that China attaches importance to 
other nationalist goals. China views that preventing other countries’ potential 
intervention from the first island chain is vital for national survival due to its 
experiences in the century of humiliation in which imperial powers invaded China 
from the sea (Liu, 2004). This view underpins the Chinese navy’s expansion in the 
SCS. Liberal institutionalist Ikenberry (2014, p.8) falsely regards that China will yield 
to the pressure of a coalition of democratic countries and change its illiberal behavior. 
However, as demonstrated in Chapter 6, when perceiving itself to be facing great 
ideological challenges, the CCP conducted a vigorous top-down approach to 
recentralize its power and ensure the party’s domination over other non-party 
systems. Further, some constructivists that have argued that China could possibly be 
socialized have underestimated the identity costs that China would suffer in the 
process of such socialization (Johnston, 2008, Epstein, 2013). Second, thus far, 
pessimistic neo-classical and offensive realists’ expectations that China’s rise would 
not be peaceful because it would face a hard-balancing coalition from established 
powers (Goldstein, 2007, p.641) has also not been realized. Thus, since the current 
theoretical frameworks used by scholars in the extant literature have not been 
completely satisfactory for examining China’s rise in East Asia, we need a new 
approach to understand China’s relationship with East Asian states and the US. 
 
As such, this thesis proposes an SIT-based approach to explore the puzzle in which 
China has not changed its communist and nationalist identities but has managed to 
maintain a relatively benign regional environment and has not yet been confronted 
by a hard-balancing coalition. First, this SIT-based approach uses SIT’s 
recategorization strategy, which comprises attempts that increase “the number of 
categories which simultaneously define a target … to reduce ingroup-outgroup 
differentiation” (Prati, et al, 2021, p. 50). One of the recategorization strategies is the 
creation of cross-cutting identities/interests (Hogg, 2016); that is, although China has 
conflicting identities and related interests with other states in some dimensions, they 




shared identities/interests could cancel out the negative effects of the conflicting 
identities/interests (Brown, 2000). The cross-cutting identities/interests open up the 
possibility that even if China does not change its communist and nationalist identities, 
it could still preserve a relatively peaceful environment and prevent the formation of 
a hard-balancing coalition by forming shared identities/interests with other states on 
non-conflicting dimensions. Second, this thesis uses SIT’s emphasis on the rational 
choice of the actor to explore how China manages the consequences of actions 
deriving from its conflicting identities. While stressing that an actor cannot change its 
important identity, SIT also postulates that the actor could pursue their identity-
related interests in a rational manner (Van Zomeren, et al, 2012, p.188, Hogg, 2016). 
According to this principle, China could manage these consequences by pursuing its 
nationalist actions in a restrained manner. Based on these two principles, to maintain 
a relatively peaceful environment, China could form and increase the salience of its 
shared identities and interests and pursue or defend the interests deriving from 
identities that conflict with those of others in a restrained manner. 
 
The thesis’s approach also makes a contribution to the application of SIT in IR and 
the analysis of China’s rise. The current dominant SIT framework in IR, established 
by Larson (2015), focuses on its three identity management strategies: social mobility 
(abandoning a disadvantageous or lower status social identity to gain higher status 
identities), social creativity (changing negative traits into positive ones or finding 
another dimension/group for comparison), and social competition (reversing the 
current status of the relationship) (Tajfel and Turner, 2001, p103, Larson, 2015). 
Scholars that have used SIT to analyze China’s rise have erroneously viewed social 
creativity as a feasible strategy to realize China’s peaceful rise (Gries, 2005, Larson, 
2015). As I demonstrate in Chapter 4, this view has weaknesses because China 
cannot sidestep the negative sentiments deriving from these two identities by finding 
another dimension for comparison. Since these scholars regard social creativity as a 
viable means for China to achieve a peaceful rise, they have failed to discuss how 




recategorization strategy, which is SIT’s method of ameliorating competition, has not 
been used within existing studies. In the IR literature, three scholars have addressed 
recategorization strategy. Mercer (1995, p.250) notes that the EU can ameliorate 
conflicts between France and Germany; however, his focus is on the fact that this 
superordinate identity will not change the “self” or “other” distinction because the EU 
also has “the other,” such as Japan (Mercer, 1995, p.250). Ward (2015, p.21) used 
recategorization to explain how a shared Anglo-Saxon identity fostered a relatively 
peaceful power transition from the UK to the US in the 20th century; however, his 
case study is short and lacks depth (Ward, 2015, p.29). Finally, Wendt (1999, p.229) 
argues that collective identity is social identity; however, as noted in the introduction 
of this thesis, constructivists’ definition of collective identity formation is to a large 
extent dissimilar to that of SIT. Thus, using recategorization to analyze China’s 
relations with regional countries and the US can fill the gap left by previous academic 
works that have used SIT to analyze China’s rise and IR. 
 
Another of this thesis’s contributions to SIT’s application in IR is bringing its emphasis 
on actors’ rational choice back to IR’s SIT framework. Scholars that have employed 
SIT to analyze China’s rise have often underplayed SIT’s emphasis on rational choice 
in their frameworks (Gries, 2005, Lee, 2016, Larson, 2015). Moreover, thus far, SIT 
has not been applied to analyze regional flashpoints, such as the SCS disputes and 
the Taiwan issue. This thesis also fills this gap. 
 
Chapter 3 focuses on UFS. The current dominant application of UFS, treats the 
strategy as a revolutionary one, reflecting the irreconcilable competition between 
authoritarian and democratic states (Brady, 2017). However, in this thesis, UFS is a 
practice of SIT that aims to manage competition and cultivate shared identities and 
interests that enable trust and compromise between conflicting parties. Moreover, 
many Chinese scholars have used traditional Chinese thoughts as frameworks to 
prove that China’s peaceful rise is possible (Qin, 2014, Yan, 2016). However, UFS, 




analyze China’s peaceful rise in East Asia, and this thesis fills the gap. Moreover, 
unlike the predominant analysis of UFS, which has mainly examined China’s 
relationship with sub-national actors, this thesis examines the shared 
identities/interests among China’s state counterparts. In the Taiwan chapter, the 
thesis does examine Beijing’s relationship with the KMT and the DPP. However, it 
focus on whether Beijing has successfully constructed a shared “one China” identity 
with the KMT and the DPP.  
 
SIT offers a general idea about how China could possibly maintain a relatively 
peaceful environment without changing its communist and nationalist identities. UFS, 
as an example of SIT, demonstrates concrete ways in which China can put SIT into 
practice. In Chapter 3, through an exploration of how the CCP attempted to form 
shared identities/interests with Chiang/warlords and downplay conflicting ones, this 
thesis deduced principles of what I call the strategic management of identities and 
interests. First, China could maintain a relatively benign relationship with other actors 
by seeking shared identities and interests in important dimensions. Second, these 
shared identities and interests could offset the negative effects that derive from 
conflicting identities/interests and, thus, help China downplay them. Third, China 
could pursue conflicting interests in a restrained manner to downplay conflicting 
identities and interests. Fourth, when others raise an incident that makes conflicting 
identities salient, China can again react in a restrained manner to avoid a total 
breakdown of its relationship with others. To control this reaction, it may choose less 
confrontational means of response. Fifth, even if China acts offensively to prevent 
the perceived serious damage to its critical interests, it can behave with restraint and 
always maintain a cooperative attitude for negotiation. Sixth, when China feels that 
its critical interests or identities are secured, it will avoid overtly escalating frictions 
that are destructive to its relationships with others. China does this by showing 
restraint when it develops strategies or reacts to others’ assertive actions, seeking 
shared identities or interests to offset frictions or conceding less important interests 





Another original contribution of this thesis is its application of the CCP’s UFS in the 
anti-Japanese war period as a framework to analyze the CCP’s, and later the PRC’s, 
interaction with regional countries and the US from 1944, when the US military 
observation team visited Yan’an, to the present. This framework has not been used 
in the literature before. As noted in the introduction, this thesis uses the UF framework 
due to the many similarities between the CCP’s relationship with Chiang/warlords 
and the PRC’s relationship with the US/regional countries. 
 
In Chapter 3, the thesis explains the CCP’s division of the two periods based on its 
power distribution with the KMT’s Chiang and its adjustment of its recategorization 
strategy in these two periods. In the defensive period, the CCP’s power lagged 
behind that of the KMT’s Chiang in all dimensions. In the stalemate period, because 
the CCP’s power rose to a point that began to threaten Chiang’s leading status, 
Chiang began to constrain the CCP’s rise. However, because Chiang’s power was 
declining and the CCP’s power was rising, Chiang could not easily constrain the CCP. 
Moreover, since the CCP’s power did not exceed that of Chiang, the CCP could not 
easily expel Chiang’s containment. A stalemate was, thus, formed between Chiang 
and the CCP. The CCP adjusted its recategorization strategy according to the power 
distribution and Chiang’s responses. In the defensive period, the CCP’s main target 
for recategorization was Chiang as only through successfully forming shared 
identities/interests with Chiang could the CCP break through the KMT’s encirclement. 
In the stalemate period, the CCP’s main target for recategorization was the KMT 
warlords; since Chiang prioritized conflicting identities/interests and was determined 
to contain the CCP, it was difficult for the CCP to form a shared identity/interests with 
Chiang. This thesis applies this UF framework, mainly focusing on the CCP’s 
adjustments and the definition of the two periods, to analyze the CCP, and later the 






By applying the above analytical framework, this thesis makes several main 
arguments.  
 
First, competition between China and the US (or many regional countries) in several 
dimensions is inevitable. As the CCP is unwilling to transform China’s communist 
identity, China will continue to resist political liberalization. Further, due to its 
nationalist identity, China represents a revisionist power in the East Asian 
geostrategic context because it is determined to reverse its perceived disadvantages 
regarding territorial disputes and the US-led island chains encirclement. China’s 
efforts to defend its sovereignty claims will also cause frictions with other claimant 
states. Moreover, as China’s hard power is rising, it will threaten the US’s leadership 
in the region, forewarning the latter to constrain its rising power. 
 
Second, while this competition is inevitable, SIT’s recategorization strategy and 
emphasis on actors’ rational choice open up the possibility that China can strike a 
balance between its goals of stabilizing the communist regime and pursuing 
nationalist interests and maintaining a relatively peaceful environment by strategically 
managing its identities and interests. That is, based on the security of its communist 
and nationalist identities, China can possibly maintain a relatively peaceful regional 
environment by forming or increasing the salience of shared identities or interests 
with other countries and making the communist and nationalist identities and related 
interests less salient to others.  
 
Third, the CCP has used this strategic management strategy for decades, which is 
reflected by its international UFS. To a certain degree, this strategy has contributed 
to China’s simultaneous attainment of its three goals because the CCP has currently 
stabilized its control over the Chinese nation and secured or even advanced 
important nationalist interests while maintaining a relatively benign regional 




territorial disputes with regional countries, such as the SCS and Diaoyu island 
disputes, arouse frictions, they are under control in many cases.  
 
Nevertheless, this strategy has some limitations. Since China always seeks shared 
identities/interests when it perceives that its communist identity and key nationalist 
interests are secure, the shared identity/interests strategy may fail because the CCP 
does not want to concede its domination over the Chinese nation or its nationalist 
interests, such as unification with Taiwan on Beijing’s “one country, two systems” 
terms, in exchange for forming shared identities/interests.  
 
Furthermore, although China always demonstrates restraint when pursuing or 
defending important nationalist interests when compared with its most assertive 
options, it does not always achieve the intended result. For instance, China’s restraint 
may not be able to compensate for other regional states’ perceptions of the damage 
to their interests. Also, despite its restraint, China may incrementally increase the 
intensity of its actions, thereby leading to the escalation of tensions.  
 
Empirical Chapters. 
Parts 2 to 5 comprise the empirical chapters of this thesis. Part 2 includes Chapter 4, 
which contributes to the thesis’s main arguments by demonstrating that competition 
between China and regional countries or the US in several dimensions is inevitable. 
Unlike IR scholars using SIT that have viewed social creativity as a viable means for 
China to achieve a peaceful rise, Chapter 4 argues that because both of its identities 
are important for China’s self-identification, it can hardly abandon them (social 
mobility) or neglect them by finding other dimensions for comparison (social 
creativity). After proving social mobility and creativity are not viable methods, the 
thesis analyzes the reasons that China will meet the three conditions that cause 
social competition (an unstable power relationship, dissatisfaction with the current 
status quo, and a cognitive alternative). First, as its power rises, the power 




to reverse its perceived disadvantageous position regarding its territorial disputes 
and the East Asian geostrategic environment. China will also promote pluralism in 
the face of pressure from US-led liberal internationalism. From China’s perspective, 
it cannot declare the completion of national rejuvenation without achieving its key 
nationalist goals, such as recovering Taiwan. Moreover, China wishes to rise as a 
socialist great power and, thus, will work hard to preserve its communist identity.  
 
Based on the argument that competition between China and regional countries or the 
US is inevitable in some dimensions, Parts 3 and 4 analyze to what extent China has 
preserved a relatively peaceful environment through its strategic management of 
identities and interests by breaking or preventing a perceived US-led hard-balancing 
coalition in East Asia without changing its communist and nationalist identities from 
1944 to today. Drawing on the UF framework, this thesis denoted the period from 
1944 to 1976 as that in which the CCP, and later the PRC, strived to form a shared 
identity/interests with the US to break the US-led economic and military blockade on 
China (Chapter 5). The period from 1978 to 2009 is defined by this thesis as the 
defensive period, in which China’s power lagged behind that of the US in all 
dimensions (Chapter 6). China’s strategic management of its identities and interests 
in these two periods is the major theme of Part 3, which covers China’s historical 
application of this strategic management. The thesis defines the period from 2009 to 
today as the period of stalemate between China and the US (Part 4). During this 
stalemate period, the target of China’s strategic management of identities and 
interests has shifted from the US to regional countries. However, this does not mean 
that China will not try to construct a shared identity or interests with the US. This 
change occurred because during the stalemate period, the strategic competition 
between China and the US has been tense, and the nations’ shared interests, such 
as environmental protection, are unlikely to be salient enough to ameliorate frictions 





Within Part 3, which focused on China’s historical application of the strategic 
management of its identities and interests, Chapter 5 examines this strategic 
management between 1944 and 1976. The arguments presented in this chapter are 
as follows. First, China’s shared identity and interest approach broke the US-led 
military and economic blockade, even if the PRC was not politically liberalized and 
did not concede important nationalist interests, such as those related to the ROC’s 
status since the 1972 US-China rapprochement. Second, the strategic partnership 
reduced the salience of China’s communist identity within the Sino-US relationship 
and encouraged the US to concede to conflicting interests related to China’s 
nationalist identity, such as the issue of Taiwan. Third, to establish an amicable Sino-
US relationship, the CCP downplayed China’s communist identity by proposing 
ideological armistice and minimized its nationalist identity by conceding less 
important interests relating to Taiwan, such as tolerating Taiwan’s de facto 
independence. 
 
However, this strategy had some limitations. First, the shared identity/interests 
approach failed to help the CCP ameliorate the relationship with the US before 1970 
because the CCP was reluctant to concede when it perceived that China’s communist 
regime and crucial nationalist interests were insecure. For instance, one reason that 
CCP failed to form an anti-Japanese alliance with the US in 1944 and gain US 
recognition in 1949 was that the CCP was unwilling to loosen its control over its base 
area in 1944 or the Chinese nation in 1949. Second, the shared interests/identity 
approach may not be effective enough to ameliorate frictions deriving from conflicting 
identities, as evidenced by China’s failure to use the shared interest of easing the 
Taiwan Strait tension in 1955 to pave way for the establishment of a Sino-US 
diplomatic relationship.  
 
Chapter 6 argues that, to a certain degree, the strategic management of identities 
and interests succeeded in helping China maintain a relatively benign regional 




defensive period. The relationship between China and the US was good from 1979 
to 1989 and from 2002 to 2008, respectively, due to the salience of their shared 
strategic partnership and anti-terrorist colleague identity. Moreover, shared economic 
interests helped China gain “most favored nation status” from the US in 1994. Their 
shared strategic partnership and anti-terrorist collaborator identity also reduced the 
salience of China’s communist identity despite China’s suppression of the student 
protests in 1989 and failure to improve its human rights record in the 2000s. China 
also attempted to downplay its communist and nationalist identities to alleviate 
regional countries’ fear and ideological competition. For instance, it discontinued its 
support for the communist movements in regional countries from the late 1970s, 
maintaining a low-profile policy from 1990 to the 2000s. Meanwhile, the CCP 
maintained political control over the Chinese nation. Frictions occurred when China 
consolidated or defended its key nationalist interests; however, it attempted to use 
controlled military actions and diplomatic means to avoid undue escalation. In some 
cases, it succeeded, such as the 1988 seizure of land in the Spratly Islands and the 
1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis.  
 
However, in some cases, China’s restraint in using offensive means failed to prevent 
these frictions from overt escalation. For instance, China underestimated ASEAN’s 
strong criticism after its seizure of Mischief Reef in 1995. Moreover, because the CCP 
would not concede its authoritarian control over the Chinese nation, the ideological 
frictions had been salient until China constructed another shared identity/interest to 
which the US attached significance. For instance, the ideological frictions between 
China and the US were highly salient after the end of their strategic partnership in 
1991, although China’s efforts to construct shared economic interests with the US 
smoothed these frictions in 1994. 
 
Part 4 discusses to what extent China has preserved its communist identity and 




Asia in order to preserve a relatively benign regional environment in the stalemate 
period (Chapters 7–9).  
 
Specifically, Chapter 7 examines how the CCP ensured its control over the Chinese 
nation while avoiding an anti-communist coalition in East Asia during the stalemate 
period. Chapters 8 to 9 analyze how China sought shared identities and interests with 
regional countries while pursuing or defending its own nationalist interests in a 
restrained manner to prevent the formation of a regional hard-balancing coalition 
operating against it.  
 
Chapter 8 argues that based on economic partnerships, China is increasing the 
salience of its economic interests and constructing a shared pluralist identity with 
regional countries through BRI, despite their conflicting interests. The shared 
economic interests and pluralist identity could offset the negative effects of the 
nations’ conflicting interests and, thus, could possibly prevent regional countries from 
joining a hard-balancing coalition.  
 
Chapter 9 investigates how China pursued nationalist interests in a restrained 
manner. This is because although China has made significant efforts to seek shared 
interests and identities with regional countries and, thus, preserve the peaceful 
environment, its nationalist actions, if uncontrolled, will likely cause regional countries 
to prioritize conflicting identities and interests over shared ones and join a rival bloc 
to contain it. To systematically analyze China’s restraint in pursuing offensive actions, 
this chapter presents three criteria. First, China’s actual actions are compared with 
the actions that it could have taken before the incident. Second, China’s actual 
actions are also compared with similar actions of regional states. Third, the chapter 
classifies regional countries’ responses into five categories to analyze the 
effectiveness of China’s strategy, that is, whether its restraint could avoid the 
breakdown of its relationships with regional countries. The first category is declarative 




(Chubb, 2021, p.88). The second is demonstrative response, which means actions 
by regional states demonstrating their claimed sovereignty without directly or 
physically confronting China (Chubb, 2021, p.89). The third is low-intensity 
confrontation, in which regional states use limited means to directly confront China 
while cautiously avoiding overt escalation and remaining ready for de-escalation. The 
fourth is medium-intensity confrontation, in which regional states use stronger means 
than those of low-intensity confrontation to directly confront China but still also 
cautiously avoid over-escalation and remain ready for de-escalation. The fifth is high-
intensity confrontation; here, regional states use forceful means to confront China 
with little if not no consideration for de-escalation. If the regional states choose high-
intensity confrontation, their relationships with China will break down.  
 
By examining China’s gray zone operations, such as its patrolling of the first island 
chain and the China Coast Guards’ actions regarding fishing and oil exploration, this 
chapter argues that in these operations, China has demonstrated restraint when 
compared with its most assertive options. China’s actions in these gray zone 
operations have generally been of similar strength or even less assertive than other 
regional states’ similar actions. In general, regional states’ responses to China’s 
actions have ranged from declarative response to medium-intensity response. Thus, 
China’s strategy of pursuing or defending its nationalist interests in a restrained 
manner does manage the consequences of its nationalist actions. Moreover, China’s 
upper limit of not occupying land features held by other claimants reduces the 
threatening potential of its gray zone actions. China’s response to Japan’s 
nationalization of the Diaoyu Islands also prevented tension from unduly escalating 
while consolidating China’s sovereignty claims over this island chain. The one 
exception is the Scarborough Shoal incident of 2012, which is discussed in Chapter 
10 as a case study of the SCS disputes. 
 
Part 5 presents the thesis’s case studies, including Chapters 10 and 11. These case 




pursued important nationalist interests and maintained a relatively benign regional 
environment through its strategic management of identities and interests.  
 
Chapter 10 covers the SCS disputes. Specifically, this chapter analyzes to what 
extent China has maintained a balance between pursuing critical nationalist interests 
and avoiding overtly escalating frictions and breaking down its relationship with 
regional countries through the strategic management of its interests. Like Chapter 9, 
Chapter 10 analyzes China’s restraint in pursuing or defending its nationalist interests 
through a comparison between its actual actions and the available options before the 
incidents, a comparison between its actual actions and other regional states’ similar 
actions, and the five categories of response specified in the preceding chapter. This 
chapter explores the two cases that have had a significant influence on China’s 
sovereignty claims and relationships with regional countries/ASEAN: the 2012 
Scarborough Shoal incident and the Philippines’ 2013 submission of arbitral awards 
to the PCA and its subsequent impact.  
 
This chapter argues that China’s strategic management of its interests was effective 
in striking a balance but had limitations. First, China’s shared interests in the de-
escalation with the Philippines or ASEAN did manage the tension in the SCS in the 
first phase (April 11–14), the first half of the third phase of the Scarborough Shoal 
incident in 2012, and the tensions aroused by the arbitral tribunal from 2013 to 2016. 
China’s endorsement of ASEAN’s shared interests in managing the disputes helped 
it alleviate ASEAN’s pressure. Second, China’s strategy of defending its interests in 
a restrained manner ensured space for dialogue, especially in the case of the arbitral 
tribunal. 
 
However, in the Scarborough Shoal incident, China’s reluctance to accept the 
Philippines’ proposal for international arbitration led to its failure to construct shared 
interests in de-escalating the tensions from April to May. Further, although China 




Philippines’ perceived loss and directly resulted in the breakdown of the relationship 
between the two countries from July 2012 to 2016. 
 
Chapter 11 features a case study of the Taiwan issue. In this chapter, the thesis 
examines how Beijing attempted to strike a balance between achieving its nationalist 
goal to reunite with Taiwan, defending the one China principle, and maintaining a 
relatively stable Taiwan Strait through strategically managing identities and interests. 
This chapter reveals that, to a large extent, Beijing’s strategic management of 
identities and interests failed in the context of the Taiwan issue. First, Beijing formed 
a shared one-China identity with the KMT through the 1992 consensus from 2008 to 
2016. Meanwhile, Beijing downplayed its nationalist identity to the Taiwanese by 
tolerating the KMT’s interpretation of China as the ROC and giving the KMT space to 
participate in international organizations. By doing so, the mainland defended the one 
China principle and a relatively peaceful Taiwan Strait without explicitly using force 
from 2008 to 2016. However, since Beijing was reluctant to recognize the ROC’s 
legitimacy, the KMT was stigmatized as a traitor of the ROC and was unable to 
commence political talks with Beijing or revise textbook guidelines that promote de-
Sinification. Consequently, non-coercive unification was impossible. Due to this 
reluctance, Beijing’s effort to seek a shared one-China identity with the DPP also 
failed. Thus, Beijing increasingly relied on conducting military actions in a restrained 
manner to address the DPP’s disobedience of the one China principle and maintain 
a relatively stable Taiwan Strait. Beijing succeeded in striking this balance from 2016 
to 2019; however, although Beijing demonstrated restraint, the cross-strait tension 
escalated, particularly in 2020. The shrinking shared interests between Beijing and 
the US also led the US to become less tolerant of Beijing’s emphasis on the PRC’s 
sovereignty over Taiwan, which resulted in Beijing’s more escalatory military actions 
in 2020. As a result, Beijing is finding it increasingly difficult to strike a balance 
between maintaining a relatively peaceful Taiwan Strait and pursuing or defending 
the one China principle. As such, heightened tension or even conflict in the Taiwan 






Besides reinforcing the main arguments of the thesis, the empirical chapters 8, 9, 10, 
and 11 also make novel empirical contributions to the literature.  
 
First, this thesis contributes to the literature with findings concerning China’s 
assertiveness. Some analysts have argued that China has been increasingly 
assertive in consolidating its sovereignty claims (Hoang, 2016, p.188, Do, 2018, 
p.213-214), while other scholars have held that China has been restrained when 
consolidating these claims (Wu and You, 2019, p.54, Zhang, 2019, p,119) 
 
The findings of this thesis demonstrate that China does show restraint when 
compared with its most assertive options. In many cases, China’s actions are of 
similar strength or even less assertive than other claimant states, such as the CCG’s 
governing of fishing activities. However, in some cases, China is more assertive than 
other claimants even if it is restrained when compared with its most assertive options. 
Nevertheless, China’s restraint may not be able to compensate for other states’ 
perceived significant damage to their sovereignty interests, as demonstrated by the 
case study of the Philippines’ loss of the Scarborough Shoal in the SCS chapter. 
Moreover, while China shows restraint, it may heighten regional tension by increasing 
the strength of its actions, as demonstrated by this thesis’s case study of Taiwan.  
 
Second, the current literature has mainly focused on the China-US relationship or 
China’s relationship with specific regional states (Boon and Ardy, 2017, p. 117, Smith, 
2021, p.57), and a more holistic analysis of the general pattern of China’s 
relationships with regional states is lacking (Boon and Ardy, 2017, p. 117, Smith, 
2021, p.57). SIT categorizes actors into a limited number of groups to simplify the 
social world (Larson, 2015, p.326). The identities and interests that China shares with 
regional states accentuate the similarities between them. Analyzing China’s attempts 




states can contribute to a more holistic analysis of the general pattern of China’s 
relationships with these regional states.  
 
Limitations and Future application. 
This thesis proceeded on the basis of the assumption that China will not experience 
a severe economic downturn. However, it should be recognized that any such severe 
economic downturn would have a negative influence on China’s strategic 
management. A possible economic downturn would first decrease China’s 
performance legitimacy and, thus, destabilize the communist regime. Second, China 
mainly uses its economic interests or partnerships to attract regional countries, and 
a severe economic downturn would substantially reduce this attractiveness. Third, a 
severe economic downturn would also hinder China’s achievement of its nationalist 
goals because its military modernization would not have sufficient economic support.  
 
Second, in Chapter 6, the thesis analyzes China’s use of shared Asian and pluralist 
identities to downplay its communist identity in East Asia and prevent the formation 
of a regional anti-communist coalition. Downplaying its communist identity in East 
Asia is relatively easy because most regional countries do not value or prioritize 
democratic values. However, ideological competition is salient in international society, 
especially between China and Western countries. Currently, ideological divergences 
between Xinjiang and Hong Kong have already hindered the cooperation between 
China and European countries in important dimensions. For instance, in 2021, the 
European Union suspended its trade deal with China due to China’s sanctions on a 
member of the European Union parliament, which was a tit-for-tat response to the 
EU’s sanction on Chinese officials over China’s Xinjiang policy (Ni, 2021). The trade 
deal has been regarded by many as China’s attempt to prevent the US consolidation 
of a transatlantic partnership with the EU (Lau, 2020). Thus, the EU’s suspension of 
the trade deal reflects how China’s shared interests approach may fail to ameliorate 
ideological frictions. Thus, to what extent China’s strategic management is effective 







12371 Net. 2016. Xi Jinping guanyu jiaqiang dangwei lingdao banzi jianshe lunshu 
zhaibian 习近平加强党委领导班子建设论述摘编 [the selected edits of Xi Jinping’s 
speech concerning consolidation of Party Committee]. 12371 Net. [online]. 
[Accessed 25 May 2021]. Available from: 
http://news.12371.cn/2016/03/02/ARTI1456868176414679.shtml 
A central research group of TWOCCPCC. 2018. Yi Xi zong shuji duitai gongzuo 
zhongyao sixiang yinling xin shidai duitai gongzuo以习总书记对台工作重要思想引领
新时代对台工作[dealing with Taiwan issue in the new era, we must be under the 
guidance of General Secretary Xi’s important thought regarding mainland’s Taiwan 
policy]. Qiushi. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_2029333 
AFP. 2021. Philippines' Duterte refuses to stop South China Sea patrols. France 24. 
[online]. 29 April. [Accessed 11 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210429-philippines-duterte-refuses-to-
stop-south-china-sea-patrols 
Agence France-Presse. 2012. Other nations must take stand on China – Philippines. 
Inquirer, net. [online]. 22 April. [Accessed 22 May 2012]. Available 
from:  https://globalnation.inquirer.net/34333/other-nations-must-take-stand-on-
china-%E2%80%93-philippines#ixzz6xgTLIebm  
Ansfield, J., and Johnson, I. 2012, China’s hierarchy Strives to regain Unity After 
Chongqing leader’s ouster. The New York Times. [online]. 31 March. [Accessed 25 
May 2021] Available from: https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/30/world/asia/chinas-
leaders-seek-unity-after-ouster-of-bo-xilai.html?_r=1&ref=china 
Anya, A. and Septiari, D. 2019. Indonesia, Vietnam clash again at sea. The Jakarta 






AP News. 2014. Philippine court convicts 9 Chinese of Poaching. AP News. [online]. 
24 November. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://apnews.com/article/77bfe65c727b4d9ba245cc398b2a6a7d 
AP News. 2020. Vietnam demands Malaysia probe fatal shooting of fishermen. AP 
News. [online]. 18 August. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://apnews.com/article/malaysia-shootings-hanoi-vietnam-
6316cb878af7adb124cceb3f88dfc422 
ASEAN. 1967. ASEAN declaration. [Press release]. [Accessed 19 June, 2018]. 
Available from: https://asean.org/the-asean-declaration-bangkok-declaration-
bangkok-8-august-1967/ 
ASEAN. 2007. ASEAN Charter. [Press release]. [Accessed 25 June 2019]. Available 
from: https://asean.org/storage/2012/05/The-ASEAN-Charter-26th-Reprint.pdf 
ASEAN.(2016, July 24). Joint Communiqué 49th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ 
Meeting.[Press release]. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://asean.org/storage/2016/07/Joint-Communique-of-the-49th-AMM-
ADOPTED.pdf 
ASEAN.2015. Joint Communiqué 48th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting.[Press 
release]. [Accessed 25 May 2021]. Available from: https://www.asean.org/wp-
content/uploads/images/2015/August/48th_amm/JOINT%20COMMUNIQUE%20OF
%20THE%2048TH%20AMM-FINAL.pdf 
Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. 2017. Update: China’s continuing reclamation 
in the Paracel. Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. [online]. August 9. [Accessed 
22 May 2021]. Available from: https://amti.csis.org/paracels-beijings-other-buildup/ 
Associate Press. 2018. Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte will go to war with China 
if it crosses ‘red lines’ and claims disputed resources, foreign ministry warns. South 






Avendano, C., and Yap, DJ. 2012. Aquino: These are our waters. Philippine Daily 
Inquirer. [online]. 24 April. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://globalnation.inquirer.net/34503/aquino-these-are-our-waters 
Baidu Baike. 百度百科. No date. Waizhai chang zhai lv 外债偿债率. [Debt service 
ratio]. Baidu Baike. [online]. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://baike.baidu.com/item/外债偿债率/4871758?fr=aladdin 
BBC News. 2011. Vietnam accuses China in seas disputes. BBC News. [online]. 30 
May. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
asia-pacific-13592508 
BBC News. 2014. China detains Vietnamese fishermen in South China Sea. BBC 
News. [online]. 4 July. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-28168447 
BBC News. 2015. China to 'complete' South China Sea land reclamation. BBC News. 
[online]. 16 June. [Accessed 16 June, 2018]. Available from: 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-33144751 
BBC News. 2016. Min Jin Dang Huiying Wang Yi xianfa ruidong liangan heping shuo 
民进党回应王毅“宪法推动两岸和平说 [DPP’s response to Wang Yi’s statement of 
using ROC constitution to promote cross-strait peace]. BBC News. [online]. 26 
February. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/china/2016/02/160226_tw_dpp_wangyi 
BBC News. 2019. Taiwan Fujian sheng zhengfu: tingbai beihou 91 nian de bianqian 
shi 台湾福建省政府：停摆背后一段 91 年的变迁史 [Taiwan’s Fujian provincial 
government, the 91 years development behind the lockout]. BBC News. [online]. 4 
January. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/chinese-news-46745882 
BBC News. 2019. Zhongguo Wuhan Luoyang kangyi la ji chang feng shao zao 
zhenya: zheshe zhongguo minzhong yundong du li xing中国武汉阳逻抗议垃圾焚烧
厂遭镇压，折射中国民众运动独特性 [the protests against construction of waste 
incineration power plants in Luoyang, Wuhan, China has been suppressed, reflecting 




May 2020]. Available from: https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/chinese-news-
48881707 
BBC News. 2020. Liangan guanxi Jiefang Jun zhanji yueguo haixia zhongxian beihou 
de Zhong mei tai jushi 两岸关系：解放军战机“越过海峡中线”背后的中美台局势[The 
relationship between two sides of the corss-strait, the relationship among Taiwan, 
Mainland and the US behind PLA air fighters’crossing of the cross-strait medium line]. 
BBC News. [online]. 21 September. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/chinese-news-54189623 
BBC News. 2020. Taiwan mingyi diaocha xianshi: Taiwan ren rentong chuang xingao 
dan weichi xianzhuang rengshi zhuliu mingyi 台湾民意调查显示： 台湾人认同创新
高  但维持现状仍是主流民意  [Taiwan public opinion survey demonstrates: 
Taiwanese regarded themselves as Taiwanese only reached new high but the 
mainstream public opinion is still maintaining the status quo]. BBC News. [online]. 14 
July. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/chinese-news-53391406 
Beijing Daily. 2013. Zhunque bawo dangzhen fenkai de neihan 准确把握党政分开的
内涵 [rightly understand the meaning of separating the party from government]. 
People’s Net. [online]. 25 March. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2013/0325/c49150-20899102.html 
Beijing Daily. 2021. Yidai yilu duijie dajian tejian: 11 ge zhongfei zhengfu hezuo 
xiangmu yi wancheng 一带一路对接大建特建: 11 个中菲政府合作项目已完成 [one 
belt one road connected with build build build: 11 China-Philippine governmental 
cooperation projects completed]. One Belt One Road Net. [online]. 5 February. 
[Accessed 25 May 2021]. Available from: https://www.ydylcn.com/zx/336828.shtml 
Beijing Youth Daily. 2014. Meiti: 1989 zhi 2010 nian jian 800 duoming yumin bei 
zhuakou panxing 媒体：1989年至 2010年间 800多名渔民被抓扣判刑 [Media: from 
1989 to 2010, over 800 fishermen had been arrested and faced criminal charges]. 





Blanchard, B. 2013. Newsmaker: Chinese President Xi raised by elite, steeled by 
turmoil. Reuters. [online]. 14 March. [Accessed 29 May 2019]. Available from: 
https://www.reuters.com/article/china-parliament-xi-president/newsmaker-chinese-
president-xi-raised-by-elite-steeled-by-turmoil-idINDEE92D03K20130314 
Blanchard, B., and Holland, S. 2017. Trump changes track, backs “one China” policy 
in call with Xi. Reuters. [online]. 10 February. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available 
from: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-china-idUSKBN15P0ED 
Blanchard, B., and Yu, J.M. 2017. China, Taiwan spar over Chinese diplomat's 
invasion threat. Reuters. [online]. 11 September. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available 
from: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-taiwan-usa-idUSKBN1E506A 
Bloomenthal, A. 2019. Six factors driving investment in China. Investopedia. [online]. 
29 May. [Accessed 22 June 2019]. Available from: 
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/economics/09/factors-drive-investment-in-
china.asp 
Bordadora, N. 2011. ‘It’s West Philippine Sea’. Inquirer. [online]. 11 June. [Accessed 
26 June 2019]. Available from: https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/13833/‘it’s-west-
philippine-sea’ 
Border, J. 1997. Clinton defends engagement with China. New York Times. [online]. 
25 October. [Accessed 4 May 2019]. Available from: 
https://www.nytimes.com/1997/10/25/world/clinton-defends-engagement-with-
china.html 
Brown, J. 2017. The failure of Abe’s new approach to Russia. Nikkei Asia. [online]. 
28 June. [Accessed 22 May 2019]. Available from: 
https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/The-failure-of-Abe-s-new-
approach-to-Russia 
Buckley, C. 2016. China’s Foreign Minister castigates Canadian reporter for rights 
question. New York Times. [online]. 2 June. [Accessed 29 May 2019]. Available from: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/03/world/asia/canada-china-wang-yi.html 
Calonzo, A. 2012. AFP official: situation at Panatag Shoal stable as another Coast 






Cankao Xiaoxi 参考消息. 2020. Wai jiao bu huiying mei buzhang fangtai; tiaozhan 
yizhong yuanze biding shibai 外交部回应美部长访台：挑战一中原则必将失败 
[Foreign Ministry’s response to the US’s Health Secretary’s visit to Taiwan; any 
challenge to one China principle will be doomed to fail]. Sohu. [online]. 6 August. 
[Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.sohu.com/a/411719427_114911?_trans_=000014_bdss_dkjhl 
Cao, Guoxing. 曹国星. 2013. Bo Xilai tingshen zuihou chengshu quanwen baoguang, 
fouren xiangzuo zongli pujing 薄熙来庭审最后陈述全文曝光：否认想做总理，普京 
[Bo Xilai’s last statement at the court hearing fully exposed that denied he wanted to 
be Premier or Putin]. Rfi. [online]. 29 August. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available 
from: https://www.rfi.fr/cn/中国/20130829-薄熙来庭审最后陈述全文曝光-否认想做
“总理、中国普京” 
Cao, jingqing. 曹锦清. 2013. yongyou sange zixin danqi sanda zeren 拥有三个自信，
担起三大责任 [having three type of confidence and shoulder three types of 
responsibilities]. People’s daily overseas. [online]. 1 August. [Accessed 24 May 2019]. 
Available from: http://opinion.people.com.cn/n/2013/0801/c1003-22401388.html 
CCP Northeast Bureau. 1948. Dongbeiju gei Zhongyang de dianbao 东北局给中央
的电报 [CCP Northeast Bureau’s telegram to CCPCC]. 6 November.  
CCTV News. 2017. Zhonggong zhongyang bangongting guowuyuan bangongting jiu 
qilianshan guojia ziran baohuqu shengtai huanjing wenti fachu tongbao. 中共中央办
公厅国务院就祁连山国家自然保护区生态环境问题发出通报 [The Office of Chinese 
Communist Party Central Committee and the State Council’s announcement 
regarding the environmental protection issue of Qilianshan environmental protection 
zone]. CCTV News. [online]. [Accessed 12 June 2019]. Available from: 
http://tv.cctv.com/2017/07/20/VIDEa7YJc19V1IyApgvLj20X170720.shtml 
CCTV News. 2018. Dujia shipin: zhongguo kongjun hong-6K deng duoxing zhanji 
zhanxun nanhai 独家视频：中国空军轰-6K 等多型战机战巡南海 [exclusive video: 




25 March. [Accessed 26 June 2019]. Available from: http://news.sina.com.cn/o/2018-
03-25/doc-ifysqwsc6722088.shtml 
CCTV News. 2018. Xi Jinping guanyu heping fazhan de zhexie zhenyan [Xi Jinping’s 
comments concerning peaceful development] 习近平关于和平发展的这些箴言 . 
China News. [online]. 20 September. [Accessed 2 May, 2019]. Available from: 
http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2018/09-20/8632508.shtml 
CCTV News. 2020. Zongtai haixian shiping: taidu shili ruo yiyi guxing bizao 
huimiexing daji [The comment regarding cross-strait relations from the central 
television: if Taiwan pro-independence force continues, it will definitively suffer a 
devastating blow]. CCTV. [online]. 20 September. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available 
from: https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1678275225840480728&wfr=spider&for=pc 
CCTV. 2018. Lihai le wo de guo 厉害了我的国 [amazing China]. [online]. [Accessed 
15 May 2021]. Available from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CT3ZdsSxgbM 
CCTV.com. 2000. Zhu Rongji zongli tan Taiwan wenti 朱镕基谈台湾问题  [Zhu 
Rongji talks about Taiwan issue]. CCTV.com. [online]. 15 March. [Accessed 24 May 
2019]. Available from: http://www.cctv.com/overseas/chinareport/200003/15.html 
CGTV. 2019. China confident to complete a 'final, binding' code of conduct in the 
South China Sea. CGTV.[online]. 1 August. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://news.cgtn.com/news/2019-07-31/China-ASEAN-complete-first-reading-of-
South-China-Sea-COC-draft--IMfjnOtXeo/index.html 
Chan, F. 2017. Indonesia blows up and sinks another 81 fishing boats for poaching. 
The Strait Times. [online]. 2 April. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/indonesia-blows-up-and-sinks-another-
81-fishing-boats-for-poaching 
Chen, Mingfeng. 陈民峰. 2016. Xiongsan daodan wushe Shijian Taiwan fayuan pan 
sanwei haijun junshiguan zuigao liangnian tuxing [the incident of Xiongsan missile 
falsely fired to the mainland, three navy officers were put into sentence and the 
highest prison term was three years]. RFi. [online]. 30 September. [Accessed 22 May 





Chen, Ming-tong. 陈明通 . 2018. Minzhu ziyou shi fazhan liangan guanxi de 
zhongyao jishi 民主自由是发展两岸关系的重要基石 [democracy and freedom is the 
major foundation for developing relationship between two sides of the cross-strait]. 
[online]. 24 July. Heritage Foundation. Washington, D.C. [Accessed 26 July, 2018]. 
Available from: https://www.rfa.org/cantonese/news/htm/TW-Speech-
07242018134513.html 
Chen, Shaoyu. 陈绍禹. 1938. Chen Shaoyu deng guanyu yige dadang wenti tanpan 
qingkuang gei Zhongyang de dianbao陈 绍 禹 等 关 于 一 个 大大党问题谈 判 
情  况  给  中  央  的  报  告  [Chen Shaoyu and others’ report to CCP Central 
Committee regarding the negotiation of forming a grand party]. In: Zhonggong 
Zhongyang tongyi zhanxian gongzuobu 中共中央统一战线工作部  [Chinese 
Communist Party Central Committee united front department] eds. Zhonggong 
Zhongyang kangri mingzu tongyi zhanxian wenjian xuanbian中共中央抗日民族统一
战线文件选编 [Selected documents of Chinese Communist Party Central Committee 
anti-Japanese united front]. Beijing: dang an chu ban she, pp. 183-184.  
Cheng, Bingzhang. 程炳璋. 2015. Ti dai yi nan Lin Feifan mingnian daxuan qian 
santian tuiwu 替代役男 林飛帆明年大選前 3 天退伍 [Lin Feifan who is serving 
alternative civilian service will leave the army three days before the Presidential 
election]. China Times. [online]. 24 December. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available 
from: https://www.chinatimes.com/realtimenews/20151224003203-260407?chdtv 
China Daily. 2007. Hu Jintao: zhongguo jiang shizhong buyu zou heping fazhan 
daolu [Hu Jintao: China will persist in peaceful development] 胡锦涛: 中国将始终不
渝走和平发展道路. China Daily. [online]. 15 October. [Accessed 15 October 2007]. 
Available from: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hqzg/2007-
10/15/content_6175356.htm 
China Daily. 2012. Manila going too far. China Daily. [online]. 27 April. [Accessed 22 
May 2021]. Available from: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2012-
04/27/content_15156014.htm 
China Daily. 2013. Waijiaobu: Gambia yu Taiwan duanjiao shixian buzhiqing 外交




Gambia break up diplomatic relationship with Taiwan beforehand]. China News Net. 
[online]. 15 November. [Accessed 15 November, 2013]. Available from: 
http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2013/11-15/5509481.shtml 
China Economic Net. 2012. Wen Jiabao jiu Diaoyu dao zaici biaotai: zhenzhen tiegu 
haobu tuirang 温家宝就钓鱼岛再次表态：铮铮铁骨毫不退让 [We Jiabao once again 
made statement regarding Diaoyu islands, we have iron bones and will not concede]. 
Sohu News. [online]. 21 September. [ accessed 21 September 2018]. Available from: 
http://news.sohu.com/20120921/n353658874.shtml 
China Economic Net. 中国经济网. 2013. Gaige kaifang yilai zhongguo linian GDP 
zengzhanglv yilan biao 改革开放以来中国历年 GDP增长率一览表 [China’s annual 
growth rate of GDP since reform and opening up]. China Economic Net [online]. 13 
August. [Accessed 25 May 2020]. Available from: 
http://intl.ce.cn/specials/zxxx/201308/13/t20130813_1358216.shtml 
China News Net, 2019. Zhongguo shangwubu: jiang jiakuai zhongrihan zimaoqu 
tanpan 中国商务部： 将加快中日韩自贸区谈判 [Chinese Ministry of Commerce:  
we will accelerate negotiation of Free Trade Zone among China Japan, and South 
Korea]. China News Net. [online]. 22 July. [Accessed 7 September 2019]. Available 
from: http://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1639745472527510764&wfr=spider&for=pc 
China News Net. 2012. Lingdaoren jielian jiu Diaoyu dao biaotai, Wen Jiabao chen 
juebu tuirang banbu. 领导人接连就钓鱼岛表态，温家宝称绝不退让半步 [Leaders are 
making statements regarding Diaoyu islands disputes, Wen Jiabao said that China 
would never make concessions]. Tencent News. [online]. 11 September. [ accessed 
11 September, 2018]. Available from: https://news.qq.com/a/20120911/000183.htm 
China News Net. 2012. Yuenan hai yang fa mingqi shengxiao：jiang xisha nansha 
naru zhuquan fanwei 越南海洋法明起生效：将西沙南沙纳入主权范围 [Vietnam’s 
national maritime law will come into effect tomorrow, which include Paracel and 
Spratly islands into its sovereignty scope]. Huanqiu Net. [online]. 31 December. 





China News Net. 2020. Guo Tai Ban: min jin dang dangju yiyi moudu zhuding zaodao 
kechi shibai 国台办：民进党当局“以疫谋独”注定遭到可耻失败[Taiwan Affairs Office 
of the State Council: DPP administration’s attempt to use coronavirus to pursue 
Taiwan independence is shameful and will be doomed to fail]. China News Net. 
[online]. 14 February. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1658507301498654315&wfr=spider&for=pc 
China news, 2011. Wen Jiabao: zhongguo jianding zhichi dongmeng quyu hezuo 
zhudao zuoyong 温家宝: 中国坚定支持东盟区域合作主导作用[China firmly supports 
ASEAN’s leadership in regional cooperation]. Ifengs. [online]. 30 April. [Accessed 25 
June 2019]. Available from: 
http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/special/wenjiabaochufangmalaixiya/content-
2/detail_2011_04/30/6095659_0.shtml 
China News.1999. Jiang Zemin tan zhongguo de jiben jiazhi guannian [Jiang Zemin 
talked about basic Chinese values] 江泽民谈中国的基本价值观念. China News. 
[online]. 27 September. [Accessed 2 May 2019]. Available from: 
http://www.chinanews.com/1999-9-27/26/2040.html 
China Taiwan Net, 2007. Zhou Enlai de yigang simu 周恩来的一纲四目 [Zhou 
Enlai’s one main theme and four specific conditions]. China Taiwan Net. [online]. 31 
October. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
http://www.taiwan.cn/tsfwzx/qybh/zywx/200710/t20071031_476933.html 
China Youth Net. 2019. Cong 31 tiao dao 26 tiao huitai zhengce jin yibu 从 31条到
26 条惠台政策进一步 [From 31 to 21 preferential policies, polices that benefits 
Taiwanese moves further]. China Youth Net. [online]. 11 May. [Accessed 22 May 
2021]. Available from: 
https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1649311316711094998&wfr=spider&for=pc 
Chinese Communist Party （CCP）. 1935. Wei kangri jiuguo gao quanti tongbao shu 
为抗日救国告全体同胞书[announcement of resisting Japanese army and saving the 
nation]. In: Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Archives eds. Zhonggong 




Communist Party Central Committee]. Beijing: Zhonggong Zhongyang dangxiao chu 
ban she, pp.518-525. 
Chinese Communist Party Central Committee. 1937. Zhongguo Gongchandang 
Zhongyang gei zhonggguo guomindang sanzhong quanhui dian 中国共产党中央给
中国国民党三中全会电 [Chinese Communist Party Central Committee’s telegram to 
the Third Plenary Session of Chinese Kuo Min Tang]. In: Chinese Communist Party 
Central Committee Archives eds. Zhonggong Zhongyang wenjian xuanji 中共中央文
件选集[selected documents of Chinese Communist Party Central Committee]. Beijing: 
Zhonggong Zhongyang dangxiao chu ban she, pp.157-158. 
Chinese Communist Party Central Committee. 1981. Guanyu jianguo yilai dang de 
ruogan lishi wenti de jueyi 关于建国以来党的若干历史问题的决议 [the resolution 
concerning the Party’s historical issue since the founding of PRC]. [Press release]. 
Available from: http://2008.cctv.com/special/733/-1/47008.html 
Chinese Communist Party Central Committee. 2016. Guanyu xinxingshi xia dangnei 
zhengzhi shenghuo de ruogan zhunze 关于新形势下党内政治生活的若干准则
[Several principles concerning intra-party political life in the new situation]. [Press 
release]. [Accessed 19 June 2019]. Available from: 
http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/fgk/law_display/6330 
Cho, Y., Hiroi, Y., and Anzai, A. 2018. Alibaba to bulk up shopping list of Japanese 
products. Nikkei Asian Review. [online]. 22 May. [Accessed 22 June 2019]. Available 
from: https://asia.nikkei.com/Asia300/Alibaba-to-bulk-up-shopping-list-of-Japanese-
products 
Chung, L. 2019. Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen tells Beijing it must respect island’s 
sovereignty, people’s choice. South China Morning Post. [online]. 1 January. 
[Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/2180250/taiwan-wont-give-
ground-sovereignty-tsai-ing-wen-says-new-year 
Chung. L. 2013. Philippines admits coastguard fired at Taiwanese fishing boat. South 






CNA. 2020. Liangan chongtu kenengxing, Tsai zongtong: danxin hui caqiang zouhuo 
兩岸衝突可能性 蔡總統：擔心會擦槍走火 [The possibility of cross-strait conflict? 
President Tsai worried about accidental conflicts]. United Daily News. [online]. 27 
August. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://udn.com/news/story/6656/4814930 
CNA. 2021. G7 guo weiyi wei yin xinjiang renquan zhicai zhongguo riben taidu baoliu 
G7国唯一未因新疆人权制裁中国日本态度保留 [the only country of G7 countries did 
not impose sanction on China, Japan’s attitude is conservative]. CNA. [online]. 24 
March. [Accessed 25 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aopl/202103240109.aspx 
Cui, Citi崔慈悌。 2016. Min Jin dang: Fumao 520 hou chongqi tanpan [DPP: service 
trade deal will be renegotiated after 20 May]. China Times. [online]. 25 January. 
[Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20160125000787-260202?chdtv 
Cui, Citi崔慈悌。 2018. Dongao zhengming ruobei tichu aohui, AIT zhuxi Moriarty 
tixing meiguo bang bu shang mang東奧正名若被踢出奧會 AIT主席莫健提醒美國幫
不上忙  [AIT’s chairman Moriarty mentioned that if Taiwan was kicked out from 
International Olympic Committee, the US could not help]. China Times. [online]. 19 
November. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.chinatimes.com/realtimenews/20181119004144-260407?chdtv 
Daim, N., and Teoh, Pei Ying. 2019. Malaysia's overall debt, liabilities stood at 
RM1.09 trillion at end-2018. New Strait Times. [online]. 17 July. [Accessed 25 May 
2021]. Available from: 
https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2019/07/505095/malaysias-overall-debt-
liabilities-stood-rm109-trillion-end-2018 
Das, S. 2015. What AIIB means for Asean connectivity. The Strait Times. [online]. 





Deng Xiaoping 邓小平. 1989. disandai lingdao jiti de dangwu zhiji第三代领导集体的
当务之急 [ the third collective leadership’s prior task].16 June.  
Deng Xiaoping. 邓小平.1989c. Zhongmei guanxi zhonggui yao haoqilai caixing 中
美关系终归要好起来才行 [The Sino-US relationship must be restored]. 71.cn. [online] 
[Accessed 15 May 2020]. Available from: http://www.71.cn/2008/0409/501048.shtml 
Deng, Xiaoping 邓 小 平 . 1978. Jiefang sixiang shishi qiushi tuanjie yiqie 
xiangqiankan 解放思想 实事求是，团结一切向前看 [emancipating thought, seeking 
truth from the fact, uniting together and moving forward]. People’s Net [online]. No 
date. [Accessed 25 May 2021]. Available from: 
http://www.people.com.cn/item/sj/sdldr/dxp/B101.html 
Deng, Xiaoping. 邓小平. 1980. Dang he guojia lingdao zhidu de gaige 党和国家领
导制度的改革 [the reform of the party and national leadership institution]. 71.cn. 
[online]. [Accessed 25 May 2020]. Available from: 
http://www.71.cn/2012/0423/612983.shtml 
Deng, Xiaoping. 邓小平. 1983. Deng Xiaoping zhongguo dalu he Taiwan heping 
tongyi de shexiang 邓小平中国大陆和台湾和平统一的设想 [Deng Xiaoping: the 
thoughts about peaceful unification between mainland China and Taiwan]. [online]. 
26 June. Zhongnanhai, Beijing. [Accessed 26 June, 2018]. Available from: 
http://www.taiwan.cn/wxzl/zhyyl/dxp/200811/t20081129_789323.htm 
Deng, Xiaoping. 邓小平. 1984. Jundui yao fucong zhengge guojia jianshe de daju. 
军队要服从政治国家建设的大局  [The army must obey the holistic situation of 
national development]. [online]. 01 November, Junwei Kuoda Huiyi, Beijing. 
[Accessed 4 June 2019]. Available from: http://www.71.cn/2008/0402/500857.shtml 
Deng, Xiaoping. 邓小平. 1986. Qizhi xianming de fandui zichan jieji ziyouhua 旗帜
鲜明的反对资产阶级自由化 [show the flag and oppose capitalist liberalization]. 
Aisixiang. [online]. [Accessed 25 May 2020]. Available from: 
http://m.aisixiang.com/data/3406.html 
Deng, Xiaoping. 邓小平. 1989a. Jianchi shehui zhuyi fangzhi heping yanbian 坚持




71.cn. [online]. [Accessed 25 May 2020]. Available from: 
http://www.71.cn/2012/0423/612905.shtml 
Deng, Xiaoping. 邓小平. 1989b. disandai lingdao jiti de dangwu zhiji 第三代领导集
体的当务之急 [The collective leadership of the third generation’s imperative]. 71.cn. 
[online] [Accessed 12 May 2015]. Available from: 
http://www.71.cn/2008/0409/501039.shtml 
Deng, Xiaoping. 邓小平. 1990. Shanyu liyong shiji jiejue fazhan wenti 善于利用时机
解决发展问题 [be good at seizing opportunity to solve developmental issue]. 71.cn. 
[online]. [Accessed 25 May 2020]. Available from: 
http://www.71.cn/2008/0409/501054.shtml 
Deng, Xiaoping. 邓小平.1981. Fazhan zhongmei guanxi de yuanze lichang 发展中
美关系的原则立场 . [the principle and position regarding developing Sino-US 
relationship]. 71.cn [online]. 4 January. [Accessed 25 May 2020]. Available from: 
http://www.71.cn/2012/0423/612986.shtml 
Deng, Xiaoping.邓小平. 1949. Dapo diguo zhuyi fengsuo zhidao 打破帝国主义封锁
之道 [the way to break imperial powers’ blockade]. 71.cn. [online]. [Accessed 25 May 
2020]. Available from: http://www.71.cn/2008/0116/499652.shtml 
Denyer, S. 2019. Japan-South Korea ties ‘worst in five decades’ as U.S. leaves 
alliance untended. The Washington Post. [online]. 9 February. [Accessed 5 May 




Department of Asian Affairs of Ministry of Commerce of People’s Republic of China,
中华人民共和国商务部亚洲司 . 2016. Zhongguo-dongmeng jingmao guanxi 
jiankuang 中国东盟经贸关系简况  [a brief introduction to ASEAN-China trade 
relationship]. [online]. [Accessed 21 June 2019]. Available from: 
http://yzs.mofcom.gov.cn/article/t/201609/20160901384768.shtml 
Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines [DFA], 2013. SFA 




[Accessed 18 May, 2018]. Available from: https://www.dfa.gov.ph/127-
newsroom/unclos/216-sfa-statement-on-the-unclos-arbitral-proceedings-against-
china 
Ding, Shijie.丁世杰. 2020. ECFA shi tangyi paodan haiyao chi, Lu Wei Hui; jiushi jixu 
ECFA是糖衣毒藥還要吃？陸委會：就是繼續 [Why should we continue if ECFA is 
sugar coated shell? Mainland Affair Council: we must continue]. China Times. [online]. 
28 May. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.chinatimes.com/realtimenews/20200528005584-260407?chdtv 
Dizon, D. 2012. DFA: Disputes shows China threat to other nations. ABS-CBN News. 
[online]. 23 April. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: https://news.abs-
cbn.com/nation/04/23/12/dfa-dispute-shows-chinas-threat-other-nations 
Dorimulu, P. 2018. Jakarta-Bandung high-speed rail to open in 2021: Constructor. 
Jakarta Globe. [online]. 05 August. [Accessed 24 June 2019]. Available from: 
https://jakartaglobe.id/context/jakarta-bandung-high-speed-rail-open-2021-
constructor 
DW News. 2017. Tsai Ing-wen; Beijing ying buhui dui tai dongwu 蔡英文：北京应不
会对台动武 [Tsai Ing-wen: Beijing will not use force to conquer Taiwan]. DW News. 
[online]. 29 December. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.dw.com/zh/蔡英文北京应不会对台动武/a-41974800 
DW News. 2020. Jie fang jun taihai junyan Taiwan huyu Yuanya lema 解放军台海军
演 台湾呼吁“悬崖勒马”[PLA conducted military drills in the Taiwan strait, Taiwanese 
Defense Ministry called for stop]. DW News. [online]. 17 September. [Accessed 22 
May 2021]. Available from: https://www.dw.com/zh/解放军台海军演-台湾呼吁悬崖勒
马/a-54986272 
DW News. 2020. Germany wants to mediate between US and China. DW.COM. 






DW. 2014. Tai yang hua xueyun tuichang 太阳花学运退场  [the Sun Flower 
Movement stopped]. DW. [online]. 10, April. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.dw.com/zh/太阳花学运退场/a-17558926 
DW. 2018. Tsai Ying-wen: Zhongguo dui quanqiu mingzhu goucheng weixie 蔡英文：
中国对全球民主构成威胁  [Tsai Ying-wen: China poses threat to democracy 
internationally]. DW. [online]. 25 June. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.dw.com/zh/蔡英文中国对全球民主构成威胁/a-44385720 
Dziedzic, S. 2020. Australia started a fight with China over an investigation into 
COVID-19 — did it go too hard?. ABC News. [online]. 20 May. [Accessed  March 
28, 2021]. Available from; https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-05-20/wha-passes-
coronavirus-investigation-australia-what-cost/12265896 
Ei Ei Toe Lwin, 2013. Fury over Letpadaung copper mine report. Myanmar Times. 
[online]. 18 March. [Accessed 24 June 2019]. Available from: 
https://www.mmtimes.com/national-news/5175-fury-at-copper-mine-report.html 
Eloksari, E. 2020. Alibaba.com aims to onboard 5,000 Indonesian SMEs by 
2025. The Jakarta Post. [online]. 11 December. [Accessed 26 May 2021]. Available 
from: https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/12/11/alibaba-com-aims-to-
onboard-5000-indonesian-smes-by-2025.html 
Esmaquel II, P. 2012. Aquino’s softened tone on Scarborough Shoal. Rappler. 
[online]. 21 June. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.rappler.com/nation/aquino-s-softened-tone-on-scarborough 
ETtoday. 2016. 11 tian lianyue 5 zhengmei dou ‘bushi nvyou’, Chen Weiting beibao 
fu ti dai yi guo taishuang 11 天连约 5正妹但都不是女友，陈为廷被爆服替代役过太
爽 [Exposed: Chen Weiting dated five girls but they are not his “girlfriend’ in 11 days. 
He is having a very relaxed time by joining alternative civilian service]. ETtoday. 
[online]. 8 June. [Accessed 25 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.ettoday.net/news/20160608/713171.htm 
ETtoday. 2018b. Dongao zhengming gongtou xuangao shibai 东奥正名公投宣告失




[online]. 25 November. [Accessed 25 November, 2018]. Available from: 
https://www.zaobao.com.sg/realtime/china/story20181125-910550 
Evangelista, K. 2012. Philippine archaeological ship leaves troubled West Philippine 
Sea. Inquirer, net. [online].19 April. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available 
from:  https://globalnation.inquirer.net/33923/philippine-archaeological-ship-leaves-
troubled-west-philippine-sea#ixzz6xgR2MG7p  
Everington, K. 2020. Bolton alleges Trump belittled US obligations to Taiwan. Taiwan 
News. [online]. 18 June. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3949896 
Fackler, M. 2014. Japan protests China’s near miss fly-bys over East China Sea. The 
Sydney Morning Herald. [online]. 12 June. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.smh.com.au/world/japan-protests-chinas-nearmiss-flybys-over-east-
china-sea-20140612-zs4me.html 
Feng, Xue. 冯雪. 2016. Zhang Zhijun: buyao wudu Wang Yi ti Taiwan de xianfa dui 
tai fangzhen bubian 张志军：不要误读王毅提台湾的“宪法” 对台方针不变[Zhang 
Zhijun: do not misinterpret Wang Yi’s mention of Taiwan’s constitution, our policy 
regarding Taiwan is unchanged]. The Observer. [online]. 2 March. [Accessed 22 May 
2021]. Available from: https://www.guancha.cn/local/2016_03_02_352697_s.shtml 
Fletcher, E. 2020. Swelling Bloc of WHO Member States Proposes Invitation To 
Taiwan For May 18 World Health Assembly. Health Policy Watch. [online]. 11 May. 
[Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: https://healthpolicy-watch.news/member-
states-submit-proposal-to-invite-taiwan-to-world-health-assembly/ 
Focus Taiwan, 2019. Former House Speaker Paul Ryan to attend TRA events. Focus 
Taiwan. [online]. 10 April. [Accessed 26 April, 2019]. Available from: 
http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201904100005.aspx 
Foreign Ministry of People’s Republic of China. 2000. Zhongmei jianjiao yu Deng 
Xiaoping fu zongli fangmei 中美建交与邓小平副总理访美[the establishment of Sino-
US relationship and the vice Premier Deng Xiaoping’s visit to the US]. FMPRC. 






Fu, Shuangqi., and Wu, Jihai. 傅双琪 吴济海. 2021. Taiwan 2020 nian dui dalu 
chukou chuang xingao. [Taiwan’s export to the mainland reached new high in 2020]. 
Xinhua Agency. [online]. 8 January. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/tw/2021-01/08/c_1126962176.htm 
Fu, Ying. 傅莹. 2021. Wo ceng qinli de huang yan dao Shijian, you xie hua bixu 
yaoshuo. 我曾亲历的黄岩岛事件，有些话必须要说  [My experience regarding 
Scarborough Shoal incident, something that I must say]. Guan Cha Zhe.  [online]. 
15 March. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1694253124699017425&wfr=spider&for=pc 
Fu, Ying. 傅莹. 2021. Wo ceng qinli de huang yan dao Shijian, you xie hua bixu 
yaoshuo. 我曾亲历的黄岩岛事件，有些话必须要说  [My experience regarding 
Scarborough Shoal incident, something that I must say]. Guan Cha Zhe.  [online]. 
15 March. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1694253124699017425&wfr=spider&for=pc 
Fu, Ying., and Wu, Shicun. 付莹和吴士存. (2016, May 12). Nanhai jushi ji Nansha 
qundao Zhengyi: lishi huigu yu sikao 南海局势及南沙群岛争议： 历史回顾与思考 
[South China Sea: how we got to this stage: understanding the source of tension]. 
Xinhua Net. [online]. 12 May. [Accessed 25 May, 2020] 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2016-05/12/c_128977813.htm 
Geddie, J and Shepherd, C. 2018. Southeast Asia, Beijing hail progress in South 
China Sea talks. Reuters. [online]. 2 August. [Accessed 2 August, 2018]. Available 
from: https://in.reuters.com/article/asean-singapore/southeast-asia-beijing-hail-
progress-in-south-china-sea-talks-idINKBN1KN0RZ 
Geddie, J. 2018. Trump's overture to emerging Asia drowned out by trade war. 






Gehrke, J. 2018. Pompeo: China is buying an ‘empire’. Washington Examiner. 
[online]. 25 June. [Accessed 25 June 2019]. Available from: 
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/defense-national-security/mike-
pompeo-china-is-buying-an-empire 
Global Times. 2012. Aung San Suu Kyi ouxuan zhongguo zaimian tongkuang 
zhengyi erdu huyu yifa xieshang 昂山素季斡旋在缅铜矿争议呼吁依法协商 [Aung 
San Suu Kyi mediated controversy relating China-backed cooper mine, calling for 
negotiation under law]. Global Times. [online]. 06 December. [Accessed 24 June 
2019]. Available from: http://world.huanqiu.com/exclusive/2012-
12/3352994.html?agt=15438 
Global Times. 2012. Zhang Zhaozhong: zhongguo bao xin cai zhanlue fanzhi fei 
qingzhan daojiao. 张召忠：中国包心菜战略反制菲侵占岛礁 [Zhang Zhaozhong: 
China’s cabbage strategy resists Philippines’ illegal occupation of land features]. 
Global Times. [online]. 27 May. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://mil.huanqiu.com/article/9CaKrnJAF0p 
Global Times. 2019. Miandian guanyuan xianru tingzhi de misong shui dian zhan 
keneng you tidai fangan 缅甸官员 : 陷入停滞的密松水电站可能有替代方案 
[Myanmar official: the stalled Myitsone Hydropower Dam may have alternative plan]. 
Bei Ji Xing Electric. [online]. 30 January. [Accessed 25 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://news.bjx.com.cn/html/20190130/960303.shtml 
Global Times. 2019. Taiwan can’t gamble on cross-straits crisis. Global Times. 
[online]. 1 April. [Accessed 26 April. 2019]. Available from: 
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1144298.shtml 
GMA News. 2012a. DFA: No need to ask US help in Panatag standoff, for now. GMA 
News. 12 April. [Accessed 22 May 2019]. Available from: 
https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/nation/254665/dfa-no-need-to-ask-us-
help-in-panatag-standoff-for-now/story/ 
GMA News. 2012b. DFA: 1 of 3 Chinese Vessels in Panatag Shoal standoff leaves. 






Gong, Li. 宫力. 1998. Mao Zedong yu meiguo 毛泽东与美国 [Mao Zedong and the 
US]. Beijing; Shijie zhishi chu ban she. 
Guo, Kuangchao. 郭匡超. 2020. Guo Min Dang baixuan jiantao baogao quanwen lie 
qida yuanying [KMT’s report regarding reflection of the Presidential Campaign failure, 
listing seven major reasons]. China Times. [online]. 15 January. [Accessed 22 May 
2021]. Available from: https://www.chinatimes.com/realtimenews/20200115003496-
260407?chdtv 
Haiwai Net. 海外网. 2018. Liaoning Jian zhende laile, Tai dangju jinzhang xishu; 
zheshi di shici 辽宁舰真的来了，台当局紧张细数：这是第十次 [Liaoning Aircraft 
carrier is really coming, Taiwan administration is nervous and counting: this is the 
tenth times]. Haiwai Net. [online]. 21 April. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1598313815562987362&wfr=spider&for=pc 
Han, Yi. 韩熠. 2019. Meiguo daxue mingdiao: liangan ruo kaizhan 23% Taiwan ren 
yuanyi dikang 美国大学民调：两岸若开战 23%台湾人愿抵抗 [Public opinion survey 
from the US’s university: if war in the cross-strait happens, 23% Taiwanese is willing 
to resist]. DW News. [online]. 9 April. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.dwnews.com/台湾/60127790/美国大学民调两岸若开战 23台湾人愿抵抗 
Heydarian, R, J. 2017. Tragedy of Small Power Politics: Duterte and the Shifting 
Sands of Philippine Foreign Policy. Asian Security, 13(3), pp.220-236. 
Hogg, M. 2016. Social identity theory. In: McKeown, S., Haji, R., and Ferguson, N. 
eds. Understanding peace and conflict through social identity theory: contemporary 
global perspectives. Switzerland: Springer International Publishing. pp.3-19.  
Hookway, J and Ngui, Y. 2018. Malaysia’s Mahathir leads opposition to breathtaking 
election win. The Wall Street Journal. [online]. 10 May. [Accessed 9 September 2019]. 
Available from: https://www.wsj.com/articles/malaysias-mahathir-claims-opposition-
election-win-1525890131 
Horowitz, J., and Alderman, L. 2017. Chastised by E.U., a Resentful Greece 




[Accessed May 27, 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/26/world/europe/greece-china-piraeus-alexis-
tsipras.html 
Hou, Yan. 侯艳. 2012. Wai Jiao bu: Zhong hai you zai nanhai zhaobiao qukuai shi 
zhengchang qiye xingwei 外交部：中海油在南海招标区块是正常企业行为 [Foreign 
Ministry： China National Offshore Oil Cooperation’s bid areas in the South China 
Sea are normal enterprise’s practice]. Sohu. [online]. 26 June. [Accessed 22 May 
2021]. Available from: http://news.sohu.com/20120626/n346575005.shtml?edjn8 
Hoyama, T., and Makamura, Y. 2021. US and allies to build ‘China-free’tech supply 
chain. Nikkei Asian Review. [online]. 24 February. [Accessed 25 May 2021], 
Available from: https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Biden-s-Asia-
policy/US-and-allies-to-build-China-free-tech-supply-chain 
Hu, Jintao. 2012. Full text of Hu Jintao's report at 18th Party Congress. [online]. 27 
November, Great Hall of the People, Beijing. [Accessed 26 June 2019]. Available 
from: http://www.china-
embassy.org/eng/zt/18th_CPC_National_Congress_Eng/t992917.htm 
Hu, Jintao. 胡锦涛. 2008. Hu Jintao zai jinian gao Taiwan tongbao shu fabiao sanshi 
zhounian zuotan hui shang jianghua quanwen 胡锦涛在纪念告台湾同胞书发表三十
周年座谈会上讲话全文 [Hu Jintao’s speech at the 30th anniversary of issuance of 
letter to Taiwan comrades]. [online]. 31 December. Renmin Da Huitang, Beijing. 
[Accessed 2 January, 2019]. Available from: 
http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1024/8610403.html 
Hu, Qiaomu. 胡乔木. 2003. Hu Qiaomu huiyi Mao Zedong 胡乔木回忆毛泽东 [Hu 
Qiaomu’s memory of Mao Zedong]. Beijing: renmin chu ban she. 
 Hua, Xuan. 滑璇.2012. Si san fangan: yu ziben zhuyi de diyi ci qinmi jiechu 四三方
案：与资本主义的第一次亲密接触 [The four three projects: the first close contact with 
capitalism]. China News Magazine. [online]. 13 February. [Accessed 25 May 2021]. 




Huang, Hua. 黄华. 2007. Qinli yu Jianwen; Huang Hua Huiyi Lu 亲历与见闻：黄华
回忆录 [Experience and information: the Memoir of Huang Hua]. Beijing: Shijie Zhishi 
chu ban she. 
Huang, Qingchang., and Zou, Wei. 黄庆畅和邹伟. 2015. Jiekai weiquan Shijian 
beihou de heimu 揭开维权事件背后的黑幕  [unveil the dark secret behind the 
incidents of defending rights]. Xinhua Net. [online]. 11 July. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. 
Available from: http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2015-07/11/c_128010249.htm 
Huang, Zijuan. 2015. Zhongguo kongjun jinnian qida tupo: yuanhai zuozhan nengli 
dafu tisheng 中国空军今年七大突破：远海作战能力大幅提升 [Chinese Airforce’s 
seven big improvement: combative capability in the distant water has substantially 
improved]. Tencent. [online]. 10 November. [Accessed 26 June 2019]. Available from: 
https://new.qq.com/rain/a/20151111019453 
Hutzler, C., and Hsu, J. 2016. China Can’t Make Taiwan ‘Bow to Pressure,’ Island’s 
Leader Says. The Wall Street Journal. [online]. 4 October. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. 
Available from: https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-cant-make-taiwan-bow-to-
pressure-islands-leader-says-1475616782 
Inomata, S. 2011. VII. An evolutionary perspective on production networks in the 
Asia-US region. In: Escaith, H and Inomata, S. eds. Trade patterns and global value 
chains in East Asia: From trade in goods to trade in tasks. [online]. Geneva: World 
Trade Organization [WTO]- The Institute of Developing Economies [IDE-JETRO]. 
[Accessed 22 June 2019]. Available from: 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/stat_tradepat_globvalchains_e.pdf 
Inquirer.net. 2012. PH sovereignty based on Unclos, principles of international law. 
Inquirer.net. [online]. 20 April. [Accessed 20 April, 2014]. Available from:  
https://globalnation.inquirer.net/34031/ph-sovereignty-based-on-unclos-principles-
of-international-law#ixzz5XzdkoBlj  
Interaksyon, 2018. Japan has better rates for loans, but PH needs China, too to 
speed up infra projects: Pernia. Interaksyon. [online]. 22 February. [Accessed 24 






International Crisis Group. 2012. Stirring up the South China Sea (II): regional 
responses. [online]. New York: International Crisis Group. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. 
Available from: https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/229-stirring-up-the-south-
china-sea-ii-regional-responses.pdf 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2018. IMF Executive Board Concludes 2018 
Article IV Consultation with Malaysia. [Press Release]. Available from: 
https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/002/2018/061/article-A003-en.xml 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2020. IMF Executive Board Concludes 2020 
Article IV Consultation with Malaysia. [Press Release]. Available from: 
https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2020/02/27/pr2071-malaysia-imf-executive-
board-concludes-2020-article-iv-consultation 
ITV. 2020. Donald Trump labels coronavirus the 'Plague from China'. ITV. [online]. 
13 May. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: https://www.itv.com/news/2020-
05-13/coronavirus-donald-trump-accuses-china-of-unleashing-a-plague-upon-the-
world 
Jaipragas, B. 2018. Q&A: Philippine Foreign Minister on why Duterte and Xi Jinping 
get along. South China Morning Post. [online]. 13 April. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. 
Available from: https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2141500/qa-
philippine-foreign-minister-why-duterte-and-xi-jinping-get 
Jaipragas, B. 2019. I’d side with rich China over fickle US: Malaysia’s Mahathir 
Mohamad. South China Morning Post. [online]. 8 March. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. 
Available from: https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/2189074/id-side-
rich-china-over-fickle-us-malaysias-mahathir 
Jaipragas. B, and Yuniar, R. 2021. Asean looks to China for ‘follow-up’ on stalled 
Myanmar consensus plan. South China Morning Post. [online]. 7 June. [Accessed 25 






Jamandre, T. 2012. China sends reinforcement in standoff with PH navy. Yahoo 
News. [online]. 12 April. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://sg.news.yahoo.com/blogs/the-inbox/china-sends-reinforcement-standoff-ph-
navy-021443120.html 
Japanese Defense Ministry. 2020. Defense of Japan. [online]. [Press release]. 
[Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.mod.go.jp/en/publ/w_paper/wp2020/DOJ2020_EN_Full.pdf 
Ji, Peijuan. 暨佩娟. 2012. Fei lv bing wushi zhongfang jinggao jianchi la waizi kaifa 
nanhai youqi 菲律宾无视中方警告坚持拉外资开发南海油气 [Philippines ignored 
China’s warning and insisted on exploring oil in the South China sea with the help of 
foreign investment]. Tencent. [online]. 29 February. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. 
Available from: https://news.qq.com/a/20120229/001685.htm 
Jiang Zemin,江泽民. 1995. Wei cujin zuguo tongyi daye de wancheng er jixu fendou 
为促进祖国统一大业的完成而继续奋斗 [Continuing striving for the great mission of 
completing national unification]. [online]. 31 January. Renmin Da Huitang, Beijing. 
[Accessed 2 January, 2019]. Available from: 
http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/zt/jiang/201101/t20110105_1676843.htm 
Jiang Zemin. 江泽民 . 1999. Tongchou dikai tuanjie yuwu 同仇敌忾  团结御侮 
[enhancing unity to confront a common enemy and deter humiliation]. Zhonggong 
ZhongYang Zhengzhiju Changwu Weiyuanhui Huiyi, 8 May, Beijing.  
Jiang, Zemin. 江泽民. 1995. Jiang xuexi jiang zhengzhi jiang fengqi 讲学习讲政治
讲风气 [stress study, stress politics, and stress good habits] [online]. 8 August, [no 
place], Beijing. [Accessed 7 June 2019]. Available from: 
http://www.wenming.cn/specials/zxdj/gjwf/ll/201302/t20130225_1084910.shtml 
Jiang, Zemin. 江泽民. 1998. Zouchu yitiao touru jiaoshao xiaoyi jiaogao de jundui 
xiandaihua jianshe de luzi. 走出一条投入较少， 效益较高 的 军队现代化建设的路
子 [modernizing the army in a relatively less costly but highly effective way].[online]. 





Jiang, Zemin. 江泽民. 1999. Shinian lai junwei gongzuo de huigu yu zongjie 十年来
军委工作的回顾与总结  [my retrospect and summary of the ten year working 
experience at the Central Military Committee]. 71.cn. [online].  [Accessed 12 May 
2015]. Available from: http://www.71.cn/2008/0902/505402.shtml 
Jiang, Zemin. 江泽民. 2000. Tongbao Zhongyang zhengzhiju sanjiang qingkuang de 
jianghua 通报中央政治局三讲工作的讲话 [the speech that notify the work of “thee 
Jiang”at the political Bureau of Central Committee]. 71.cn. [online]. [accessed 25 May 
2020]. Available from: http://www.71.cn/2012/0423/613616.shtml 
Jiang, Zemin. 江泽民. 2000. Zai Zhongyang sixiang gongzuo hui shang de jianghua 
在中央思想工作会上的讲话  [the speech at the central committee’s meeting 
concerning ideological works]. 71.cn. [online]. no date. [Accessed 1 May 2021]. 
Available from: http://www.71.cn/2012/0423/613397.shtml 
Jiang, Zemin. 江泽民. 2001. Guanyu jianchi sixiang jiben yuanze 关于坚持四项基本
原则 [issues relating to insistence on the four basic principle]. 71.cn. [online]. no date. 
[Accessed 1 May 2021]. Available from; http://www.71.cn/2012/0423/613368.shtml 
Kaiman, J. 2014. Japan's Abe and China's Xi hold ice-breaking meeting as APEC 
starts. The Guardian. [online]. 10 November. [Accessed 20 June 2019]. Available 
from: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/10/xi-jinping-shinzo-abe-ice-
breaking-meeting-apec-starts 
Kasai, T. 2020. Japan should continue to speak up on China’s human rights abuses. 
The Japan Times. [online]. 6 July. [Accessed 25 May 2020]. Available from: 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2020/07/06/commentary/japan-
commentary/japan-continue-speak-chinas-human-rights-abuses/ 
Kato, M. 2021. Japan shies away from sanctions on China over Xinjiang. Nikkei Asia. 
[online].24 March, [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Japan-shies-away-from-
sanctions-on-China-over-Xinjiang 
Kelly, T. 2020. Japan and the US begin major military exercises as concern about 





Kimura, S. 2018. Japan, China join forces to standardize EV quick chargers. The 
Asahi Shimbun. [online]. 23 August. [Accessed 23 June 2019]. Available from: 
http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201808230026.html 
Kissinger, H. 2012. On China . Penguin Books. 
Kuhn, R. 2004. The man who changed China: the life and legacy of Jiang Zemin. 
New York: Crown Publishers. 
Kuo Ming Tang [KMT], 2019. KMT Statement. KMT official website. [online]. 3 
January. [Accessed 3 January, 2019]. Available from: 
http://www.kmt.org.tw/2019/01/blog-post_3.html 
Kuo Ming Tang 国民党. 1937. Guanyu gengjue chihuo zhi jueyian 关于根绝赤祸之
决议案 [the resolution concerning eliminating the red peril]. In: Rong Mengyuan 荣
孟源 eds. zhongguo guomindang lici daibiao dahui ji Zhongyang quanhui ziliao 中国
国民党历次代表大会暨中央全会资料 [Archives of Chinese Kuo Ming Tang Party 
Congress and Central Committee’s Plenary Session]. Beijing: Guangming ribao chu 
ban she, pp.433-436. 
Kyodo, 2015. China wins Indonesia high-speed rail project as Japan laments 
‘extremely regrettable’ U-turn. South China Morning Post. [online]. 29 September. 
[Accessed 25 June 2019]. Available from: 
https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/southeast-asia/article/1862459/china-wins-
indonesia-high-speed-rail-project-japan-laments 
Kyodo, 2016. Thousands rally in Jakarta against Java power plant project backed by 
Japan. South China Morning Post. [online]. 11 May. [Accessed 24 June 2019]. 
Available from: https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/southeast-
asia/article/1943935/thousands-rally-jakarta-against-java-power-plant-project 
Kyodo, 2019. Japan and China to open talks on foreign infrastructure projects amid 







Lai, Juvina. 2018. China angry at U.S. Senate passage of Taiwan Travel Act. Taiwan 
News.[online]. 1 March. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3374546 
Lau, S. 2020. EU agrees “in principle” to an investment agreement with China. South 
China Morning Post. [online]. 18 December. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3114414/eu-agrees-principle-
investment-agreement-china 
Lawder, D. and Bose, N. 2019. Trump says tariffs making companies leave China, a 
deal can't be '50-50'. Reuters. [online]. 20 May. [Accessed 20 May 2019]. Available 
from: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-china-trump/trump-says-tariffs-
making-companies-leave-china-a-deal-cant-be-50-50-idUSKCN1SQ03N 
Lawi Weng and Thet Swe Aye, 2013. Stop protests against copper mine, Suu Kyi 
tells communities. The Irrawaddy. [online]. 13 March. [Accessed 24 June 2019]. 
Available from: https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/stop-protests-against-
copper-mine-suu-kyi-tells-communities.html 
Lederer, E. 2020. US envoy to United Nations meets with Taiwan official in NY. The 




Lee, Hsien Loong. 2014. Scenarios for Asia in the next 20 years. [online]. 22 May, 
Nikkei Conference, Tokyo. [Accessed 28 July 2019]. Available from: 
https://www.pmo.gov.sg/Newsroom/scenarios-asia-next-20-years 
Li, Dongyao. 李东尧. 2018. Miandian da fudu suojian zhongguo touzi de jiaopiao 
gang guimo: 10 ge bowei ni jianzhi 2 ge 缅甸大幅度缩减中国投资的皎漂港规模： 10
个泊位拟减至 2 个 [Myanmar dramatically reduced the scale of China invested 
Kyaukpyu deep water port: 10 berths will be reduced to 2]. Guan Cha Zhe. [online]. 





Li, Ming. 李名. 2019. Mei zaitai xiehui: buzhichi taidu gongtou 美在台协会：不支持
“台独公投”[AIT: we do not support Taiwan independence referendum]. Global 
Times. [online]. 14, February. [Accessed 3 March, 2019]. Available from: 
http://taiwan.huanqiu.com/article/2019-02/14305491.html?agt=15422 
Li, Sikun. 李司坤 . 2018. Waijiaobu huiying mei zaiti hangxing ziyou: nanhai 
mingming fengping langjing, youren pianpian wufeng qilang 外交部回应美再提航行
自由， 明明风平浪静，有人偏偏无事生非 [Foreign Ministry’s response to the US’s 
freedom of navigation: the South China Sea is peaceful and calm, someone was 
deliberately making trouble]. Global Times. [online]. 6 February. [Accessed 6 
February 2018]. Available from: http://world.huanqiu.com/exclusive/2018-
02/11588128.html 
Li, Tong. 李潼. 2014. Taiwan jiaoyu tuanti piping Ma Ying-jeou yi da zhongguo 
sixiang xiugai jiaokeshu 台湾教育团体批评马英九以大中国思想修改教科书 [Taiwan 
education groups criticized Ma Ying-jeou for using thoughts concerning China to 
revise textbook]. RFA. [online]. 21 January. [accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.rfa.org/mandarin/yataibaodao/gangtai/al-01212014092154.html 
Li, Wenji., and Zhang, Ying 李文姬和张莹. 2017. Zhongguo shisinian kangzhan lishi 
jiaocai jiuyue yiri qi quanguo touyong 中国十四年抗战历史教材九月一日起全国投用 
[China’s history textbook concerning fourteen years anti-Japanese war period began 
to be used nationwide since 2017]. Tencent [online]. 1 September. [Accessed May 
25 2021]. Available from: https://news.qq.com/a/20170901/057948.htm 
Li, Xiaoyu. 李晓瑜. 2019. Zhongguo shang wu bu: jiang jiakuai Zhong ri han zimao 
qu tanpan 中国商务部：将加快中日韩自贸区谈判 [Chinese Commerce Ministry: we 
will accelerate free trade zone agreement among China, Japan and South Korea]. 
China News Net. [online]. 22 July. [Accessed 25 July 2019]. Available from: 
http://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1639745472527510764&wfr=spider&for=pc 
Li, Yanmou. 李彦谋. 2019. Shei zai da jiaqiu? Lan lv zai liangan jiandu tiaoli de 
maodun haishi zhengzhi 誰在打假球？藍綠在兩岸監督條例的矛盾還是「政治」[who’s 




mechanism is politics]. Xin Media. [online]. 17 April. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. 
Available from: https://www.cmmedia.com.tw/home/articles/15161 ) 
Li, Zongxian. 李宗宪 . 2019. Taiwan ling bangjiaoguo fengxian you duoda: 
suoluomen qundao yu Taiwan duanjiao 台湾“零邦交国”风险有多大 所罗门群岛和台
湾断交 [how big is Taiwan’s risk of having zero international recognition? Solomon 
Islands breaks up diplomatic relationship with Taiwan]. BBC News. [online]. 16 
September. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/chinese-news-49716498 
Liang, Heng. 梁衡. 2011. Deng Xiaoping weihe jueding tingzhi shuchu geming 邓小
平为何停止输出革命  [Why Deng Xiaoping stopped exporting revolution]. Ifeng. 
[online]. 19 July [Accessed 6 June 2019]. Available from: 
http://news.ifeng.com/history/zhongguoxiandaishi/detail_2011_07/19/7780779_0.sh
tml 
Liao, Shifeng. 廖士锋. 2020. Taiwan yuchuan zai Diaoyu dao haiyu yu riben xunluo 
ting pengzhuang haixun jianting chiyuan 台湾渔船在钓鱼岛海域与日本巡逻艇碰撞, 
海巡舰艇驰援 [Taiwanese fishing boats collided with Japanese coastguards patrol 
vessels, the Taiwanese coast guards went to help the fishing boats]. DW News. 27 
September. [Accessed 22 May 2022]. Available from: https://www.dwnews.com/台湾
/60213282/台湾渔船在钓鱼岛海域与日本巡逻舰碰撞海巡舰艇驰援 
Lin Ke., Xu Tao., and Wu Xujun. 林克， 徐涛，和 吴旭君. 1998. Lishi de zhenshi 历
史的真实[The truth of history]. Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian chu ban she.  
Lin, Shixiang. 林仕祥. 2018. Yuanfen Jinle? Wang Jin-pyng pan yuanxiao jie hou 
xuanbu canxuan 緣分近了-王金平盼元宵節後宣布參選 [the destiny is calling: Eang 
Jin-pyng anticipate to announce its campaign for competing Presidential candidate 
after Yuanxiao festival]. SETN. [online]. 15 January. [Accessed 15 January, 2019]. 
Available from: https://tw.news.yahoo.com/緣分近了-王金平盼元宵節後宣布參選-
091523045.html 
Lin, Shixiang. 林仕祥. 2020. Lai Chin-te: 1911 nian chuangli de zhonghua mingguo 
bufu cunzai yi zaitai xinsheng 赖清德：1911年创立的中华民国不复存在 已在台新生




in Taiwan]. DW News. [online]. 22 January. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.dwnews.com/台湾/60165898/赖清德 1911年创立的中华民国不复存在已
在台新生 
Liu, He. 刘鹤. 2020. Jiakuai goujian yi guonei da xunhuan wei zhuti, guonei guoji 
Shuang xunhuan xianghu cujin de xin fazhan geju 加快构建以国内大循环为主体，
国内国际双循环相互促进的新发展格局  [creating a new development pattern 
centering on internal circulation with the domestic and international markets 
promoting each other]. Xinhua Net. [online]. 25 November. [Accessed 25 May 2021]. 
Available from: 
https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1684327374809560660&wfr=spider&for=pc 
Liu, Huaqing. 刘华清. 2004. Liu Huaqing huiyilu [The Memoir of Liu Huaqing] 刘华
清回忆录. Beijing: Jiefangjun Chubanshe.  
Liu, Jie. 柳洁. 2020. Ma lai xi ya jiaqi minxin qiao 马来西亚架起民心桥 [a Bridge 
connecting people’s heart has been built in Malaysia]. OBOR Net. [online]. 21 
September. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/xwzx/hwxw/149206.htm 
Liu, Jieyi. 刘结一. 2019. Zuohao xin shi dai duitai gongzuo de genben zunxun he 
xingdong zhinan 做好新时代对台工作的根本遵循和行动指南 [the guideline and 
basic principle of dealing with Taiwan issue in the new era]. Qiushi. 2. [Accessed 22 
May 2021]. Available from: http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2019-
01/16/c_1123987913.htm 
Liu, Wanlin. 刘万林. 2018. Ma Ying-jeou: woguo xianfa shi yizhong xianfa, mubiao 
shi cujin tongyi 马英九：我国宪法是一中宪法目标是促进统一 [Ma Ying-jeou: our 
country’s constitution is one China constitution, the aim of the constitution is promote 
unification]. Lianhe Xinwen net. [online]. 25 February. [Accessed 25 February, 2018]. 
Available from: https://udn.com/news/story/6656/2999175 
Liu, Zhen. 2017. Japanese firms now more willing to invest China, after years of 
decline over political tensions. South China Morning Post. [Online]. 22 June. 






Lo, K. 2021. Japan sends destroyer after China’s Liaoning aircraft carrier group 
spotted passing Okinawa. South China Morning Post. [online]. 5 April. [Accessed 22 
May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3128348/japan-sends-destroyer-
after-chinas-liaoning-aircraft-carrier 
Locklear, S. 2014. Department of Defense Press Briefing on US Pacific Command’s 
area of responsibility by admiral Locklear in the Pentagon Briefing Room. [Press 
Release]. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/606933/departme
nt-of-defense-press-briefing-on-us-pacific-commands-area-of-responsibil/ 
Lungu, A. 2018. Diaoyu islands dispute can be laid to rest if China and Japan accept 
joint sovereignty. South China Morning Post. [online]. 30 October. [Accessed 25 
August 2019]. Available from: https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/hong-
kong/article/2170613/diaoyu-islands-dispute-can-be-laid-rest-if-china 
Luo, Xuehui. 罗雪挥. 2019. Wang Jiaxiang beipi sanhe yishao shimo 王稼祥被批三
和一少始末 [the story that Wang Jiaxiang was criticized for being “three surrenders 
and one reduction.”]. Gongchan dangyuan. 2, p.46. 
Lyer, A., Zhang, Airong., Jetten, J., Hao, Z., and Cui, Lijuan. 2017. The promise of a 
better group future: cognitive alternatives increase students’ self-efficacy and 
academic performance. British Journal of Social Psychology, 56, pp.750-765. 
Magnier, M. 2020. US moves bolstering Taiwan are meant to ‘restore balance’, US 
diplomat David Stilwell says. South China Morning Post. [online]. 1 September. 
[Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3099639/us-moves-bolstering-
taiwan-are-meant-restore-balance-us 
Manthorpe, J. 2015. Burma puts the brakes on resource exports to China. Business 






Mao, Zedong 毛泽东. 1935. Lun fandui riben diguo zhuyi de celue 论反对日本帝国
主义的策略 [discussing strategies of resisting Japanese imperialism]. [online]. 27, 
December, Zhonggong Zhongyang Zhengzhiju Huiyi, Wayaobao. [Accessed 7 March, 
2019]. Available from:  
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64184/64185/66615/4488890.html 
Mao, Zedong 毛泽东. 1938. Lun chijiu zhan 论持久战 [on protracted war]. [online]. 
26, May, Yan’an Kangri Zhanzheng Yanjiuhui, Yan’an [Accessed 7 March, 2019]. 
Available from: http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/8198/46867/46882/3605847.html 
Mao, Zedong 毛泽东 . 1940a. muqian zhengzhi xingshi ji dui Yan Xishan de 
fangzheng 目前政治形势及对阎锡山的方针  [the current political situation and 
policies regarding Yan Xishan]. 11, January.  
Mao, Zedong 毛泽东. 1940b. Muqian kangri tongyi zhanxian zhong de celue wenti 
目前抗日统一战线中的策略问题  [issues concerning anti-Japanese united front 
strategy]. [online]. 11, March. Zhongguo Gongchandang Gaoji Ganbu Huiyi. Yan’an. 
[Accessed 7 March, 2019]. Available from: 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64184/64185/66616/4488908.html 
Mao, Zedong 毛泽东 . 1943. Qieshi zhixing shida zhengce 切实执行十大政策 
[substantively enforcing the ten policies]. [online]. 14, October, Zhonggong 
Zhongyang Xibei Gaoji Ganbu Huiyi. Yan’an. [Accessed 14, March, 2019]. Available 
from: http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64184/64185/189963/11567754.html 
Mao, Zedong 毛泽东 .1939. fandui touxiang tigang 反对投降提纲 .[objecting the 
outline of surrender]. In Zhonggong Zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi 中共中央文献研
究室[Chinese Communist Party Central Committee’s research office regarding party 
literature],eds. Mao Zedong wenji di er juan毛泽东文集第二卷 [The second volume 
of Mao Zedong literature]. Beijing: Renming chu ban she, pp.207-221. 
Mao, Zedong 毛泽东.1949. Lun renming minzhu zhuanzheng 论人民民主专政 [the 
essay of People’s democratic authoritarianism]. People’s Daily. [online]. [Accessed 




Mao, Zedong. 毛泽东. 1948a. Mao Zedong gei gaogang de dianbao 毛泽东给高岗
的电报[Mao Zedong’s telegram to Gaogang]. 17 November.  
Mao, Zedong. 毛泽东. 1948b. Mao Zedong zai Zhongyang guanyu jizou yingmei 
lingshiguan gei dongbeiju dian shang de piyu 毛泽东在中央关于挤走英美领事馆给
东北局电上的批语 [Mao Zedong’s comment on CCPCC’s telegram to Northeast 
Bureau concerning compelling British and US consular to move out from China]. 23 
November.  
Mao, Zedong. 毛泽东. 1955. Conversation with delegation of Thailand. [No date] 
Mao, Zedong. 毛泽东. 1956. Lun shida guanxi 论十大关系 [the discussion of the ten 
major relationships]. Enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of CCPCC, 25 April, 
Beijing. 
Mao, Zedong. 毛泽东 . 1963. Conversation with Prime Minister of Somalia 
Cabdirashiid Cali Sharma'arke. 09 August.  
Mao, Zedong. 毛泽东.1958. Guancha guoji xingshi de ruogan guandian. 关于国际
形势的若干观点[Several viewpoints regarding the current international situation]. In: 
Zhongguo Waijiao Bu and Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiu Shi eds. 1994: 
Mao Zedong Waijiao Wenxuan. Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, Shijie 
Zhishi Chuban She, pp.341-358. 
Mao, Zedong., Zhu De., and Wang, Jiaxiang. 毛泽东 , 朱德，和王稼祥  1940. 
Telegram to Ye Ting., Xiang, Ying., Liu, Shaoqi., Zhang, Yunyi., Chen, Yi., Huang, 
Kecheng., Peng, Xuefeng., and Li, Xian’nian: dongyuan yiqie liliang zhengqu youjun 
gongzuo 对叶挺，项英，刘少奇，张云逸，陈毅，黄克诚，彭雪枫，和李先念的电报：
动员一切力量，争取友军工作[Telegram to Ye Ting., Xiang, Ying., Liu, Shaoqi., Zhang, 
Yunyi., Chen, Yi., Huang, Kecheng., Peng, Xuefeng., and Li, Xian’nian: mobilize all 
resources to win over friendly armies]. 4, November.  
Mao, Zedong.毛泽东. 1949. Mao Zedong zai Zhongyang zhengzhiju huiyi shang de 
baogao 毛泽东在中央政治局会议上的报告 [Mao Zedong’s report at the meeting of 
the Political Bureau of CCPCC]. 8 January. Beijing. 
Martina, M and Blanchard, B. 2019. China hits back at prejudiced US with own rights 






Mei, Wen.梅文. 2013. Liaoning Jian zhengwei: daolian bushi suolian ershi hangbiao 
辽宁舰政委: 岛链不是锁链是航标 [The Political  Commissar of Liaoning Aircraft 
carrier: the island chains are not shackles but Navigation mark]. Jiefangjun bao. 
[online] 13 January. [Accessed 24 May 2019]. Available from: 
http://www.chinanews.com/mil/2013/01-16/4491590.shtml 
Menon, P and Daga, A. 2018. In Mahathir's Malaysia, Japan is back amid doubts 
over Chinese funding. Reuters. [online]. 10 June. [Accessed 24 June 2019]. Available 
from: https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-malaysia-japan/in-mahathirs-malaysia-
japan-is-back-amid-doubts-over-chinese-funding-idUKKCN1J607T 
Meyer, E. 2014. The end of the “Chinese Rice For Train Plan” in Thailand, 
Right? Forbes. [online]. 15 September. [Accessed 26 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ericrmeyer/2014/09/14/the-end-of-the-chinese-rice-
for-train-plan-in-thailand-right/ 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China [FMPRC]. 2012. Waijiaobu: 
xiwang rifang nachu chengyi jiejue diaoyudao wenti 外交部：希望日方拿出诚意解决
钓鱼岛问题 [Chinese Foreign Ministry: hope that Japanese side will show sincereity 
in solving Diaoyu islands disputes]. China Youth net. [online]. 30 October. [Accessed 
19 September 2019]. Available from: 
http://d.youth.cn/shrgch/201210/t20121030_2565588.htm 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China [FMPRC]. 2015a. Zhonghua 
renming gonghe guo shenming (2012 9yue 10ri) [Central Government of People’s 
Republic of China’s statement 10 September 2012]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
People’s Republic of China. [online]. 9 October. [Accessed 9 October, 2018]. 
Available from: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/diaoyudao/chn/flfg/zcfg/t1304548.htm 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China [FMPRC]. 2015b. Diaoyu 
Dao shi zhongguo guyou lingtu baipishu (2012nian 9yue 10ri)  钓鱼岛是中国领土白
皮书 2012年九月 10日 [White paper that Diaoyu islands are China’s territory 10 




9 October. [Accessed 9 October, 2018]. Available from: 
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/diaoyudao/chn/flfg/zcfg/t1304550.htm 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China [FMPRC]. 2015c. Zhonghua 
renming gongheguo zhengfu guanyu Diaoyudao ji fushu daoyu linghai jixian 
shengming 中华人民共和国政府关于钓鱼岛及附属岛屿领海基线声明 （2012 年 9
月 10日）(2012nian 9yue 10ri) [Central government of People’s Republic of China’s 
statement concerning the base line of Diaoyu islands and its related islets 10 
September 2012]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China. [online]. 
9 October. [Accessed 9 October, 2018]. Available from: 
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/diaoyudao/chn/flfg/zcfg/t1304547.htm 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China [FMPRC]. 2014. 981 zuanjin 
pingtai zuoye: yuenan de tiaoxin yu zhongguo lichang 981 钻井平台作业：越南的挑
衅与中国立场 [981 oil rig operation: Vietnam’s challenges and China’s position]. 
[Press Release]. [Accessed 20 September 2019]. Available from: 
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/nanhai/chn/snhwtlcwj/t1163255.htm 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China [FMPRC]. 2016a. Statement 
of the government of the People's Republic of China on China's territorial sovereignty 
and maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea. Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of People’s Republic of China. [online]. 12 July. [Accessed 12 July 2018]. Available 
from: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/nanhai/eng/snhwtlcwj_1/t1379493.htm 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China [FMPRC]. 2016b. Zhongguo 
jianchi tanpan jiejue zhongguo yu feilvbing zai nanhai de youguan zhenyi. Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China. [online]. 13 July. [Accessed 5 
December, 2018]. Available from: 
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/zyxw/t1380600.shtml 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China [FMPRC]. 2011. Wai jiao bu 
huiying yuenan zai nanhai quzhu zhongguo yuchuan 外交部回应越南在南海驱逐中
国渔船  [Foreign Ministry’s response to Vietnam’s expelling to Chinese fishing 





Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China [FMPRC]. 2012. 2012 nian 
si yue 11 ri Wai jiao bu fa yan ren Liu Weiming juxing lixing jizhe hui [Spokesperson 
of Foreign Ministry Liu Weiming held regular press conference on 11 April 2012]. 
CCTV. [online]. 11 April. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
http://news.cntv.cn/china/20120411/116725.shtml 
Ministry of National Defense of People’s Republic of China. 2018. Defense Ministry's 
regular press conference on June 28. Ministry of National Defense of People’s 
Republic of China. [online]. 28 June. [ Accessed 28 June, 2018]. Available from: 
http://eng.mod.gov.cn/focus/2018-06/29/content_4818078.htm 
Mo, Yan-Chih. 2011. Ma slams WHO, China on name. Taipei Times. [online]. 11 May. 
[Accessed 11 May, 2018]. Available from: 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2011/05/11/2003502936 
Mogato, M. 2015, Exclusive: Philippines reinforcing rusting ship on Spratly reef 




Mogato, M. 2017. Duterte says China’s Xi threatened war if Philippines drills for 
oil. Reuters. [online]. 19 May. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-philippines-china-
idUSKCN18F1DJ 
Murray, B. 2016. Vietnam demands answers from Indonesia over sea clash. AA. 
[online]. 11 November. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/vietnam-demands-answers-from-indonesia-
over-sea-clash/683335 
Myers, S. L., and Beech, H. 2021. In Geopolitical Struggle Over Myanmar, China Has 






Nakayama, S. 2014. US reluctant to slam China’s ADIZ. Nikkei Asian Review. [online]. 
8 January. [Accessed 8 January, 2018]. Available from: 
https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Washington-Reacts-Less-Strongly-To-Chinas-ADIZ 
Nan, Xi 南希. 2019. Tsai Ing-wen 3 nian duanjiao 7 guo, Chen Shuibian wo 8 nian 
diu liuguo bi ta qiang 蔡英文 3年断交 7国 陈水扁：我 8年丢 6国比她强 [Tsai Ing-
wen lost seven diplomatic ties in three years, Chen Suibian I lost 6 diplomatic ties in 
eight years and thus is more capable than her]. DW News. [online]. 21 September. 
[Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: https://www.dwnews.com/台湾/60150050/
蔡英文 3年断交 7国陈水扁我 8年丢 6国比她强 
Nanfang Net 南方网. 2008. Hu Jintao juebu zou gaiqi yizhi de laolu 胡锦涛：绝不走
改旗易帜的道路[Hu Jintao: we will never go on the path of changing the flag]. 
Nanfang Net. [online]. 18 December. [Accessed 26 May 2019]. Available from: 
http://news.southcn.com/china/ng/content/2008-12/18/content_4778968.htm 
Nation Thailand. 2016. Govt, Alibaba sign deal to help SMEs succeed in e-
commerce. Nation Thailand. [online]. December 9. [Accessed 25 May 2020]. 
Available from: https://www.nationthailand.com/business/30301812 
National Chengchi University. 2019 Taiwan mingyi yu guojia anquan: Taiwan guojia 
anquan diaocha.台湾民意与国家安全: 台湾国家安全调查 [Taiwan public opinion 
and national security: Taiwan National Security Survey]. [online]. [Accessed 1 
January, 2019]. Available from: 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1hc0rbTQMUCBXbAH6qB22EqWK02DCN9et/view 
Ni, V. 2021. EU Parliament freezes China trade deal over sanctions. The Guardian. 
[online]. 20 may. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/may/20/eu-parliament-freezes-china-
trade-deal-over-sanctions 
Nikkei Chinese. 2018. Liucheng riben daqiye jingyingzhe danyou maoyizhan 
yingxiang 六成日本大企业经营者担忧贸易战影响 [over 60% big enterprises worried 
about influence of the trade war]. Nikkei Chinese. [online]. 11 September. [Accessed 





Nikkei Chinese. 2021a. Riben ban dao ti houfa qiye zai zhongguo zhao chulu 日本
半导体后发企业在中国找出路 [Japanese semi-conductor late mover companies are 
expanding business in China]. Nikkei Chinese. [online]. 25 March. [Accessed 22 May 
2021]. Available from: https://cn.nikkei.com/industry/manufacturing/44126-2021-03-
25-05-00-30.html 
Nikkei Chinese. 2021b. Rili gaoxin jishu zai zhongguo shengchan yiyong fenxi shebei 
日立高新技术在中国生产医用分析设备 [Hitachi High-tech is producing automatic 
medical analysis devices in China]. Nikkei Chinese. [online]. 16 April. [Accessed 22 
May 2021]. Available from: https://cn.nikkei.com/industry/itelectric-appliance/44447-
2021-04-16-14-14-41.html 
Office of The Historian. [no date]. Bandung Conference (Asian-African 
Conference), 1955. [online]. [Accessed 25 June 2019]. Available from: 
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/bandung-conf 
One Belt One Road [OBOR] net. 2021. Yuenan henei qinggui er hao xian xiangmu 
shi yunxing yuanman wancheng 越南河内轻轨二号线项目试运行圆满完成 [The 
operation of the second light rail way project completed]. One Belt One Road Net. 
[online]. 5 February. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/xwzx/hwxw/164003.htm 
Ou, Jingluo. 欧敬洛. 2020. [gangban guoan fa] rimei: riben zhengfu renwei zhicai 
zhongguo buxianshi 港版国安法：日媒： 日本政府认为制裁中国不现实 [Hong Kong 
national security law: Japanese media: Japanese government thinks that imposing 
sanctions on China is impractical]. HK01. [online]. 5 July. [Accessed 25 May 2020]. 
Available from: https://www.hk01.com/即時國際/494075/港版國安法-日媒-日本政府
認為制裁中國不現實 
Padin, M. 2018. DOF denies China asking for Philippines natural resources as loan 






Palma, S. 2018. Malaysia suspends $22bn China-backed projects. Financial Times. 
[online]. 05 July. [Accessed 24 June 2019]. Available from: 
https://amp.ft.com/content/409942a4-7f80-11e8-bc55-50daf11b720d 
Party committee of Ministry of State Security of PRC. 国家安全部党委 . 2020. 
Fangfan huajie fengxian tiaozhan de kexue zhinan 防范化解风险挑战的科学指南 
[the scientific guide for preventing or solving risks and challenges]. People’s Net-
People’s Daily. [online]. 27 October. [24 May 2021]. Available from: 
http://theory.people.com.cn/n1/2020/1027/c40531-
31906943.html?from=singlemessage 
Party history research group of CCPCC. 2011. Zhongguo gongchandang lishi 中国
共产党历史 [The History of Chinese Communist Party], the 2nd volume. Beijing: 
zhonggong dangshi chu ban she.  
Pearlman, J. 2018. US, Japan and Australia sign infrastructure agreement to counter 
China's belt and road. The Telegraph. [online]. 31 July. [Accessed 24 June 2019]. 
Available from: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/07/31/us-japan-australia-
sign-infrastructure-agreement-counter-chinas/ 
Pence, M. 2018. Remarks by Vice President Pence on the administration’s policy 
toward China. [online]. 4 October, The Hudson Institute, Washington, D.C. [Accessed 
3 May 2019]. Available from: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/remarks-vice-president-pence-administrations-policy-toward-china/ 
Peng, Dehuai. 彭德怀 . 1981. Peng Dehuai zishu 彭德怀自述  [Peng Dehuai’s 
personal statement]. Beijing: renmin chu ban she.  
People’s Daily 人民日报. 2015. Dangda haishi fada: Xi Jinping yong xianfa huida 党
大还是法大，习近平这样回答 [Xi Jinping’s answer to the question whether the party 
is more powerful than the law]. People’s Net. [online]. 2 May [Accessed 25 May 2015]. 
Available from: http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2015/0205/c1001-26513950.html 
People’s Daily. 人民日报 . 2019. Renmin ribao pinglun yuan: bazhun douzhen 
fangxiang, mingque douzhen renwu 人民日报评论员: 把准斗争方向, 明确斗争任务 
[People’s Daily commentary: ensuring the rightful struggle direction and be clear 




May 2020]. Available from: http://opinion.people.com.cn/n1/2019/0905/c1003-
31337097.html 
People’s Daily. 人民日报 . 2019. Renming ribao: duiyu bupingdeng tiaoyue: 
zhongguoren youzhe kegumingxin de jiyi 人民日报: 对于不平等条约：中国人有着刻
骨铭心的记忆[People’s Daily: Chinese People have unforgettable memory regarding 
unequal treaties]. Guanchazhe wang. [online]. 17 May. [Accessed 20 May 2019]. 
Available from: https://www.guancha.cn/politics/2019_05_17_501932.shtml 
People’s Daily-CPC News 人民日报-共产党新闻网, 2019. Gongheguo shi hongse de, 
Xi zongshuji shuo yingxiong 共和国是红色的， 习总书记说英雄 [PRC is red, The 
General Secretary Xi talks about the heroes]. People’s Daily-CPC News. [online]. 3 
April. [Accessed 26 May 2019]. Available from: 
http://dangshi.people.com.cn/n1/2019/0403/c85037-31010716.html 
People’s Daily-CPC News. 人民日报-共产党新闻网. 2014. 1979nian lilun gongzuo 
wuxuhui Deng Xiaoping jianchi sixiang jiben yuanze jianghua jingguo 1979年理论工
作务虚会：邓小平坚持四项基本原则讲话经过 [the story that Deng Xiaoping made the 
speech concerning the four basic principles at the meeting of devising theory]. 
People’s daily-CPC news. [online]. 09 May [Accessed 7 June, 2019]. Available from: 
http://dangshi.people.com.cn/n/2014/0905/c369328-25613452.html 
People’s Education Press. 1960. Chuji zhongxue keben: zhongguo lishi disice 初级
中学课本: 中国历史第四册[Middle School textbook of Chinese History: the fourth 
volume]. Beijing: People’s Education Press. 
People’s Net, 2014. Jiexi zhongguo haijun fazhan de sanda jieduan hangmu hejian 
dazao lanshui haijun 解析中国海军发展的三大阶段：航母核潜打造蓝水海军 [an 
analysis of the three stages of Chinese Navy development: aircraft carrier and 
nuclear submarines create blue water navy]. China News. [online]. 12 August. 
[Accessed 9 June 2019]. Available from: http://www.chinanews.com/mil/2014/08-
12/6483108.shtml 
People’s Net. 2015. Di 48 jie dongmeng waizhang hui Wang Yi chanshu zhongguo 
lichang chuancheng yazhou jingyan. 第 48 届东盟外长会 王毅阐述中国立场传承亚




48th ASEAN Foreign Minister Meeting]. People’s Net. [online]. 07 August, [Accessed 
25 June 2019]. Available from:  http://world.people.com.cn/n/2015/0807/c1002-
27427444.html 
People’s Net. 2016. Mao Zedong xinxi haijun jianshe: women yiding yao jiancheng 
qiangda de haijun. 毛泽东心系海军建设: 我们一定要建成强大的海军 [Mao Zedong 
cared about the development of navy: we must build a strong navy]. China Net. 
[online]. 26 December. [Accessed 9 July 2019]. Available from: 
https://military.china.com/history4/62/20161226/30112466_all.html 
People’s Net. 2019. Shangwubu haiguan zhongshu zhutui duiwai kaifang paochu 
jiasudu 商务部海关总署助推对外开放跑出加速度  [Ministry of Commerce and 
General Administration of Customs. P.R.China help boosting China’s opening up]. 
People’s Net. [online]. 8 January. [Accessed 19 September 2019]. Available from: 
http://finance.people.com.cn/n1/2019/0108/c1004-30509804.html 
People’s Net. 人民网. 2001. Zhongguo gongchandang 80 nian dashiji, 1934 [中国共
产党 80 年大纪事] [Chinese Communist Party’s major events in 80 years, 1934]. 
People’s Net. [online]. 1 June. [Accessed 1 June, 2019]. Available from: 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/5580/5581/20010601/479724.html 
People’s Net.人民网. 2014. Xi Jinping: wangji lishi yiwei beipan, fouren zuize yiwei 
chongfan 习近平: 忘记历史意味背叛，否认罪责意味重犯 [Xi Jinping: forgetting 
history means betrayal, denying guilty means repetition of the offense]. People’s Net. 
[online]. 13 December. [Accessed 19 May 2019]. Available from: 
http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/1213/c70731-26201521.html 
People’s Net-CCP New 人民网 -共产党新闻网 . 2014. 1936 nian zhonggong 
Zhongyang ceng zhudong churang wayaobao gei Zhang Xueliang dang zhengji 1936
年中共中央曾主动出让瓦窑堡给张学良当政绩 [ in 1936, Zhang Xueliang attained a 
political achievement that CCP Central Committee transferred Wayaobao to him]. 
People’s Net-CCP New. [online]. 17 December. [Accessed 25 May 2021]. Available 
from: http://dangshi.people.com.cn/n/2014/1217/c85037-26222688.html 
People’s net-Global times, 2014. Yuenan yuchuan xie zhayao jinru xisha, waijiaobu 




[Vietnamnese fishing vessel enters Paracel islands with explosive materials, Foreign 
Ministry asks Vietnam to stop illegal fishing]. People’s Net. [online]. 11, September. 
[Accessed 11 September, 2018]. Available from:  
http://military.people.com.cn/n/2014/0911/c1011-25638375.html 
Philips, T., Smith, N., and Woolf, N. 2016. Trump's phone call with Taiwan president 
risks China's wrath. The Guardian. [online]. 3 December. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. 
Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/dec/03/trump-angers-
beijing-with-provocative-phone-call-to-taiwan-president 
The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of Philippines v. The People's 
Republic of China)(Final Award) (Permanent Court of Arbitration, 12 July 2016)[2013-
19]. 
 
Pincus, W. 2015. China is not the only country reclaiming land in South China Sea. 




Pincus, W. 2015. China is not the only country reclaiming land in South China Sea. 




Pincus, W. 2015. China is not the only country reclaiming land in South China Sea. 




PLA Airforce, 2016. Zhongguo kongjun chudong Hong-6k feiji fu nanhai chang tai 
hua zhandou xunhang 中国空军出动轰-6K 飞机赴南海常态化战斗巡航 [Chinese 




18 July. [Accessed 26 June 2019]. Available from: http://www.81.cn/jwgz/2016-
07/18/content_7161480.htm 
PLA news. 2016. Zhongguo jianchi tongguo tanpan xieshang jiejue Zhengyi 中国坚
持通过谈判协商解决争议 [China insisted on solving disputes through negotiation]. 
PLA news. [online]. 14 July. [Accessed 19 September 2019]. Available from: 
http://www.sohu.com/a/105694355_220051 
PLA News. 2016. Zhongguo jianchi tongguo tanpan xieshang jiejue Zhengyi 中国坚
持通过谈判协商解决争议 [China insisted on solving the disputes through dialogue 
and negotiation]. PLA News. [online]. 14 July. [Accessed 19 September 2019]. 
Available from: http://www.sohu.com/a/105694355_220051 
PLA News. 2018. Taidu kan guolai! Liaoning Jian biandui zai Taiwan dongce shidan 
yanxi “台独”看过来！辽宁舰编队在台湾岛东侧实战军演！[Look here! Taiwan 
independence supporters, Liaoning aircraft carrier and its fleet are conducting live-
fire drills in the east of Taiwan]. Global Times.. [online]. 21 April. [Accessed 22 May 
2021]. Available from: https://china.huanqiu.com/article/9CaKrnK7UHD 
Pondent, C. 2017. What is salient identity. Bizfluent. [online]. 26 September. 
[Accessed 5 August 2019]. Available from: https://bizfluent.com/info-8710971-
salient-identity.html 
Prata, P. 2011. US, Vietnam begin Naval exercises amid tension with China. Wall 
street journal. [online]. 16 July. [Accessed 16 July, 2018]. Available from: 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304223804576447412748465574 
Qi, Xianghui, and Zha, Wenhua  齐湘辉和查文晔. 2016. Huiying liangan fumao 
chongtan shuo: Guo Tai Ban: ying weihu lianghui xieyi de quanwei xing 回应两岸服
贸重谈说 国台办：应维护两会协议权威性 [In response to the call for re-negotiation 
of service trade deal: Taiwan Affair Office of the State Council, PRC: we need to 
defend the authority of the deals negotiated by the two Councils]. Xinhua Agency. 
[online]. 27 January. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2016-01/27/content_5036572.htm 
Qian, Qichen.钱其琛, 2005. Waijiao shiji 外交十记 [ten cases of diplomacy]. Beijing: 




Qianlong Net.千龙网. 2010. Malai xiya gongchan dang zhanbai shi: bei yiwang zai 
conglin de huaren geming 马来西亚共产党战败史：被遗忘在丛林的华人革命[The 
defeat of Malaysian communist party: the Chinese revolution that was forgotten in 
the jungle]. Ifeng. [online]. 1 March. [Accessed 25 May 2019]. Available from: 
https://news.ifeng.com/mil/history/201003/0301_1567_1559506_3.shtml 
Qin, A. 2020a. U.S. Health Secretary to Visit Taiwan, in a Move Likely to Anger 
Beijing. New York Times. [online]. 4 August. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/04/world/asia/taiwan-azar-beijing-
coronavirus.html 
Qin, A. 2020b. U.S. Official Visits Taiwan, and China Warns of Consequences. New 
York Times. [online]. 17 September. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/17/world/asia/us-official-taiwan-china.html 
Rauhala, E. 2016. Philippines says China has stopped chasing fishermen from 
contested shoal. The Washington Post. [online]. 28 October. [Accessed 22 May 
2021]. Available from: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/report-filipino-
fishermen-return-to-fish-shoal-contested-with-china/2016/10/28/51d51eb4-9cb3-
11e6-b4c9-391055ea9259_story.html 
Reicher, S and Haslam, S. 2012. Change we can believe in: the role of social identity, 
cognitive alternatives and leadership in group mobilization and social transformation. 
In Wagoner, B., Jensen E., and Oldmeadow, J. Eds, Culture and social change: 
transforming society through the power of ideas. London: Routledge. pp. 53–73. 
Rekhi, S. 2019. Asian Insider April 15: Malaysia rescued from China's debt trap? The 
Strait Times. [online]. 15 April. [Accessed 25 June 2019]. Available from: 
https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/asian-insider-april-15-malaysia-rescued-from-
chinas-debt-trap 
Renping. 任平. 2019. Renmin ribao renping: jizhong Liliang ban dashi de youshi rang 
zhongguo shixian yige you yige bu keneng 人民日报任平：集中力量办大事的优势让
中国实现一个又一个的不可能  [People’s Daily commentary: the advantage of 
concentration of power to make big things help China realize one after another 






Renran. 荏苒. 2021. Taimei bao meiguo dashi yiyue fangtai quxiao neimu; zhongguo 
jiefang jun chushou poju 台媒曝光美国大使 1 月访台取消内幕 中国解放军出手破局
[Taiwanese media exposed the insider information regarding the former US 
ambassador to the UN’s cancelling of visit to Taiwan, PLA took actions and broken 
the deadlock]. DW News. [online]. 14 March. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.dwnews.com/中国/60233050/台媒曝光美国大使 1 月访台取消内幕中国
解放军出手破局 
Reuters Staff. 2014. China says Japan fighter jets shadowed its planes over disputed 
waters. Reuters. [online]. 7 August. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-japan-idUSKBN0G70B220140807 
Reuters Staff. 2015. hilippines says Chinese ship rammed fishing boats in 
Scarborough Shoal. Reuters. [online]. 4 February. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. 
Available from: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-china-
idUSKBN0L81IM20150204 
Reuters Staff. 2018. Philippines asks China to stop coast guard from taking 
fishermen's catch in Scarborough. Reuters. [online]. 11 June. [Accessed 22 May 
2021]. Available from: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-philippines-
china-idUSKBN1J717Q 
Reuters Staff. 2019. Japan scrambles fighters to intercept Russian and Chinese 
airplanes. Reuters. [online]. 23 July. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-russia-aircraft-idUSKCN1UI146 
Reuters Staff. 2020. Russia deploys advanced S-300 missiles to disputed islands 
near Japan. Reuter. [online]. 1 December. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.reuters.com/article/russia-japan-missiles-idUSKBN28B5D3 
Reuters. 2016. Vietnam welcomes South China Sea ruling, reasserts its own claims. 






Reuters. 2016. Vietnam welcomes South China Sea ruling, reasserts its own claims. 
The Strait Times. [online]. 12 July. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/vietnam-welcomes-south-china-sea-
ruling-reasserts-its-own-claims 
Reuters. 2019. China tells U.S. to remove 'black hands' from Hong Kong. Reuters. 
[online]. 23 July. [Accessed 28 July 2019]. Available from: 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-extradition-usa/china-tells-u-s-to-
remove-black-hands-from-hong-kong-idUSKCN1UI0QJ 
RFA. 2020. Jie fang jun Taiwan hai kongyu junyan, Taiwan hanjian dadongzuo 
miandui [PLA conducted drills near Taiwan’s air and water space, in a rare 
circumstance, Taiwan responds vigorously]. RFA. [online]. 11 September. [Accessed 
22 May 2021]. Available from: https://www.rfa.org/mandarin/yataibaodao/gangtai/hx-
09112020075527.html 
RFA. 2021. Zhongguo jiu jiange zhoubian huodong chen kezhi shiyong wuqi ri 
fangwei xiang pi zhongguo hai jing ju jiaqiang yu jundui xiezuo 中国就尖阁周边活动
称克制使用武器  日防卫相批中国海警局加强与军队协作 [China says that it would 
use forces with restraints regarding Chinese coast guards’ actions in waters 
surrounding Senkaku islands, Japanese Defense Minister criticized that Chinese 
Coast Guard Bureau has enhanced cooperation with military]. RFA. [online]. 13 
March. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.rfa.org/mandarin/Xinwen/3-03132021102058.html 
Rfi. 2020. Hanguo wai jiao bu Wen Zaiying weishuo xianggang he Xinjiang dou shu 
zhongguo neizheng 韩国外交部 : 文在寅未说香港和新疆都属中国内政  [South 
Korea Foreign Ministry: Wen Jae-In did not say that Hong Kong and Xijiang is China’s 
internal affair]. Rfi. [online]. 30 December. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.rfi.fr/cn/中国/20191230-韩国外交部文在寅未说香港新疆都属中国内政 
Rivas, R. 2018a. Philippines 'extra careful' with China loans – NEDA. Rappler. 






Rivas, R. 2018b. Chinese debt trap? Americans did it too – Dominguez. Rappler. 
[online]. 31 July. [Accessed 24 June 2019]. Available from: 
https://www.rappler.com/business/208560-carlos-dominguez-chinese-debt-trap-
americans 
Romero, P and Lee-Brago, P. 2009. GMA signs Baselines Bill into law, triggers China 
protest. Philstar. [online]. 12 March. [Accessed 12 March, 2010]. Available from: 
https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2009/03/12/447409/gma-signs-baselines-bill-
law-triggers-china-protest#1XAQ34WQylIdwlGq.99 
Rosales, E. 2017. Asean banking on China-led AIIB to plug infrastructure gaps. 
Business Mirror. [online]. 13 November. [Accessed 22 June 2019]. Available from: 
https://businessmirror.com.ph/2017/11/13/asean-banking-on-china-led-aiib-to-plug-
infrastructure-gaps/ 
Santos, E. 2019. Progress made in South China Sea Code of Conduct as Beijing 
eases up on demands – Locsin. CNN Philippines. [online]. 25 September. [Accessed 
22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2019/9/25/teddy-boy-locsin-south-china-sea-
code-of-conduct.html# 
Sakhalinski, Y. 2019. Russian PM Dmitry Medvedev visits disputed island off 
Hokkaido despite protest from Tokyo. The Japan Times. [online]. 2 August. 
[Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/08/02/national/russian-pm-dmitry-
medvedev-visits-disputed-island-off-hokkaido-despite-protest-tokyo/ 
Service, J. 2004. Zai zhongguo shidiao de jihui 在中国失掉的机会 [The lost chance 
in China]. Beijing; Guoji wenhua chuban gongsi. 
Severino, R. 2006. Southeast Asia in search of an ASEAN community: insights from 
the former ASEAN Secretary-General. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies (ISEAS). 
Severino, R.C. 2006. Southeast Asia in search of an ASEAN community: insights 





Shi, Changxue. 施昌学. 2013. Haijun siling Liu Huaqing 海军上将刘华清. Beijing: 
Changzheng Chu ban she 
Shi, Zhongquan 石仲泉. 2012. Yi Qiaomu tongzhi tan yan;an zhengfeng: jianlun 
Yan’an zhengfeng yundong 忆乔木同志谈延安整风:兼论延安整风运动 [In memory 
of Qiaomu comrade’s discussion of Yan’an rectification movement and analysis of 
the movement]. Zhonggong Dangshi Yanjiu. 5, pp.10-23. 
Shixizhi. 时习之. 2020. 2020 nian zhonggong Zhongyang zhengzhiju huiyi yanjiu 
bushu naxie dashi 2020年中共中央政治局会议研究部署哪些大事 [what major tasks 
that Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee political Bureau discussed and 
arranged in 2020]. 163. [online]. 9 January. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from:  
https://www.163.com/news/article/FVUDSDVF000189FH.html 
Sima Tai. 司马台. 2020. Dang yuanyi shang zhanchang biancheng Taiwan ren de 
zizhu can 当 “愿意上战场 ”变成台湾年轻人的自助餐  [When the willingness of 
participating in the army becomes Taiwanese’ buffet]. DW News. [online]. 9 October. 
[Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: https://www.dwnews.com/台湾/60214290/
当愿意上战场变成台湾年轻人的自助餐 
Sina economics. 新浪财经. 2018. Shangwubu: zhongguo yi lianxu jiunian chengwei 
dongmeng diyida maoyi huoban 商务部：中国已连续九年成为东盟第一大贸易伙伴
[China has been the largest trading partner for ASEAN in 9 years]. Sina economics. 
[online]. 17 July. [Accessed 22 June 2019]. Available from: 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/usstock/c/2018-07-17/doc-ihfkffam5710479.shtml 
Sina. 2016. Guotai ban zhuren: taifang xu dui daodan wushe Shijian youge shufa 国
台办主任：台方需对导弹事件有个说法 [The director of Taiwan Affair office of State 
Council: Taiwanese side need to explain the incident of Xiongsan missile]. SIna. 
[online]. 1 July. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://news.sina.cn/gn/2016-07-01/detail-ifxtsatm1175259.d.html?from=wap 
Strait Exchange Foundation [SEF], 2016. Jiu’er gongshi de zhenxiang 92共识的真
相[the truth of 1992 consensus]. SEF. [online]. 20 May. [Accessed 20 May, 2016]. 




Strong, M. 2019. Taiwan President not planning to visit Washington, D.C.: 
Presidential Office.Taiwan News. [online]. 5 July. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available 
from: https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3739046 
Suettinger, R. L. 2003. Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of U.S.-China Relations 
1989–2000. [Kindle iPhone app]. Washington. D.C: Brookings Institution Press. 
Sun, Yanhong.孙艳红. 2018. Shixian fuguo he qiangjun de xingdong zhinan 实现富
国和强军的行动指南 [the guide of realizing enriching the nation and building a strong 
army]. Xuexi Shibao. [online]. 2 May. [Accessed 24 May 2019]. Available from: 
http://theory.people.com.cn/n1/2018/0502/c40531-29959535.html 
Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council PRC. 2016. Jiu’er gongshi de youlai 92 共
识的由来 [The origin of 1992 consensus]. Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council 
PRC. [online]. 12 July. [Accessed 12 July, 2016]. Available from: 
http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/m/news/201710/t20171030_11859743.htm 
Taiwan people’s news. 民报. 2015. Jiuer gongshi tongyi zhiqian, Zhu Li-Luan: xianfa 
mingwen guiding 九二共识统一之前，朱立伦 宪法明文规定 [“1992 consensus”, 
“before unification”, Zhu Li-Luan: constitution explicitly stipulates]. Taiwan People 
News. [online]. 6 June. [Accessed 6 June, 2018]. Available from:  
https://www.peoplenews.tw/news/43a2b444-9ba2-4bd9-b871-b50d99e5305a 
Taiwan Today. 2016. Premier Lin drops charges against sunflower protesters. 
Taiwan Today. [online]. 24 May. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://taiwantoday.tw/news.php?unit=2,23&post=3897 
Tan, Liya. 谭 丽 娅 . 2012. .Jianpuzhai fandui nanhai wenti guojihua: yingzai 
dongmeng-zhongguo kuangjia nei jiejue 柬埔寨反对南海问题国际化：应在东盟和中
国框架内解决[Cambodia opposed internationalisation of South China Sea disputes, 
which must be solved within ASEAN-China framework]. Global Times. [online]. 1 
April. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://world.huanqiu.com/article/9CaKrnJuOCK. 
Tang,Bin. 唐斌. 1999. Yipiao zhicha gonglufa xiuzhengan weihuo tongguo de juece 




background behind the failure of passing the draft of national road law modification]. 
Juece yu Xinxi. 7, pp.7-8. 
Tao, Wenzhao. 陶文钊. 2016. Zhongmei guanxi shi 中美关系史 [The history of 
Sino-US relationship]. Shanghai: shanghai renmin chu ban she.  
The Cabinet Papers. [No date]. China and Japan. [online]. [Accessed 25 August, 
2019]. Available from: 
https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/cabinetpapers/themes/china-japan.htm 
The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, 中华人民共和
国中央人民政府. 2012. Minzhengbu guanyu guowuyuan pizhun sheli diji sanshashi 
de gonggao 民政部关于国务院批准设立地级三沙市的公告 [Ministry of Civil Affairs’ 
announcement concerning the State Council’s permission of establishing Prefecture-
level Sansha city]. [Press release]. [Accessed 26 June 2019]. Available from: 
http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2012-06/21/content_2167058.htm 
The Guardian. 2001. Keep the decibels down. The Guardian. [online]. 8 March. 
[Accessed 6 June 2019]. Available from: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/mar/08/usa.guardianleaders 
The National Development and Reform Commission [NDRC], Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs [FMPRC], and Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China 
[MOFCOM], 2015. Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt 
and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road. [Press release]. [Accessed 22 June 2019]. 
Available from: http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html 
The Observer. 2016. Zhongguo kongjun shouci baoguang Hong-6K xunhang 
huangyan dao gaoqing zhaopian 中国空军首次曝光轰 6k 巡航黄岩岛高清照片 
[Chinese Airforce for the first time exposed photos that H-6k’s partrol Scarborough 
Shoal]. The Observer. [online]. 15 July. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.guancha.cn/military-affairs/2016_07_15_367643.shtml 
The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of Philippines v. The People's 





The Star. 2019. Malaysia’s external debt lower at 64.7% of GDP at the end-2018. 
The Star. [online]. 14 February. [Accessed 25 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.thestar.com.my/business/business-news/2019/02/14/malaysias-
external-debt-lower-at-64pt7pct-of-gdp-at-end-2018/ 
The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, 2015. China’s 
military strategy. [Press release] [Accessed 30 May, 2018]. Available from: 
http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/WhitePapers/2014.htm 
the State council information office.2009. Xinzhongguo linian junfei zhichu fenxi 新
中国历年军费支出分析 [the analysis of China’s annual defense spending since the 
founding of new China]. the State council information office. [online]. 29 September. 
[Accessed 25 May 2020]. Available from: 
http://www.scio.gov.cn/zggk/gqbg/2009/Document/426589/426589.htm 
The State Council. 2011. Guoyou tudi fangwu zhengshou yu buchang tiaoli 国有土
地房屋征收与补偿条例 [regulations concerning acquisition and compensation of 
households on national land]. [Press Release]. [Accessed 28 May 2020]. Available 
from: http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2011-01/21/content_1791480.htm 
The Straits Times. 2019. South Korean military drills around disputed island draw 
Japanese protest. The Straits Times. [online]. 25 August. [Accessed 22 May 2022]. 
Available from: https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/south-korea-begins-
military-drills-around-disputed-island-amid-feud-with-japan 
Torres, E. 2016. Cuisia chides Yasay for failing to get ASEAN behind sea ruling. 
Inquirer net. [online]. July 29. [Accessed 22 May 2019]. Available from: 
https://globalnation.inquirer.net/142125/cuisia-chides-yasay-for-failing-to-get-asean-
behind-sea-ruling 
Tran, M. 2010. Vietnam demands release of fishermen held in China. The Guardian. 
[online]. 6 October. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/oct/06/vietnam-china-captured-fishermen 
TRT World. 2016. Duterte aligns with China and says 'goodbye' to US. TRT World. 






Tsai, Ing-wen. 2016. Inaugural address of ROC 14th-term President Tsai Ing-wen. 
[online]. 20 May. Office of the President, Republic of China, Taipei. [Accessed 2 
January, 2019]. Available from: https://english.president.gov.tw/NEWS/4893 
Tsai, Ing-wen. 2019. Tsai Ing-wen huiying Xi Jinping quanwen: Taiwan jue buhui 
jieshou yiguo liangzhi 蔡英文回应习近平全文：台湾绝不会接受一国两制 [Tsia Ing-
wen’s response to Xi Jinping: Taiwan will never accept one country two systems]. 
[online]. 2 January. Office of the President, Republic of China, Taipei. [Accessed 2 
January, 2019]. Available from: 
https://www.chinatimes.com/cn/realtimenews/20190102002877-260407 
TWOCCPCC. 2017. Dili fengjin kenan qianxing dang de shiba da yilai duitai gongzuo 
de bu pingfan lichen 砥砺奋进 克难前行--党的十八大以来对台工作的不平凡历程 
[persistent in striving for achievements and progressing by overcome difficulties-the 
unordinary process of dealing with Taiwan issue after the party’s 18th congress]. 
Qiushi. [online]. 15 October. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/wyly/201710/t20171016_11852722.htm 
Udn. 2019. Lianhebao shelun: taidu bian taizhu, Lai, Ching-te de wushi huo touji? 联
合报社论：台独变台主, 赖清德务实或投机 [Commentary of United Daily News: 
Taiwan independence becomes Taiwan self-determination: Lai, Ching-te pragmatic 
or opportunistic? ]. Udn. [online]. Comment posted on 24 March, 2019. [Accessed 4 
April, 2019]. Available from: https://udn.com/news/story/11321/3716711 
United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea [UNCLOS]. 1994. [online]. 
1833.1834.1835. UNTS 3, opened for signature 10 December, 1982, entered into 
force 16 November, 1994. [Accessed 16 November, 2018]. Available from: 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201833/volume-1833-A-
31363-English.pdf 
Vietnam Investment Review. 2019. Alibaba partners with Fado to sell Vietnamese 




2019]. Available from: https://www.vir.com.vn/alibaba-partners-with-fado-to-sell-
vietnamese-goods-globally-66418.html 
Vietnam News Agency. 2019. Yuegong Zhongyang zongshuji Guojia zhuxi Ruan 
Fuzhong huijian henei xuanmin 越共中央总书记国家主席阮富仲会见河内市选民 
[General Secretary of Communist Party of Vietnam, Vietnamese President Nguyễn 
Phú Trọng met Hanoian voters]. Vietnam Plus. [online]. 15 October. [Accessed 22 
May 2021]. Available from: https://zh.vietnamplus.vn/越共中央总书记国家主席阮富
仲会见河内市选民/103486.vnp 
Vietnam News Agency.2020. Việt Nam actively pursues defence diplomacy in peace 
time for national development: Defence official. Vietnam News. [online]. 25 
December. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: https://vietnamnews.vn/politics-
laws/836279/viet-nam-actively-pursues-defence-diplomacy-in-peace-time-for-
national-development-defence-official.html 
Villamor, F. 2017. Duterte says Xi warned Philippines of war over South China Sea. 
Today. [online]. 20 May. [Accessed 20 May, 2017]. Available from: 
https://www.todayonline.com/world/asia/duterte-says-xi-warned-philippines-war-
over-south-china-sea 
Viray, P. 2018. Philippines, China draw 'red lines' in South China Sea dispute. 
Philstar. [online]. 29 May. [Accessed 29 May, 2018]. Available from: 
https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2018/05/29/1819745/philippines-china-draw-
red-lines-south-china-sea-dispute 
Vishwadeepak. 2018. PM Modi’s Bullet Train dream derails after Japan stops 
funding. National Herald. [online]. 25 September. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available 
from: https://www.nationalheraldindia.com/india/prime-minister-narendra-modis-
bullet-train-dream-derails-after-japan-stops-funding 
Vu, K. 2020. Vietnam protests Beijing’s sinking of South China Sea boat. Reuters. 





Walcott, J. and Worland, J. 2019. Taiwan won't get U.S. fighter jets while Trump 
seeks a China deal. Time. [online]. 05 April. [Accessed 25 April, 2019]. Available from:  
http://time.com/5564773/taiwan-fighter-jet-sale-trump-china/ 
Wan, D. 2018. China-Myanmar high-speed railway quietly back on track. Myanmar 
Times. [online]. 06 July. [Accessed 24 June 2019]. Available from: 
https://www.mmtimes.com/news/china-myanmar-high-speed-railway-quietly-back-
track.html 
Wan, W. 2012. Beijing both encourages and reins in anti-Japanese protests, analysts 




Wang, Haicheng. 2014. Zhang Xueliang tan weishenme guomindang da buguo 
gongchandang 张学良谈为什么国民党打不过共产党[Zhang Xueliang talks about 
reasons that Kuo Min Tang could not defeat Chinese Communist Party]. Beijing Daily. 
[online]. December 15 [Accessed 26 May 2021]. Available from: 
http://dangshi.people.com.cn/n/2014/1215/c85037-26206271.html 
Wang, Kunyi. 王昆义. 2021. Guojia Tongyi qian xiuxian gongtou lianshu liangan weiji 
youxian“国家统一前”修宪公投联署 两岸危机又现 [Before Unification referendum, 
will the cross-strait crisis happen again?]. DW News. [online]. 3 February. [Accessed 
22 May 2021]. Available from: https://www.dwnews.com/台湾/60228305/国家统一前
修宪公投联署两岸危机又现 
Wang, Qianrun. 王千润. 2020. Rimei: anbei zhengfu ceng jihua rang zi wei dui 
jianchuan shiguo nanhai zhongguo linghai, yin danyou zhongfang fandui er fangqi 
日媒：安倍政府曾计划让自卫队舰船驶过南海中国“领海”，因担忧中方反对而放弃
[Japanese media: Abe administration once planned to deploy self-defense vessels 
enter into “territorial sea” of SCS but gave up due to fear of deterioration of Sino-
Japan relationship]. Global Times. [online]. 22 November. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. 




War Annals Office of Japanese Defense Ministry, 1982. Huabei zhi’an zhan 华北治
安战 [enforcing public order in the Northern China]. Tianjin: Tianjin Renming Chu 
ban she.  
West, K. 2012. Banana crisis blamed on Philippines-China dispute. ABC News. 
[online]. June 29. [Accessed May 25, 2021]. Available from:  
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-06-29/an-banana-exporters-caught-in-
philippines-china-dispute/4100422 
Wong, E. L. 2019. Belt and Road Initiative not a “domination plan” by China, says Dr 
Mahathir. The Edge Markets. [online]. 28 April. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available 
from: https://www.theedgemarkets.com/article/belt-and-road-initiative-not-
domination-plan-china-says-dr-mahathir 
Wroe, D. 2018. Asia must not fragment into 'rival blocs' as region reshapes: 
Singapore PM. The Sydney Morning Herald. [online]. 16 March. [Accessed 25 June 
2019]. Available from: https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/asia-must-not-
fragment-into-rival-blocs-as-region-reshapes-singapore-pm-20180315-p4z4hq.html 
Wu, Jianmin. 吴建民. 2009. Cong laoyibei gemingjia de yanxing kan zhongguo 
waijiao bianhua. 从老一辈革命家的言行看中国外交变化  [exploring changes in 
China’s diplomacy in terms of talks and actions of the elder revolutionaries]. 
Tongzhou Gongjin. 10, pp.8-9. 
Wu, Jianmin.吴建民. 2007. Waijiao anli. 外交案例 [the case of diplomacy]. [online]. 
Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Chubanshe. [Accessed 6 June 2019]. Available 
from: http://book.people.com.cn/GB/69399/107424/113248/113249/6729765.html 
Wu, Lengxi. 吴冷西. 1999. Shinian lunzhan 1956-1966 zhongsu guanxi huiyi lu十年
论战 1956-1966 中苏关系回忆录. [The ten years debate 1956-1966 the memoir of 
Sino-Soviet relationship]. Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chu ban she. 
Wu, Qian. 吴倩. 2016. Zhongfang chen shijie di yi da jing ji ti ru jiaru ya you hang 
Shijian haoshi 中方称作为世界第一大经济体的美国如加入亚投行是件好事 [China 
says as the largest economy in the world, the US’s participation in AIIB is a good 





Xi, Jinping 习近平. 2019. Wei shixian minzu weida fuxing, tuijin zuguo heping tongyi 
er gongtong fendou: zai gao Taiwan tongbao shu fabiao 40 zhounian jinianhui shang 
de jianghua 为实现民族伟大复兴，推进祖国和平统一而奋斗：在告台湾同胞书发表
40周年纪念会上的讲话[the speech at the commemoration of the 40th anniversary of 
issuing Message to Compatriots in Taiwan: striving for realizing great national 
rejuvenation and promoting peaceful national unification]. [online]. 2 January. 
Renmin Da Huitang, Beijing. [Accessed 2 January, 2019]. Available from: 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2019-01/02/c_1123937757.htm 
Xi, Jinping 习近平. 2020. Zhongguo gongchandang de lingdao shi zhongguo tese 
shehui zhuyi zui benzhi de tezheng 中国共产党的领导是中国特色社会主义最本质的
特征 [CCP’s leadership is the most essential trait of Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics]. Qiushi [online]. 15 July. [Accessed 15 July 2021]. Available from: 
https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1672267229607089303&wfr=spider&for=pc 
Xi, Jinping. 2014. New Asian security concept for new progress in security 
cooperation. 21 May, Expo Center, Shanghai. [Accessed 25 June 2019]. Available 
from: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1159951.shtml 
Xi, Jinping. 2015. Towards a community of common destiny and a new future for Asia. 
[online]. 28 March, Boao Forum, Hainan. [Accessed 29 May 2019]. Available from: 
http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/2015-03/29/c_134106145.htm 
Xi, Jinping. 习近平. 2017. Juesheng quanmian jiancheng xiaokang shehui duoqu 
xinshidai zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi weida shengli: zai zhongguo gongchandang di 
shijiuci quanguo daibiao dahui shang de baogao 决胜全面建设小康社会夺取新时代
中国特色社会主义伟大胜利：在中国共产党第十九次全国代表大会上的报告
[ completing the goal of comprehensively developing a well-off society and get the 
great victory of socialism with Chinese Characteristics: the report at the 19th National 
Congress of the Communist Party of China]. [online]. 18 October, Renmin Dahuitang, 
Beijing. [Accessed 29 May 2019]. Available from: http://www.gov.cn/zhuanti/2017-
10/27/content_5234876.htm 
Xi, Jinping. 习近平. 2017. Juesheng quanmian jiancheng xiaokang shehui duoqu 




shijiuci quanguo daibiao dahui shang de baogao 决胜全面建设小康社会夺取新时代
中国特色社会主义伟大胜利：在中国共产党第十九次全国代表大会上的报告
[ completing the goal of comprehensively developing a well-off society and get the 
great victory of socialism with Chinese Characteristics: the report at the 19th National 
Congress of the Communist Party of China]. [online]. 18 October, Renmin Dahuitang, 
Beijing. [Accessed 29 May 2019]. Available from: http://www.gov.cn/zhuanti/2017-
10/27/content_5234876.htm 
Xi, Jinping. 习近平. 2019. Wei shixian minzu weida fuxing, tuijin zuguo heping tongyi 
er gongtong fendou: zai gao Taiwan tongbao shu fabiao 40 zhounian jinianhui shang 
de jianghua 为实现民族伟大复兴推进祖国和平统一而共同奋斗：在告台湾同胞书发
表 40周年纪念会上的讲话 [unitedly striving for realizing national rejuvenation and 
pushing for national peaceful unification: the speech at the anniversary meeting of 
the issuance of letter to Taiwanese comrades]. [online]. 2 January. Renmin Da 
Huitang, Beijing. [Accessed 2 January, 2019]. Available from: 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2019-01/02/c_1123937757.htm 
Xi, Jinping. 习近平.2013. Guanyu jianchi he fazhan shehui zhuyi de jige wenti 关于
坚持和发展社会主义的几个问题 [questions concerning insisting on and developing 
socialism]. [online]. 5 January, Guanche Xuexi Dangde Shibada Jingshen Yantaoban, 
Beijing. [Accessed 27 May 2019]. Available from: 
http://www.xmcdi.gov.cn/sjjs/201904/t20190401_5266506.htm 
Xiao, Xucen. 萧旭岑. 2018. Ma Ying-jeou koushu: ba’nian zhizheng huiyi lu. 马英九
口述：八年执政回忆录 [Ma Ying-jeou dictate; the memoir of eight years’ experience 
as Taiwanese President]. Taipei: Yuanjian Tianxia Wenhua.   
Xiaoshan. 2020a. rimei ceng bao jiefang jun yanxi moni duo dongsha dao Taiwan pai 
Xinjian zengfang 日媒曾曝解放军演习模拟夺东沙岛 台湾派新舰增防 [Japanese 
media once exposed that PLA conducted military drills that aimed at seizing Prata 
islands, Taiwan sent new vessels to fortify defence]. Rfi. [online]. 30 May. [Accessed 





Xiaoshan. 小山. 2020. Riben jujue canjia jiu xianggang guoanfa piping zhongguo de 
lianhe shengming oumei huo buman 日本拒绝参加就香港国安法批评中国的联合声
明 欧美或不满 [Japan’s refusal to participate in the joint statement that criticized 
China’s passage of national security law may cause European Union or the US’s 
dissatisfaction]. Rfi. [online]. 7 June. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.rfi.fr/cn/亚洲/20200607-日本拒绝参加就香港国安法批评中国的联合声明
-欧盟或不满 
Xiaoshan. 小山. 2020b.  Jie fang jun Taiwan nanbei jiaji shidan junyan 解放军台湾
南北夹击实弹军演 [PLA conducted military drills near south and north Taiwan]. Rfi. 
[online]. 23 August. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: https://www.rfi.fr/cn/中
国/20200823-解放军台湾南北夹击实弹军演 
Xinhua agency, 2017a. 2017lianghui Wang Qishan Beijing daibiaotuan shengyi: 
zhiyou dangzheng fengong meiyou dangzheng fenkai. 2017两会：王岐山背景代表
团审议：只有党政分工没有党政分开 [2017 the national people’s congress and the 
Chinese people consultative conference: Wang Qishan Beijing delegation group 
discussion: there is only division of labors between the party and the government 
rather than separating the party from the government]. Guanchazhe wang. [online]. 
6 March. [Accessed 19 June 2019]. Available from: 
http://www.guancha.cn/politics/2017_03_06_397295.shtml 
Xinhua Agency. 2016c, July 15. Yang Jiechi jiu nanhai zhongcaian zhongcaiting 
zuochu zuowei caijue jieshou zhongyang meiti caifang 杨洁篪就南海仲裁案仲裁庭
作出所谓裁决接受中央媒体采访  [Yang Jiechi answers state media’s questions 
concerning so-called awards issued by the arbitral tribunal for the SCS arbitration]. 
Xinhua Agency. [online]. July 15. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2016-07/15/c_1119221292.htm 
Xinhua Agency. 2016a. zhongfang zhuhe Duterte yingde fei zongtong daxuan [China 
congratulates Duterte’s Presidential election victory]. Guangming net. [online]. 18 





Xinhua Agency. 2016b. zhongguo dashi huijian Duterte 中国大使会见杜特尔特 
[Chinese ambassador to Philippine met with Duterte]. Global Times. [online]. 16 May. 
[Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://world.huanqiu.com/article/9CaKrnJVvWD 
Xinhua Agency. 2016d. Xi Jinping: ba sixiang zhengzhi gongzuo guanchuan jiaoyu 
de quan guocheng 习近平：把思想政治工作贯穿教育的全过程 [Xi Jinping: the 
pollical and ideological works must be implemented throughout the process of 
education]. Xinhua Net. [online]. 08 December. [Accessed 11 May 2020]. Available 
from: http://www.xinhuanet.com//politics/2016-12/08/c_1120082577.htm 
Xinhua Daily Telegraph. 2019. Shushuo di yi lun Zhongyang huanbao ducha ji hui 
tou kan 数说中央环保督查及回头看 [use statistics to explain the central committee’s 
inspection and re-inspection on the provinces’environmental protection]. Xinhua 
Daily Telegraph. [online]. 17 May. [Accessed 17 May, 2020]. Available from: 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/mrdx/2019-05/17/c_138065122.htm 
Xinhua Net, 2012. Xi Jinping: jianchi fuguo qiangjun xiang tongyi, shixian minzu 
weida fuxing 习近平 : 坚持富国与强军相统一，实现民族伟大复兴  [Xi Jinping: 
ensuring the co-development of national economy and army and realizing great 
national rejuvenation]. Xinhua Net. [online]. 13 December. [Accessed 24 May 2019]. 
Available from: https://news.qq.com/a/20121213/000249.htm 
Xinhua Net. 2008a. 911 shijian hou Jiang Zemin dangji zhidian Bush biaoshi weiwen 
911 事件后江泽民当即致电布什表示慰问[after 911 incident, Jiang Zemin immediate 
called Bush to express condolence]. Xinhua Net. [online]. 12 December. [Accessed 
6 June 2019]. Available from: http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2008-12-
12/104916835142.shtml 
Xinhua Net. 2008b. Hu Jintao: juebuzou fengbi laolu ye juebuzou gaiqi yizhi de xielu 
胡锦涛：绝不走封闭老路也绝不走改旗易帜的邪路 [Hu Jintao: we reject both the old 
and rigid closed-door policy and any attempt to abandon socialism and take an 
erroneous path] . Xinhua Net. [online]. 18 December. [Accessed 6 June 2019]. 




Xinhua Net. 2012. Di erci guogong hezuo 第二次国共合作 [The second cooperation 
between Kuo Ming Tang and Chinese Communist Party]. China Youth Net. [online]. 
21, August. [Accessed 21, August, 2018]. Available from: 
http://agzy.youth.cn/xzzh/ecgghz/sjjg/201208/t20120821_2373686.html 
Xinhua Net. 2012. Hu Jintao Xi Jinping chuxi junwei kuoda huiyi fabiao zhongyao 
jianghua 胡锦涛习近平出席军委扩大会议发表重要讲话 [Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping 
attended the enlarged meeting of Central Military Committee and made important 
speeches]. Zhongxin Net. [online]. 17 November. [Accessed 25 May 2021]. Available 
from: https://www.chinanews.com/mil/2012/11-17/4336613.shtml 
Xinhua Net. 2012. Wai jiao bu fa yan ren: zhongfang yaoqiu fei lv bing kaogu chuan 
liji likai huangyandao haiyu 外交部发言人: 中方要求菲律宾考古船立即离开黄岩岛海
域 . Xinhua Net. [online]. 16 April. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2012-04/16/c_111788268.htm 
Xinhua Net. 2014. 80 niandai zhongmei miyueqi 80 年代中美蜜月期[The Sino-US 
honeymoon in 1980s]. 81.cn. [online]. 08 December. [Accessed 15 May 2021]. 
Available from: http://www.81.cn/jsdj/2014-12/08/content_6260110.htm 
Xinhua Net. 2014. Xi Jinping zongshuji huijian Taiwan heping tongyi canfang tuanti 
习近平总书记会见台湾和平统一参访团 [General Secretary Xi Jinping met with 
Taiwanese delegation group aiming for peaceful unification]. Xinhua Net. [online]. 26, 
September. [Accessed 15, April, 2019]. Available from: 
http://www.xinhuanet.com//politics/2014-09/26/c_1112641354.htm 
Xinhua net. 2015. Xi Jinping: Zhongguo wanquan you xinxin you nengli tong 
dongmeng guojia yidao weihu hao nanhai de hepingwending [Xi Jinping: China has 
complete confidence and capability to maintain peace and stability in the South China 
sea with ASEAN countries] 习近平: 中国完全有信心有能力同东盟国家一道维护好南
海的和平稳定. Xinhua net. [online]. 7 November. [Accessed 9 May 2019]. Available 
from: http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2015-11/07/c_1117070489.htm 
Xinhua Net. 2016. Xi Jinping: chongwen dangwei gongzuo de fangfa 习近平; 重温




Beijing Qingnian bao. [online]. 26 February. [Accessed 22 May 2020].Available from: 
http://www.xinhuanet.com//politics/2016-02/26/c_128754428.htm 
Xinhua Net. 2019. Liangxue yizuo xuexi jiaoyu 两学一做 学习教育 [ two study and 
one action, study and education]. Xinhua Net. [online]. [Accessed 19 June 2019]. 
Available from: http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/liangxueyizuo/ 
Xinhua Net新华网. 2020. Waijiaobu Zhongfang jianjue fandui youzui tuildingshi de 
guoji diaocha 外交部：中方坚决反对有罪推定式的国际调查[Chinese Foreign Ministry: 
China firmly opposes international investigation that is based on presumption of guilt]. 
Xinhua Net. [online]. 30 April. [Accessed May 21, 2021]. Available from: 
https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1665366301475779094&wfr=spider&for=pc 
Xinhua, 2005. The ten principles of Bandung. [Press release]. [Accessed 25 June 
2019]. Available from: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-
04/23/content_436882.htm 
Xinhua, 2016. China sticks to "dual-track" approach to solve South China Sea issue: 
FM. Xinhua net. [online]. 24 July. [Accessed 24 July, 2016]. Available from: 
http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/2016-07/24/c_135536484.htm 
Xinhua, 2017. AIIB committed to providing strong support to ASEAN. Xinhua Net. 
[online]. 12 May. [Accessed 19 September 2019]. Available from: 
http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/2017-05/12/c_136277998.htm 
Xinhua, 2018. China hopes to complete talks on S. China Sea code of conduct in 3 
years. Xinhua net. [online]. 13 November. [Accessed 13 November, 2018]. Available 
from: http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-11/13/c_137603619.htm 
Xiong, Xianghui. 熊向晖. 2006. Wode qingbao he waijiao shengya我的情报和外交
生涯[My career in intelligence and Foreign Policy]. Beijing: Zhong gong dang shi chu 
ban she. 
Xiong, Xianghui. 熊向晖. 2006. Wode qingbao he waijiao shengya我的情报和外交
生涯[My career in intelligence and Foreign Policy]. Beijing: Zhong gong dang shi chu 
ban she. 
Xu, zhengrui. 徐政璿. 2017. Yizhong tongbiao gebiao cha nali? Hung Hsiu-chu yong 




[what’s the difference between one China same interpretation and one China 
different interpretation? Hung Hsiu-chu use three minutes to explain clearly]. ETtoday. 
[online]. 22 June. [Accessed 22 June, 2018]. Available from:  
https://www.ettoday.net/news/20170622/950322.htm 
Xue, Zhibai.薛之白 2016. Zhongguo guofangbu: Meifei lianhe junyan tixian lengzhan 
siwei 中国国防部: 美菲联合军演体现冷战思维 [the US-Philippines military drill 
reflects cold-war mentality]. Zaobao. [online]. 14 April. [Accessed 23 May 2019]. 
Available from: https://www.zaobao.com.sg/realtime/china/story20160415-605640 
Xuexi Shibao.学习时报. 2017. Xi Jinping zong shuji de chengzhang zhilu.习近平总书
记的成长之路 [the career development of the General Secretary Xi Jinping]. Xuexi 
Shibao. [online]. 7 August. [Accessed 7 August, 2018]. Available from:  
http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0728/c64094-29433685-3.html 
Yang, Gongsu., and Zhang, Zhirong 杨公素和张植荣. 2009. Dangdai zhongguo 
waijiao lilun yu Shijian.当代中国外交理论与实践 .[Contemporary China Foreign 
Relations: Theory and Practice]. Beijing: Beijing da xue chu ban she. 
Yang, Kuisong 杨奎松 . 2010.. Zhongjian didai de geming 中间地带的革
命.[revolutions at the middle ground]. Shanxi: Shanxi ren min chu ban she. 
Yang, Qing 杨晴. 2020. Mao Zedong juece langmei yuanchao 毛泽东决策抗美援朝
[Mao Zedong decided to assist North Korea and resist the US]. Hunan Daily [online]. 
10 November. [Accessed 25 May 2021]. Available from: 
http://dangshi.people.com.cn/n1/2020/1019/c85037-31896571.html 
Yang, Xiaodan and Yang, Zhirong. 杨晓丹和 杨志荣. 2019. Weihu Haiyang quanyi, 
jianshe Haiyang qiangguo [Protect maritime interests and construct the maritime 
great power]维护海洋权益，建设海洋强国. 81.cn. [online]. 1 April. [Accessed 4 May 
2019]. Available from: http://www.81.cn/rd/2019-04/01/content_9464658.htm 
Yap, DJ. 2012. Fishing boats gone from the shoal but one Chinese ship remains. 






Ye, Fei. 叶飞 . 1993. Paoji Jinmen jishi 炮击金门纪实  [the documentary of 
bombarding Jinmen]. In: Chen, min 程敏 eds. Gongheguo zhanshen shilu 共和国战
神实录 [The documentary of PRC’s god of war]. Beijing: tuanjie chu ban she.  
Yoshida, R. 2013. No Chinese Jet scrambled. The Japan Times. [online]. 30 
November. [Accessed 22 May 2020]. Available from: 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/11/30/national/no-chinese-jets-scrambled-
japan/ 
You, Kaixiang. 游凯翔. 2020. Gongjun lian liangri zai Taiwan xinan fang 166 gongli 
haikong yanxun, guofang bu: yanzhong tiaoxing 共軍連兩日在台灣西南方 166公里
海空演訓 國防部：嚴重挑釁 [Communist party’s army had air and naval drills near 
Taiwan southeast Part 166 km in two days, Defense Ministry: serious challenges]. 
CNA. [online]. 10 September. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.cna.com.tw/news/firstnews/202009105006.aspx 
Zaobao. 早报. 2020. Mei Gaoguan fangtai geri, dalu 18 jia junji jinru Taiwan zhouwei 
kongyu 美高官访台隔日 大陆 18 架军机进入台湾周围空域 [the day after the US’s 
high-level officials visit Taiwan, 18 planes from the mainland’s Airforce entered into 
the airspace surrounding Taiwan]. Zaobao. [online]. 18 September. [Accessed 22 
May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.zaobao.com.sg/realtime/china/story20200918-1085998 
Zaobao. 早报. 2020. Zhongguo yuming bei jinzhi jinru Diaoyu dao 30 haili nei 中国
渔民被禁止进入钓鱼岛三十海里内 [Chinese fishermen were not allowed to enter 
waters that were 30 nautical miles far from Diaoyu island]. Zaobao. [online]. 16 
August. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.zaobao.com.sg/realtime/china/story20200816-1077322 
Zaobao. 早报. 2021. Zhongguo shouci jiu haijing fa yunyong fangzhen tongbao riben 
中国首次就海景法运用方针通报日本 [China for the first time inform Japan about its 
policy regarding applying Coastguard Law]. Zaobao. [online]. 14 March. [Accessed 





Zhang, H. 2016. Defiant Tsai threatens cross-straits progress. Global Times. [online]. 
11 October. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1010748.shtml 
Zhang, Ming. 张明. 2011. Fei Lv Bin hecha zai nansha qundao qiangji liangming 
yuenan yuming xiaoxi 菲律宾核查在南沙群岛枪击两名越南渔民消息 [Philippines 
was verifying the report that Philippines armed officials shot at two Vietnamese 
fishermen]. Tencent News. [online]. 21 May. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://news.qq.com/a/20110521/000699.htm 
Zhang, Qingjun., and Chen, Youtai 张清俊和陈泰佑. 2015. Lvying chuanchu gaihui 
zheng bing zhi nan dasheng hui yingxiang toupiao yiyuan 绿营传出改回征兵制 男大
生： 会影响投票意愿 [The green camp revealed that to restart full conscription, male 
University students: this will affect their voting preference]. ETtoday. [online]. 22 April. 
[Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.ettoday.net/news/20150422/496079.htm 
Zhang, Shu 张曙. 2018. Deng Xiaoping: jianchi sixiang jiben yuanze yongbu rangbu 
邓小平： 坚持四项基本原则永不让步[Deng Xiaoping：insisting on the four basic 
principle and never making concessions]. Zhongguo Jijian Jiancha Bao. [online]. 22 
May. [Accessed 26 May 2019]. Available from: 
http://www.wenming.cn/djw/djw2016sy/djw2016dsgs/201805/t20180522_4694518.s
html 
Zheng, Kaijun. 郑开君 . 2015. Xi Jinping: zhongguo jiang jianding fazhan tong 
dongmeng de youhao hezuo jianding zhichi dongmeng fazhan zhuangda 习近平中
国将坚定发展同东盟的友好合作坚定支持东盟发展壮大[Xi Jinping: China will firmly 
develop friendly cooperation with ASEAN and support ASEAN’s development and 
growth]. Xinhua Net. [online]. 07 November. [Accessed 25 June 2019]. Available from: 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2015-11/07/c_1117070246.htm 
Zheng, Zhonglan 郑中岚. 2016. Tai ri yuchuan kouliu an yanshao, Taiwan guanfang 
jiang paichuan xunhu 台日渔船扣留案延烧，台湾官方将派船巡护 [the escalation of 
Japanese’ detain of Taiwanese fishing vessel, Taiwan official will send coastguard 




May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/china/2016/04/160429_tw_jp_fish_boat_disput
e 
Zheng, Zhonglan. 郑仲岚. 2018. Tsai Ing-wen shuangshi jie yanshuo zhongguo 
tiaozhan taihai wending xianzhuang 蔡英文双十节演说：“中国挑战台海稳定现
状”[Tsai Ying-wen’s speech at double ten festival:China challenges stable status quo 
of Taiwan strait]. BBC News. [online]. 10 October. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available 
from: https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/chinese-news-45809519 
Zheng, Zhonglan. 郑仲岚. 2019. Taiwan lvxing fa huo meiguo zhongyi yuan tongguo, 
meitai yuanshou hufang zhiri kedai?《台湾旅行法》获美国众议院通过 美台元首互访
指日可待？[The US House of Representatives passed the Taiwan travel Act, the 
mutual visit between the US and Taiwanese Presidents will be just around the 
corner?]. BBC News. [online]. 12 January. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/chinese-news-42652320 
Zhong, Chenfang. 钟辰芳. Chengren zhonghua mingguo? Wang Yi xianfa shuo re 
reyi 承认中华民国？王毅“宪法”说引热议 [recognizing ROC? Wang Yi’s statement 
regarding ROC constitution aroused heated discussion]. VOA. [online]. 27 February. 
[Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: https://www.voachinese.com/a/china-
taiwan-cross-strait-relations-20160226/3210107.html 
Zhongsheng. 钟声. 2016. Renmin ribao ping meiguo zongtong daxuan: xuanzhan 
guaixiang zhizhi zhidu biduan 人民日报评美国总统大选：选战怪象直指制度弊端 
[People’s Daily commentary on the US Presidential election, the weird situations of 
electoral campaigns reflect institutional shortcomings]. Ifeng. [online]. 08 October. 
[Accessed 27 May 2019]. Available from:  
http://news.ifeng.com/a/20161008/50067848_0.shtml 
Zhou, Enlai. 1939. Zhou Enlai guanyu yu Jiang Jieshi tanpan qingkuang ji yijian gei 
Zhongyang de baogao 周恩来关于与蒋介石谈判情况与意见给中央的报告 [Zhou 
Enlai’s report concerning negotiation with Chiang and related advices to Chinese 
Communist Party Central Committee]. In: Zhonggong Zhongyang tongyi zhanxian 




Committee united front department] eds. Zhonggong Zhongyang kangri mingzu 
tongyi zhanxian wenjian xuanbian 中共中央抗日民族统一战线文件选编 [Selected 
documents of Chinese Communist Party Central Committee anti-Japanese united 
front]. Beijing: dang an chu ban she, pp. 192-193. 
Zhou, Enlai. 1954. Conversation with Indian Ambassador to the UN Vengalil Krishnan 
Krishna Menon. 20 July. 
Zhou, Jinglu. 周晶璐 . 2012. Yuenan lianhe fei lv bing kangyi zhongguo youlun 
shihang xisha lvyou xianlu 越南联合菲律宾抗议中国邮轮试航西沙旅游线路 
[Vietnam cooperated with the Philippines to protest against the tourist route of 
Paracel islands]. Huanqiu Net. [online]. 12 April. [Accessed 11 May 2021]. Available 
from: https://go.huanqiu.com/article/9CaKrnJwA4L 
Zhou, Siyu. 周思宇. 2016. Bei zhiyi shanbing, Lin Xuzuo ying shenhuan jiaolv zheng 
被質疑「閃兵」 林昶佐：因身患焦慮症 [being criticized for shirking responsibility of 
joining the army, Lin Xuzuo: because I have anxiety]. China Times. [online]. 3 March. 
[Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.chinatimes.com/realtimenews/20160303003739-260407?chdtv 
Zhou, Xuanhui. 周煊惠. 2018. Chongshen liangan weichi xianzhuang. Tsai Ing-wen 
buhui zai yali xia qufu重申兩岸「維持現狀」 蔡英文：但不會在壓力下屈服 [reiterating 
maintaining cross-strait status quo: Tsai Ing-wen: but we will not yield to pressure]. 
New Talks. [online]. 20 May. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://newtalk.tw/news/view/2018-05-20/124988 
Zhou, Yingfeng., Hua, Chunyu., and He, Zongyu. 周英峰，华春雨，和 何宗渝. 2012. 
Zhongzubu: dang mianlin “sida kaoyan” he “sida weixian” 中组部：党面临四大考验
和四大危险 [The organizational department of CCPCC：the Party faces four great 
trials and four great dangers]. Xinhua Net, [online]. 9 November. [Accessed 11 
November, 2019]. Available from: https://news.qq.com/a/20121110/000086.htm 
Zhu, Jiamu 朱佳木. 2016. Chen Yun bu zancheng faxing tequ huobi 陈云不赞成发
行特区货币 [Chen Yun did not endorse issuing special currency for the Special 





Abdelal, R., Herrera, Y. M., Johnston, A. I., and McDermott, R. 2009.  Identity as a 
variable. In: Abdelal, R., Herrera, Y. M., Johnston, A. I., & McDermott, R eds. 
Measuring Identity: A Guide for Social Scientists (Illustrated ed.). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.pp.17-33. 
Acharya, A. 1998.Collective identity and conflict management in Southeast Asia. In: 
Adler, E and Barnett, M, eds. Security Communities. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp.198-227. 
Acharya, A. 2005. Containment, engagement, or counter dominance? Malaysia’s 
response to the rise of China. In: Johnston, A and Ross, R. eds. Engaging China: the 
management of an emerging power. [online]. London: Routledge, pp.132-155. 
[Accessed 4 May, 2019]. Available from:  
https://www.dawsonera.com/readonline/9780203979495 
Acharya, A. 2009. Constructing a security community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and 
the problem of regional order. [online]. 2nd ed. New York: Routledge. [accessed 19 
May, 2018]. Available from: https://www.dawsonera.com/readonline/9780203939239 
Acharya, A. 2009. Whose ideas matter? Agency and power in Asian regionalism. 
London: Cornell University Press. 
Acharya, A. 2019, From Heaven to Earth: ‘Cultural Idealism’ and ‘Moral Realism’ as 
Chinese Contributions to Global International Relations. The Chinese Journal of 
International Politics, 12(4), pp. 467–494.  
Acharya, A., and Layug, A. 2012. Collective Identity Formation in Asian Regionalism: 
ASEAN Identity and the Construction of the Asia-Pacific Regional Order. the 
International Political Science Association, Madrid, Spain. 
Adler, E and Barnett, M. 1998. A framework for the study of security communities. In: 
Adler, E and Barnett, M, eds. Security Communities. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Ahmed, J.U. 2010. Documentary research method: new dimensions. Indus Journal 
of Management & Social Sciences, 4(1), pp.1-14  
Alcaro, R. 2018. The liberal order and its contestations. a conceptual framework. The 




Allison, G. 2017. Destined for war: can America and China escape thucydides’s trap? 
London: Scribe.  
Allison, G. 2020. The new sphere of influence: sharing the globe with other powers. 
Foreign Affairs. 99(2), pp.30-40. 
Amadeo, K. 2020. Understand the Greek Debt Crisis in 5 Minutes. The Balance. 
[online]. 18 May. [Accessed May 18, 2021]. Available from:  
https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-the-greece-debt-crisis-3305525 
Amer, R. 2014. China, Vietnam, and the South China Sea: disputes and dispute 
management. Ocean Development & International Law. 45(1), pp.17-40  
An, Gang. 安刚 . 2017. Ruhe lijie nanhai xingwei zhunze kuangjia wenjian de 
dacheng 如何理解南海行为准则框架文献的达成[how to understand the completion 
of the South China Sea code of conduct framework]. Shijie zhishi. [online]. 5 
September. [Accessed 5 September, 2018]. Available from: 
http://www.sohu.com/a/169591463_825951 
Arase, D. 2015. China’s two silk roads initiative: what it means for Southeast Asia. 
Southeast Asian Affairs. 2015, pp.25-45.  
Armstrong, J. D. 2018. Revolutionary Diplomacy: Chinese Foreign Policy and the 
United Front Doctrine (First ed.). University of California Press. 
Ba, A. 2016. The South China Sea: primary contradictions in China-Southeast Asia 
relations. In: Storey, I and Lin, Cheng-yi eds. The South China Sea dispute: 
navigating diplomatic and strategic tensions. Singapore: ISEAS Publishing. pp. 104-
134. 
Ba, A. and Kuik, Cheng-Chwee. 2018. Southeast Asia and China: engagement and 
constrainment. In Ba, A and Beeson, M. eds. Contemporary Southeast Asia. 3rd 
edition. London: Palgrave. pp. 229-247   
Babbage, R. 2016. Countering China’s adventurism in the South China Sea, strategy 
options for the Trump administration. Washington, D.C: Center for Strategic and 




Baranovitch, N. 2020. A Strong Leader for A Time of Crisis: Xi Jinping’s Strongman 
Politics as A Collective Response to Regime Weakness. Journal of Contemporary 
China, 30(128), pp.249–265.  
Barnhart, J. 2016. Status Competition and Territorial Aggression: Evidence from the 
Scramble for Africa. Security Studies, 25(3), pp.385–419.  
Bar-Tal, D. 2011. Introduction: conflicts and social psychology. In: Bar-Tal, D. ed. 
Intergroup conflicts and their resolution: a social psychology perspective. New York: 
Psychology Press, pp.1-39. 
Bateman, S. 2016. The South China Sea arbitration ruling-two months on. The 
Strategist. [online]. 21 September. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from:  
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/south-china-sea-arbitration-ruling-two-months/ 
Baveria, A. 2014. An ASEAN perspective on the South China Sea: China-ASEAN 
collision or China-US hegemonic competition. In: Chachavalpongpun, P. eds, 
Entering uncharted waters? ASEAN and the South China Sea. Singapore: ISEAS 
Publishing, pp.88-115.  
Beeson, M and Breslin, S. 2014. Regional and global forces in East Asia’s economic 
engagement with international society. In: Buzan, B and Zhang, Yongjin eds. 
Contesting international society in East Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, pp.93-119. 
Beeson, M. (2020). The great ASEAN Rorschach test.The Pacific Review, 33(3-4), 
pp.574-581.  
Benton, G. 1999. New Fourth Army: Communist Resistance Along the Yangtze and 
the Huai, 1938-1941. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Blanchard, Jean-Marc. 2017. Probing China’s twenty-first-century Maritime Silk Road 
Initiative (MSRI): an examination of MSRI narratives. Geopolitics, 22(2), pp.246-268.  
Boon, H. T., and Ardy, C. 2017. China and Lilliputians: Small States in a Big Power’s 
Evolving Foreign Policy. Asian Security, 13(2), pp.116–131. 
Boon, Hoo Tiang. 2017. Hardening the Hard, Softening the Soft: Assertiveness and 




Bowe, A. 2018. China’s Overseas United Front Work Background and Implications 




Bowen, G. 2009. Document analysis as a qualitative research method. Qualitative 
Research Journal. 9(2), pp.27-40. 
Boyle, M. 2016. The coming illiberal order. Survival, 58(2), pp.35-66  
Brady, Anne-Marie. 2017. Magic Weapons: China's political influence activities under 
Xi Jinping. Conference on the corrosion of democracy under China’s global 
influence,16/17 September, Arlington.  
Brady, H., and Kaplan, C. 2009. Conceptualizing and measuring ethnic identity. In: 
In: Abdelal, R., Herrera, Y. M., Johnston, A. I., & McDermott, R eds. Measuring 
Identity: A Guide for Social Scientists (Illustrated ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp.33-72.  
Breuer, A., and Johnston, A. I. 2019. Memes, narratives and the emergent US–China 
security dilemma. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 32(4), pp.429–455.  
Brewer, M. 2011. Identity and Conflict. In: Bar-Tal, D. ed. Intergroup conflicts and 
their resolution: a social psychology perspective. New York: Psychology Press. 
pp.125-145 
Brooks, S. and Wohlforth, W. 2016. The rise and fall of the great powers in the twenty-
first century: China’s rise and the fate of America’s global position. International 
Security. 40(3), pp.7-53.  
Brown, J. 2017. The failure of Abe’s new approach to Russia. Nikkei Asia. [online]. 
28 June. [Accessed 22 May 2019]. Available from: 
https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/The-failure-of-Abe-s-new-
approach-to-Russia 
Brown, J. 2018. Japan’s security cooperation with Russia: neutralizing the threat of 




Brown, J. 2018. Japan's Indo-Pacific strategy falls short. The Japan Times. [online]. 
3 April. [Accessed 19 September 2019]. Available from: 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2018/04/03/commentary/japan-
commentary/japans-indo-pacific-strategy-falls-short/#.XYO8ai2VaqA 
Brown, K. 2009. Friends and enemies: the past, present and future of the communist 
party of China. New York: Anthern Press.  
Brown, K. 2018. The PRC’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative, Southeast Asia, and the 
United States. In: Arduino, A, and Xue, Gong, eds. Securing the Belt and Road 
Initiative, pp.101-118. 
Brown, R. 2000. Group processes. 2nd edition. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.  
Brzezinski, Z. 1997/1998. The grand chessboard: US geostrategy of Eurasia. 
Harvard International Review. 20(1), pp.48-53. 
Bush, R. 2013. Uncharted strait: the future of China-Taiwan relations. Washington, 
D.C: Brookings Institute Press. 
Buszynski, L. 2012. The South China Sea: oil, maritime claims, and U.S.–China 
strategic rivalry. The Washington Quarterly. 35(2), pp.139-156  
Buszynski, L. 2015. The origins and development of the South China Sea maritime 
dispute. In: Buszynski, L and Roberts, C. eds. The South China Sea Maritime Dispute: 
Political, Legal and Regional Perspectives. New York: Routledge， pp.1-23.  
Buzan, B. 2014. An introduction to the English School of international relations: the 
societal approach. Cambridge: Polity Press.  
Caballero-Anthony, M. 2014. Understanding ASEAN's centrality: bases and 
prospects in an evolving regional architecture. The Pacific Review. 27(4), pp.563-584 
Callahan, W. 2006. History, identity, and security: Producing and consuming 
nationalism in China. Critical Asian Studies, 38(2), pp.179–208.  
Callahan, W. 2010. China: the pessoptimists nation. [online]. Oxford: Oxford 







Callahan, W. 2016. China’s ‘‘Asia Dream’’: the Belt Road Initiative and the new 
regional order. Asian Journal of Comparative Politics. 1(3), pp. 226-243. 
Campbell, K and Ratner, E. 2018. The China reckoning: how Beijing defied American 
expectation. Foreign Affairs. 97(2), pp.60-71. 
Cao, jingqing. 曹锦清. 2013. yongyou sange zixin danqi sanda zeren 拥有三个自信
担起三大责任 [Having three confidence and shouldering three great responsibilities]. 
People’s Daily overseas. [online]. 1 August. [Accessed 24 May 2019]. Available from: 
http://opinion.people.com.cn/n/2013/0801/c1003-22401388.html 
Carter, A. 2016. The rebalance and Asia-Pacific security: building a principled 
security network. Foreign Affair. 95, pp.65-75. 
Castro, R.C.D. 2016. Facing up to China’s realpolitik Approach in the South China 
Sea dispute: the case of Scarborough Shoal stand-off and its aftermath. Journal of 
Asian Security and International Affairs. 3(2), pp.157-182. 
Castro, R. C. D. 2020. The Limits of Intergovernmentalism: The Philippines’ 
Changing Strategy in the South China Sea Dispute and Its Impact on the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Journal of Current Southeast Asian 
Affairs, 39(3), pp.335–358.   
Chan, G. 2013. “Diplomatic truce” in cross-strait relations: limits and prospects. In 
Hu,Weixing ed. New Dynamics in Cross-Taiwan Strait relations, how far can the 
rapprochement go?. London: Routledge. pp.97-115.   
Chang, G., and Di, H. 1993. The Absence of War in the U.S.-China Confrontation 
over Quemoy and Matsu in 1954–1955: Contingency, Luck, Deterrence? The 
American Historical Review, 98(5), pp.1500–1524. 
Chaturvedy, R. 2014. New maritime silk road: converging interests and regional 
responses. [online]. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. [Accessed 24 
June 2019]. Available from: 
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/184577/ISAS_Working_Paper_No._197_New_Maritim
e_Silk_Road_08102014200801.pdf 
Chen, Charles, I-hsin. 2018. After election: Taiwan’s grand strategy is in doubt. The 




November, 2018]. Available from: https://nationalinterest.org/feature/after-election-
taiwan’s-grand-strategy-doubt-37277 
Chen, Dingding and Wang, Jianwei. 2011. Lying low no more? China’s new thinking 
on Tao Guang Yang Hui. China: an International Journal. 9(2), pp.195-216. 
Chen, J.Y., and Zhang, F.W. 1999. Chinese Foreign Relation Strategies Under Mao 
and Deng: A Systematic and Comparative Analysis. The Philippine Journal of Third 
World Studies. 4(3), pp.91-114. 
Chen, Jia. 陈佳. Dangdai zhongguo minzu zhuyi sichao pingxi 当代中国民族主义思
潮的评析 [the evaluation of Contemporary Chinese nationalism]. Gaige yu Kaifang, 
pp.1-3. 
Chen, Jian. 2001. Mao’s China and the Cold war. London: The University of North 
Carolina Press.  
Chen, Kongli. 陈孔立. 2011. Liangan zhengzhi dingwei de pingjing 两岸政治定位的
瓶颈  [The Bottlenecks on Cross Straits Political Orientation]. Taiwan Research 
Quarterly. 3, pp.1-5. 
Chen, Shaofeng. 2018. Regional responses to China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative 
in Southeast Asia. Journal of Contemporary China. 27(111), pp.344-361.  
Chen, Xiancai. 陈先才 . 2020. Liangan tongyi bu keneng yidai tuo yidai: bitong 
qiutong doushi disan tiao zhanlue 两岸统一不可能一代拖一代！“逼统”“求统”都
是第三条战略道路  [unification could not be delayed one generation after one 
generation, compelling Taiwan to unification or begging for unification could be the 
third road]. [online]. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.ixigua.com/6867863762486067724 
Chen, Yongfa. 陈永发, 2001. Zhongguo gongchan geming qishi nian 中国共产革命
七十年 [70 years’ Chinese Communist revolution]. Taipei: jingwei. 
Chi, Fulin. 迟福林. 2008. Jianli Zhongyang gaige xietiao jigou zhengti tuijin gaige 建
立中央改革协调机构, 整体推进改革 [establish coordinating organization for reform 
at the central committee, holistically promote reform]. Hainan Daily. [online]. 13 






Chin, G. and Thakur, R. 2010. Will China change the rules of global order? The 
Washington Quarterly. 33(4), pp.119-138.  
Chin, G. and Thakur, R. 2010. Will China change the rules of global order? The 
Washington Quarterly. 33(4), pp.119-138.  
China Times. 2019. Zhongshi Shelun: Ma Ying-jeou de cuo Han Kuo-yu buyao zai 
fan 中时社论：马英九的错韩国瑜不要再犯 [China Times Commentary; Han Kuo-yu 
must not make Ma Ying-jeou’s fault again]. China Times. [online]. 30 October. 
[Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.chinatimes.com/opinion/20191030004239-262101?chdtv 
Christensen, T. 1995. A “Lost Chance” for What? Rethinking the Origins of U.S.-PRC 
Confrontation. Journal of American-East Asian Relations, 4(3), pp. 249–278.  
Christensen, T. 2015. The China challenge. London: W.W. Norton Company. 
Chubb, A. 2021. PRC Assertiveness in the South China Sea: Measuring Continuity 
and Change, 1970–2015. International Security, 45(3),pp. 79–121.  
Chung, C. 2009. Southeast Asia and the South China Sea dispute. In: Bateman, S 
and Emmers, R. eds. Security and international politics in the South China Sea: 
towards a cooperative management regime. London: Routledge. pp. 95-110.  
Chung, C. 2009. Southeast Asia and the South China Sea dispute. In: Bateman, S 
and Emmers, R. eds. Security and international politics in the South China Sea: 
towards a cooperative management regime. London: Routledge. pp. 95-110.  
Chung, Chien-Peng, and Voon, T. 2017. China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative  
Chung, CP. 2017. China’s maritime silk road initiative: political-economic calculations 
of Southeast Asian states. Asian Survey. 57(3), pp.416-449.  
Clover, C and Hornby, L. 2015. China’s great game: road to a new empire. Financial 





Clunan, A. 2014. Historical Aspirations and the Domestic Politics of Russia’s Pursuit 
of International Status. Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (3–4), pp. 281–
90.  
Cohen, W. I. 1997. Introduction: Was There a “Lost Chance” in China? Diplomatic 
History, 21(1), pp. 71–75. 
Crisp, R and Hewstone, M. 2007. Multiple social categorization. In Zanna, M. ed. 
Advances in experimental social psychology. Vol.39. San Diego, CA: Academic. 
pp.163-254. 
Crisp, R and Turner, R. 2010. Essential social psychology. 2nd ed. London: Sage 
Publications. 
Deng, Y. 2008. China’s struggle for status: the realignment of international relations. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Dickson, B. 2016. The survival strategy of the Chinese Communist Party, The 
Washington Quarterly. 39(4), pp.27-44  
Do, Thanh Hai. 2018. Vietnam: riding the Chinese tide, The Pacific Review. 31(2), 
pp. 205-220  
Dovidio, J., Gaertner, S., and Saguy, T. 2009. Commonality and the complexity of 
“we”: social attitudes and social change. Personality and Social Psychology Review. 
13(1). pp.3-20. 
Dovidio, J., Gaertner, S., Ufkes, E., Saguy, T., and Pearson, A. 2016. Included but 
invisible? subtle bias, common Identity, and the darker side of “we”. Social Issues 
and Policy Review. 10(1), pp.6-46.   
Dreyer, J. T. 2018. A Weapon Without War: China’s United Front Strategy. Foreign 
Policy Research Institute. [online]. February 6. [Accessed 25 May, 2021]. Available 
from: https://www.fpri.org/article/2018/02/weapon-without-war-chinas-united-front-
strategy/ 
Dutta, S. 2005. Securing the Sea Frontier: China's Pursuit of Sovereignty Claims in 
the South China Sea. Strategic Analysis. 29(2), pp. 269-294.  
Dyke, J and Valencia, M. 2000. How valid are The South China Sea claims under the 




Economy, E. 2018. China’s new revolution: the reign of Xi Jinping. Foreign Affairs. 3, 
pp. 40-69. 
Edwards, F. 1999. Review: International Relations: About Face. International Journal, 
54(4), pp. 720–722. 
Emmers, R. 2009. The de-escalation of the Spratly dispute in Sino-Southeast Asian 
relations. In: Bateman, S and Emmers, R. eds. Security and international politics in 
the South China Sea: towards a cooperative management regime. London: 
Routledge, pp.140-155. 
Emmerson, D. 2010. China’s “frown diplomacy” in Southeast Asia. East Asia Forum. 
[online]. 8 October. [Accessed 8 October, 2010]. Available from: 
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/10/08/chinas-frown-diplomacy-in-southeast-
asia/ 
Epstein, C. 2012. Stop Telling Us How to Behave: Socialization or 
Infantilization?1. International Studies Perspectives, 13(2), pp.135–145.  
Erickson, A. 2019. Competitive coexistence: an American concept for managing 
U.S.-China Relations. The National Interest. [online]. [Accessed 1 August 2019]. 
Available from: https://nationalinterest.org/feature/competitive-coexistence-
american-concept-managing-us-china-relations-42852 
Erickson, A., and Martinson, R. 2019. Introduction: “war without gun smoke”: China’s 
Para naval challenge in the maritime gray zone. In: Erickson, A., and Martinson, 
R.eds. China’s maritime gray zone operations. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, pp.1-
15.  
Etzioni, A. 2011. Is China a responsible stake holder? International Affairs. 87(3), 
pp.539-553.   
Evans, A. 2015. Ideological Change Under Vladimir Putin in the Perspective of Social 
Identity Theory. Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post- Soviet Democratization 23 
(4), pp.401–26.  
Fang, Xiao. 2012. Dongmeng hanjian yizhi xiwang yu zhongguo tanpan nanhai 
xingwei zhunze. Dongfang Zaobao. [online]. 19, July. [Accessed 19 July, 2018]. 




Fearon, J., and Wendt, A. 2002. Rationalism v. constructivism: a skeptical view. In: 
Carlsnaes, W., Risse, T., and Simmons, B. A. eds. Handbook of International 
Relations. London: Sage, pp.52-72.  
Feng, Shizheng. 冯仕政. 2015. Shehui chongtu, guojia zhili yu qun ti xing Shijian 
gainian de yanshen 社会冲突，国家治理与群体性事件概念的演生 [Social conflict, 
state governance, and the concept of mass incident evolution]. She hui xue Yanjiu. 
5, pp.63-78.  
Fewsmith, J., and Nathan, A. J. 2019. Authoritarian Resilience Revisited: Joseph 
Fewsmith with Response from Andrew J. Nathan. Journal of Contemporary 
China, 28(116), pp.167–179. 
Fisher, M. 2018, Xi Sets China on a Collision Course With History. The New York 
Times. [online]. 1 March. [Accessed 25 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/28/world/asia/xi-jinping-china.html 
Fiske, S., Dupree, C., Nicolas, G., and Swencionis, J. 2016. Status, power and 
intergroup-relations: the personal is the societal. Current Opinion in Psychology. 11, 
pp.44-48. 
Foot, R. 2006. Chinese strategies in a US-hegemonic global order: accommodating 
and hedging. International Affairs, 82(1), pp.77–94.  
Foot, R. 2014. Social boundaries in flux: secondary regional organizations as a 
reflection of regional international society. In: Buzan, B and Zhang, Yongjin. eds. 
Contesting international society in East Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, pp.188-207. 
Foot, R. 2017. Power transitions and great power management: three decades of 
China-Japan-US relations. The Pacific Review. 30(6), pp. 829-42 
Fravel, T. 2015. Response from M. Taylor Fravel. In A. Taffer (Ed.), State strategy in 
territorial conflict: A conceptual analysis of China’s strategy in the South China sea. 
Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, 37 (1): 
pp. 85–108.  
Fravel, T. 2008. Strong borders secure nation: cooperation and conflict in China’s 




Fravel, T. 2011. China’s strategy in the South China Sea. Contemporary Southeast 
Asia. 33(3), pp.292-319.  
Fravel, T. 2012. Maritime security in the South China Sea and the competition over 
maritime rights. In Cronin, P. ed. Cooperation from strength: the United States, China 
and the South China Sea. [online]. Washington, D.C: Center for a New American 
Security. pp.31-51 [Accessed 1 January 2018]. Available from: 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS_CooperationFromStren
gth_Cronin_1.pdf?mtime=20160906081232 
Fravel, T. 2016. Explaining China’s escalation over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands. 
Global Summitry. 2 (1). pp. 24–37 
Fravel, T. 2017. Threading the needle: The South China Sea disputes and US-China 
relations. In Ross, R and Tunsjø, Ø, eds. Strategic adjustment and the rise of China: 
power and politics in East Asia. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, pp. 233-
261 
Fravel, T., Roy, J., Swaine, M., Thornton, S., and Vogel, E. 2019. China is not an 




Friedberg, A. 2011. Hegemony with Chinese characteristics. National Interests. 
[online]. [Accessed 2 May 2019]. Available from: 
https://nationalinterest.org/article/hegemony-chinese-characteristics-5439 
Friedberg, A. 2011. Hegemony with Chinese characteristics. National Interests. 
[online]. [Accessed 2 May 2019]. Available from: 
https://nationalinterest.org/article/hegemony-chinese-characteristics-5439 
Friedberg, A. 2018. Competing with China. Survival. 60(3), pp.7-64  
Gaertner, S and Dovidio, J. 2012. Reducing intergroup bias: the common in-group 
identity model. New York: Routledge.  
Galtung, J. 1964. A structural theory of aggression. Journal of Peace Research. 1(2), 




Gao Cheng. 高程 . 2018. Zhongmei jingzhen shijiao xia dui wending fazhan 
zhongmei guanxi de zai shenshi [Reconsideration of "Developing Steady Sino-U.S. 
Relations" from the Perspective of the Sino-US Competition] 中美竞争视角下对“稳
定发展中美关系的再审视. Zhanlue Juece Yanjiu. 2, pp.14-25. 
Garnaut, J. 2018. The Interference Operations from Putin’s Kremlin and Xi’s 
Communist Party: Forging a Joint Response. | The Asan Forum. [online]. 8 May. 
[Accessed 21 May 2021]. Available from: http://www.theasanforum.org/the-
interference-operations-from-putins-kremlin-and-xis-communist-party-forging-a-
joint-response/ 
Garver, J. 1988. The Origins of the Second United Front: The Comintern and the 
Chinese Communist Party. The China Quarterly, 113, pp.29-59. 
Garver, J. 1991. The Soviet Union and the Xi'an Incident. The Australian Journal of 
Chinese Affairs, 26, pp. 145-175. 
Garver, J. 1997. Little Chance: Revolutions and Ideologies, Diplomatic History, 21(1), 
pp.87–94, 
Gates, R. 2009. A balanced Strategy: Reprograming the Pentagon for a new age. 
Foreign Affair. 88(1), pp.28-40. 
Gill, B., and Schreer, B. 2018. Countering China’s “United Front.” The Washington 
Quarterly, 41(2), pp.155–170. 
Gilley, B. 2019. 30 Years After Tiananmen: The Young and the Restless. Journal of 
Democracy, 30(2), pp.50–56.  
Glaser, B., and Funaiole, M. 2019. South China Sea, assessing Chinese Para-naval 
behavior within the nine dashed line. In: Erickson, A., and Martinson, R.eds. China’s 
maritime gray zone operations. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, pp.189-207.  
Glaser, B., and Green, M. 2017. What is the US “one China policy” and why does it 
matter. CSIS. [online]. 13 January. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-us-one-china-policy-and-why-does-it-matter 
Glaser, C. L. 2015. A U.S.-China grand bargain? the hard choice between military 




Goh, E. 2011. Limits of Chinese power in Southeast Asia. YaleGlobal Online. [online]. 
26 April. [Accessed from 26 April 2018]. Available from: 
https://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/limits-chinese-power-southeast-asia 
Goldstein, A. 2007. Power transitions, institutions, and China's rise in East Asia: 
Theoretical expectations and evidence. Journal of Strategic Studies. 30(4-5), pp.639-
682  
Goldstein, A. 2013. US-China interactions in Asia. In Shambaugh, D eds. Tangled 
titans: the United States and China. Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Inc. 
Gong, Fangbin and Hou, Angyu. 公方彬和侯昂妤 2018. Xi Jinping qiangjun sixiang 
fenxi 习近平强军思想分析[An analysis of Xi’s thought concerning army buildup]. 
Qianxian Magazine. 8，[no pagination]. 
Gong, Li. 宫力. 1998. Mao Zedong yu Meiguo 毛泽东与美国 [Mao Zedong and the 
US]. Beijing: shi jie zhi shi chu ban she. 
Gong, X. 2018. The Belt & Road Initiative and China’s influence in Southeast 
Asia. The Pacific Review, 32(4), pp.635–665.  
Gong, Yun. 龚云. 2011. Sida kaoyan: dangde jianshe mianlin de zhongda tiaozhan 
四大考验：党的建设面临的重大挑战[the Four great trials: important challenges to the 
party’s development]. People’s Net. [online]. 8 July [Accessed 11 June 2019]. 
Available from: http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/15105893.html 
Green, M. 2017. The NSS and the China Challenge. Foreign Policy. [online]. 
[Accessed 18 December, 2018]. Available from: 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/12/18/the-nss-and-the-china-challenge/ 
Green, M., Hicks, K., Cooper, Z., Schaus, J., and Douglas, J. 2017. Countering 
coercion in Maritime Asia: the theory and practice of Gray Zone deterrence.  
Washington, D.C: Center for Strategic and International Studies. 
Gries, P. 2001. Chinese nationalist reactions to the Belgrade Embassy bombing. The 
China Journal. 46, pp.25-43. 
Groot, G. 2017. The long reach of China’s United Front Work. The Interpreter. [online]. 





Han, Qingxiang. 韩庆祥. 2014. Renmin ribao kanwen: zhongguo gongchandang 
mianlin bage xinde weida douzheng 人民日报刊文：中国共产党面临八个新的伟大斗
争 [People’s Daily; CCP faces eight new great challenges]. People’s Daily. [online]. 
Comment posted on 23 July 2014. [Accessed 11 June 2019]. Available from: 
http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2014/0723/c40531-25323333.html 
Han, Z, and Paul, T.V. 2019. China’s rise and balance of power politics. The Chinese 
Journal of International Politics. 13(1), pp.1-26. 
Harding, H.1992. A fragile relationship: The United States and China since 1972. 
Washington, D.C. 
Hass, R., and Sacks, D, 2020. American support for Taiwan must be unambiguous. 
Foreign Affairs. [online]. 2 September. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/american-support-taiwan-must-
be-unambiguous 
Hayton, B. 2014. The South China Sea: the struggle for power in Asia. London: Yale 
University Press.  
He, Kai. 2015. Contested regional orders and institutional balancing in the Asia 
Pacific. International Politics. 52(2), pp.208-222.   
Heydarian, R. 2021. Philippines muscling up in the South China Sea. Asia Times. 
[online]. 12 May. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://asiatimes.com/2021/05/philippines-muscling-up-in-the-south-china-sea/ 
Hilton, B. 2009. “Maximum Flexibility for Peaceful Change”: Jimmy Carter, Taiwan, 
and the Recognition of the People’s Republic of China*. Diplomatic History, 33(4), 
pp.595–613.  
Hinkle, S and Brown, R. 1990. Intergroup comparisons and social identity: some links 
and lacunae. In Abrams. D and Hogg, M. eds. Social identity theory: constructive and 
critical advances. New York: Springer-Verlag. pp.48-70. 
Hoang, Anh Tuan. 2016. A Vietnamese perspective on the South China Sea Dispute. 
In: Storey, I and Lin, Cheng-yi eds. The South China Sea dispute: navigating 




Hoang, V. 2020. The Code of Conduct for the South China Sea: A Long and Bumpy 
Road. The Diplomat. [online]. 28 September [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/the-code-of-conduct-for-the-south-china-sea-a-
long-and-bumpy-road/ 
Hogg, M and Abrams, D. 1988. Social identifications: a social psychology of 
intergroup relations and group processes. London: Routledge.  
Hogg, M. 2016. Social identity theory. In: McKeown, S., Haji, R., and Ferguson, N. 
eds. Understanding peace and conflict through social identity theory: contemporary 
global perspectives. Switzerland: Springer International Publishing. pp.3-19.  
Holslag, J. 2015. China’s coming war with Asia. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Hopf, T. 1998. The promise of constructivism in international relations theory. 
International Security, 23(1), pp.171-200. 
Hsiao, R. and An, D. 2018. Taiwan Is ready to serve as an Indo-Pacific partner. The 
National Interests. [online]. Comment posted on 4 January. [4 January, 2018]. 
Available from: https://nationalinterest.org/feature/taiwan-ready-serve-indo-pacific-
partner-23936 
Hsieh, John Fuh-Sheng. 2017. Cross-strait relations in the aftermath of Taiwan’s 
2016 elections. Journal of Chinese Political Science. 22, pp.1-15  
Hsu, S. Philip. 2010. Reappraising the debate and practice of US strategic 
ambiguity/clarity in cross-strait relations. The Pacific Review. 23(2), pp.139-162. 
Hu, Angang., and Yang, Zhusong.胡鞍钢和杨竺松. 2017. Jianchi wanshan dang 
Zhongyang jiti lingdao tizhi: qida jizhi yu hexin 坚持完善党中央集体领导体制：七大
机制与核心 [persist in improving collective leadership of Chinese Communist Party 
Central Committee; seven institutions and the core]. Qinghua Daxue Xuebao. 32(1), 
pp.5-18 
Hu, Jian. 胡健. 2020. Zhongguo jueqi de jiazhi jichu:cong minzu zhuyi dao xin shijie 
zhuyi 中国崛起的价值基础: 从民族主义到新世界主义[the value basis of China’s rise: 




Hu, Le. 2021. [Forthcoming]. Examining ASEAN’s effectiveness in managing South 
China Sea disputes. The Pacific Review. [online]. [Accessed 22 July 2021]. Available 
from: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09512748.2021.1934519 
 Huang, Chuangxia. 黄创夏. 2014. Ziwo aihua, xiangzhong meigong? Ma Ying-jeou 
lian dalu dou kanbuqi 自我矮化，降中媚共? 马英九连大陆都看不起 [Self-belittle, 
surrender to China and placate CCP? Even the mainland China looked down upon 
Ma Ying-jeou]. SETN. 28 January. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.setn.com/News.aspx?PageGroupID=6&NewsID=11964 
Huang, Nian. 黄年. 2013. Huangnian changyi de dawuding zhongguo 黄年倡议的大
屋顶中国 [Huang Nian’s advocacy of China under a big roof]. Yuanjian Magazine. 
[online].21 March. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.ettoday.net/news/20130321/176775.htm 
Hughes, C. 2015. Japan’s foreign and security policy under the ‘Abe doctrine’: new 
dynamics or new dead end? New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Hughes, C. 2018. Japan and the South China Sea disputes: emerging power politics 
and “fake liberalism”. In: Feng, Huiyun., and He, Kai.,eds. US-China competition and 
the south China sea disputes. London and New York: Routledge, pp.82-98. 
Hughes, C. 2018. Japan and the South China Sea disputes: emerging power politics 
and “fake liberalism”. In: Feng, Huiyun., and He, Kai.,eds. US-China competition and 
the south China sea disputes. London and New York: Routledge, pp.82-98. 
Hughes, C. 2020. Japan and Indo-Pacific Strategy. In: Huxley, T., Kuok, L;, and 
Choong, W. eds, Asia-Pacific Regional security assessment: key developments and 
trends.  London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, pp.71-84. 
Huntington, S. P. 1996. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order . 
London: Simon & Schuster. 
Hurd, I. 2008. Constructivism. In: Reus-Smit, C and Snidal, D. eds. The Oxford 
handbook of international relations. [online]. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 






Ikenberry, J. 2008. The rise of China and the future of the west: Can the Liberal 
System Survive? Foreign Affairs. [online]. [Accessed 4 March, 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2008-01-01/rise-china-and-future-west 
Ikenberry, J. 2008. The rise of China and the future of the west: Can the Liberal 
System Survive? Foreign Affairs. [online]. [Accessed 4 March, 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2008-01-01/rise-china-and-future-west 
Ikenberry, J. 2009. Liberal internationalism 3.0: America and the dilemmas of liberal 
world order. Perspectives on Politics. 7(1), pp.71-87. 
Ikenberry, J. 2014. The rise of China and the future of liberal world order. [online]. 7 
May. Chatham House The Royal Institute of International Affairs. London. [Accessed 
4 March, 2021]. 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/field/field_document/20140507Ris
eofChina.pdf 
Ikenberry, J. 2014. The rise of China and the future of liberal world order. [online]. 7 
May. Chatham House The Royal Institute of International Affairs. London. [Accessed 
4 March, 2021]. 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/field/field_document/20140507Ris
eofChina.pdf 
Jian, Junbo. 简军波. 2009. Zhonghua chaogong tixi: guannian jiegou yu gongneng 
中华朝贡体系：观念结构与功能 [Chinese tributary system: concept, structure and 
function]. Guoji Zhengzhi Yanjiu. 1, pp.132-143. 
Jin, Yingzhong 金应忠. 2011. Guoji shehui de guosheng lun-heping fazhan shidai de 
guoji guanxi lilun 国际社会的共生论-和平发展时代的国际共生理论 [Co - Existing 
Theory of International Society-The Theory of International Relations of Peaceful 
Development Era]. Shehui Kexue. 10, pp.12-21. 
Johnson, J. 2017. Washington's perceptions and misperceptions of Beijing's anti-
access area-denial (A2-AD) ‘strategy’: implications for military escalation control 
and strategic stability. The Pacific Review. 30(3), pp.271-288. 





Johnston, A. 2003. Is China a status quo power. International Security. 27(4), pp.5-
56 
Johnston, A. 2008.  Social states: China in international institutions, 1980-
2000.Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
Johnston, A. 2008.  Social states: China in international institutions, 1980-
2000.Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
Johnston, A. 2013. How new and assertive is China's new assertiveness? 
International Security. 37(4), pp.7-48. 
Johnston, A. I. 2008.  Social states: China in international institutions, 1980-
2000.Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
Johnston, A. I. 2019. China in a World of Orders: Rethinking Compliance and 
Challenge in Beijing’s International Relations. International Security, 44(2), pp.9–60.  
Jones, D. M., and Jenne, N. 2016. Weak states’ regionalism: ASEAN and the limits 
of security cooperation in Pacific Asia. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 
Volume, 16(2), pp.209–240. https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcv015 
Jones, D. M., and Jenne, N. 2016. Weak states’ regionalism: ASEAN and the limits 
of security cooperation in Pacific Asia. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 
Volume, 16(2), pp.209–240. https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcv015 
Ju, Jian 鞠健. 1996. Yan’an zhengfeng yundong de zhijie qiyin he jiben mudi tanxi 
延安整风运动的直接起因和基本目的探析 [exploring Yan’an rectification movement’s 
direct cause and basic aims]. Shixue Yuekan. 1, pp.119-120. 
Kallgren, J. K. 1979. China 1978: The New Long March. Asian Survey, 19(1), pp.1–
19.  
Kastner, S. 2015/2016. Is the Taiwan Strait still a flash point?: rethinking the 
prospects for armed conflict between China and Taiwan. International Security. 40(3). 
pp. 54-92. 
Khong, Y.F. 2013. The American tributary system. The Chinese Journal of 
International Politics. 6(1), pp.1-47. 
Kirshner, J. 2012. The tragedy of offensive realism: Classical realism and the rise of 




Kirshner, J. 2019. Offensive realism, thucydides traps, and the tragedy of unforced 
errors: classical realism and US–China relations. China Int Strategy Rev. 1, pp.51–
63  
Koga, K. 2020. Japan’s ‘Indo-Pacific’ question: countering China or shaping a new 
regional order? International Affairs, 96(1), pp.49–73.  
Krickovic, A., and Zhang, C. 2020. Fears of Falling Short versus Anxieties of Decline: 
Explaining Russia and China’s Approach to Status-Seeking. The Chinese Journal of 
International Politics. 13(2), pp.219-251. 
Krickovic, A., and Zhang, C. 2020. Fears of Falling Short versus Anxieties of Decline: 
Explaining Russia and China’s Approach to Status-Seeking. The Chinese Journal of 
International Politics, 13(2), pp.219–251.  
Krochik, M and Jost, J. 2011. Ideological conflict and polarization: a social 
psychological perspective. In: Bar-Tal, D. ed. Intergroup conflicts and their resolution: 
a social psychology perspective. New York: Psychology Press. pp.145-175. 
Kuik, Cheng-Chwee, 2013. Making sense of Malaysia’s China policy: asymmetry, 
proximity and elites’ domestic authority. The Chinese Journal of International Politics. 
6(4). pp.429-467. 
Kuo, M. A. 2018. China’s United Front Work: Propaganda as Policy. The Diplomat. 
[online]. 14 February. [Accessed May 25 2021]. Available from: 
https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/chinas-united-front-work-propaganda-as-policy/ 
Kydd, A. 2008. Methodological individualism and rational choice. In: Reus-Smit, C 
and Snidal, D. eds. The Oxford handbook of international relations. [online]. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. [Accessed 5 August 2019]. Available from: 
https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199219322.001.000
1/oxfordhb-9780199219322-e-25 
Kynge, J., Hornby, L., and Anderlini, J. 2017. Inside China’s secret ‘magic weapon’ 
for worldwide influence. Financial Times. [online]. 26 October. [Accessed 25 May, 





Lampton, D. 2014. Following the leader: ruling China, from Deng Xiaoping to Xi 
Jinping. London: University of California Press.  
Lampton, D., Ho, S., and Kuik, Cheng-Chwee. 2020. Rivers of iron: railroads and 
Chinese power in Southeast Asia. California: University of California Press. 
Larson, D and Shevchenko, A. 2014. Managing rising powers: the role of status 
concerns. In Paul, T.V., Larson, D., and Wohlforth, W. eds. Status in world politics. 
New York: Cambridge University Press. pp.3-33. 
Larson, D. 2015. Will China be a new type of great power. The Chinese Journal of 
International Politics. 8(4), pp.323-348 
Larson, D. 2015. Will China be a new type of great power. The Chinese Journal of 
International Politics. 8(4), pp.323-348 
Larson, D. 2015. Will China be a new type of great power. The Chinese Journal of 
International Politics. 8(4), pp.323-348. 
Larson, D. 2020. Can China Change the International System? The Role of Moral 
Leadership. The Chinese Journal of International Politics. 13(2), pp.163-186. 
Law, Sung-tim. 2011. The Cooperation and Confrontation of KMD and CCP in the 
Second United Front: A Critical Study with Focus on the Wannan Incident. Master 
dissertation, University of Hong Kong. 
Lee, J. J. 2016. Will China’s rise be peaceful? a social psychological 
perspective. Asian Security, 12(1), pp.29–52.  
Lee, Lai To. 1999. China and the South China Sea dialogues. London: Praeger 
Publisher. 
Lee, S. 2017. An Institutional Analysis of Xi Jinping’s Centralization of Power. Journal 
of Contemporary China, 26(105), pp.325–336.  
Leung, Zoe and Depp, M. 2019. An American consensus: time to confront China. 
The Diplomat. [online]. [Accessed 5 May 2019]. Available from: 
https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/an-american-consensus-time-to-confront-china/ 
Li, C. 2012. The End of the CCP’s Resilient Authoritarianism? A Tripartite 




Li, Jia. 李佳. 2016. Dangyuan ganbu yao zijue zengqiang sige yishi 党员干部要自觉
增强四个意识 [the party members must voluntarily increase the four awareness]. 
People’s Net. [online]. 5 April. [Accessed 19 June 2019]. Available from: 
http://theory.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0405/c49150-28249802.html 
Li, Shengming 李慎明 . 2013. Mao Zedong guanyu baochi dang he zhengquan 
yongbu bianzhi zhanlue sixiang chansheng de yuanyuan fazhan mailuo ji xiangguan 
sikao 毛泽东关于保持党和政权永不变质战略思想产生的渊源发展脉络及相关思考
[the cause, development and related analysis of Mao Zedong’s strategic thought of 
consolidating party and CCP regime]. CCCPC Party Literature Research Office. 
[online]. [Accessed 18 May 2019]. Available from: 
https://www.wxyjs.org.cn/wxzj_1/dbzb/201309/t20130905_144100.htm 
Liff, A. 2018. China and the US alliance system. The China Quarterly. 233, pp. 137–
165.  
Liff, A. 2019. China’s maritime gray zone operations in the East China sea and 
Japan’s response. In: Erickson, A., and Martinson, R.eds. China’s maritime gray 
zone operations. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, pp.207-232. 
Liff, A. 2019. Unambivalent alignment: Japan’s China strategy, the US alliance, and 
the hedging strategy. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific. 19, pp.453-491. 
Lim Kheng Swe., Ju Hailong., and Li Mingjiang. 2017. China’s revisionist aspirations 
in Southeast Asia and the curse of the South China Sea disputes. China: An 
International Journal. 15(1), pp.187-213  
Lim, D., and Cooper, Z. 2015. Reassessing hedging: the logic of alignment in East 
Asia. Security Studies. 24(4), pp.696-727. 
Lim, Kheng Swe., Ju Hailong., and Li Mingjiang. 2017. China’s revisionist aspirations 
in Southeast Asia and the curse of the South China Sea Disputes. China: An 
International Journal. 15 (1). pp. 187-213. 
Lin, Cheng-yi. 2009. A status quo with different interpretations: Taiwan, China, the 
United States, and security in the Taiwan strait. In: Lin Cheng-yi and Roy, Denny, 
eds. The future of United States, China and Taiwan relations. New York: Palgrave 




Liu, Feng. 刘丰. 2011. Anquan yuqi, jingji shouyi, yu dongya anquan chixu [Security 
expectations, economic benefits and East Asian Security] 安全预期, 经济收益，与
东亚安全秩序. Dangdai Yatai.3, pp.6-25. 
Liu, Guangyou. 刘光友. 2016. Riben qiye de zhongguo +1 haiwai zhijie touzi zhanlue 
tanxi 日本企业的中国+1 海外直接投资战略探析  [an analysis of Japanese 
enterprises’China plus one overseas direct investment strategy]. Xiandai Riben Jingji. 
6, pp.27-40. 
Liu, Guoshen. 刘国深. 2008. Liangan heping fazhan xin keti jiexi 两岸和平发展新课
题解析 [Analysis on the New Subject of the Peaceful Development of the Cross-strait 
Relations]. Taiwan Research Quarterly. 4, pp.1-6. 
Liu, H., and Lim, G. 2018. The Political Economy of a Rising China in Southeast Asia: 
Malaysia’s Response to the Belt and Road Initiative. Journal of Contemporary 
China, 28(116), pp.216–231.  
Luo, Yanming. 2010. Yibo sanzhe de zhongmei jianjiao 一波三折的中美建交 
[establishing the Sino-US diplomatic relationship had many twist and turn]. Dangshi 
Wenhui. 4, pp.10-17.   
Lv, zheng. 吕峥. 2011. Wan’nan shibian zhenxiang shimo 皖南事变真相始末 [the 
truth of Wan’nan incident]. Yuanliu, 3, pp.6-13. 
Lyer, A., Zhang, Airong., Jetten, J., Hao, Z., and Cui, Lijuan. 2017. The promise of a 
better group future: cognitive alternatives increase students’ self-efficacy and 
academic performance. British Journal of Social Psychology, 56, pp.750-765. 
Malik, J. 2002. Dragon on terrorism: Assessing China’s tactical gains and strategic 
losses after 11 September. Contemporary Southeast Asia. 24(2), pp.252-293.  
Malik, J. 2018. Myanmar’s role in China’ s Maritime Silk Road Initiative. Journal of 
Contemporary China. 27(111), pp.362-378.  
Mandelbaum, M. 2019, The New Containment. Foreign Affairs. [online]. February 
2.  [Accessed 4 March, 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-02-12/new-containment 
Masahiko Hosokawa. 2018. bei tyuu tuu shou kyou gi ni su ke ru, bei koku no ase ri 




Business Publication Online. [online]. 8 May. [Accessed 8 May 2018]. Available from: 
http://business.nikkeibp.co.jp/atcl/report/15/110879/050700824/?AMP=1& 
Mazarr, M. 2015. Mastering the gray zone: understanding a changing era of conflict. 
Washington, D.C.: US Army War College Press. 
Mearsheimer, J. 2014. Can China rise peacefully.  National Interests. [online]. 
[Accessed 25 August 2019]. Available from: 
https://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204 
Mearsheimer, J. 2014. Say goodbye to Taiwan.  National Interests. [online]. 
[Accessed 25 August 2019]. Available from: https://nationalinterest.org/article/say-
goodbye-taiwan-9931 
Mearsheimer, J., and Walt, S 2016. The Case for Offshore Balancing. Foreign Affairs. 
[online]. June 13. [Accessed 20 May, 2020]. 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-06-13/case-offshore-
balancing 
Mercer, J.1995. ‘Anarchy and Identity’, International Organization 49(2), pp.229–52.  
Miller, A. 2015. The trouble with factions. China Leadership monitor. 46, pp.1-12. 
Miller, T. 2017. China’s Asian dream. London: Zed Books. 
Milles, W. 2020. Deterring the dragon returning US force to Taiwan. Military Review. 
[online]. September-October. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-
Archives/September-October-2020/Mills-Deterring-Dragon/ 
Mogalakwe, M. 2009. The Documentary Research Method – Using Documentary 
Sources in Social Research. Eastern Africa Social Science Research Review. 25(1), 
pp. 43-58 
Mounk, Y and Foa, R. 2018. The end of the democratic century: autocracy's global 
ascendance. Foreign Affairs. 97(3), pp.29-36.  
Murphy, A. M. 2017. ASEAN’s external policy: caught between the United States and 
China. In D, Denoon (ed). China, the United States and the future of Southeast Asia, 




Nathan, A. 2003. China's Changing of the Guard: Authoritarian Resilience. Journal 
of Democracy. 14(1), pp.6-17  
Nehru, V. 2017. Southeast Asia: thriving in the shadow of giants. In: Denoon, D. ed. 
China, the United States, and the future of Southeast Asia. New York: New York 
University Press, pp.15-50 
Ng, Sik Hung. 1982. Power and intergroup discrimination. In Tajfel, H. ed. Social 
identification and intergroup relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 
179-205. 
Nguyen, H.H. 2020. U.S.-Vietnam relations and the Indo-Pacific Framework: 
Recalibrating hedging strategies through deepening cooperation in an emerging 
region. East Asia security symposium and conference. Beijing. [online].[Accessed 25 





Odgaard, L. 2003. The South China Sea: ASEAN’s security concerns about China. 
Security Dialogue. 34(1). pp. 11-24. 
Pan, Zhongqi. 2007. Sino-Japanese dispute over Diaoyu/Senkaku islands: the 
pending controversy from the Chinese perspective. Journal of Chinese Political 
Science. 12(1). pp71-92.  
Panda, A. 2015. For the ASEAN-China South China Sea Code of Conduct, ninth time 
isn't the charm. The Diplomat. [online]. 1 August. [Accessed 1 August, 2018]. 
Available from:  https://thediplomat.com/2015/08/for-the-asean-china-south-china-
sea-code-of-conduct-ninth-time-isnt-the-charm/ 
Panda, A. 2015. For the ASEAN-China South China Sea Code of Conduct, ninth time 
isn't the charm. The Diplomat. [online]. 1 August. [Accessed 1 August, 2018]. 





Pang, Baoqing., Keng, Shu.,and Zhong, Lingna. 2018. Sprinting with Small Steps: 
China’s Cadre Management and Authoritarian Resilience. The China Journal. 80, 
pp.68-93. 
Parker, S and Chefitz, G. 2018. Debtbook diplomacy: China’s strategic leveraging of 
its newfound economic influence and the consequences for U.S. Foreign Policy. 
[online]. Cambridge: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. [Accessed 
24 June 2019]. Available from: 
https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/Debtbook%20Diplom
acy%20PDF.pdf 
Paul, T.V. 2019. Restraining great powers:soft balancing from empires to the global 
era. London: Yale University Press. 
Paul, T.V. 2019. Why balancing towards China is not effective: understanding BRI’s 
strategic role. RSIS Commentaries. 49, no page number. 
Pavlićević, D., and Kratz, A. 2018. Testing the China Threat paradigm: China’s high-
speed railway diplomacy in Southeast Asia. The Pacific Review, 31(2), pp.151–168.  
Petersen, M.B. 2019. The Chinese maritime gray zone: definitions, dangers, and the 
complications of rights protection operations. In: Erickson, A., and Martinson, R.eds. 
China’s maritime gray zone operations. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, pp.15-30. 
Poling, G. 2015. Sophistry and bad messaging in the South China Sea. Asia Maritime 
Transparency Initiative. [online], 1 July. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://amti.csis.org/sophistry-and-bad-messaging-in-the-south-china-sea/ 
Prati, F., Crisp, R., and Rubini, M. 2021. 40 years of multiple social categorization: a 
tool for social inclusivity. European Review of Social Psychology. 32 (1), pp.47-87. 
Pyle, K. 2018. Japan in the American Century. London: The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press. 
Qin, Yaqing and Wei Lin. 2008. Structures, processes, and the socialization of power: 
East Asian community-building and the rise of China. In: Ross, R and Zhu Feng, 
eds., China’s Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics. Ithaca: 




Qin, Yaqing. 2014. Continuity through change: background knowledge and China’s 
international strategy. Chinese Journal of International Politics. 7(3), pp.285-314. 
Qin, Yaqing. 2014. Continuity through change: background knowledge and China’s 
international strategy. Chinese Journal of International Politics. 7(3), pp.285-314. 
Qin, Yaqing. 秦亚青. 2006. Guoji guanxi lilun zhong zhongguo xuepai shengcheng 
de keneng he biran 国际关系理论中中国学派生成的可能和必然 [A Chinese school 
of international relations: possibility and inevitability]. Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi, 3, 
pp.7-13. 
Qin,Ming., and Wu, Xiaofan. 秦明 吴晓帆. 2007. Chen Yi yu Subei kangri mingzu 
tongyi zhanxian 陈毅与苏北抗日民族统一战线 [Chen Yi and the anti-Japanese 
united front in Subei]. Wenshi Chunqiu, 8.  
Raine, S. and Mière, C. 2013. Regional disorder: the South China Sea disputes. 
Oxon: Routledge. 
Ratner, E. 2013. China’s victim complex: why are Chinese leaders so paranoid about 
the United States. Foreign Policy. [online]. [Accessed 28 July 2019]. Available from: 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/04/19/chinas-victim-complex/ 
Ratner, E. 2013. Learning the lessons of Scarborough reef. The National Interest. 
November 21. [Accessed February 18, 2019]. Available from: 
https://nationalinterest.org/commen-tary/learning-the-lessons-scarborough-reef-
9442.  
Reicher, S and Haslam, S. 2012. Change we can believe in: the role of social identity, 
cognitive alternatives and leadership in group mobilization and social transformation. 
In Wagoner, B., Jensen E., and Oldmeadow, J. Eds, Culture and social change: 
transforming society through the power of ideas. London: Routledge. pp. 53–73. 
Reilly, J. 2013. China and Japan in Myanmar: aid, natural resources and influence. 
Asian Studies Review. 37(2), pp.141-157.  
Reilly, J. 2014. A wave to worry about? public opinion, foreign policy and China's 




Ren, Xiao 任晓. 2019. Cong shijie zhengfu dao gongsheng heping 从世界政府到共
生和平 [From World Government to “Gongsheng Peace”]. Guoji Guancha, 1, pp.36-
50.  
Rolland, N. 2017. China’s “Belt and Road Initiative”: Underwhelming or Game-
Changer? The Washington Quarterly, 40(1), pp.127–142.  
Rolland, N. 2017. China’s “Belt and Road Initiative”: Underwhelming or Game-
Changer? The Washington Quarterly, 40(1), pp.127–142.  
Romberg, A. 2012. The 2012 Taiwan election: off and running. China Leadership 
Monitor. 35. pp.1-44.  
Ross, R. 2000. The 1995-96 Taiwan strait confrontation: coercion, credibility, and the 
use of force. International Security. 25(2). pp. 87-123. 
Ross, R. 2002. US relations with China. In: Vogel, E., Yuan, M., and Akihiko, T. eds. 
The golden age of the US-China-Japan triangle 1972-1989. Harvard: Harvard 
University Press, pp.79-109. 
Ross, R. 2020. The changing East Asian balance of power and the regional security 
order. In: Ross, R., Tunsjø, Ø., and Dong, Wang, eds. US-China Foreign Relations: 
power transition and its implications for Europe and Asia. London and New York: 
Routledge, pp.50-61. 
Rowen, I. 2015. Inside Taiwan's Sunflower Movement: Twenty-Four Days in a 
Student-Occupied Parliament, and the Future of the Region. The Journal of Asian 
Studies. 74(1), pp.5-21. 
Roy, D. 2013. Return of dragon: rising China and regional security. New York: 
Columbia University Press.  
Roy, D. 2013. Return of dragon: rising China and regional security. New York: 
Columbia University Press.  
Roy, D. 2016. Prospects for Taiwan Maintaining Its Autonomy under Chinese 
Pressure. Asian Survey. 57(6), pp.1135-1158. 





Roy, N. 2016. The South China Sea disputes; past, present and future. Lanham: 
Lexington Books. 
Rumelili, B. 2007. Constructing Regional Community and Order in Europe and 
Southeast Asia (Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies) . New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Sachs, J. 2020. Letter: Trump’s chest-beating risks a China cold war. Financial Times. 
[online]. 21 July. [Accessed 25 May 2021], Available from: 
https://www.ft.com/content/36045045-cb4c-4ddc-b904-f16136a5a907 
Saguy, T and Dovidio, J. 2013. Insecure status relations shape preferences for the 
content of intergroup contact. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. 39(8), pp. 
1030–1042.  
Saguy, T and Kteily, N. 2014. Power, negotiations, and the anticipation of intergroup 
encounters. European Review of Social Psychology. 25(1), pp. 107–141  
Saguy, T., Dovidio, J., and Pratto, F. 2008. Beyond contact: intergroup contact in the 
context of power relations. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. 43(2), pp.432-
445. 
Saguy, T., Dovidio, J., and Pratto, F. 2008. Beyond contact: intergroup contact in the 
context of power relations. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. 43(2), pp.432-
445. 
Schreer, B. 2017. The double-edged sword of coercion: cross-strait relations after 
the 2016 Taiwan elections. Asian Politics and Policy. 9(1). pp.50-65 
Schreer, B. 2017. The double-edged sword of coercion: cross-strait relations after 
the 2016 Taiwan elections. Asian Politics and Policy. 9(1). pp.50-65 
Schubert, G. 2008. One-Party Rule and the Question of Legitimacy in Contemporary 
China: preliminary thoughts on setting up a new research agenda. Journal of 
Contemporary China 17(54), pp. 191-204.  
Schweller, R. 2018. Opposite but compatible nationalisms: a neoclassical realist 
approach to the future of US–China relations. The Chinese Journal of International 




Scobell, A. 2000. Show of Force: Chinese Soldiers, Statesmen, and the 1995–1996 
Taiwan Strait Crisis. Political Science Quarterly, 115(2), pp.227–246.  
Secondary Source 
Secondary Sources 
Shambaugh, D. 2008. China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation. Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press. 
Shambaugh, D. 2016. China’s future. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Shambaugh, D. 2016. China’s future. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Shang, Huipeng. 尚会鹏.2009. Lun ren yu tianxia- jiedu yi chaogong tixi wei hexin 
de gudai dongya guoji zhixu.论仁与天下-解读以朝贡体系为核心的古代东亚国际秩序 
[ discuss the ancient Asian international order of which ren and tianxia at its core]. 
Guoji Zhengzhi Yanjiu. 2, pp.29-43 pp.191-192.  
Shao Zonghai. 邵宗海. 2010a. Jiejue liangan zhengzhi tanpan Zhong de dingwei 
wenti 解决两岸政治谈判中的定位问题 [solving the issue of position in the bi-lateral 
political talks]. In: Zhang Yazhong 张亚中, ed. Liangan zhengzhi dingwei tansuo 两
岸政治定位探索  [exploring the issue of political positioning]. Taipei: shengzhi 
wenhua shiye zhongxin. 
Shao Zonghai. 邵宗海. 2010b. tantao Ma Ying-jeou de zhengshi xianshi 探讨马英
九的正视现实  [Exploring Ma Ying-jeou’s face up to reality]. Wang Newspaper. 
[online]. 21 July. [Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20100721001039-260301?chdtv 
Sheng, M. 1992. Mao, Stalin, and the Formation of the Anti-Japanese United Front: 
1935–37. The China Quarterly, 129, pp.149-170. 
Sheng, M. M. 1994. Chinese Communist Policy Toward the United States and the 
Myth of the ‘Lost Chance’ 1948–1950. Modern Asian Studies, 28(3), pp.475–502.  
Shi Anbing. 史安斌. 2018. Touxi suowei ruishili 透析所谓锐实力 [Dialyzing the so-
called sharp power]. Lilun Daobao. 4, pp.56-57. 
Shi, Changxue. 施昌学. 2013. Haijun siling Liu Huaqing 海军上将刘华清. Beijing: 




Shi, Jing., Hao, Zheng., Saeri, A., and Cui, Lijuan. 2015. The dual-pathway model of 
collective action: impacts of types of collective action and social identity. Group 
Processes & Intergroup Relations.18(1), pp.45–65  
Smith, S. N. 2019. Harmonizing the periphery: China’s neighborhood strategy under 
Xi Jinping. The Pacific Review, 34(1), pp.56–84.  
Smith, S. N. 2021. Harmonizing the periphery: China’s neighborhood strategy under 
Xi Jinping. The Pacific Review, 34(1), pp.56–84.  
Steinberg, J. and O’Hanlon, M. 2014. Strategic reassurance and resolve: U.S-China 
relations in the twenty-first century. Oxford: Princeton University Press.  
Storey, I. 1999. Creeping assertiveness: China, the Philippines and the South China 
Sea. Contemporary Southeast Asia. 12(1). pp.95-118. 
Storey, I. 2012a. China’s bilateral and multilateral diplomacy in the South China Sea. 
In Cronin, P. ed. Cooperation from strength: the United States, China and the South 
China Sea. [online]. Washington, D.C: Center for a New American Security. pp51-67 
[Accessed 1 January 2018]. Available from: 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS_CooperationFromStren
gth_Cronin_1.pdf?mtime=20160906081232 
Storey, I. 2016. Assessing Responses to the Arbitral Tribunal’s Ruling on the South 
China Sea. ISEAS Perspective. 2016(43), pp.1-7. 
Storey, I. 2016. Rising tension in the South China Sea: Southeast Asian responses. 
In: Storey, I and Lin, Cheng-yi eds. The South China Sea dispute: navigating 
diplomatic and strategic tensions. Singapore: ISEAS Publishing. pp. 134-161. 
Storey, I. 2017. Assessing the ASEAN-China Framework for the Code of Conduct for 
the South China Sea. ISEAS Perspective. 
https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2017_62.pdf 
Storey, I. 2018. ASEAN’s falling grade in the South China Sea. In G. Rozman & 
J.C.Liow (Eds.), International relations and Asia’s Southern Tier: ASEAN, Australia, 
and India. Palgrave Macmillan, pp.111-125. 
Stubbs, R. 2014. ASEAN's leadership in East Asian region-building: strength in 




Stubbs, R. 2018. Order and contestation in the Asia-Pacific Region: liberal vs 
developmental/non-interventionist approaches, The International Spectator, 53(1), 
pp.138-151  
Sullivan, R. W. 1992. Discarding the China Card. Foreign Policy, 86, pp.3–23.  
Sun, Lan. 孙澜. 2020. Liangan guancha: Beijng tanpan beihou: taihai Zhongxian de 
xushi yu shifei 两岸观察： 北京谈判背后： 台海中线的虚实与是非 [the observation 
of the cross-strait: the background of Beijing Negotiation: the false or true of the 
medium line between the Taiwan strait]. DW News. [online]. 24 September. 
[Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: https://www.dwnews.com/中国/60212861/
两岸观察北京摊牌背后台海中线的虚实与是非 
Sun, Xuefeng. 孙学峰 . 2018. Zhongmei zhanlue jingzhen shidai de zhongguo 
anquan celue [China’s security strategy in the era of Sino-US strategic competition] 
中美战略竞争时代的中国安全策略. Zhanlue Juece Yanjiu. 2, pp.26-39. 
Sutter, R. 2011. Taiwan’s future: narrowing strait. Washington, D.C: NBR Analysis. 
Sutter, R. 2019. American policy toward Taiwan-China relations in the twenty-first 
century. In: Lee, Wei-chin.ed. Taiwan’s political re-alignment and diplomatic 
challenges. Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. pp.209-245. 
Suzuki, T. 2019. China’s United Front Work in the Xi Jinping era – institutional 
developments and activities. Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies, 8(1), pp. 
83–98.  
Swaine, M. 2010. Perceptions of an assertive China. China Leadership Monitor. 32, 
pp.1-19. 
Swaine, M., and Fravel, T. 2012. China’s assertive behavior: Part two: the maritime 
periphery. China Leadership Monitor, 35, pp.1-29.  
Swanie, M. 2001. Chinese decision-making regarding Taiwan; 1979-2000. In: 
Lampton, D. M. eds. The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era 
of Reform. [Kindle iPhone app]. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Swanson, A. 2019. A new red scare is reshaping Washington. The New York Times. 






Taffer, A. 2015. State Strategy in territorial conflict: a conceptual analysis of China’s 
strategy in the South China Sea. Contemporary Southeast Asia. 37(1), pp.85-108. 
Tajfel, H and Turner, J. 2001. An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In Hogg, M 
and Abrams, D. eds. Intergroup relations. Philadelphia: Psychology Press. pp.94-110. 
Tajfel, H. 1978. Social categorization, social identity and social comparison. In: Tajfel, 
H. ed. Differentiation between social groups: studies in the social psychology of 
intergroup relations. New York: Academic Press. pp.61-67.  
Tajfel, H., and Turner, J. 2001. An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In Hogg, 
M and Abrams, D. eds. Intergroup relations. Philadelphia: Psychology Press. pp.94-
110. 
Tamaki, N. 2020. Japan’s quest for a rules-based international order: the Japan-US 
alliance and the decline of US liberal hegemony. Contemporary Politics, 26(4), 
pp.384–401.  
Tan, A. 2020. The Taiwan issue and small state survival. In: Schreer, B., and Tan, 
A., eds. The Taiwan issue: problem and prospect. [Kindle iPhone app]. London and 
New York: Routledge, pp.12-27.  
Tang, Yonghong. 唐永红. 2019. Shenhua liangan ronghe fazhan hangshi heping 
tongyi jichu 深化两岸融合发展夯实和平统一基础 [deepening integration between 
the cross-strait, and paving solid foundation for peaceful unification]. Lilun yu 
Zhengce, pp.5-7. 
Tao, Wenzhao. 陶文钊. 2016. Zhongmei guanxi shi 中美关系史 [The history of 
Sino-US relationship]. Shanghai: shanghai renmin chu ban she.  
Taylor, J. 2009. The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern 
China. Cambridge: Belknap Press.  
Tellis, A. 2013. US-China relations in a realist world. In: Shambaugh, D. ed. Tangled 





Teo, Victor. 2019. Japan’s arduous rejuvenation as a global power. Democratic 
resilience and the US-China challenge. Singapore: The Palgrave Macmillan. 
Thayer, C. 2011. China’s new waves of aggressive assertiveness in the South China 
Sea. Conference on Maritime Security in the South China Sea. 20-21 June, 
Washington. D.C. 
Thayer, C. 2012. ASEAN’S Code of Conduct in the South China Sea: A Litmus Test 
for Community-Building? The Asia-Pacific Journal, 34(4), pp.1-22. 
Thayer, C. 2012. Standoff in the South China Sea. Yale Global. [online]. 12 June. 
[Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: https://archive-
yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/standoff-south-china-sea 
Thayer, C. 2016. Vietnam’s Strategy of ‘Cooperating and Struggling’ with China over 
Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea. Journal of Asian Security and International 
Affairs, 3(2), pp.200–220.  
Thayer, C. 2016. Vietnam’s strategy of ‘cooperating and struggling’ with China over 
maritime disputes in the South China Sea. Journal of Asian Security and International 
Affairs. 3(2). pp. 200–220   
Thayer, C. 2017. ASEAN’s Long March to a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. 
Maritime Issues. [online]. 18 July. [Accessed 18 July, 2018]. Available from: 
http://www.maritimeissues.com/politics/aseans-long-march-to-a-code-of-conduct-in-
the-south-china-sea.html 
The Economist. 2017. How China’s “sharp power” is muting criticism abroad. The 
economist. [online] 5 December. [Accessed 21 May 2021]. Available from. 
https://www.economist.com/briefing/2017/12/14/how-chinas-sharp-power-is-muting-
criticism-abroad 
Thesis reference sources-secondary  
Togo, Kazuhiko. 2015. Japan and the South China sea in the context of new East 
Asian power relations. In Tran Truong Thuy and Le Thuy Trang eds. Power, Law and 
Maritime Order in The South China Sea. London: Lexington Books, pp.77-91. 
Tsang, S. 2015. Chiang Kai-shek’s “secret deal” at Xian and the start of the Sino-




Tsinghua university’s Institute of International Relations.清华大学国际关系学院 . 
2019. 1950-2019 nian zhongmei guanxi fenzhi 1950-2019年中美关系分值 [Sino-US 
relationship scores 1950-2019]. Tsinghua university’s Institute of international 
relations. [online]. [Accessed 25 May 2020]. Available from: 
http://www.imir.tsinghua.edu.cn/publish/iis/7522/2012/20120415183809561499053/
20120415183809561499053_.html 
Tunsjø, Ø. 2018. The Return of Bipolarity in World Politics: China, the United States, 
and Geostructural Realism. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Turner, J. 1982. Towards a cognitive redefinition of social group. In Tajfel, H. ed. 
Social identification and intergroup relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. pp.15-41.  
Valencia, ·M. 2016. China and the Freedom of Navigation. The diplomat. [online]. 23 
March. [Accessed 23 March, 2018]. Available from:  
https://thediplomat.com/2016/03/china-and-the-freedom-of-navigation/ 
Valencia, M. 2020. Demonizing China does nothing to untangle the contesting claims 
on South China Sea’s fish-rich waters. South China Morning Post. [online]. 12 April. 
[Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3079330/demonising-china-does-
nothing-untangle-contesting-claims-south 
Valencia, M. 2021. US and its allies must be wary of provoking South China sea 
conflict over freedom of navigation. South China Morning Post. [online]. 1 January. 
[Accessed 22 May 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3115813/us-and-its-allies-must-be-
wary-provoking-south-china-sea-conflict 
Van Slyke, L. 1970. The United Front in China. Journal of Contemporary History, 5(3), 
pp.119-135. 
Van Zomeren, M., Leach, C., and Spears, R. 2012. Protesters as “passionate 
economists”: a dynamic dual pathway model of approach coping with collective 




Van Zomeren, M., Leach, C., and Spears, R. 2012. Protesters as “passionate 
economists”: a dynamic dual pathway model of approach coping with collective 
disadvantage. Personality and Social Psychology Review. 16(2), pp.180–199.  
Vu, Hai Dang. 2019. Entitlement of maritime features and the Paracels dispute 
revisited. In: In: Tran Truong Thuy., Welfield, J.B., and Le Thuy Trang. eds. Building 
a normative order in the South China Sea evolving disputes, expanding options. 
Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, pp.93-116.  
Wang, ChangJiang. 2012. Morang dingceng sheji zouxing 莫让顶层设计走形 [we 
must not distort the central committee’s design]. Zhongguo Qingnian wang. [online]. 
2 July. [Accessed 25 May 2020]. Available from: 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/review/hgds/20120702/073412451688.shtml 
Wang, Fan 王帆. 2020. Lun guannian chayi yu guoji hezuo-heyi lun de tichu 论观念
差异与国际合作 -合异论的提出  [Ideational Differences and Their Influence on 
International Cooperation: Constructing A New Theory of Heyi]. Guoji Guancha. 3, 
pp.1-31. 
Wang, Jianwei. 2009. From “strategic competitors” to “stakeholders”: US-China 
relations during the Bush administration. In: Hauser, G and Kernic, F. eds. China: the 
rising power. Oxford: Peter Lang. pp.41-63. 
Wang, Jin. 2016. The Adjustment of Kuomintang-Chinese Communist Party 
Cooperation Policy After the Wannan Incident.  Canadian Academy of Oriental and 
Occidental Culture, pp.35-38.   
Wang, Jisi and Hu, Ran. 2019. From cooperative partnership to strategic competition: 
a review of China–U.S. relations 2009–2019. China International Strategy Review. 
[online].[Accessed 30 July 2019]. Available from: 
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s42533-019-00019-6 
Wang, Jisi. 王缉思. 2011. Zhongguo de guoji dingwei yu taoguang yanghui yousuo 
zuowei de zhanlue sixiang 中国的国际定位与韬光养晦有所作为的战略思想 [China’s 
position in the international society and the strategic thinking of taoguang yanghui 




Wang, Lisheng. 王立胜. 2006. Deng Xiaoping dui zhongyao zhanlue jiyuqi de bawo 
qiji sixiang 邓小平对重要战略机遇期的把握及其思想 [Deng Xiaoping’s thinking and 
actions regarding the “important strategic opportunity period”]. Dang De Wenxian. 4, 
pp.40-44. 
Wang, Quanwei. 王泉伟. 2017. Tianchao yishi yu ming qing zhongguo de chaogong 
waijiao. 天朝意识与明清中国的朝贡外交 [The awareness of Celestial dynasty and 
the tributary diplomacy in Ming and Qing dynasty]. Guoji Zhengzhi Yanjiu. 1, pp.93-
117. 
Wang, Zhengxu., and Zeng, Jinghan. 2016. Xi Jinping: the game changer of Chinese 
elite politics?. Contemporary Politics. 22(4), pp.469-486. 
Wang, Zhongqing 王仲清. 2000. Yan’an zhengfeng yundong he Yan’an shenggan 
yun dong de lianxi he qubie 延安整风运动和延安审干运动的联系和区别 
[relationship and difference between Yan’an rectification movement and censorship 
over officials]. Zhonggong Dangshi Yanjiu. 3, pp.14-18 
Ward, S. 2015. Lost in Translation: The Misadventures of Social Identity and Status 
in IR Theory. Unpublished. 
Ward, S. 2017. Lost in Translation: Social Identity Theory and the Study of Status in 
World Politics. International Studies Quarterly, 61(4), pp.821–834.  
Wei, Bo 魏波. 2010. Kangzhan shiqi wodang junshi tongyi zhanxian jiben yanjiu 
jingyan 抗战时期我党军事统一战线基本研究经验 [basic research experience of 
Chinese Communist Party’s military united front]. Dangshi Wenyuan. 16, pp.10-12. 
Wei, Shiqiang 韦世强 and Wei, Guoyou 韦国友. 2010. Mao Zedong de waijiao 
geming he geming waijiao 毛泽东的外交革命和革命外交 [Mao Zedong’s diplomatic 
revolution and revolutionary diplomacy]. Qianyan 前沿. 16, pp.129-132. 
Weiss, J. 2013. Authoritarian signaling, mass audiences, and nationalist protest in 
China. International organization. 67(1), pp.1-35.  
Weiss, J. 2019. A world safe for autocracy? China’s rise and the future of global 
politics. Foreign Affairs. 98(4), pp. 92-108.  
Wen, Yong and Zhang, Yongmin. 温勇和张永敏. 2018. Lun Mao Zedong de haifang 




strategic thought]. CCCPC Party Literature Research Office. [online]. 15 January. 
[Accessed 24 May 2019]. Available from: 
https://www.wxyjs.org.cn/mzdsxyj_568/201801/t20180122_236523.htm 
Wendt, A. 1999. Social theory of international politics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Wolf, R. 2014. Rising Powers, Status Ambitions, and the Need to Reassure: What 
China Could Learn from Imperial Germany’s Failures. The Chinese Journal of 
International Politics, 7(2), pp.185–219. 
Womack, B. 2016. The Washington-Beijing-Taipei Triangle: An American 
Perspective. In: Womack, B and Hao Yufan, eds. Rethinking the triangle: 
Washington-Beijing-Taipei. [online]. Singapore and Macau: World Scientific 
Publishing Co & University of Macau. [Accessed 26 May, 2017]. pp. 3-41. Available 
from: https://www.dawsonera.com/readonline/9789814713139 
Wright, S., Taylor, D., and Moghaddam, F. 2001. Responding to membership in a 
lower status group: from acceptance to collective protest. In Hogg, M and Abrams, 
D. eds. Intergroup relations. Philadelphia: Psychology Press. pp.337-353. 
Wu, Xiangning and You, Ji. 2019. China’s South China Sea strategy and Sino-US 
discord. In: Tran Truong Thuy., Welfield, J.B., and Le Thuy Trang. eds. Building a 
normative order in the South China Sea evolving disputes, expanding options. 
Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, pp.27-47.   
Wu, Xiangning and You, Ji. 2019. China’s South China Sea strategy and Sino-US 
discord. In: Tran Truong Thuy., Welfield, J.B., and Le Thuy Trang. eds. Building a 
normative order in the South China Sea evolving disputes, expanding options. 
Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, pp.27-47.   
Wu, Xiangning., and You, Ji. 2019. China’s South China Sea strategy and Sino-US 
discord. In: Thuy, T. T., Welfield, J.B. and Trang, L.T. eds. Building a normative order 
in the South China Sea: evolving disputes, expanding options. Cheltenham: Edward 




Wu, Xiaolin and Yang, Tao.吴晓林和杨涛. 2013. 2012 qunti luanxiang fenxi 2012群
体乱象分析 [the analysis of 2012 mass incident and social chaos]. Juece. Z1, pp.80-
82 
Xin, Qiang. 2020a. Selective engagement: Mainland China’s dual track Taiwan Policy. 
Journal of Contemporary China. 29 (124), pp.535-552.  
Xin, Qiang. 2020b. Having much in common? Changes and continuity in Beijing’s 
Taiwan policy. The Pacific Review, pp.1-18. 
Xing, Weibo and Li Shantong. 行伟波和李善同 .2012. Difang Baohu Zhuyi Yu 
Zhongguo Shengji Maoyi 地方保护主义与中国省际贸易 [local protectionism and 
China’s inter-provincal trade]. Nanfang Jingji.1, pp.58-70. 
Xu, Bingjun. 徐秉君. 2014. Xin zhongguo chengli hou sulian dui hua junshi jishu 
yuanzhi 新中国成立后苏联对华军事技术援助 [The Soviet Union’s military and 
technological assistance after founding of new China]. Bainianchao. 11, pp.51-58. 
Xu, Jialiang. 徐家良. 2002. Difang baohu zhuyi: zhongyang yu difang de boyi guanxi 
地方保护主义：中央与地方博弈关系 [local protectionism: the central and local game 
relationship]. Zhonggong Yunan Shengwei Dangxiao Xuebao. 3(3), pp.82-86. 
Xu, Jilin 许纪霖. 2010. Pushi wenming haishi zhongguo jiazhi-jin shinian zhongguo 
de lishi zhuyi sichao 普世文明还是中国价值-近十年中国的历史主义思潮 [Universal 
culture or Chinese value: China’s historicism over the past decade]. Renwen Tiandi, 
pp.66-82. 
Xu, Zhong 徐忠. 2016. Zhou Enlai quanjiang bijiang kangri de bafeng xin 周恩来劝
蒋逼蒋抗日的八封信 [Zhou Enlai’s eight letters about “convincing” or “forcing”Chiang 
to resist Japanese]. Dangshi Bolan, 5, pp.17-21. 
Xue, Li. 薛力. 2014. Yidai yilu zheshe de zhongguo waijiao fengxian 一带一路折射
中国外交风险[one belt and one road reflects risk for China’s diplomacy]. Financial 
Times Chinese. [online]. 30 December. [Accessed 25 June 2019]. Available from: 
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001059886?full=y&archive 





Yale, W. 2015. China’s Maritime Silk Road gamble. The Diplomat. [online]. 22 April. 
[Accessed 25 June 2019]. Available from: https://thediplomat.com/2015/04/chinas-
maritime-silk-road-gamble/ 
Yan, Xuetong 阎学通. 2014. Daoyi xianshi zhuyi de guoji guanxi lilun 道义现实主义
的国际关系理论 [An international theory of moral realism], Guoji Wenti Yanjiu, 5, 
pp.102-130. 
Yan, Xuetong. 2016. Political leadership and power redistribution, The Chinese 
Journal of International Politics, 9(1), pp. 1–26  
Yan, Xuetong. 2019. The age of uneasy peace: Chinese power in a divided world. 
Foreign Affairs. 98(1), pp.40-46. 
Yang, Gongsu., and Zhang, Zhirong 杨公素和张植荣. 2009. Dangdai zhongguo 
waijiao lilun yu Shijian.当代中国外交理论与实践 .[Contemporary China Foreign 
Relations: Theory and Practice]. Beijing: Beijing da xue chu ban she. 
Yang, Hailiang. 杨海亮 . 2019, Jinxi shibian Zhong zhongguo gongchandang 
tongzhan gongzuo de lishi kaocha 晋西事变中中国共产党统战工作的历史考察
[examining Chinese Communist Party’s united front work in the Jin’xi incident]. 
Tongyi Zhanxian Xue Yanjiu. 3, pp.86-92. 
Yang, Hongxing and Zhao, Dingxin. 2015. Performance legitimacy, state autonomy 
and China’s economic miracle. Journal of Contemporary China, 24(91), pp.64-82,  
Yang, Kaihuang. 杨开煌. 2019. Cong gao Taiwan tongbao shu dao liangan tongyi 
zhi sikao 从告台湾同胞书到两岸统一之思考 [The thinking of unification between the 
mainland and Taiwan in terms of the letter to Taiwanese comrades]. Zhongguo 
Zhengzhi yu Guoji zhengzhi. 1, pp.15-25. 
Yang, Kuisong 杨奎松, 1989. Guanyu gongchan guoji yu zhongguo gongchandang 
lianjiang kangri fangzhen de guanxi wenti 关于共产国际与中国共产党联蒋抗日方针
的关系问题  [discussing the relationship between Communist international and 
Chinese Communist Party’s policy of cooperating Chiang to resist Japanese]. 




Yang, Kuisong. 1994. 杨奎松. Huade shijian yu xin zhongguo duimei zhengce de 
queli 华德事件与中国对美政策的确立[ the Ward’s case and the setup of China’s US 
policy]. Lishi Yanjiu, pp.104-118. 
Yang, Kuisong. 杨奎松. 2010. Xinzhongguo de geming waijiao sixiang yu shijian. 新
中国的革命外交思想与实践 [Revolutionary diplomacy thought and practice of New 
China]. Shixue yuekan. 2, pp.62-74. 
Yang, Kuisong 杨奎松. 1995.xi’an shibian xintan 西安事变新探[new exploration of 
Xi’an incident]. Taipei: Dongda tushu gongsi. 
Yang, Kuisong 杨奎松 . 2010.. Zhongjian didai de geming 中间地带的革
命.[revolutions at the middle ground]. Shanxi: Shanxi ren min chu ban she. 
Yang, Yaguang. 杨亚光. 2004. Deng Xiaoping taoguang yanghui lilun yu xin yidai 
lingdaoren de heping jueqi zhanlue 邓小平韬光养晦理论与新一代领导人的和平崛起
战略  [Deng Xiaoping’s theory of Taoguang Yanghui and the new generation 
leaders’peaceful rise strategy]. Lingdao Yu Juece. 7, pp.8-11. 
Yang, Yuan. 杨原. 2020. Duikang haishi rangbu, daguo jueqi guocheng zhongde 
yingge celue queshe luoji [Fight or flight，hawk or dove? the Logic of strategy 
selection within the context of great power rise] 对抗还是让步，大国崛起过程中的鹰
鸽策略取舍逻辑. Dangda Yatai. 5, pp.4-34. 
Ye, Zicheng 叶自成. 2007. Zhongguo chuantong wenhua de yiliguan yu zhongguo 
waijiao. 中国传统文化的义利观与中国外交 [The justice and interests perspective in 
traditional Chinese culture and Chinese diplomacy]. Guoji Zhengzhi Yanjiu. 3, pp.24-
28. 
Ying, Chende. 尹承德. 2016. Taiwan hai huishi mei buchen de hangkong mujian ma 
台湾还会是美不沉的航空母舰吗 [Is Taiwan still the unsinkable aircraft carrier for the 
US]. Global Times. [online]. 30 May. [Accessed 30 May 2020]. Available from: 
https://opinion.huanqiu.com/article/9CaKrnJVGR8 
Yingxuan. 映玄. 2020. Sisha bi jiu duan xian geng wuli 四沙比九段线更无理. Voice 





You, J. 1997, Making sense of war games in the Taiwan Strait. Journal of 
Contemporary China, 6(15), pp.287–305.  
Yu, Xingwei于兴卫. 2005. Kangzhan shiqi zhonggong gengjudi jingji jianshe jiben 
jingyan 抗战时期中国根据地经济建设基本经验 [the basic experience of Chinese 
base areas’ economic development in the anti-Japanese war period]. Henan Shehui 
Kexue. 13(4), pp. 42-45. 
Yuzawa, T, 2012. The Fallacy of socialization? Rethinking the ASEAN way of 
institutional building. In Emmers, R. eds. ASEAN and the Institutionalization of East 
Asia. London: Routledge, pp.75-89. 
Zeng, Jinghan. 2014. The Chinese Communist Party’s Capacity to Rule: Legitimacy, 
Ideology, and Party Cohesion. Ph.D thesis, University of Warwick. 
Zeng, Linzi 曾林子. 2014. Cong rangbu jiaodu kan wan’nan shibian hou guogong 
liangdang de zhengzhi jiaoliang 从让步角度看皖南事变后看国共两党的政治较量 
[examining political struggle between Kuo Ming Tang and Chinese Communist Party 
after Wan’nan incident in terms of their concessions]. Dangshi Wenyuan, pp.11-15.  
Zhang, Baohui. 2013. Peaceful unification vs divided rules. In Hu,Weixing ed. New 
Dynamics in Cross-Taiwan Strait relations, how far can the rapprochement go?. 
London: Routledge. pp.115-130. 
Zhang, F. 2019. China’s long march at sea: explaining Beijing’s South China Sea 
strategy, 2009–2016. The Pacific Review, 33(5), pp.757–787.  
Zhang, Jie. 张洁 . 2013. Huangyan dao moshi yu zhongguo Haiyang weiquan 
zhengce de zhuanxiang 黄岩岛模式与中国海洋维权政策的转向 [The model of 
Huangyan Dao and the changes in China’s strategy of defending maritime rights]. 
Dongnanya Yanjiu. 4, pp.25-31. 
Zhang, K. 2019. Cautious Bully: Reputation, Resolve, and Beijing’s Use of Coercion 
in the South China Sea. International Security, 44(1), pp.117–159.  
Zhang, Mingjun., and Liu, Xiaoliang. 张明军和刘晓亮. 2015. 2015 nian zhongguo 
shehui quntixing Shijian fenxi baogao 2015 年中国社会群体性事件分析报告[the 
analysis and report of 2015 mass incidents in China]. Zhongguo Shehui Gonggong 




Zhang, Mingjun., and Liu, Xiaoliang. 张明军和刘晓亮. 2016. 2016 nian zhongguo 
shehui quntixing Shijian fenxi baogao 2016 年中国社会群体性事件分析报告[the 
analysis and report of 2015 mass incidents in China]. Zhongguo Shehui Gonggong 
Anquan Baogao. 10, pp.3-18.  
Zhang, Mingjun., and Zhu, Yumei. 张明军和朱玉梅. 2017. 2017 nian zhongguo 
shehui quntixing Shijian fenxi baogao 2017 年中国社会群体性事件分析报告[the 
analysis and report of 2015 mass incidents in China]. Zhongguo Shehui Gonggong 
Anquan Baogao. 13, pp.3-14.  
Zhang, Mingliang. 张明亮 . 2016. Dongmenghua nanhai yiti Jincheng dongli yu 
qianjing 东盟化南海议题进程动力与前景 [ASEAN’s approach for South China Sea 
issue: process, background, and implication]. Nanyang Wenti Yanjiu. 1, pp.1-12 
Zhang, Mingliang. 张明亮. 2018. Yuanze xiade tuoxie:dongmeng yu nanhai xingwei 
zhunze tanpan 原则下的妥协：东盟与南海行为准则谈判[Compromise under the 
Principle: ASEAN and the Code of Conduct for the South China Sea].Dongnanya 
yanjiu [Southeast Asian studies].3,pp.58-80. 
Zhang, Nianchi. 章念驰. 2010. Chuang tiaojian jiejue zhonghua mingguo nanti 创条
件解决中华民国难题 [create environment to solve the ROC issue]. available from: 
http://nacpu.org/articles/051610.html 
Zhang, Qianfan. 张千帆.2012. Zhongguo difang baohu zhuyi jiqi zhili jizhi 中国地方
保护主义及其治理机制  [China’s local protectionism and related management 
mechanism]. Shihezi Daxue Xuebao. 28(4), pp.48-53. 
Zhang, Xiaoman张小满. 1988. Bijiang kangri yu lianjiang kangri guanxi qiantan 逼
蒋抗日与联蒋抗日关系浅探 [exploring relationship between forcing Chiang to resist 
Japanese and cooperating Chiang to resist Japanese]. Nandu Xuetan. 4, pp.58-62. 
Zhang, Yingjin. 张应进 . 2020. Ma lai xi ya zhaiwu wenti zhengzhi hua: zhaiwu 
xianjing lun tuxian de gengyuan 马来西亚债务问题政治化：债务陷阱论凸显的根源 
[The politicalization of Malaysia’s debt issue: the root cause of the debt trap 




Zhang,Jiakang张家康. 2013. Cong fanjiang kangri dao Lianjiang kangri 从反蒋抗日
到联蒋抗日 [from resisting Chiang and Japanese to cooperating Chiang to resist 
Japanese]. Dangshi Zongheng. 11, pp.31-34. 
Zhao, Dingxin. 2009. The mandate of heaven and performance legitimation in 
historical and contemporary China. American Behavioral Scientist. 53(3), pp.416-433. 
Zhao, Guojun.赵国军. 2013. Lun nanhai wenti dongmenghua de fazhan dongmeng 
zhengce yanbian yu zhongguo yingdui论南海问题东盟化的发展：东盟政策演变与中
国应对  [ASEANization of South China Sea disputes: ASEAN’s policy shift and 
China’s response]. Guoji Zhanwang. 2, pp.84-153.  
Zhao, Suisheng. 2013. Foreign policy implications of Chinese nationalism revisited: 
the strident turn. Journal of Contemporary China. 22(82), pp.535-553.  
Zhao, Suisheng. 2018. China and the South China Sea arbitration: geopolitics versus 
international law. Journal of Contemporary China. 27(109), pp.1-15. 
Zhao, Suisheng.1998. A state-led nationalism: the patriotic education campaign in 
post-Tiananmen China. Communist and post-Communist studies. 31(3), pp.287-
302.  
Zhao, Weihua. 赵卫华. 2020. Yuenan zai nanhai de xindongxiang yu zhongyue 
guanxi zoushi 越南在南海的新动向与中越关系走势 [Vietnam’s new action in South 
China Sea: motivations, goals and trends].Bianjie yu Haiyang Yanjiu [Journal of 
Boundary and Ocean Studies].5(1), pp.99-110. 
Zheng, Yongnian. 郑永年. 2012. Shibada yu zhongguo de gaige wenti. 十八大与中
国的改革问题 [The 19th national congress and issues concerning reform]. Qiushi. 
[online]. 24 August. [Accessed 25 May 2020]. Available from: 
http://www.qstheory.cn/jj/tslj/201208/t20120824_177566.htm  
Zheng, Yongnian., and Weng, Cuifen. 2017. The development of China’s formal 
political structure. In: Ross, R., and Bekkevold, J.I. eds. China in the era of Xi Jinping: 
domestic and foreign policy challenges. Washington, DC: Georgetown University 
Press, pp.32-66. 
Zhou, Deyong 周德勇. 2015. Kangri zhanzheng shiqi renmin jundui zhidu jianshe de 




Army’s organizational development and implication in the anti-Japanese war period]. 
In: Zhonggong Zhongyang Dangshi Yanjiushi 中共中央党史研究  [Party history 
Research of Chinese Communist Party]., Zhongguo Shehui Kexueyuan 中国社会科
学院[Chinese Social Science Academy]., and Zhongguo Renming Jiefangjun Junshi 
Kexueyuan 中国人民解放军军史科学院[School of Chinese People’s Liberation Army 
history], eds. Jinian Zhongguo Renming Kangri Zhanzheng Ji Shijie Renming Fan 
Faxisi Zhanzheng Shengli 70 Zhounian Xueshu Yantao Hui Wenji 纪念中国人民抗
日战争暨世界人民反法西斯战争胜利 70 周年学术研讨会文集 [volume of seminar 
concerning memorizing the 70th anniversary of Chinese anti-Japanese war and world 
anti-Fascist war victories]. Beijing: Zhonggong Dangshi Chubanshe. pp.440-454. 
Zhou, Jianren. 2019. Power transition and paradigm Shift in diplomacy: why China 
and the US march towards strategic competition? Chinese Journal of International 
Politics. 12(1), pp.1-34. 
Zhou, W., and Esteban, M. 2018. Beyond Balancing: China’s approach towards the 
Belt and Road Initiative. Journal of Contemporary China, 27(112), pp.487–501.  
Zhou, Xueguang. 周雪光. 2011. Quanwei tizhi yu youxiao zhili: dangdai zhongguo 
guojia zhili de zhidu luoji 权威体制与有效治理：当代中国国家治理的制度逻辑. 
[authoritarian institution and effective management: the logic of the contemporary 
China’s national management]. Kaifang Shidai. 10, pp.67-85. 
 
